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
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THE BAPTIST REVIEW.

ARTICLE I.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF INFINITES.

BY ALVAH HOVEY, D. D., LL. D.

THE question which we propose to discuss has been often asked by thoughtful men, and there is reason to suppose that many are considering it at the present time. It would, indeed, be surprising if Christians, who believe in the existence of an infinite God, did not give it their serious attention. And it would be no less surprising if mental philosophers, who are seeking to ascertain the extent of knowledge possible to man, did not examine it with the utmost care. The same may also be said of many persons whose minds have been perplexed by the contradictory views of able writers on this theme. To these may be added numerous devotees of physical science, who might have been expected to feel but little interest in that which lies beyond the range of observation, but who have given much thought to this question, and are themselves ready enough to discuss it.

If now it be asked: Why are men who have been trained to physical research, who have applied their minds for years to objects of sense, and who, perhaps, discard religious obligation, restlessly intent on discovering whether there is, or is not, something back of these objects, and dimly revealed by them? why do they not rest content with a knowledge of that which is phenomenal, dependent, and finite, instead of seeking to peer into the dark beyond and discover, if

possible, some traces of the infinite? we can respond only, that their restless search must spring from the depths of their cognitive and religious nature, from the very constitution of their souls. Now, while it has been argued by able metaphysicians that our knowledge is restricted to finite objects, others no less able have maintained that it embraces, in a partial way, infinite objects. And the arguments for the one opinion often seem to be so nearly balanced by those for the other, that the inquirer after truth feels himself called upon to examine the whole question afresh. In this state of the case, we can not think it will be labor wasted to go over some part of the ground once more, and assign our reasons for holding that *we have a partial knowledge of infinite objects.*

By the word "objects" must be understood objects of thought, whether these be substantial entities, possessing force, or unsubstantial forms, conditions, or relations of being. According to this use of the word, time and space, arithmetical and geometrical truths, together with the first principles of morality, and perhaps of knowledge in general, are objects of thought or cognition—as truly so as are the stars of heaven or the particles of sand on the sea-shore. We insist on this comprehensive meaning of the word, both because it is philosophically correct, and because it brings into our subject important materials needed for illustration and proof. It is philosophically correct; for there is in reality no better reason for denying that space and time are objects of thought, than there is for denying that matter and force are such objects. The action of the mind in cognizing the former is as natural and necessary as its action in cognizing the latter, and there is no process of criticism tending to prove its action deceptive in the former case which can not be matched by a similar process tending to prove it deceptive in the latter. In his work on "Modern Philosophy," Professor Bowen borrows from Schopenhauer a tabular statement of twenty-eight truths concerning time, and twenty-eight concerning space, which are "necessary and

universal, since it is impossible to doubt any one of them, or to derive it from mere experience." Can we know and describe twenty-eight properties of that which is not an object of thought? Moreover, this interpretation of the word "objects" brings into our theme important materials for proof and illustration. For should it appear that our knowledge of such infinities as time and space is trustworthy, it will certainly follow that we need not and must not distrust our knowledge of God simply because he is infinite. There may be other grounds for calling in question our knowledge of him, but not the mere fact of his being infinite. But if, on the other hand, it should appear that our supposed knowledge of time and space is illusory, there will be greater reason than might otherwise appear for distrusting the knowledge which we seem to have of a Supreme Being.

The word "infinite" is not used by us in a pantheistic sense. That sense is, indeed, perfectly intelligible; but, as Dean Mansel has shown, the term can not be applied to God in that sense without leading to numberless difficulties and contradictions. Yet he insists upon that as the only true meaning of the word, asserting that "the metaphysical representation of the Deity, as the absolute and infinite, must necessarily . . . amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality." Nay, he takes another step, and affirms, "That which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible, modes of being. For if any actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode, and limited by it; and if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation." That is to say, the absolute and infinite must include in itself personal and impersonal, holy and sinful, uncreated and created, independent and dependent, modes of being: it must be a synthesis of all contradictories; it must be "the one and the all." Such a statement proves that a pantheistic interpretation is not given, and must not be given, to the terms "absolute" and

“infinite,” when they are applied to God; but it does not prove that this is the only proper use of these terms, or that they may not be applied to God in another and proper sense. Indeed, Mr. Mansel has defined the word absolute in a very satisfactory manner. “By the *Absolute* is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no *necessary* relation to any other being.” This definition allows us to suppose that an absolute Being may freely originate and uphold other beings, while it forbids us to suppose that his own existence or action is dependent on them. Less satisfactory is his definition of the infinite. “By the *Infinite* is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable.” Here are two definitions; and if by the former he means that, in order to be infinite, a being must be free from all possible limitation, apart from his own free action, or the product of that action, we accept it as correct. But if he means that, in order to be infinite, a being must have no power or will to originate other beings and stand in voluntary relation to them, we must reject the definition as pantheistic, and inapplicable to the living God. So, too, if he means by the expression, “that than which a greater is inconceivable,” a being so great that no conceivable addition can be made to his nature without marring its perfection and destroying its self-consistency, we accept the definition as correct. Thus understood, the nature of God is infinite, because he has power so great that no increase of it is conceivable, knowledge so great that no increase of it is conceivable, and goodness so great that no increase of it is conceivable. Yet dependent and sinful modes of existence are not included in his being. In a word, our use of the term infinite justifies us in speaking of time as infinite; of space, as infinite; of knowledge, as infinite; of power, as infinite; and of a being whose nature is the greatest and best conceivable, as infinite.

Of the word “knowledge,” which occurs in our theme, it may seem wholly unnecessary to offer any explanation. Yet there is reason to suppose that the principal difficulty

may lurk in this very term. There is reason to believe that the view which one takes of the nature and origin of human knowledge in general will determine the view which he takes of our alleged knowledge of infinities. For if a consistent thinker believes that all knowledge originates in sensation, he will be certain to deny that man has any true knowledge of infinite objects. But if such a thinker holds that his own spiritual nature, as well as the world of sense, is a source of knowledge to him; if he holds that the human mind can see universal and necessary truths by occasion of contact with objects of sense, his conclusion may be just the reverse. We adopt the latter view as the only one that is sufficient to account for the facts of consciousness. For it is evident that the necessity of some cause for every change; of space as a condition of extended being; of time as presupposed by recollection; and the certainty that, in every possible instance, a whole is equal to the sum of all its parts, that two parallel lines can never meet or inclose a portion of space, and that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line connecting them—it is evident that these, and many other truths, are contributions which the mind itself makes to its own knowledge. By occasion of the actual, it perceives the necessary; from a single instance it divines and sees a universal law. And it knows this law with a certainty of conviction which does not admit of any doubt. It may criticize its own action, and fail to discover the bridge by which it has passed the chasm that separates the actual from the necessary, the particular from the universal; but it can not fail to see that the passage has been made, so that it is now face to face with immutable principles and the nature of things, if not with God himself.

Lastly, we have characterized our knowledge of infinities as “partial.” This was necessary, because it is a self-evident truth that the knowledge of any being must be limited by his power to know, that as the human mind is finite its powers of cognition must be finite, and that with such cognitive powers its knowledge of infinite objects must be

extremely imperfect. But, if this be admitted, will it not follow that his knowledge of infinities is worthless? If the disparity between the finite and the infinite is inconceivably great, can it be made probable that limited knowledge of an unlimited object is worthy of the least confidence? In answer to this question, we remark: 1. That human knowledge of any object, whether finite or infinite, is imperfect. This statement will not be called in question. The mind of man never comprehends all the causes, properties, relations, and history of the simplest object in nature. The known everywhere leads back and forward to the unknown. Human science is throughout fragmentary. There is no department or branch of it which is perfectly understood by the greatest proficient. But is it certain that we know nothing about an object because we do not know every thing about it? that we do not know that it exists, and has certain powers and relations, because we are ignorant of certain other properties which it may possess? Is omniscience the only knowledge worthy of the name? the only knowledge that will direct one in the path of duty? No rational man will affirm this. Nor will any one who has reflected much upon the problems of life undertake to state what ratio the known properties of an object must bear to its unknown properties, in order that knowledge may be useful. Hence, it is futile for any one to insist on the view that, in order to have any proper knowledge of infinities, one must be infinite himself. We remark, 2. That imperfect knowledge of an infinite object may be just as valid as imperfect knowledge of a finite object. Of this there can be no doubt, if the judgment of the mind as to the character of its own action is accepted. For the mind perceives with perfect clearness certain properties of certain infinities. Take, for instance, time and space. The properties which it ascribes to these it can not separate from its notion of them. These properties are affirmed with the same assurance as the axiom that the whole of any thing is equal to the sum of all its parts. And the only judge of truth is mind; the only standard of

evidence, of credibility, of certainty, of necessity, is reason. That which is accepted with the greatest confidence by the mind, acting normally, is worthy of being thus accepted. Otherwise knowledge is an illusion and reasoning vain. Hence, the most certain truths are those which it is impossible for any sane mind to perceive and also reject. And some of these truths are embraced in our knowledge of infinities. We may select as one the fact that duration or time is infinite. For there is no clearer intuition or judgment of the human mind than this, that for every thing there must be a sufficient reason. Acute thinkers who deny this in respect to events in the world of sense, and affirm that a cause is merely a regular antecedent, having nothing to do in producing the so-called effect, are constrained, in spite of their theory, to admit the principle of a sufficient reason as valid in the realm of mind. For they attempt to *account for*—that is, to *assign a reason or cause for*—the notion of causality by appealing to the influence of an orderly repetition of given events upon the mind. By this appeal they bear witness to a great law of their mental being—a law which they assume to be valid for all other minds—a law which they implicitly honor by every appeal to the reason of their fellow-men—a law which they instinctively apply to the operations of nature, and which they find to be a key to the changes in nature. According to this law of reason every man assumes the existence of something from eternity. Whether that something be many or one, mutable or immutable, matter or mind, the fact that something now is makes it certain that something has always been. But, if something has always been, duration in the past has no beginning. And, if being or force, as scientific writers affirm, is imperishable, duration hereafter will have no end. Moreover, as the present moment does not really interrupt the continuity of existence, but the past flows without break into the future, men of science and philosophers of the positive school are brought face to face with being that is unlimited in duration, past or future. In other words, an

object which is in one respect infinite is before them and is recognized by them. No sane skepticism can deny this. Thus, the man who rejects the principle of causality makes haste to accept it; the man who pronounces our knowledge of infinities illusory perceives and asserts that some kind of being is infinite in duration. We hold, therefore, that our cognition of infinities, though imperfect, is no less trustworthy than our cognition of finities; and we hold this, because the mind itself, which is the only measure of truth or certainty, requires us to do so. We now add, 3. That imperfect knowledge of an infinite object may include in itself the fact that the object is in reality infinite. And we call attention to this point, lest it should be supposed that a limited mind may be able to lay hold, as it were, of an infinite object without being able to know that it is infinite—just as one can be in the atmosphere of our earth, and inhale it continually, without knowing its extent. To show that our knowledge, though imperfect, may embrace the fact that an object is itself infinite, we turn to one of the instances already mentioned. If any thing is certain to a reflecting mind, it is this, that space is infinite. All limits of space must be *in* it, not around it. These limits may mark it off into inseparable parts, but they can not circumscribe it as a whole. If the mind tries to fix a real boundary to it in any direction it soon perceives that space reaches beyond that boundary, indeed, beyond all boundaries, and is, by its very nature, illimitable. Our knowledge of the infinitude of space rests, therefore, on the same foundation as our knowledge of space itself. If the latter is certain, so is the former. If things material, having length, breadth, and thickness are known to exist, they are known to exist in space; and if they are known to exist in space, space is known to be an objective reality; and if space is known to be an objective reality and not a mere illusion of the mind, it is known by the same power which knows it at all to be illimitable or infinite. Nay, more; the mind of man clearly perceives that empty space is indestructible.

As mere room for substantive being, and as having no life or power in itself, it can never be annihilated or changed.

It appears, therefore, that even finite knowledge of an object may include the fact that the object is infinite. And it is proper to remark that our knowledge of this fact is not, as Sir Wm. Hamilton supposed, a fruit of mental imbecility. It originates in power, not in weakness, in ability to see that the nature of an object forbids limitation, and not in the circumstance that our vision is too narrow to see the limits. This is admitted by Herbert Spencer. "Our notion of the limited is composed, firstly, of a consciousness of some kind of being, and secondly, of a consciousness of the limits under which it is known. In the antithetical notion of the unlimited the consciousness of limits is abolished, but not the consciousness of some kind of being." "There is something which alike forms the raw material of definite thought and remains after the definiteness which thinking gave to it is destroyed." And in another place, he says: "In the same manner that, on conceiving any bounded space, there arises a nascent consciousness of space outside the bounds; so, when we think of any definite cause, there arises the nascent consciousness of a cause behind it; and in the one case as in the other this nascent consciousness is in substance like that which suggested it, though without form." But this statement, though it is an improvement on the doctrine of Hamilton, can not be accepted as an exact account of the mental action of which we are conscious in the case supposed. It would have been more correct to say that, together with a conception of bounded space, and by occasion of that conception, there arises in the mind a perception of space outside the bounds. And, in so far as the raw material of thought is concerned, the latter is just as clear, valid, and indubitable as the former. The mind sees that there must be space outside the bounds as distinctly as it sees that there must be space within. It also perceives that, by virtue of its nature, space is unlimited, infinite; that limits do not, in reality, separate one part

of space from another, except by means of space; and hence that all spaces unite, and are of necessity one infinite space.

Yet the words of Spencer may perhaps be justified, if by consciousness of space he means a sort of mental picture, like that of a landscape which one sees before him. With this definition of consciousness, it may be represented in the case supposed as "nascent." But with this definition, our consciousness of *bounded* space may also in many cases be described as nascent. For the extent of space which the mind can image to itself at any moment is very small. The surface of any considerable lake would be far too great for the mind to grasp in this way. But it is doubtful whether such a consciousness of space is well described as "nascent,"—whether the mind does not rather, in the process of imaging, pass from limited space to limited space, forming a succession of mental pictures which it is unable to unite in one, though it clearly perceives that they must be in reality one. It is also doubtful whether we can form any mental picture of space itself, in distinction from objects in space or from limits to parts of space.

But it is more important to observe that a mental picture is by no means essential to knowledge. In other words, knowledge is not limited to objects of which we can form a mental picture. We can know with all possible certainty what thought, feeling, or willing, is, without being able to form a mental picture of any one of these states of consciousness. We can know the properties belonging to every perfect circle, without being able to form a mental image of every such circle. We can know that every whole is equal to the sum of all its parts, without being able to form a mental image of every whole or of all the parts in any one whole. We can know that some kind of being or force has existed eternally, without having any mental image of being, of force, or of eternity. It is true that we can form a sort of picture in our minds of many

things that have shape and limits; but of realities, like force, volition, truth, and virtue, we can have no mental image; and all reasoning which is founded on the assumption that consciousness implies an image of its object before the mind's eye is futile. By occasion of its own volition, producing change, the mind perceives that every change must have a cause. By seeing an object in space, it discovers space itself, and perceives that by its very nature space is infinite. Thus of the knowledge which it gains by normal action a large part arises from itself, from the light of its own rational nature; and this part of its knowledge is inseparable from the rest. If this be unworthy of confidence, all the rest must be so likewise.

We do not forget that this doctrine has been denied by Kant. But his assumption that the mind's judgment in regard to time and space is valid only for itself, but untrue in the objective world, seems to us wholly groundless. All that can be urged in its favor may be summed up, if we mistake not, in the following remarks: *a.* The nature of the human mind may be regarded as a sufficient cause for its judgment concerning time and space; and it is unphilosophical to multiply causes needlessly. But in reply to this, we ask if it is rational to regard the uniform and necessary action of the human mind as a sufficient cause for error, for untruth? Yet this is an assumption involved in Kant's doctrine, and this assumption strikes a fatal blow at the mind as a cognitive power. *b.* The perfect uniformity and necessity of the mind's judgment respecting time and space refer us to the nature of the mind as the only source of it. Why so? If time and space are real in nature, why should they not be always the same? And if they are always the same, why should they not be always apprehended as the same, even as the sum of two and two is always perceived to be four, or as the shortest distance between two points is perceived to be a straight line connecting them? Is there nothing real in the universe which is as immutable as the action of the human mind? *c.* Infinites can not, as infinite,

act upon a finite mind, and therefore can not give it any evidence of their reality. But may not an infinite object act somewhere upon a finite object or mind as truly as the ether, which is practically infinite to the human eye, can act on the retina of that eye? And may not the *nature* of an infinite object be so far revealed to a finite mind that the latter will perceive the former to be necessarily infinite? These questions ought, we think, to be answered in the affirmative, in view of what has been said of time and space. *d.* If time and space are in reality objective to the human mind they can never be known to be so, because their nature is such as to make no impression on the mind from without. In reply to this, we freely admit that the mind does not know time and space as active forces, like the will; but we assert that it does cognize them distinctly as passive limits and conditions of being—as limits from which no finite being can escape, and as conditions independent of which no finite being can exist. And there is no way of proving its action in this case deceptive. For that action is both natural and necessary. By distrusting it, therefore, the mind distrusts its own cognitive nature, and plunges into chaos and mental despair. We can not, then, err in saying that the skepticism which rejects this action of the mind is absolutely unfounded. Professor Bowen characterizes it as “the most comprehensive and thorough-going system of skepticism that the wit of man has ever devised,” and declares that, “without space, there is no co-existence, but the universe is contracted to a mathematical point, which is nowhere, and therefore has no relation to any thing beyond itself; without time, there is no successive existence, but the past and future shrink into the indivisible moment which alone is present; and even this disappears as soon as it begins to be.” We adopt this criticism as just, and believe that, while men reason at all, they must hold time and space to be real conditions of finite existence as well as of human knowledge. For we know them to be objective and actual conditions of being

in the same way and with the same certainty as we know that a whole is equal to the sum of its parts.

To recapitulate, we have tried to show: 1. That the mere infinity of an object does not wholly withdraw it from our knowledge. The ether may be known equally well as a medium of sight, whether it be diffused through all space or be confined to certain parts of space. Its extension need not be supposed to affect its qualities as a medium of sight. The latter may be known, at least to some extent, though we are consciously ignorant of the former. 2. That our partial knowledge of infinities is trustworthy, when treated as partial; but if treated as complete it is liable to mislead. The latter statement scarcely needs illustration; for it may be taken for granted that, as a rule, misconception will lead to misconception, a wrong conclusion will follow wrong premises. Yet if the premises are rightly conceived, in so far as nature or tendency is concerned, though imperfectly apprehended in so far as force is concerned, the inference may be right as to character, though not as to amount. Benevolence will tend to what is good rather than to what is bad; righteousness, to what is right rather than to what is wrong. 3. That the infinity of an object may be known as a fact, though the mind can not represent it to itself by any sort of picture. It is discovered by reason, not by imagination. We can perceive *that* an object is infinite, or why it must be so, though we can not *comprehend* the object itself. There is surely nothing absurd in this; for the same is true of a thousand objects not strictly infinite, *e. g.*, the ocean, the sun, the solar system, the milky way. Our knowledge of these is confessedly imperfect, yet, within certain limits, real and useful: we do not *comprehend* the magnitude of any one of them, yet we do know something about every one of them. The same is true of infinities.

Two questions remain unanswered, namely: Is there a Supreme Being, or Mind? And, if so, is that Being, or Mind, infinite? Our answer to the first of these questions

must be summary; for it is only intended to prepare the way for an answer to the second. We have already called attention to the fact that philosophical thinkers are constrained, at the sacrifice of consistency in many instances, to seek a sufficient reason for every being and event. Moreover, it is now generally admitted that the known phenomena of existence and change must be accounted for in one of two ways; either by tracing them back to the action of self-existent, but blind, forces in nature, or by tracing them back to the action of a self-existent and supreme Mind. The latter alternative is far more reasonable than the former. For it affords, as the former does not, an adequate explanation (1) of order and beauty in the material universe, even where these are of no conceivable advantage to the objects distinguished by them; (2) of life in manifold gradation and endless variety, adapted always to its habitat, and sometimes adorned with a beauty of form and color which is useless to the animal possessing it; (3) of reason and conscience, which reveal to man universal principles, laws, and duties, and connect his spiritual life, even here, with that which is unseen and eternal; (4) of that mysterious tendency to worship, which makes the privilege of personal communion with God indispensable to the highest satisfaction of man; and (5) of the historic phenomena of the Christian religion, including the person, the miracles, and the resurrection of its Founder, together with the effect of his mission on the world. None of these things are satisfactorily accounted for by attributing their existence to the action of blind forces, working out unintended results. Hence, there must be a supreme Mind, an intelligent Author and Director of things; for such a Being is the only sufficient reason for what we see and know.

But is this Being infinite? We admit that an infinite cause can not be presumed necessary to account for a finite effect; and we also admit that the created universe is finite. If, then, we limit our observation to the bare fact of a finite created universe, we can not logically infer from it the exist-

ence of an infinite Maker. We can only infer the existence of a Being whose wisdom and power are sufficient to originate such a universe as we actually know. Whether he has any unrepresented wisdom, or reserved power, must be a matter of simple conjecture. But our observation should not be confined to the mere fact of a finite creation. The qualities, the duties, the needs, the aspirations, and the probable destiny of the beings included in that creation, must also be considered. And it is quite possible that some of these will require for their explanation the existence of an infinite Being. Take, for instance, the religious nature of man. By virtue of a constitutional tendency, man is disposed to worship. The life to which he is moved by the deepest instincts of his spirit, and against many of his appetites, is a religious life, in which he renders true homage and service to a supreme Being. If this be not so, the lessons of history and of experience are worthless. The later years of Auguste Comte bore witness to the indestructible power of the religious instinct in his nature, and the serious tone of Herbert Spencer, in certain passages which refer to the Absolutely Inscrutable Cause of all phenomena, reveals the same instinct in his soul. We are, therefore, entitled to say that man was made for a religious life. By whatever process he was brought into being, it was the intention of his Creator that he should worship and adore.

But what sort of a being was he made to worship? A superficial glance at history may seem to justify us in answering: Almost any being, rational or irrational, noble or mean, will satisfy the nature of man when it is seeking an object of worship. But further examination will show that this answer is not correct. History proves, indeed, that men may be so ignorant and low as to worship, or seem to worship, almost any object visible in heaven or on earth. But this historical phenomenon gives rise to several questions: *e. g.*, Can we say that even the most ignorant and debased of our kind really worship the objects which they seem to worship? If they do, can we say that this worship satisfies

the cravings of their religious nature? And if it does, can we say that it would satisfy that nature when properly enlightened and developed? No one of these questions can be safely answered in the affirmative. For it will be found, upon careful inquiry, that the homage which is ostensibly paid, by ignorant men, to any common object, whether living or lifeless, is really paid to some mysterious power or destiny which is associated in their imagination with that object. We seriously doubt whether the human soul can render any homage which deserves to be called religious to a natural object that is conceived as simply natural. Again, whatever may be the real object of worship in the case of idolaters, we are by no means certain that this worship ever satisfies, properly speaking, the religious cravings of their nature. Doubtless it satisfies them in part; and the nobler the object of worship, as apprehended by the worshiper, the more satisfying will the service be; but perfect trust, holy love, and unqualified obedience can not have an imperfect being for their object. In so far as any one perceives and believes that there are imperfections in his god will his religious nature be unsatisfied.

But we can not confine our attention to the ignorant and debased, for they are not the only men who have a religious nature. Give them the benefit of knowledge, discipline, science, philosophy, and the instinct of worship still survives. It is constitutional, and remains in full force through all the changes of human society. But what sort of being can the truly enlightened worship? What kind of nature must be possessed by him whom the wisest and the best of mankind can forever adore? It may be answered without hesitation that it is not enough for him to be free from moral defect and distinguished for great wisdom and power. Such a being, whom Matthew Arnold might properly call a magnified, non-natural man, would command a certain degree of respect, and perhaps of admiration, but he would fall far short, as an object of worship, of meeting the wants of the soul. If we appeal to the judgment of

Christian scholars on this point, we shall find them virtually unanimous in declaring that he who is God must be infinite in every natural and moral perfection. Unappalled by the mystery which is thus ascribed to his being, and untroubled by the many passages of Scripture which speak of him as if he were finite and subject to the laws of time and space, they accept as literally true the highest statements concerning his nature, and look upon the anthropomorphic language of the Bible as a condescension to our weakness. And we are constrained to regard this unity of judgment as a proof that our religious nature was made for the worship of an infinite Being.

For the scholars referred to are keen sighted and independent, differing from one another on many points both philosophical and religious. This agreement can not, therefore, be pronounced merely accidental or traditional. It must spring from some very convincing evidence addressed to the soul from without, or from something in the deeper nature of the soul itself. But for any such evidence of the infinitude of God we seem to look in vain to the physical universe. That universe, as presented to the mind of man, is certainly finite, and can not be said to make known of itself any thing infinite. We therefore turn to the soul for an explanation of the agreement noted. Nor do we turn in vain. For we find that the soul, starting with the finite, discovers the infinite; we find that the soul, starting with temporal being, perceives the certainty of eternal being; we find that the soul, starting with a consciousness of moral and religious duty, divines the existence of a being whose power, knowledge, and goodness are infinite. To such a being no soul can refuse homage on grounds of reason; or, in other words, the soul which is made for worship is made for the worship of an infinite God. But to any being less than infinite—to any being whose excellence in this respect or in that could be fully compassed in however long a time by a finite mind—many a soul would be unable to pay such homage as it is made to pay.

From this but one inference can be justly drawn, viz.: that God is an infinite being. The alternative inference, that, being finite, he has given to man a religious nature which can never be fully satisfied, is unreasonable. A finite being may, indeed, be supposed to have made mistakes, and possibly grave mistakes, in so delicate and difficult a matter as that of creating souls. But it is to be observed, *first*, that there is no solid ground on which to base the assumption that God is a finite being—certainly no ground in the religious nature of man; and *secondly*, that there is a vast amount of evidence going to show that God has made no such mistakes in the lower orders of animal life as this view supposes him to have made in the case of man. For in these lower orders of life constitutional wants are met by corresponding provisions. And the same is true of man if we look away from his religious capacity. Consider, then, what it is to assume that God is finite. It is to assume, 1. That something is true which neither intuition nor observation, nor evidence of any kind, affirms; 2. That he who made the worlds has blundered in making man, by giving him a religious nature which yearns for an infinite God, while his Creator is finite, and 3. That man's highest aspirations can never be fulfilled, however pure and faithful he may be. Nay, his progress in knowledge and virtue is almost certain to be a progress in religious dissatisfaction. In view of these considerations, we do not hesitate to infer the infinitude of God from the religious nature of man.

ARTICLE II.

MISSIONARY CAREER OF JESUS CHRIST.

BY E. T. WINKLER, D. D.

THERE are two ideal personages whom the genius of many nations has honored in immemorial legend and song—the young hero who perishes in his prime and the traveler who moves amid various scenes of adventure and peril. Now it is Achilles, and now the restless Ulysses, whom the bard of old celebrates with sounding lyre. In our Lord's history the two characters unite in one. Jesus is the captain of our salvation, contending with the powers of earth and hell; and he is an indefatigable wanderer from city to city and province to province. All Palestine is sacred now and forever, because it is the land

“Over whose acres walked those blessed feet
That, eighteen hundred years ago, were nailed,
For our advantage, to the bitter cross.”

A careful examination of the evangelical narratives must be made before we can appreciate the amount of missionary work performed by Jesus. It is interesting to observe how soon he became a traveler—first at the time of the presentation of the first-born, when he was carried in his mother's arms from Bethlehem to Jerusalem and back, then in the long and rapid flight to Egypt. On their return from the land of bondage to Nazareth, an event important enough to be celebrated by prophecy, the holy family, avoiding Jerusalem, pursued the coast route, and crossed the lower heights of Carmel into the great plain beyond, thus tracing nearly the whole length of the land of Palestine. At twelve years of age he traveled from Nazareth to Jerusalem and back, doubtless following the road which extended from the Jewish capital to Jericho, thence skirting the Jordan, and finally

turning westward into the plain of Jezreel. Nothing more is told us by the Evangelists of the movements of Jesus until we reach the period of his manhood. Then his travels were dictated by a great purpose, and became a part of his plan of life. Knowing that the time was short, and resolved to improve every occasion for the accomplishment¹ of his mission, he went forth to herald the kingdom of God. Toward the close of his ministry he said, when about to perform one of his greatest miracles of healing, John ix, 4: "I must work the works of him that sent me while it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work. As long as I am in the world I am the light of the world." Such was the elevated sentiment by which his whole life was inspired and controlled,—an overmastering, unremitting sense of duty, and a tireless humanity drove him on.

In considering the missionary work of our Lord, it is aside from our purpose to discuss questions of chronology. Were it not, we should unhesitatingly take the position that the references to time and place made by the evangelists are, for the most part, too vague and too perplexed by the uncertainties of the contemporaneous history to furnish materials for a harmony of the Gospels which would secure the general acceptance of Christian scholars. There seems to be a divine wisdom in this vagueness, which protects the integrity of each separate Gospel. The chronological data relating to our Lord's public ministry are sufficiently distinct. His baptism occurred when he was about thirty years of age (Luke iii, 23), in the forty-sixth year of the temple restoration, and in the season of the year which preceded the Passover. These dates indicate the Roman year 780 and the Christian year 27 as the period when the missionary work of Jesus began. As to the duration of this ministry, it was from Passover to Passover (John ii, 13; John xii, xiii). Between these two feasts occurred a Passover which Jesus did not attend (John vi, 4). These three Passovers certainly embrace two years. But there is another feast mentioned in John v, 1, which Jesus attended. If this

were also a Passover, the record shows that our Lord's ministry embraced at least four Passovers, and therefore about three years. We are satisfied that this is the fact, although Lücke, after a diligent investigation of the subject, declares it to be impossible to determine whether John here refers to the Purim or the Passover; and, among others, Meyer and Godet contend for Purim. For, 1. The feast is mentioned without any other designation than that it was "a feast of the Jews," by which we may suppose one of the three great feasts to be indicated. And if it were one of these, it unquestionably was the Passover. 2. John computes our Lord's ministry by Passovers. "The feast" of the previous chapter (iv, 45) is a Passover, and so is that of the chapter which follows (vi, 4), which is also designated like this, as "a feast of the Jews." When John mentions the other feasts, he names them (vii, 2; x, 22). 3. The order of intermediate events can not be compassed, unless a year extends from this point to the Passover of John vi, 4, as Hengstenberg and Thompson prove must be the case by an appeal to the synoptical Gospels. 4. The assertion of Meyer that John "lets his narrative present the most uninterrupted sequence" is incorrect. The phrase, *μετὰ ταῦτα* (after these things), indicates a break at the beginning of this chapter, and also at the beginning of the next, as Lücke shows. The precise reason why this phrase is "the more usual in John" (Meyer) is because John supplements the synoptic Gospels, and therefore does not pretend to pursue an "uninterrupted sequence" of narrative. From these considerations we conclude that our Lord's missionary work began in the year 27, when he was in the prime of his manhood, and continued about three years. We propose to exhibit the salient features and the spirit of this work.

After his baptism by John, Jesus, leaving the thronged banks of the Jordan, buried himself in solitary and inhospitable wilds,—perhaps, as tradition relates, in the gloomy desert of Quarantania, the Mountain of Temptation, whose bald summits and frightful crags overlook the fertile plain

of Jericho; more probably, upon the granite heights of Sinai, where Moses, the giver of the law, and Elijah, the reformer of Israel, passed through a similar ordeal. (Matt. iv, Mark i, Luke iv: compare Exod. xxiv, 18; 1 Kings, xix, 8.) The glory wrought out by such affliction was signified by the transfiguration of these three upon the Mount (Matt. xvii, 1-8).

Not long after the temptation Jesus proceeded to Jerusalem, where he attended the Passover and formally began his public ministry, gathering disciples in Judea and then in Samaria on the way of his return to the north. In the Autumn of the same year he undertook the missionary work in Galilee. From this period there are indications of not less than five missionary circuits performed by himself, independently of those to which he commissioned and sent his disciples. His missionary career, as traced, or rather illustrated, by the evangelists, is full of movement and adventure. Nowhere does he fix his steadfast abode, nowhere linger long—for the household to which he belongs is the whole family of man. No city, no province can confine his activity. From Gennesaret, whose fertile shores and prolific waters had attracted a dense population, he goes about all Galilee, teaching in the synagogues, where the people meet on the Sabbath to hear the Law and the Prophets read and explained, preaching the Gospel of the kingdom, and healing all manner of sickness and all manner of disease (Matt. iv, 23). Soon, from this commercial center, his fame overspreads the neighboring province of Syria. When the Gospel has been preached to the cities, he repairs to the villages to teach (Mark vi, 6). He bears the message of salvation to hamlets most remote, until he finds himself within the boundaries of Tyre and Sidon (Matt. xv, 21). He returns to traverse the city-beaconed Gennesaret in every direction, until all its rude fishers know him,—and its very storms and waves. He climbs the mountains and treads the wildernesses. He crosses the Jordan to and fro. Now he labors in the far north, in Cæsarea Philippi; now

in Jerusalem, the mart and sanctuary of the South, to which, indeed, he frequently resorts, as his mournful rebukes for slighted opportunities and his intimacies and friendships attest; now in the central province of Samaria; now beyond the river, amid the barbarous swine-keepers and demoniacs of the eastern highlands, or in the pillared streets of the Ten Cities, or beneath the sylvan shades of Bethabara, where John baptized. A whole year was devoted to his last missionary journey. From that first day, when Messiah stood apparent in Jordan, to the moment when he fell into the hands of his enemies, the career of our Lord was a long pilgrimage. Do those Christians who sneer at missions remember the history of him whose name they bear? of him whose restless wanderings have given to Carey and Judson and a thousand kindred souls their supreme inspiration?

Yet the picture of our Savior's life would not be complete did we not speak of the arduousness and painfulness of his missionary career. We have already referred to the fact that he sacrificed every worldly advantage and blessing to this object. He amassed no property. He allowed himself no domestic seclusion, no competency, no accommodation, no repose. His itineracy was a weary work. Of conveniences to relieve the long journey there were none; or, had there been any for others, there were none for him. He bore the manifold privations of poverty and the harsh judgments and unreasoning opposition which men are prompt to show to a lowly and beggared stranger. He had to rely upon the kindness of good people to receive him into their houses and give him food and shelter. He traveled—a dependent upon meagre charity—when the wealth of kingdoms and the glory thereof might have been marshaled in his train.

Here and there we have glimpses of this familiar experience of Jesus. On one of his journeys to Jerusalem he sent messengers to a Samaritan village at the foot of the hills of Manasseh to make ready for him. But the villagers of En Gannim (now Jenin) would not receive him, because his

face was as if he would go up to Jerusalem (Luke ix, 52). There was no refreshment for him in the "Fountain of Gardens." At Sychar he cast himself fainting upon the well-curb, and his prayer for water was answered with a taunt (John iv, 5). How suggestive the circumstance that, when he went up to the barren fig-tree, he "sought fruit thereon, because he hungered" (Matt. xxi, 18)! How painful and how general an experience of rejection is indicated in that remark, made as it was by the meekest of all sufferers: "The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head!"

Nor is this all; for often, when Jesus expected to rest, he must turn away from shelter, and flee for his life. At one time the mob at Nazareth, stung to madness by his faithful words, undertook to hurl him down the cliff which walls the hill-encircled village on the south-west. At another, the blood-streaming sword of Herod was lifted against him (Matt. xiv, 12); and when Jesus heard that John was killed, he departed into a desert place apart. At another, he was sentenced by the Sanhedrim, the High Court of his people. At the Passover the Chief Priests and the Pharisees took counsel to put him to death. Jesus, therefore, walked no more openly among the Jews; but went thence into a country near to the wilderness, into a city called Ephraim; and there continued with his disciples (John xi, 47-53). Henceforth he lived and labored with a price set upon his head. That touching description which the Apostle Paul gave of his own sufferings, in conveying the Gospel to the Gentiles, had already been realized in the experience of the greater teacher, while publishing the Gospel to the chosen people. Jesus also knew what it was to be "in journeyings often, in perils of waters, in perils of robbers, in perils by his own countrymen, in perils by the heathen; in perils in the city, in perils of the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils among false brethren; in weariness and painfulness, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst; in fastings often,

in cold and nakedness" (2 Cor. xi, 26). Oh, the painful, painful pilgrimage! Oh, the weary days and the watchful nights! Oh, the bruised feet, and the parched lip, and the beard frosted with the cold, and the brow breaking into the blood-sweat of the fever, and the eyes swimming with tears, and the wounded heart—signs manifold, and eloquent beyond all other expression, of the love of that Good Shepherd who came to seek and to save that which was lost! On the Domesday-book of the Martyrs the name of Jesus stands first of all (Matt. x, 24–27.)

Yet all hardships were borne by Jesus with patient resignation. For it was not his object to secure secular advantages or personal accommodations in his journeys. He went about to benefit the world by the doctrines he proclaimed, and the acts of mercy he performed. He blessed those who applied to him; but he did not wait for their applications. He went about seeking objects of pity—the ignorant, who needed to be taught; the sick, who needed to be healed; the lost, who needed to be saved. He went about to discharge the grand function of a Teacher, a Physician, a Redeemer. Such was the motive of his journeys: and for all the weariness, the privation and the danger attending his course, he gained a sweet reward, if but one soul was found whom he could enlighten, cleanse, and console (John iv, 28–32); if anywhere, in all the midnight of the world, appeared one single sign and starry promise of the time for which he prayed and labored then, and sits now on the heavenly throne—that gracious time

“When every evil thing,
From being and remembrance both, shall die,—
The world one solid temple of pure good!”

Fain would we emphasize our Lord's benignant purpose. As we have observed, the journeys he performed constitute a considerable and important part of his history. But Jesus was no fugitive Ulysses, wandering aimlessly over lands and seas. He pursued a career of beneficence. The idea of all he did, of all he taught, of all he suffered—the heading of

every separate chapter of his life—the sum of the whole Gospel narrative, the ground of all the faith and hope he inspires, the theme of the saints on earth, and the song of the angels in the heavens, is, “He went about doing good!”

How wide was the beneficence of Jesus! It had no limits. Like the sun, which refuses light and warmth to none of God's creatures, the Redeemer shed the radiance of his truth and the refreshment of his bounty upon all. His blessings were as impartial as the droppings of the clouds, as limitless as the flight of the winds. They were given without respect of persons—to the poor as freely as the rich, and (a thing that deserves special notice in these days of patronizing humanitarianism and condescending posture-making) to the rich as well as to the poor; to the wicked as generously as to the devout; to the lowly as cordially as to the honored. The scorner as well as the disciple was an object of pity and of help. His heart poured forth its treasures like a fountain. What need did he not supply! What prayer did he not answer! What benefit, sought at his hands, did he not joyfully bestow! His blessings were as boundless as his love. Each moment of his life was charged with kindness. Here he blessed men as their teacher, there he relieved them as a miracle-worker: here he was an admonisher; there, a consoler: here, a physician; there, a guardian: here, a prophet of the divine will; there, a giver of heavenly grace. And all this marvelous work of philanthropy was crowned by the grandest sacrifice—his vicarious death upon the cross. While his personal labors were, for the most part, confined to Palestine, the scope of Christ's work of mercy was as broad as the needs and the sorrows of men (John x, 16).

And Jesus was active in doing good. To bless the world was his daily and loved employ. To this commanding interest all the repose, all the conveniences, all the pleasures of life were cheerfully surrendered. It was not by accident that he helped others, or in extreme cases only; he made beneficence the business of his life. He acted considerately.

He decided how this or that deed of kindness might best be done. He sought every opportunity to do good to men. He did not wait to be addressed; but encountered the wants and woes of men with anticipating love, and extended to them a free and heart-subduing largess which they dared not solicit or expect. He had the pilgrim instinct impatient of repose, and the poet vision to which the robes of the flowers eclipsed the pomp of kings; but neither as pilgrim nor poet did he traverse "the goodly land," and visit the frequent shrines it reared to beauty, or valor, or devotion, so many of whose sites were visible from the hills familiar to his boyhood.* A higher purpose possessed him.

And how persevering was the Redeemer in doing good! The case of the healed lepers, of whom but one returned to thank him, indicates what had become his common and daily experience. The acorns dropped from the liberal oak; but how few looked upward to admire and bless the tree. If we did not know how men are wont to deal with Christ now, we would be astounded by the ingratitude then displayed toward him, not only by individuals, but by whole cities and provinces. The incident at Nazareth, already alluded to, may be recalled in this connection. In that village he had been brought up. Above all other communities, the Nazarenes knew that spotless life, one moment of which, fixed by the magical hand of Genius upon the canvas, has immortalized the author of "The Shadow of the Cross." But when, as his custom was, Jesus went into the synagogue on the Sabbath day, and stood up to read, so far were they from welcoming the salutary words he uttered and reverencing the more eloquent appeal of his example, that all they in the synagogue were filled with wrath, and rose up, and thrust him out of the city, and led him to the brow of a hill whereon their city was built, that they might cast him down headlong (Luke iv, 16).†

. * Abbott's "Life of Jesus," p. 76.

† The relation of this cliff to the town shows the stern vindictiveness of their murderous intent. Although a part of the hill on which Nazareth is built, the "brow" is not below the town, but above it. An abrupt face

Nevertheless, so soon as time had cooled their rage, the outraged Teacher returned, to make one more effort for their salvation; for to him it was not hard to pity and forgive those whose passion and prejudice revealed their spiritual degradation and misery. But now he found their hatred hardened and polished into irony; the rude metal that once glowed in the furnace was now tempered into impenetrable steel. When the Sabbath day was come, he began to teach in the synagogue, and many hearing him were astonished, saying: "From whence hath this man these things, and what wisdom is this which is given unto him, that even such mighty works are wrought by his hands? Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James and Joses and Jude and Simon? And are not his sisters here with us? And they were offended at him. . . . And he marvelled because of their unbelief" (Mark vi, 2-6). Thus, again and again, "he came unto his own, and his own received him not." All around, the beautiful valley spread its vineyards, corn-fields, and gardens; and the air was fragrant with fig and olive, orange and pomegranate; only human hearts, in that "realm of flowers,"* resented culture and denied their sweet fruits to the diligent hand.

So, also, it was in the other cities where Jesus labored. Among these Capernaum stands conspicuous. During three of the most important years of his life his home was in this city, when any home he had. Here, in a scene whose brilliant vegetation the cold pen of Josephus could describe only by hyperboles;† in the heart of the most populous district of Palestine; amid the stir of the communities that clustered around the cold blue lake of Gennesaret, of limestone rock, some forty feet in height, looks down upon Nazareth from the south-west corner. (Stanley, "Sinai and Palestine," p. 359.) And the people must leave the town, and climb around to the summit of this Tarpeian rock, dragging with them their victim, before they could effect their purpose. The intense yet deliberate rage exercised under such circumstances, and toward such a person, betray a spirit simply Satanic.

* Stanley, "Sinai and Palestine," 357, n.

† Bell. Jud., Lib. iii, c. 10, § 8.

he published the Gospel of the kingdom—here he interpreted the Sabbath readings of the synagogue; here he drew lessons of wisdom from secular employs,—that of the fisher casting his nets, of the sower going forth to sow, of the merchant seeking goodly pearls, of the householder, the ruler, the soldier, the woman, the child; here he wrought miracles of mercy; here he established missionary circuits, and hence he sent forth heralds of amnesty and pardon. With what result? The answer is given in his lament: “Thou, Capernaum, that wast exalted unto heaven, shalt be cast down to hell; for if the mighty works which were done in thee had been done in Sodom, it would have remained unto this day” (Matt. xi, 23).

The work seemed to be a failure, and the prospect became more and more gloomy. Still it was carried on. With a courage that rose as difficulties multiplied, with a cheerful trust that turned to new fields of missionary adventure when the old refused their increase, with a devotion that no peril or sacrifice could chill, our Lord continued to travel and teach and toil, as the benefactor of the race. For the sake of the guilty he even consented to be treated as a malefactor, to be scandalized, persecuted, condemned, and crucified. No reproach or injury, no unthankfulness or treachery could prevent him from going about doing good. He maintained his kindly conduct toward friends and enemies, even to the end of his earthly course.

In reviewing this wondrous career we are struck by the harmony subsisting between our Lord's acts and teachings (Luke i, 1). Nay, we might almost say that his acts were the most important part of his teachings. He wrote nothing, either in regard to his divine doctrines or his own peerless life, the most effective part of which, its closing scenes, could not, indeed, have been recorded by his hand. He was not like John, a voice crying in the wilderness; but rather an incarnate Gospel, an enduring, regenerating spirit, a life that must be repeated in every age and Church of Christendom. Christ wrote no other book. The repent-

ance he demanded was emphasized by his display, practically as well as orally, of the peculiar and spiritual character of the law of God (Matt. v, 17, 18). The faith he insisted upon (Mark i, 15) was encouraged more by his condescending friendship and humanity and vicarious sacrifice than by the pictures of the perfect eternal blessedness proposed to all who accepted the transforming and elevating doctrines of the Gospel. That perfect example of godliness and virtue, of love and meekness, of poverty and self-denial,—that example unique and unparalleled,—wins the deepest reverence and the most heart-felt love and trust of which our natures are capable. That moral and religious character, exercised in so many ministries of blessing, tested by such oppositions and hostilities, yet ever so calm, so bright, so loyal, is itself the surest proof of the genuineness of the Gospel history, is the firmest foundation of the Christian faith, and is the mightiest spiritual influence known among men. Those who penned the record of Jesus' public ministry knew that such a story had a self-evidencing power. (Luke i, 1-4; John xx, 30, 31; 2 Peter i, 15, 16; 1 John i, 3, 4; compare Buechner's *Hand Conc.*, 620, 621.)

And, what we need often to reflect upon, the same plan that possessed the heart of Jesus, and employed the weary years of his earthly life, is the policy of the glorified Redeemer's scepter. The Acts of the Apostles indicate that the missionary work is the prompting of his Spirit and the acceptable service of all his people. The Paraclete sent forth by the ascended Jesus establishes the mission at Jerusalem by signs and wonders. A call from heaven enjoins Peter to open the gates of mercy to the Gentile world, and assigns to Paul the office of apostle to the Gentiles. Then the ardent son of Jona is despatched to Babylon; John to Ephesus; Philip is summoned away from Samaria, where he has been preaching to listening thousands, to meet a solitary traveler in the desert; there the evangelist converts the chamberlain of Candace, and consecrates a missionary to the benighted continent of Africa. Paul traverses land

and sea, and publishes the good news of salvation in all the great cities of the Roman Empire. But why instance only this or that eminent teacher? Have not all the company the same grand calling? They are the light of the world. They are the salt of the earth. They receive gifts. They find opportunities opening before them. Scattered by persecution, they bear every-where the Word of Life. As they preach, converts are gathered; and these also are possessed by the same desire to extend the kingdom of the Lord. "The bigotry of the synagogue, the doubts of the academy, and the pride of the portico" are subdued by the cross, while the invisible, but ever present, Jesus leads his laborers onward to new conquests.

Such is the appointed method for the extension of our Lord's kingdom among men, as his own example teaches us and his approving providences in the history of his people declare. He was an evangelist; and in spirit he is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, and must therefore approve a career of beneficence modeled after his own. His commission to his people is, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature." And he will bless them now, just as he did in apostolic times, in proportion to the fidelity, the zeal, the enterprise, the self-denial with which they carry out the grand injunction.

Not to adventure upon the large field of evidence into which this proposition invites us, what proofs of its truth might not be drawn from the history of our own denomination! How powerful the influence of those restless Bible-readers of the dark ages was,—those men and women who bore the Word of God in the secret folds of their garments, and who published the message of salvation at the peril of their lives,—some future historian, the Niebuhr of the Church of God, must relate. But in our own age a striking illustration is found of the favor with which the Lord regards the missionary labors of his servants.

A little while ago a thousand Baptist orators were celebrating the unparalleled successes enjoyed by our people

in the first century of our national history. May we not find an explanation of our inviolate religious liberties and our wonderful progress in the fact that during this period the Baptists inaugurated the work of modern missions, and enlisted the evangelical Christians of the British empire and of America in its vigorous prosecution? In 1784 a Baptist association at Nottingham, England, determined that one hour on the first Monday in every month should be devoted to special intercession for the revival of genuine religion and for the extension of the kingdom of Christ throughout the world. In this the Monthly Missionary Concert of Prayer had its origin. In 1792 the Baptist Missionary Society was organized. From that moment the increase of the membership of our Churches and the progress of Baptist principles in other communions, and even in the social and political life of nations, has been unprecedented. While those Churches that opposed the movement have steadily declined, and are wasting into utter extinction, those that responded to the missionary call and addressed themselves to the blessed work of world-evangelization have developed a surprising energy and a nobler type of Christian character, and through the press and pulpit have exercised a commanding influence at home and abroad. The Missionary Baptists have multiplied to such an extent that "if the same rate of increase that we have enjoyed during the last half century should continue, the year of our Lord 2100 would find every adult member of our race, old enough for Church membership, included within the ranks of the Baptist denomination, even though the population of the globe should in the mean time be increased fourfold."* So immense is the harvest of souls our missionary enterprise has gathered! Let us not forget the lesson nor intermit the work, but approve ourselves as the faithful disciples of Him who went about doing good.

* Dr. Kendall Brooks: Paper in *Missionary Jubilee* on Missions in their Relation to Denominational Growth. P. 305.

ARTICLE III.

AUGUSTUS THOLUCK.

BY REV. H. S. BURRAGE.

D. August Tholuck. Zur Erinnerung an seinen Heimgang für seine Freunde.
Halle: Verlag von Julius Fricke. 1877.

THE memory of a good life is a precious legacy. It has a value in itself, as it reminds us of the noble endeavors and splendid achievements of those who have preceded us in our earthly course. It has, also, an added value in its power to quicken our slumbering energies, and to stir us with high hopes of better service in the cause of God and of man. Such a legacy, certainly, is the memory of Augustus Tholuck, the devout, saintly, Christian scholar, whose life, extended almost to fourscore years, and only recently finished, was, as he himself fitly characterized it — “a blessed life among young men.”

He was born March 30, 1799, at Breslau, the capital of Silesia, the birthplace, also, of Schleiermacher and Julius Müller. From his parents he received the name Friedrich Augustus Gotttreu Tholuck, but an abbreviated form, as above, he seems to have preferred, and this only he was accustomed to write. His father was a goldsmith, and it was the design of his parents that he should follow the same vocation. Accordingly, when he was twelve years of age he laid aside his books, and entered upon what he, or at least his parents, supposed was to be his life-work. But it was soon discovered that this was not his proper sphere, and he soon returned, we doubt not with a glad heart, to his studies. He remained at the gymnasium until 1816, when he entered the University of Breslau. There he evinced a fondness for Oriental studies, which was encouraged by his instructors; and shortly after entering the university, with recommendations from the philologist Schneider, and other literary men

in Breslau, he made his way to Berlin, where he was kindly welcomed by the prelate Von Dietz, a distinguished Orientalist, formerly Prussian ambassador at Constantinople, who at once adopted him as his foster son. Though his kind-hearted patron died within three months after Tholuck's arrival in Berlin, he was not left friendless. The minister Von Altenstein, who had heard of the promise of the young Silesian, secured for him a stipend that enabled him to continue the studies in which he was so enthusiastically engaged.

This was the time when Germany was entering upon a new life. The great wars through which the father-land had passed had humbled the people and their rulers; and a purer faith was gradually working its way into many hearts, crowding out the old rationalism whose baleful influence had been felt so long. It was well for the young scholar that, shortly after his arrival in Berlin, he was brought into intimate relations with men in whom the sweetest piety was united with the highest mental and moral endowments. For, up to this time, his religious views, like those of so many of the best young men by whom, in Berlin, he was surrounded, had been decidedly rationalistic. "Even in early boyhood," is his own testimony, "infidelity had forced its way into my heart, and at the age of twelve I was wont to scoff at Christianity and its truths." Indeed, in his religious views he was so far removed from the faith of the Gospel that, on leaving the gymnasium at Breslau, when according to custom it became his duty to deliver an address upon any theme he might select, he discussed the following: "The Superiority of the Oriental World over the Christian," or, in other words, The Superiority of Mohammedanism to Christianity. But in Berlin Tholuck came under the influence of Schleiermacher and Neander, and especially of the pious Baron von Kottwitz, whom, in his "Guido," one of his earlier works, Tholuck so lovingly sketched, and to whom he there paid the glowing tribute of hallowed affection. He now recalled the prayers his

parents had taught him, the religious instruction he had received, the sermons he had heard, the memory of the Christians with whom he had lived, the example of his pious friends, and all he had learned of the history of the Church of Christ, and then love eternal beaming into his soul, and loving kindness drawing him upward, he ceased to withstand the grace of God that leads to repentance, and cried out: "Thou God of justice, I acknowledge myself to be guilty in thy sight." In his "Hours of Devotion," No. 26, he has given us a sketch of himself at that time: "I traveled along a broad highway, and so great was the dust and turmoil that my soul grew weary. Many a time did I look to the right hand and the left for some turn of the road; but I was hurried onward by the tumultuous crowd, and could scarcely retain my self-possession. At length the heavenly Friend sought me amidst the crowd, led me out by secret ways from the throng, and brought me to a lone and verdant meadow, and to the banks of still waters, and oh, it is good to be there!"

Tholuck's great talents and his rapid progress in his studies brought him more and more into the society of the prominent professors in the University of Berlin. They admired his fiery zeal, and predicted for him a brilliant future as an Orientalist. He himself, even after his conversion, and while preparing himself for a chair in the university, had no thought of changing the course of his studies. As he has told us, it was a severe hemorrhage of the lungs, in his eighteenth year, which revealed to him the great truth, that the highest aim a man can have is to become a servant of Christ. During his illness he was impressed with this thought: "Supposing the end of thy life had come, wouldst thou be able to exculpate thyself before Him who has given knowledge by his Gospel, not only for promoting science, but that thou mightest lead others to the same blissful enlightenment that has been granted thee?" Then it was he formed the purpose that if his life was spared he would devote himself to missionary service in the East.

Through Sir George Rose, the English ambassador at Berlin, he tendered his services to the British and Foreign Bible Society, and received an appointment as agent for the Society at Malta. This appointment he had determined to accept, and he soon would have left behind "the still air of delightful studies," had not a second hemorrhage compelled him to yield his cherished purpose. It was through suffering that he was to be made ready for the great work whereunto he had been called, but which had not as yet been disclosed to him.

Not long after, De Wette, who was at that time a Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin, having offended the Prussian Government—by a letter he had written in reference to the assassination of Kotzebue—was deprived of his office, and Tholuck, his health meanwhile having been restored, was made his successor, being only twenty years of age.

It was then that he adopted the motto of the distinguished Moravian, Count Zinzendorf: "I have but one passion, and that is He, and He alone." With the same fiery zeal as hitherto, he devoted himself to his studies. Had not his heart prompted him to the work, it was a necessity that was laid upon him in the exalted position to which he had been called. But "the seeking, following, love," which in his eighteenth year had influenced his spirit, and made him God's blessed instrument in the conversion of a young artillery officer, burned even more and more brightly in his breast, so that it became the hourly problem of his life, as well as his greatest joy, to lead his students to the Savior of lost men. "Every one who knew nothing of Christ," he said at his Fiftieth Jubilee, referring to that early period, "I considered as a fortress which must be won in his name."

The first of his published writings appeared in 1821—his "Hints for the Study of the Old Testament," and "Suffismus, or Pantheistic Theology of the Persians." These were followed, in 1822, by his celebrated "Treatise on the Nature and Moral Influence of Heathenism," a work which, on its

appearance, was highly commended by Gesenius, and still holds a place in German theological literature. In 1824 Tholuck published his "Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans." His predecessor, De Wette, then professor at Basel, said it was the best Commentary on the Epistle that had as yet appeared; and Baur, referring to it in his "Paulus," said, "With his Commentary begins a new epoch in the history of this Epistle." In the following year Tholuck published a "Paraphrase of the Epistle to the Romans," an "Anthology of the Oriental Mystic Poems," and "The Doctrine of Sin and the Redeemer."

It was in this year that, by the liberality of the Prussian Government, which defrayed his expenses, he was permitted to visit England and Holland for purposes of study. By reason of ill-health he was compelled to return sooner than he had anticipated; and on his return he found that some remarks he had made in an address before the British and Foreign Bible Society, in reference to the prevailing rationalism in Germany, had in many quarters aroused feelings of bitterest hostility toward him. But these did not prevent his advancement. Knapp, the distinguished Professor of Theology at Halle, died in 1825, and in 1826, Tholuck was made his successor, being then twenty-seven years of age.

While at Berlin, engaged in his literary labors, it had been the secret wish of his heart, as he tells us, that he might be called to Halle, where, a hundred years before, the pious Francke had taught that the way to the tree of knowledge is by the tree of life. When, therefore, his appointment, as Professor of Theology at Halle, was made, it was joyfully accepted, though by it Tholuck was removed from the scene of his early triumphs and the society of his dearest friends. The theological faculty at Halle was at that time wholly rationalistic, and the appointment created not a little commotion in the ranks of its members. As a body, and supported in their opposition by the students, the professors endeavored to secure a revocation of the king's order, but were unsuccessful; and Tholuck, having been made a Doctor of

Theology by the university of Berlin, appeared in Halle. It was his prayer, he said in later years, that, where his predecessor had been able to find, out of nine hundred students, only five who believed in the divinity of Christ, God would enable him to lead souls into the truth as it is in Jesus.

Dark days were those for the young professor. Not only was there no one to welcome him on his arrival at Halle, but his colleagues in the university treated him with studied coldness. A few days after his arrival, in his loneliness he invited a student, whose acquaintance he had made, to walk, and on the way, oppressed by the thoughts of his unhappy position, he communicated to him the story of his trials. In the narration he was so much overcome by his feelings that he could not repress the tears. The student, moved by the words and tears of the young professor, turned to him, and taking him by the hand, exclaimed: "But they that be for thee are more than they that be against thee!"—words that went with peculiar power to the troubled heart of Tholuck, and he went back to his work feeling that, though he was alone, yet he was not alone, and that one day God would give him the victory.

The theological department of the university at Halle was at that time the strongest in Germany; and young men, in large numbers, from all parts of the land were attracted thither by the fame of Gesenius and his associates. Krummacher, who was at Halle a few years before Tholuck's transfer, afterwards Court Preacher at Potsdam, has given us an account of the teaching of the more prominent of these men. They were all rationalists of a decided character. Niemeyer dismissed the miracles with the remark, that for us they have no practical significance. Wegscheider praised reason as the only source of religious and moral truth. "I heard his lectures on theology," says Krummacher, "more in order to understand rationalism than Christianity." Gesenius never referred to any of the specific truths of Christianity without a smile of sarcasm. Especially in his lectures on Church history his unbelief rose to unrestrained frivolity.

“Woe to him,” says Krummacher, “who learned the history of the Church of God on earth from that caricaturist in a doctor’s hat.” These were the men who had made Halle the stronghold of rationalism, and into official relationship with whom Tholuck was brought when he entered upon his work in Halle.

It required not a little of the spirit of a true *miles Christi* to uplift the banner of the cross in such a place. But to do this, as we have seen, his soul had yearned in earlier years, and God had now granted to him the opportunity. He made no direct assault upon rationalism; but in every possible way he endeavored to awaken in the hearts of all around him a longing for a purer faith. Only a small circle was he enabled to form at the outset, and in this, as he has told us, were “the ungifted, the powerless, the witless; while on the other side, in contrast with the ‘orthodox idiots,’ as they were called, stood the talented, the brilliant, and the ambitious.” It was a trying period in Tholuck’s life, and oh, how he wrestled with God, that, in Halle, “the love that seeks and follows” might have its conquests as in Berlin!

An especially favorable opportunity for personal influence Tholuck found in his daily walk, which, on account of his delicate health, he was accustomed to take each day, usually with his students. In such familiar intercourse he was enabled to draw out the thoughts and to ascertain the feelings of the young men, and, also, by unfolding to them his own views, to impress upon them the important lessons which he himself had learned in the school of Christ. This was in accordance with his view of the proper functions of a teacher. In one of his lectures he says: “The teacher should labor with his pupil, sympathize with him, not simply impart scientific truth; but stand by his side to advise him, and enter into all the workings of his mind.” A glimpse of this kind of service, at this period of his life, he gave to his colleagues at his Fiftieth Jubilee:

“Among these young men some were amiable, but frivolous and giddy. Of this class was the well-known editor of *Kladderadatsch*, my table com-

panion, commended to my care by a pious Jewish mother. He was easily led astray, but lovable, and he yielded to the seeking, following love. Then there was another brought near my heart by a godly mother. He soon fell among companions by whom he was led into the broad and slippery way. Contrition and return followed; but then came another fall. When he could be found at home at no other time, I sought him more than once at six o'clock in the morning. I visited him in prison, that I might remind him of what he well knew, but always forgot. A few days after, I said in one of my discourses, that the preacher would have a hard task, but for the witness, even in frivolous hearts, that says: 'He was right.' The very next evening I received a note from him: 'Yes, now I know that God's word has a witness in the human heart. I, too, have felt its working.' And he promised to abandon his associates, and enter upon a new life. My words had brought him to this point, whether he would have strength to stand fast? Four or five days after, late in the evening, came a card from him. 'Tholuck sighs, Tholuck prays; but we will have our drunk out!' Yet this very man is now a preacher in Berlin. Only once have I had from him a reminder of the times gone by; but the recollection that lingers in my breast is warmer even than that reminder."

The same influence, though in a different degree, of course, he was enabled to exert as university preacher, a position to which, on his arrival at Halle, he was assigned by the king, as the associate of Prof. Marks. Unpopular as his evangelical views were, crowds were in attendance whenever he preached. Indeed, his audiences were so much larger than those of Prof. Marks, that the latter soon resigned. His sermons were plain, practical presentations of the great truths of the Gospel. He discoursed upon the wretchedness of an unholy life, the thirsting of men after God, their grieving over the power of sin, the joy that is found in believing in Christ, the blessedness of communion with the Father, and other related themes. As his distinguished colleague, Julius Müller, has said: "Tholuck's sermons possessed everything which secures the most powerful, immediate impression upon the hearers. We can easily imagine how often a student, having never before listened to an animated discourse, which penetrated into the inmost soul, and who has, therefore, gradually accustomed himself to look upon a certain kind of dullness and tediousness as belonging to the very essence of a sermon, and constituting its edifying quality, when he has once strayed into Dr. Tholuck's church, would

hang with fixed eye upon the lips of the preacher, and be confounded at the new and wonderful power of language with which he was addressed." And so, with a heart all aglow with love to Christ, and presenting themes that take hold of men with irresistible power, the influence of the young professor was felt in an ever-widening circle. Even his colleagues laid aside the weapons of their hostility for a time, and confessed the power and excellence of his amiable Christian spirit.

In 1827 Dr. Tholuck published his Commentary on the Gospel of John, which has passed through seven editions, and, like the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, has been translated into English. In the Spring of 1828 his health became so much impaired that he was compelled to relinquish his studies; and that he might have the benefit of a residence in Italy he received the appointment of Chaplain to the Prussian Embassy at Rome, of which the great Bunsen was at that time the head. He remained in Rome a year, and added not a little to the resources already at his command. On his return to Halle he published a volume of sermons preached there, and in Berlin, Rome, and London. In the following year, 1830, he was appointed Court Preacher at Dresden, an invitation which he declined.

It was at this time that he became involved in a controversy with his rationalistic colleagues at Halle. It arose in this way: Ludwig Von Gerlach, a contributor to Hengstenberg's *Evangelical Church Journal*, called attention to the manner in which Gesenius and Wegscheider assailed the Scriptures in their lectures, and, to prove his statements, gave extracts from notes taken by some of the university students. The article awakened wide-spread excitement. The professors resented this outrage upon their rights, as they termed it, claiming that their views could not be fairly ascertained in this way. The students, generally, sympathized with the professors, and as Tholuck was suspected of having been the prime mover in this assault on his rationalist associates, hostile feelings were expressed against him.

Indeed, his life at one time was believed to be in danger, and it was deemed necessary that he should have a military guard for his protection. It appeared, however, that the suspicions of his enemies were groundless. He had not approved the publication of Von Gerlach's article; but, on the contrary, had endeavored to dissuade him from such a step. The conflict was soon transferred to a wider field. Fritzsche, the well-known exegete, then a professor at the university at Rostock, published a work in 1831, entitled, "A Review of the Merits of Mr. Tholuck as an Interpreter," in which he presented an array of "blunders" that he had discovered in Tholuck's Commentaries. Tholuck replied. Fritzsche then came forward with a new work, to which Tholuck replied in his "One Sober Word More." The conflict was a sharp one. Fritzsche was supported by the entire body of rationalists, in this effort to destroy the rapidly growing reputation and influence of Tholuck, now the acknowledged leader of the evangelical party in Germany. But the replies convicted Fritzsche of greater blunders than he had charged upon Tholuck, and the discussion was an advantage to the latter in many ways. Especially it led him to make his investigations more thorough than hitherto, and so to secure greater accuracy.

In 1833 Dr. Tholuck published an edition of Calvin's "Commentaries on the New Testament;" and also his own Commentary on the "Sermon on the Mount." In 1835 he followed with a work on the "Influence of the Greek Philosophy upon the Theology of the Mohammedans and the Jews." In 1836 appeared his "Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews." In 1837 he brought out a "Treatise on the Credibility of the Evangelical History," with his reply to the "Life of Christ," of Strauss. From 1834 to 1838 he published four volumes of Sermons. In 1839 he published his celebrated "Hours of Christian Devotion," which has passed through seven editions, and has become a German classic. It was in the failure of his eyesight that this work had its origin. Prevented in the

Winter mornings and evenings from pursuing his usual employments by candle light, he planned and matured these devout meditations, and so, as he says, he "sought to extract a gratification from these hours of bitter suffering by presenting to Christian souls a fruit of the heart in place of a labor of the head." The book is worthy of a place in every Christian household. In 1843 Tholuck published his "Translation and Interpretation of the Psalms." Three years later appeared his "Colloquy Concerning the Most Prominent Religious Questions of the Time." In 1853 he published his "Academic Life in the Seventeenth Century," which was intended as an introduction to his "History of Rationalism." A part of this work, treating of Pietism, appeared a few years ago, and we believe this was Tholuck's last publication. In these later years, from 1845 we may say, much of his time was occupied in preparing enlarged and improved editions of earlier works.

In all this time his reputation and influence had steadily increased. In 1831 Dr. Edward Robinson, the distinguished author of the "Researches in Palestine," could say, "To the American Christian who travels on this part of the Continent, Tholuck is undoubtedly the most interesting person whose acquaintance he will make. He possesses a greater personal influence and reputation than any other theologian in Germany." With added years the circle of his influence extended, until his name became a household word wherever our evangelical faith is received. As was said at his funeral, he formed no school, but was content to send his students to the School of Christ.

There is one point in Tholuck's earlier history which is worthy of notice on account of a misrepresentation that is often repeated at the present day. It was claimed in this country, at one time, that Tholuck held the doctrine of universal salvation, and Universalists paraded the claim with much show of rejoicing. The facts, however, are these. There was a time when Tholuck was inclined to believe in the final restoration of the lost. Referring to

remarks of his made in 1834, which had been quoted to show that Tholuck was a Universalist, the latter, writing under date of December 22, 1837, when his attention had been called to the use which had been made of these remarks, said: "If I remember rightly, my expressions at the time were these: dogmatically, *i. e.*, as a theologian, I feel myself drawn toward this opinion (*i. e.*, the doctrine of ultimate universal salvation); but exegetically, *i. e.*, as an interpreter, I do not know how to justify it." In the same letter he added: "I confessed at the time that I did not know how to reconcile this hope with the clear passages in Scripture, which made me reluctant, even at that time, to embrace that opinion as an unquestionable truth. Mature reflection, however, on the sin against the Holy Ghost, has made me since abandon the idea of the final restoration of all men; for what Christ says concerning it seems too clearly to imply a degree of opposition against holy truth, which leads to eternal unhappiness." That his views remained the same in succeeding years we have reason to know from repeated conversations with him on the subject in 1868-9. Instead of being a witness for Universalism, therefore, Tholuck was an important witness against it. Here was a man whose life was devoted to Biblical study, who took up this subject not only without prejudice against it, but for it, and who yet, as the result of his study of God's Word, was at length compelled to yield cherished hopes, and bow to the teachings of inspiration.

Generally speaking, he held firmly those views of divine truth which are called evangelical. He loved the Evangelical Alliance, and some of his fondest recollections were of the sessions which it had been his privilege to attend. It was a great disappointment to him that on account of growing infirmities he was unable to be present at the meeting of the Alliance in New York in October, 1873. In a communication to that body, in reference to the state of religion in Germany, he said: "O my dearly beloved friends, if the grace of the Lord had granted me that privilege,

rather than send you a kind of theological report, I would have spoken from heart to heart in an assembly where I should have found Christian brethren who for many years have been most cordially attached to me." So in one of his last letters to the late Dr. H. B. Hackett (who, it will be remembered, dedicated to Tholuck his "Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles"), Tholuck could say, referring to the present attitude of unbelief, "We may regard ourselves as fellow soldiers upon the same field." Certainly of all men in Germany during the past fifty years Tholuck must be called the apostle of our evangelical faith. He it was who inspired its scattered, disheartened companies. He it was who proudly raised their banner, and bore it, like the hero he was, until rationalism had been dethroned in the university at Halle, and all his colleagues, as Rev. Leopold Witte said at the meeting of the Evangelical Alliance in New York, "had been forced to yield to his superior Christian energy and knowledge."

Yet in all these years, on to old age, he had a ceaseless struggle with disease. Professor Edwards, of Andover Theological Seminary, writing in 1839, and referring to Tholuck, said: "His appearance is, at present, that of a man prematurely old. It is to be earnestly hoped that he may add another to the many illustrations of the remark, The men of the feeblest constitutions often accomplish the most and live the longest." The hope was realized. When Tholuck was almost seventy years of age he had not omitted a lecture in the university on account of illness, though in all his years as a professor he had not known for a single day what it was to be free from pain. Time furrowed his face, his form became bent under the burdens of age, his eyesight failed, and he groped his way with difficulty; but his mind was still strong, and the words of Scripture were fulfilled in him: "Those that be planted in the house of the Lord shall flourish in the courts of our God. They shall bring forth fruit in old age."

And so he reached and passed the allotted period of

human existence, the Psalmist's threescore years and ten. A golden day in his history was December 2, 1870, for on that day he celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the commencement of his work as an instructor. It was a rare occasion. On the previous evening the aged professor addressed an audience, consisting of his associates and friends, to whom were added many of his students, whom the occasion had called together from all parts of the world. To that address we have already referred. It was an expression of his experience as a student-professor:

"They call me truly, in distinction from a book-professor, a 'student-professor,' who has had his home among the students, and nowhere so much as there. Yes, in the germinating seeds in these souls have I found and do I find my pleasure—in the flower-buds as they unfold leaf by leaf, and the flower-bells as they spring out of them, with diverse fragrance and varying colors. To see this is a rich enjoyment, and he who has once found his delight in such a work, and whom God has permitted to become a professor—he knows no more of toil, but a fullness of joy. . . . To you who have long stood near me I say this at what is perhaps the close of my career. I have been a preacher and teacher during my life; and what I have done in this way is known to the world. But all this I value less than that I have been permitted, though in weakness and imperfection, to exercise that love which seeks and follows. This is a work of which the world knows little, but of which the Lord knows much. And it is this love which seeks and follows that I now wish for you."

The jubilee festival occurred on the following day. It was opened in the early morning by a choral, which was sung by a choir of students in the street, under Tholuck's windows. At ten o'clock the friends of the aged professor assembled at his house. From King William, of Prussia, then at Versailles with the army, Dr. Kögel brought a decoration—the Star of the Order of the Red Eagle. From the queen there was a letter of greeting. The chief ecclesiastical council in Prussia, in an expression of fraternal regard, referred to Tholuck's early conflicts as, "at the front in the battles of the Church," and gave him a place "among the Church fathers of the nineteenth century." The Rector of the university, Dr. Knoblauch, alluded to the services which Dr. Tholuck had performed for the Church and the university, and placed in his hands a jubilee essay, written by

Prof. Schlottmann, "*de Romanarum et Germanicarum gentium consortio.*" Professor Schlottmann extended the greetings of the Theological Faculty at Halle, and also presented a letter containing the greetings of the university at Berlin. A student brought a tribute of praise in the name of his associates. Professor Jacobi read a letter from the theological students in the army before Paris, in which they gave fitting expression to their veneration and love, and among the signatures to which was recognized the trembling hand of one of their number who had been severely wounded in battle. Then followed the greetings of the different German universities, and various religious and civil bodies. At the close, Superintendent Müller, of Bielefeld, placed in Dr. Tholuck's hands an album containing the pictures of all the professor's amanuenses; while Professor Kahler added a present of upwards of four thousand thalers, in which more than a thousand of the friends of the aged professor, in many lands, had united as an expression of their indebtedness to a faithful instructor and leader. It was a season of hallowed memories, both to Dr. Tholuck and to the many friends gathered under his hospitable roof.

In the afternoon there was a banquet in the great hall of the "Crown Prince," and late in the evening the students had a torch-light procession; and as they thronged the street in front of Dr. Tholuck's house, the aged professor addressed them with words of affectionate counsel. Then the many hundred voices took up the grand choral, "Ein feste Burg is unser Gott," and so the day closed, as it had opened, with sacred song; and so closed a jubilee which may be regarded as Halle's joyful recognition of the great victory which faith had there won under the uplifted banner of the cross.

From this time, gradually, Dr. Tholuck was compelled to withdraw from the pursuits in which he had been so long engaged. First the pulpit, then the university, and then the house of God missed him, and he retired to the quiet and seclusion of his happy home. There, as Mrs. Tholuck once sweetly said, he prepared himself for a blessed end. Those

who saw him, found him as Dr. Hackett found him in the Summer preceding the Jubilee: "Soon Dr. Tholuck came in—seemed glad to see me: felt, in my interview with him, that he was consciously standing near his end; without any pretense or cant, there was an air of seriousness and silent thought which impressed me, and made me feel actually solemn: he seemed to breathe the air of the coming world. Awe-struck, I may say I was."

One purpose, long cherished, he was permitted to see accomplished while thus awaiting the finishing of his course: the establishment of a home for needy theological students. In 1871, with the aid of a friend, Mrs. Tholuck purchased a house in the same street, with accommodations for seven or eight young men, who are not only provided with a free lodging, but with breakfast and supper. It had been Dr. Tholuck's design to establish such a home by will; but he could not wait. He longed to see the home, and the young men occupying it and enjoying its privileges; and so the arrangement was made. It is a pleasant thought, that he who had done so much for young men, as a student-professor, had this added joy in the closing years of his life.

For more than a year before his death he was in a very feeble bodily condition, and during the last few months his mind also failed him. On the 19th of July, 1876, Mrs. Tholuck asked, "Do you feel very weak?" "Yes," he replied; "the body is weak, but the spirit rests in God. I rest in perfect peace." In November; to the question whether he still had peace, with joyful countenance, striking his breast, he exclaimed, "Forgiveness! Forgiveness! Victory!" On the 24th of February, 1877, as Mrs. Tholuck spoke to him of the eternal life, he exclaimed, with uplifted arms, and countenance radiant with joy, "I am not afraid. Christ died for me. No, I am not afraid!"

And so, ever failing in strength, he lingered until Sunday, June 10, 1877, when, at four o'clock in the afternoon, he folded his hands in death, and entered into rest. It was as

if the command had at length gone forth: "Soldier, go home; with thee the fight is won."

Two days later occurred the funeral. It was just one hundred and fifty years since a man of like spirit, August Hermann Francke, was carried out of those same gates to his burial, accompanied by thousands of mourners, whose loss was that of a father. So now, the whole city followed the remains of this other servant of God, whose life had been no less fruitful of good, and whose memory was equally precious. It was more like the funeral of a king than of the son of a goldsmith. The opening address at the grave was by Prof. Wolters, who represented the faculty of the university. Dr. Kögel, Court Preacher, spoke eloquently for those who had enjoyed the instructions of the departed. On the following Sunday Prof. Beyschlag preached a memorial discourse from 2 Cor. iv, 6, 7. Worthy tributes were all these to the glowing piety, the fiery industry, the varied scholarship, the unyielding faith, courage, and devotion of Augustus Tholuck. Truly we can say:

“Of such as he was, there be few on earth;
Of such as he is, there are many in heaven.
And life is all the sweeter that he lived,
And all he loved more sacred for his sake;
And death is all the brighter that he died,
And heaven is all the happier that he's there.

ARTICLE IV.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER ROMAN, GOTHIC, AND
RUSSIAN LAW.

BY REV. G. W. SAMSON, D. D.

WHEN about eight years since united delegations of the Evangelical Alliance called on Prince Gortschakoff, Prime Minister of the Imperial Court of Russia, to ask religious liberty for Lutherans in the Baltic provinces of the czar, the delegates from continental Europe and Great Britain met a reception and response very different from those accorded to the delegates from the United States. Said the prince to the former, "Why, gentlemen, there is religious *toleration* in Russia as truly as in any of the countries you represent." To the American delegates, with a smile at his apparent victory over their European allies, the prince graciously intimated that their peculiar principle of "religious *liberty*" was a matter for the Russian as well as other European governments to consider.

Every government of continental Europe has as the foundation of its political constitution, and of its civil jurisprudence, the principles of the old Roman law as fixed during the four hundred and sixty years of the great Republic. But that law has been more or less supplemented by the old Druidic and Gothic law, which made ecclesiastics to have supreme authority in matters claimed to have a religious bearing, and which permitted a priestly hierarchy to call in the physical power of the State when it would repress what it considered heresy in religious doctrine and practice. This latter element came into the Roman city and State with the new Gothic rulers; it remained dominant at Rome after the century of Gothic sway; it was confirmed at the close of the Gothic supremacy about a cen-

tury later by Pepin and Charlemagne, of France; and its check has been first and fully applied by the late and present kings of Italy. Its relics yet live wherever there is a State Church. Its influence is greatest in Spain, where the Goths finally settled, and its influence is least observed in Great Britain. Its sway was recognized in the American colonies, except that of Rhode Island, till the adoption of the Federal Constitution; and its lingering tenacity of life was felt in Massachusetts until 1833. Its history in Russia is a fertile present study.

The facts thus passing in review indicate the train of survey which is essential for the elucidation of the theme proposed. It is necessary first to make the distinction between religious toleration and religious liberty, as it has been recognized in many an age past, as it was conceived and permanently embodied in American constitutions, and as the Russian prime minister recognized it when speaking to Christian gentlemen from the United States. It will then be easier to trace its full control in the old Roman Republic, and the leaven of its old precedents hidden in all European Christian governments, and which is now vigorously at work.

The idea of toleration implies that government has the *authority* to demand conformity to the State Church; an authority which, however, for prudential reasons, it waives, and grants, as a favor, to dissentients from conformity to the State Church, the privilege of non-conformity. Religious liberty, like all other liberty, implies unrestrained freedom of action in matters purely religious, or in doctrines held, worship rendered, support given, and propagation extended. The bitter lament of the French heroine, led to the guillotine for resisting unto blood a tyrant demagogue, "O liberty, what crimes are committed under thy name!" and yet more the *occasion* even for this lament, demand special discrimination in determining what is the limit where liberty transgresses its bound, encroaches on the domain of law, and so becomes license. Yet it may be indicated.

The simplest form of liberty is found where any single individual, like Selkirk, is far from all fellows who have their rights which limit his. Even then man is environed by nature and her laws; he is not at liberty to do what he pleases; he dare not defy gravity, or trifle with the laws of health. He may deny, if he dares, the duty of submission and obedience to the Author of nature and its laws; but he dare not violate law; and if he frets under its bonds he makes himself a slave. Liberty is unrestrained freedom of action within the limits of manifest natural law established by the Author of all things and the Creator and Ruler of all beings.

It is easy, then, to trace the limits, practically at least, of liberty in the several relations of men to each other in society. Domestic liberty is the freedom of action of husband and wife, of parents and children within the necessary natural limit of these relations. Social liberty, as in a company of miners where there is no civil law, is unrestrained freedom of action within the limits of necessary co-operation in labor and in exchange of the means of livelihood. Civil liberty is the restrained freedom of action common to all citizens living under established governments, when that action does not interfere with the equal title to freedom of any fellow citizen; the limits of such interference being fixed by careful observation of the natural law which should control human intercourse and which should therefore be defined in codes of civil law. Political liberty—which regards not the relation of citizens to fellow citizens, but of citizens to duly authorized government, both in its constitution and administration—political liberty is an equal voice in making and administering law and unrestrained freedom of action in every thing over which government has no legitimate control. Religious liberty is unrestrained freedom in convictions about, and acts toward, God, when such individual convictions and acts do no violence to the correspondent religious rights of others. And here four subordinate principles arise for consideration.

First. Equality is essential to true liberty. The declaration of American "political independence," going back to simple natural law, asserts the principles, consecutively, of social, civil, and political liberty, their embodiment being found in these words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." It is manifest, on thought, that as these rights are "equal," true "liberty" can not exist where true equality is not granted. True "religious" equality can not exist where there is a State Church; under which all are required to pay taxes to support a Church not of their choice, and are subjected to social inequality, if not to civil disability, when they do not conform to its creed and ritual, to its view of revealed truth, and its modes of worship. It is manifest that an established Church is, therefore, inconsistent with true religious liberty. Hence, in the very first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, proposed and adopted at its origin, it was decreed: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

Second. An equally important principle to be observed is the distinction between religious liberty and irreligion. As "free government" is not "no government," or anarchy, so "free religion" is not "no religion," or irreligion. This vital distinction, recognized in all ages, has, in the contrasted history of the American and French Republics, been specially brought out. When Rousseau, in his "Social Contract," brought together important truth mixed with destructive error, whose leadings wrecked the French Republic, he forgot to develop the fact that men will ask, "What right has a majority to impose a government on a minority, any more than a minority to impose a government on a majority?" Of course, when in a voluntary association men have united

for any specified purpose, there is no other rule proper for action, in accomplishment of the objects of the association, than that a majority 'shall rule. But it is quite another question, whether a majority in any neighborhood have a right to force a minority into an association which that majority choose to form. No answer ever has been, or ever can be, given to this inquiry, except that of Cicero, the Roman: that the laws called those of nature are those of God, the author of nature, and the rightful ruler of all; or, as Blackstone's definition affirms, "law is a rule of action dictated by a superior being," which superior being is "man's Creator;" whence it follows that the "will of man's Maker is called the law of nature." No people will ever submit to any form of government, or to any enacted code of laws, unless they believe in God as the author of human law and as the institutor of human governments. Hence, when the fathers of the American Constitution were criticised, in 1793, by Volney, in his Lectures at Paris, for recognizing the Christian religion, shutting up courts, legislative halls and executive halls on the Lord's day, declaring invalid all contracts made on Sunday, and forbidding work or pleasure which interfered with the quiet of Christian worship, Robespierre was forced to inaugurate, as a necessity, the religion of "Reason," represented by a beautiful female, after whose car he walked as head of the Republic, doing homage as high-priest. In this farce falsehood was compelled to assume that there is a law of truth. Hence again, when, under the United States Constitution, chaplains in the army and navy, in legislative halls and in prisons, were appointed by government and sustained from the public treasury, it was no departure from the principle that no citizen should be required to sustain the Church of his fellow-citizen, or a State Church. True religious liberty has existed where the employes and wards of a government are provided with religious teachers generally acceptable, though of course not of the special Church of each man interested.

Third. Yet, again, religious liberty is not interfered with

when other relations of men than those strictly religious are brought into consideration. When the Mormon claims that the privilege of having more than one wife is a religious right, three points are to be noted. First, his religious views do not *require*, though they permit, polygamy. Second, since in most communities, as even the Greek Aristotle observed, the number of the sexes is substantially equal, and all men have equal rights to marriage, no man has a right to be the husband of more than one wife, since he thus deprives another of his right. Third, the laws of marriage are fixed mainly to protect defenseless children; all laws of inheritance are made simply for children by one wife; and the children of other wives than the favorite are either defrauded or may become a public charge. Again, when the Friend insists that to pay taxes for the support of government violates his religious conviction, and yet expects the protection of his person, his family, and property by government, that government is reduced to the alternative either of leaving such a man's property and family unprotected, and a prey to the lawless, or it must furnish the protection and exact the payment for service rendered. And so, in general, whenever any man claims that his neglect of domestic, social, civil, or political obligations is a matter of religious principle, he has certainly brought under the head of religion what does not belong to religion. All duties to fellow-beings are but indirectly religious obligations; and it is no interference with religious liberty to enforce their observance. All acts of worship to the Divine Being, and the privilege of holding and propagating individual religious faith, belong to the right of religious liberty; unless such acts and efforts directly restrict the same freedom belonging to another man.

Fourth. From the fact that the right to religious liberty is often either mistaken or misconstrued, and from the added fact that claimants of religious liberty are liable to violate the law of social, civil, or political relations, through this misinterpretation, the restraints imposed by government on

persons of peculiar religious views may be demanded because of their violations of other than religious obligations. Yet more: under all governments, when the integrity of the government itself is threatened, civil law may be suspended and military decrees, meant to repress only political agitation, may be, justly or unjustly, applied to persons of special religious convictions; the authority of the government being undeniable, though it may err in judgment. With an authority as unquestioned as that of the Czar of Russia, President Lincoln, by military right, freed four millions of slaves. By unquestionable right Roman law forbade the erection of temples to deities conceived to be patrons of vices, and it restrained the power of Druidic priests; and by like authority the Jewish Sanhedrim, as Gamaliel argued, (Acts v, 34-40) repressed armed zealots. To draw the line of distinction between permanent law and temporary military edicts, in the history of religious liberty, is an effort as difficult as it is important.

Coming now to apply these principles to the history of nations, we observe that the laws of ancient nations, as to religious liberty, founded, as they were, on principles of natural right, always and every-where recognized even when restricted, run back to the earliest ages. Abraham in Chaldea, in Syria, in Canaan, and in Egypt, declined to engage in the idolatrous worship of kings and peoples where he sojourned; and his own peculiar religious convictions and worship were not interfered with. When the Hebrews went out of Egypt to become a nation, the worship of Jehovah, the one true God, was the established State religion; and yet many people of other religions went along with them (Ex. xii, 38); they continued the worship of their idol gods (Ex. xxxv, 4); and they even publicly carried about the shrines of their idol deities (Amos v, 26; Acts vii, 43). Yet there is no record that they were interfered with, though the inconsistency of those who worshiped idols when they professed to be worshipers of the one true God was forbidden by Moses (Ex. xxx, 9; and Deut. iv, 19); as, also, Joshua

Samuel, Asa, Josiah, and other reformers by law put away idolatry when practiced by professed Israelites (Josh. xxiv. 23; 1 Sam. vii, 3; 2 Chron. xiv, 3; xv, 8; xxxiii, 15). Toleration, if not religious liberty, belonged to the constitution and laws of the Hebrew State; the only doubtful question being whether tithes for the Temple service were exacted of sojourners in Israel, who were not Israelites. More than all, the nice distinction made between civil and religious liberty, in the late decision of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of *Polygamy in Utah*, was manifestly made by Daniel when Prime Minister of the Persian Court at Babylon.

The book of Daniel gives two suggestive illustrations of the law of religious liberty. The first is confirmatory of the law under the Assyrian, and the second under the Persian Empire; in both cases the cited exception proving the rule. Daniel and his three associates had enjoyed the exercise of their own worship year after year at the Assyrian Court, their humbler countrymen, as the one hundred and thirty-seventh Psalm indicates, enjoying the same privilege, though subject to the ridicule of rude observers. It is manifest that the privilege of the Hebrews was religious liberty, not mere toleration; for if there were not religious equality Daniel and his three companions would by their religious peculiarity have been excluded from offices of trust. When the king requires worship of an image he has set up, the fact that Daniel is not involved, and the added fact that his three companions are not condemned at the first refusal, that they are able to meet, yet waive the privilege of defending their right (Daniel iii, 16), and that in the result the king himself acknowledges the law of right (iii, 28, 29,)—all this but confirms, by the attempted royal violation of it, the law of religious liberty. The second case is in several respects suggestive; the case of Daniel at the Persian, succeeding to the Assyrian Court. First, Daniel had been undisturbed in his religious liberty; the statement that he “prayed toward Jerusalem, as he did aforetime” (vi, 10), affirming this.

Second, this was true religious liberty, without disability; the record that he "was preferred before the presidents and princes" (vi, 3) declaring this. Third, the line between civil obligation and religious duty was perfectly preserved; since his administration over peoples of different religions, including his own people who were captives, was so perfectly conformed to the Persian law that his rivals admitted, "We shall not find any occasion against this Daniel except we find it against him concerning the law of his God (vi, 5)." Fourth, when the end his rivals sought was gained it was not found under existing law, but under an imperial or military order; limited, like all such orders, in the time of its application (vi, 7-9).

The Roman law, whose elaborated principles are down to this day recognized as fundamental throughout Europe, Western Asia, and Northern Africa, and whose special commercial subtleties have been specially incorporated into American State Statutes,—the Roman law was derived from the collation and harmonizing of world-wide common law precepts, and of course might be expected to embody the wisdom of the ages as to religious liberty. These were, first, the laws of Numa the second king, the Solomon of Rome, whose code was an adaptation made for his age of the laws of early Asiatic empires and of early Grecian sages. There were, second, the "Twelve Tables," substantially the code of the Athenian Solon, which became essential when kingly rule ceased and the Republic was established. There were, third, the acts of the Roman Senate and people, modifying and developing civil relations and obligations during nearly five centuries. There were, fourth, the collated digests of common principles found in all the codes of European, Asiatic, and African nations, brought successively under the sway of the Roman imperial or military power, whose gradually increasing volume was styled the "*jus gentium*," or law common to all nations; a designation to be distinguished from the "*jus inter gentes*," the law between nations, or international law, which regulates the "political"

relations of governments to each other, rather than the "civil" relations of the citizens of all nations to each other. There were, fifth, the special edicts of emperors, or military princes, temporary and local often in their application, yet sometimes involving principles of natural justice perpetuated under their successors and finally embodied in permanent statutes. There were, sixth, decisions of judges, especially of prætors whose jurisdiction was over distant provinces, and added to these the opinions of attorneys, called "prudentes," whose meaning is illustrated in the old English translation of Acts xiii, 7, and in our modern term "jurisprudence." There were, seventh and lastly, the digested codes of the later Romans after the division of the Empire into that of the Eastern and Western Empires: prominent among which were the Theodosian code, promulgated A. D. 438; the Gothic code, which was brought in after the fall of Western Empire, A. D. 476; and the Institutes of Justinian, promulgated as the law of the Eastern Empire A. D. 533. The history of religious liberty under each of these successive developments of Roman law will make clear the present relations of the several great nations of Europe to American efforts to secure religious liberty as distinct from religious toleration throughout the world.

In Greece, from whose philosophies of law and government Roman law borrowed much of its spirit, the law sustained those who maintained and propagated their own sentiments, while no charge could be proved against them of treating with indignity the public expiatory sacrifices (*thusiai*) observed in all states. The long continued privilege enjoyed by such men as Anaxagoras and Socrates, and the fact that they were finally arraigned, condemned and put to death on the charge of injurious political agitation, as both Plato and Xenophon record (Plato, *Apol. Socrat.*, c. 7, 15, 17, 19; Xenophon, *Mem. Socrat.*, c. 1, § 1-9), indicates what was the law by the argument against its application. Xenophon expressly declares that Socrates showed his respect for the public sacrifices by regular attendance on them.

The Institutes of Numa, who reigned from B. C. 715 to 672, and was the Solomon, as Romulus was the David, of Rome's founding, bring out, at the origin of Roman law, its peculiar features as bearing on religious liberty. Plutarch relates the following: "To form . . . so high-spirited and untractable a people to mildness and peace he called in the aid of religion." "He was of the opinion that the first cause was . . . discernible only by the mind. Hence, Numa forbade the Romans to represent the Deity in the form of man or beast." Plutarch attributes to Numa the establishment of the orders of "pontifices," or priests to the higher or "powerful" deities, as the word implies; and he adds as a feature permanent from Numa down to his own day, which was about A. D. 90 to 120: "The *pontifex maximus*, chief of the priests, is interpreter of all sacred rites, or rather a superintendent of religion, having the care not only of public sacrifices, but even of private rites and offerings, forbidding the people to depart from the stated ceremonies, and teaching them how to honor and propitiate the gods." It will be seen that the prohibition thus declared did not interpose to prohibit any form of religious worship practiced by any of the varied nations brought under the Roman Empire when Plutarch, eight hundred years after Numa, was writing. The two permanent prohibitions were, the worship of gross and vicious deities, and disrespect to the prevailing form of religion revered in any section of the Empire. The very name "gods," reckoning a plurality in place of the one deity of Numa, indicates what was permanent in the Roman law as to religious liberty.

In the preserved writings of Cicero, whose allusions indicate the history of Roman law, the exceptions cited prove the rule as to the right of religious liberty. Referring to the religious principles taught in the colleges founded by Numa, Cicero says (*De Senect.*, c. 13) that they commended themselves to such statesmen as the elder Cato. The special provisions that grew up in the progress of the Republic are more and more emphatic. The general spirit of the

Roman law as to restraints on religious practices is condensed by Cicero into a paragraph (*De Leg.*, Lib. ii. c. 8), in which these two sentences give the essential precepts: "Let no new nor foreign gods, unless publicly acknowledged, be privately worshiped:" and again, "Let due honor be paid to those virtues by which man is exalted to heaven, as intelligence, valor, piety, and fidelity, and let temples be consecrated in honor of them; but to the vices let no sacred rites be paid."

The latter of these two general provisions of Roman law under the Republic is made clear by special acts alluded to by jurists and historians; while the former, often misinterpreted by modern German scholars, requires special examination and the confirmation of precedents under the law found in the course of the Roman government towards Christian leaders recorded in the New Testament and early Christian history.

Cicero in two of his orations (*In Pis.*, c. 4, and *Pro Sext.*, c. 15, 25,) alludes to special acts of the Roman Senate suppressing certain religious colleges on the ground that they fostered political agitation; colleges whose privileges were restored again under the consulship of P. Clodius on the ground that these charges were unfounded. The historians Livy (B. 39. c. 8 etc.) and Valerius Maximus (B. i. c. 3) allude to the suppression of Bacchanalian rites and of various vicious associations, because of their injury to public morals. These allusions, as intimated, show that irreligion, and immoralities under the guise of religion, were prohibited by Roman law.

The former of the two provisions cited, as it has been misinterpreted, deserves special consideration. The words of Cicero, in full, are these: "*Seperatim nemo habessit deos: neve novos, sed ne advenas, nisi publice adscitos, privatim colunto.*" Quoting this single precept, and evidently confounding it with the latter precept, Gieseler, the specially exhaustive German scholar, makes in his text (*Ecc. Hist.*, Per. 1st, Div. i, § 12) this remark: "To introduce strange

gods, without the sanction of the State, was considered treasonable." The inquiry will naturally force itself on the careful reader: "How was it, when the Apostle Paul was, on his own appeal, taken to Rome for trial before Cæsar, that for two whole years, in his own hired house, he preached the Gospel to all that came to him, no man forbidding him? Was there a special act of the State, granting to him and his fellow Christians this privilege of introducing a new and foreign religion into the capital city? Or, did the already existing law of the State, cited by Cicero, give Paul and all Christians the right to meet for Christian worship, provided their assemblies were open to the public, so that no secret political intrigue could be connected with them?" To ask the question is to answer it; especially when the inquirer is an American reader, accustomed to entire liberty and its characteristics. At the same time, any one accustomed to intercourse with intelligent and truly pious German and English Churchmen, familiar with the difficulty of giving to them a conception of a country where there is no established Church, and where no civil or social disability whatever rests on those who differ from the majority in their religious faith and practice—to one familiar with the conceptions of such a writer as Gieseler, his misinterpretation of Cicero's words, so manifestly contradictory to the facts, need be no wonder. The confirmations of the fact that the laws of the Roman Republic gave, practically, religious liberty may then be successively traced.

Under the Roman Republic, as under the Grecian Empire, which preceded it in Asia and Africa, not only religious toleration, but religious liberty existed as to faith in the Old Testament and adherence to the Hebrew ritual. Not only were the Jews unmolested in their faith, but citizens of any country might freely become proselytes to that faith.*

Under the emperors, special acts and edicts restricted

* Any student disposed to make an exhaustive research on this point can consult the following authorities: Horace, Sat. i, 9, 69; Tacitus, Hist., Lib. v., c. 5; Juvenal, Sat. vi, 541, ec.; Josephus, Bell. Jud., Lib. ii, c. 20, ¶2; Matt. xxiii, 15; Acts ii, 10; vi, 5; xiii, 43. Most of these citations show,

religious liberty; but always under cover of the laws above cited. Under Julius Cæsar, before Augustus, the colleges of Numa were on political grounds temporarily suspended; the special exemption of the Jews, even with all their revolutionary tendencies, from the provisions of the act, indicating the law; as Suetonius (*C. J. Cæsar*, c. 42) and Josephus (*Antiq.*, B. xiv, c. 17) unite in declaring. Under Augustus, the restrictions on the old colleges, which had grown up under Numa's laws, were removed; but when this restored privilege was abused an edict was promulgated forbidding the forming of religious fraternities, "except those that are ancient and those declared to be lawful" (Sueton., *Octav.*, c. 32); in which edict, of course, the exception made proves the nature of the existing common law. Under Claudius, Jews were banished for a time from Rome; but this was done apparently under a decree of the Senate, general in character, by which pretenders to magical powers were expelled from Italy, and by which, also, the arbitrary power exercised by the Druids was repressed. This general fact is confirmed by careful comparison of the statements of Suetonius (*Claud.*, c. 25) and of Tacitus (*Annal.*, Lib. xii, c. 52). The special ground for the banishment of the Jews then residing in the city of Rome, alluded to by Luke (Acts xviii, 2), could not have been a restriction of their religious privileges; since the same Claudius issued a special edict confirming to the Jews the rights granted under both the Grecian and Roman Emperors; and that, as Josephus states (*Antiq.*, B. xix, c. 5, sec. 3), "on account of their fidelity and friendship for the Romans." The application of the old Roman law, as confirmed in its interpretation under the early emperors, becomes especially interesting and important in tracing the trials of Jesus, and local interference with his apostles in their work.

Christ's special teaching was that his religion was divine, also, that the old law, unabrogated so far as the privilege of embracing the Jewish faith was concerned, was maintained in the Empire under Augustus, when Horace wrote, and thenceforward down to the time of Trajan, the age of Tacitus and Juvenal.

while all others were human (John x, 7, 8); that his Gospel was "the truth," rather than a truth in religion (John viii, 32), and that, as divine, his word was of universal obligation (John xviii, 37), and that it was therefore to be proclaimed to "all nations" (Matt. xxxiii, 19). And yet Jesus affirmed that he came to fulfill the Old Testament teachings (Matt. v, 17), as did also his chief apostle (Acts xxvi, 7); and by the Roman rulers his religion was regarded but a new form of the old Jewish faith, the tenets of a Jewish sect (John xviii, 35; Acts xxiv, 5). From the first, after Christ's death, Jews and proselytes of other nations, Greeks and barbarians, became Christians; and the principle, by act of all the apostles, was established, that as the Jew, by becoming a Christian, was still bound by social and civil obligations to observe the customs of his nation, so converts from other nations were to be still true to the social and civil relations of their varied nationalities (Acts ii, 9-11, 17; iv, 12; vi, 1; x, 28, 34, 35, 42; xi, 4, 18, 20, 26; xv, 1-31). The Apostle Paul, specially inspired to present the application of Christian truth to the thought and life of men of all nations, taught in Asiatic cities, as Ephesus; in Roman cities, as Philippi; and in Grecian cities, as Corinth, that men of every class and custom were to be true to the old social relations in which, before their conversion, they were held (Rom. x, 1; xiii, 1; 1 Cor. iii, 1; ix, 21; xii, 31; xv, 32; Gal. iii, 28; Phil. iii, 16). In two respects, therefore, Christian duty was in harmony with the Roman law of religious liberty; first, as inculcating personal independence and responsibility in religious belief (Mark ix, 39; 1 Cor. x, 29); second, in teaching social courtesy.

The two trials of Christ, first, before the Jewish or ecclesiastical, and second, before the Roman or civil court, illustrate the Roman law. The only penalty that the former could inflict on those who became followers of Christ was exclusion from the synagogue and its privileges (John ix, 22; xii, 42). When arraigned before the High-priest and Jewish Council, and called on for a statement of his doc-

trine, Jesus declined reply, on two grounds: first, that his hearers, not he, were, according to law as well as propriety, to testify; and, second, that in his religious teachings he had conformed to the law in this: "I ever taught where the Jews resort; in secret have I done nothing" (John xviii, 19-22). The second effort was to obtain witnesses to prove seditious acts, which might condemn him to death; but this attempt failed (Mark xiv, 55, 56). The third effort was to convict him of indirect sedition in speaking against the Temple; but this, also, failing, the next charge was blasphemy (Mark xiv, 57-64); which was a crime against Hebrew, as distinct from Roman, law. When brought now before the Roman governor the first effort was to secure his condemnation without stating the charge, and on the simple finding of the Jewish Council (John xviii, 29-31). This failing, the unproved charge of sedition was brought forward; but in this form, that he "perverteth the nation, forbidding to give tribute to Cæsar, saying that he himself is Christ, a king" (Luke xxiii, 2). Upon this Pilate asked Jesus: "Art thou the king of the Jews?" when his reply was such as to lead Pilate to say to his accusers, "I find no fault in this man" (compare Luke xxiii, 3, 4, with John xviii, 33-38). When the charge of "popular disturbance" rather than of sedition was preferred, Pilate sent Jesus to Herod, then at Jerusalem; who, returning him with ridicule alike of the man and of the charge, Pilate was able to reaffirm his decision, as that, also, of Herod, that he was innocent of the charge preferred (Luke xxiii, 5-15). After repeated efforts to overcome the clamor of the people, Pilate delivered up Jesus, not under Roman law, but in deference to the popular will; declaring, "I am innocent of the blood of this just person" (Matt. xxvii, 15-25). This trial, of course, settles the fact that the Roman law gave the liberty to embrace and propagate any new religion when its faith involved no act in violation of the civil law and of the constitution of the Roman government.

The proceedings of local governments against the apos-
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bles, Peter and Paul, further illustrate the Roman law as to religious liberty. Peter and John were by police authority arrested at Jerusalem, and held for trial till morning. Peter claimed that in advocating the truth of Christ's religion God and not man was to be obeyed; when the magistrates, knowing the Roman law, released them, "finding nothing how they might punish them" (Acts iv, 3, 19, 21). The stoning of Stephen was by a mob. The slaying of James and the imprisonment of Peter by Herod, as the term "by the sword" implies (Acts xii, 2, 3), was under military authority, at a feast, when civil law was suspended. The imprisonment of Paul at Philippi was a police arrest; and the magistrates feared the law would cause them to suffer for the violence done to the prisoner (Acts xvi, 20-24; 35-39). In the assault made at Ephesus the law register appealed to the people that they were proceeding contrary to law (Acts xix, 35-41). In Paul's successive examinations at his final arrest, first before the captain of the guard, then before the high-priest's court, then before the Roman governors, Felix and Festus, the law is on Paul's side. When again, at Rome, whither he had appealed to be heard before Cæsar, the final record of Luke is (Acts xxviii, 30, 31): "And Paul dwelt two whole years in his own hired house, and received all that came in unto him, preaching the kingdom of God, and teaching those things which concern the Lord Jesus Christ, with all confidence, no man forbidding him." If the inspired penman had been gifted with personal knowledge of all the violations of the law of religious liberty that were in after centuries to be practiced in that very city of Rome under the name of Christ and of his Church, he could not have more fully or emphatically forestalled its injustice, by the statement of what the Roman civil law allowed. The force of this statement is emphasized by the fact that not only private citizens and subjects, but even members of the imperial "household" were free to profess and maintain the new religion preached by the great apostle (Phil. i, 13; iv, 22).

At a later period Nero, then emperor, in order to shield himself from the odium of having wantonly set on fire a portion of the city of Rome, had the address to charge the crime on the Christians, against whom it was easy at that era to awaken popular suspicion, as Tacitus (*Annal.*, Lib. xv, c. 44) and Suetonius (*Nero*, c. 16) state. The charges made against the Christians, however, were not, as these records attest, that they professed a new religion; but that they held "a superstition that led to evil deeds." This false charge, made by the Roman historians, is also cited by the apostles, Peter and Paul, both of whom were put to death on the charge that they were evil doers, A. D. 67 (1 Peter ii, 12; iv, 15, 16; 2 Peter i, 5; 2 Tim. ii, 9; iv, 6, 16).

Under subsequent emperors till Constantine's accession as a Christian, freedom to exercise and propagate the Christian faith was only restricted by special imperial acts, all of which were under cover of military authority, suspending temporarily the operation of civil law; and that on the ground of political necessity. Titus imposed a special tax on the Jews, when their rebellion was subdued by force; but this was as a war indemnity, and did not restrict their religious freedom; and even this discriminating tax was temporary, since after the very brief reign of Titus it was remitted by Domitian (Sueton., *Domit.*, c. 12; Joseph. *Bell. Jud.*, B. vii, c. 6, § 6). Domitian also, for political reasons, sought to destroy the posterity of David. On this ground he banished the Apostle John to Patmos, and hence also he arrested some descendants of the Apostle Jude, but released them when they, like Jesus before Pilate, were found to believe in a purely spiritual kingdom, of which Christ was the head (Rev. i, 9; Euseb. *Eccl. Hist.*, Lib. iii, c. 20; *Chron.*, Lib. ii, Olym. 218). Under Trajan an act against secret societies was revived, and the celebrated Pliny was directed by the emperor to inquire into its application to Christians in the province of Bithynia. The result proved the charges false, and brought out fully the nice distinction between civil and religious rights and duties,

recently cited by the United States Supreme Court in their decision on cases of polygamy in Utah, as a distinction which Mr. Jefferson found prevailing among the Baptists before the recognition of the right of religious liberty in Virginia. Pliny's letter (*Epist.*, Lib. x, c. 96) to Trajan presents the following points: that those who affirmed that they were Christians "did obeisance to the emperor's image," that they met "on a stated day before day-light to unite in a hymn to Christ as God," that they "bound themselves by an oath against every crime," and that they assembled again "to partake food in common and uninjurious." The nice discrimination here made between the political reverence due to the emperor when present and in his absence to his statue, and the religious worship which could only be paid to the Divine Being, is not only recognized by Pliny in the second century, but also by Eusebius, the Church historian, in the fourth century (*Eccl. Hist.*, Lib. iii, c. 32), and by Theodosius, the stern Christian emperor of the fifth century, who prohibited pagan worship, yet claimed as emperor, from all his subjects alike, the homage always required under the empire (*Cod. Theod.*, Lib. xv, tit. 4). Pliny's investigation and report called forth a reply or "rescript" from the Emperor Trajan, approving Pliny's course, and giving to the following clause the force of a permanent edict: "Without a credible witness to the charge preferred they ought not to be subjected to criminal prosecution."

The abuse, probably, of this rescript, or virtual edict, led Hadrian, Trajan's successor, to issue an edict restricting its application, of which Justin, the martyr, gives the original Latin (*Apol.*, i, c. 69), and which Eusebius also cites (*Eccl. Hist.*, Lib. iv, c. 9), in the Greek language. Under the Antonines, Justin, the martyr, defends Christians from the charge of want of allegiance; taking for granted that they had a right to religious liberty (*Apol.*, P. I., Lib. iv, c. 12). In a preserved letter of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the son states that his father had decreed "that

persons of this class should not be subjected to any harm, unless they were proved to have committed acts injurious to the welfare of the Roman Empire" (*Epist. Anton.*, Eusebius's *Eccl. Hist.*, Part I., B. iv, c. 13, 15, 26). Under Septimus Severus local persecutions were repressed, except in case of the Montanists, who were charged with political agitation (Tertul., *Apol.* c. 7, 12, 30, 37, 49; Euseb., *Eccl. Hist.*, Lib. vi, c. 7). That the course of succeeding emperors down to Constantine was determined by like principles is attested by Roman historians, such as Lampridius and Vopiscus, by Christian writers, such as Rufinus and Dionysius, and still more by the law digests of Modestinus (*Dig.*, Lib. xlviii, tit. 19, § 30) and Plautus (Lib. v. tit. 21, § 2); in which the prohibition of new religions is restricted to those whose leaders claim a personal supernatural power; which claim the Christians denied for themselves, though they affirmed it as bestowed on Christ's inspired apostles and immediate disciples.

The special fidelity of the Christians of the early age in all their social and political relations, and the fact that the privilege of religious liberty did not interfere with that fidelity, is specially illustrated in the incident which led to the conversion of Constantine. Being present, one day, at his father's court when in an audience given to his generals, some gross violation of trust was reported to him, the emperor, indignant at the unfaithfulness of his agents, turned sternly to the Pontifex Maximus, and demanded who were the men that could be trusted. Awed by the stern demand, the high-priest, for his own safety, replied: "The Christians can be trusted." This avowal the young prince never forgot; it prompted him to personal study of the New Testament and of the Christian faith; and it led to his conversion (Euseb., *Life of Const.*, Part I, c. 51). The spirit of the prince when he came to power was controlled by the double law of Christ's teaching and the Roman Constitution in his concession of religious liberty. While the patricians generally adhered to the old religious faith, the

emperor, at great expense, had copies of the Sacred Scriptures prepared and distributed throughout the empire; some of which copies may yet, now that Turkey and the East is fully open to exploration, be found in existing Christian churches and convents, and may give the same completeness to the connection and authentication of Greek manuscripts of the New Testament which was long since attained as to Hebrew copies of the Old Testament. The emperor also visited distant parts of the empire, personally addressing immense audiences in theaters or in his own traveling tent; but he declared that, while he desired that all should become Christians, every subject of the empire should be free to enjoy his own religion (Euseb., *Life of Const.*, B. ii, c. 48-60). When African deputies wished an authoritative decision as to the views of Arius, the emperor stated his grief that, when he himself had as emperor given his adhesion to the Christian faith, injury should be brought to the truth by controversies as to individual theories, which ought either to be settled among Christian leaders or to be left to individual conviction (Euseb., *Life of Const.*, B. ii, c. 64-72). In his special edict "as to piety towards God and as to the Christian religion," he assumes, that the truth of the Christian religion is "a matter to be settled by argument," and its excellence to be attested by "the acts" of its professors; he declares that he is opposed to all persecution on account of religion, and that he grants "to all the free privilege of venerating the divine law by such worship as each one deems due" (Euseb., *Life of Const.*, B. ii, c. 24-42).

That there were violations of the spirit of this edict of Constantine, who came to power A. D. 306, as also of the Roman law and of the Christian precepts which together sustained that edict, is manifest from the digest of imperial rescripts made by Theodosius II (*Cod. Theod.*, Lib. xv, xvi, tit. 5), who succeeded to power in the Eastern Empire A. D. 408. At this era a new history begins; a system which was contrary to religious liberty gaining sway in the Western

Empire and in the Roman Church, while in the Eastern Empire and in the Greek Church the spirit of the old Roman law prevailed.

During the century from A. D. 378 to 476, the Goths and Vandals, invading the Roman Empire in the East and West in successive inroads, occupied Thrace, threatening Constantinople, overran Mesopotamia, invaded France, settled in Spain, sacked Rome A. D. 410, and took possession of the Western Empire A. D. 476, where their sway was maintained for nearly a century, till they were driven over the Alps. The Gothic conquerors accepted the Christian faith, but they brought in the spirit of ecclesiastical rule practiced by their Druid priests, against which from the days of Julius Cæsar Roman law had erected a barrier. Bringing in the ecclesiastical law of their own political institutions the Goths found among the professed Christian leaders, whom worldly ambition had been gradually introducing into the Roman Church, men who welcomed the new order of forcible conformity under a hierarchy armed with State authority. Any one who would drink deeply into the spirit of the times, which threw even good men off their balance, may trace it in the voluminous correspondence that passed in the fifth century between the great scholars Augustine, who favored, and Jerome, who opposed the new claim of ecclesiastical authority; the assertion of which led on to the papal claim of supremacy over Churches made by Gregory the Great at the opening of the seventh century, and to the establishment under Pepin and Charlemagne in the middle of the eighth century of papal supremacy over nations. The history of the modifications of Roman law which permitted the setting aside thus of the right of religious liberty is somewhat intricate; but in existing law codes and in their operation down to this day in almost every country of Europe, that history may be made practically clear. This history throws light also on that yet more intricate anomaly—the canon law.

Such was the influence of Gothic intercourse that The-

odosius II in a code issued A. D. 438, brought in an entirely new department of law (*Codex*, Lib. xv), enforcing religious conformity, forbidding not only to Pagans and Jews the free exercise of their worship, but subjecting "heretics," or separatists, as the Greek term implies, to penal inflictions of imprisonment, fines, tortures, and death when persistent (*Cod.*, Lib. xv). This code when promulgated in the East was soon adopted by Valentinian III in the Western Empire. In the East it was set aside after ninety years by the Institutes of Justinian; while, however, in the West, and throughout Europe generally, it has prevailed to this day. At the Gothic conquest of Rome, A. D. 476, it was supplemented by the Edict of Theodoric and the code of the Western Goths. In the former the penal statutes against Jews and heretics, too lengthy except for quotation in a volume (*Edic. Theod.*, 70, 71, 106, 108, 125, 126, 154), exhibit a severity appalling to the spirit of modern Americans. In the latter these penal provisions (*Lex Visi-Goth.*, Lib. xii, tit. 2, 3), though somewhat ameliorated, indicate plainly how Spain, where this code to this day is fundamental law, became the home of the Inquisition and the nursery of the Jesuit order.

The spirit of the Gothic Code existed among all the old German and Gallic tribes, as Cæsar and Tacitus intimate. When Christianized, to a considerable extent under the military sway of the very Charlemagne who confirmed the Pope's temporal power, the Druidical authority passed into the early German Codes, which were gathered and digested by ecclesiastics in Latin with numerous native terms not translatable. The inquiring reader may in Walther's *Corpus Juris Germanici Antiqui*, or "Body of Ancient German Law," trace this element in the several codes there brought together. Of the principles which have led to the intolerance in Northern and Central Europe of the Roman hierarchy, and to the perpetuated denial of religious equality and consequent true religious liberty which is fundamental in all State Churches, that of England not excepted, we can see the

animus in the following citations: *Lex Aleman.*, tit. 1-23; *Lex Bavar.*, tit. 1-13; *Lex Burgund.*, addit. tit. 15.

Meanwhile the history of the Eastern Empire leads to a new field and a different fruitage. From Theodosius II, whose code was promulgated by him as Emperor of the East at Constantinople A. D. 438, till Justinian, who came to power A. D. 527, the ecclesiastical authority provided for by the Code of Theodosius was gaining sway. When the sagacious prince, Justinian, began his administration, the spirit of the times demanded a revision of the dominant code. To this the emperor set himself with energy, and the result, after the hasty compilation in the brief space of two years, was a new and voluminous digest, into which were incorporated the imperial edicts from Hadrian down, including the ecclesiastical provisions of the Theodosian code. The working of this code, promulgated A. D. 529, was most distasteful to both the people and clergy of the Greek Church, in whom yet lived the spirit of old Grecian freedom of the individual as opposed to concentrated power in the Roman body politic. This spirit was reawakened by the virtual separation of the Eastern and Western Churches as well as the two Empires. Justinian employed the ablest lawyers of his time, and set himself to secure a brief digest of Roman law as it existed under the first emperors, when the law of the Republic still prevailed. The Institutes of Justinian, which were the result of four years' labor, first promulgated as fundamental law A. D. 533, are now published in a hand-book for French law students. The preserved remains of the old digests of Gaius, Ulpian, and others made for the early emperors are printed on the left hand page, and the Institutes of Justinian in parallel precepts on the right hand page, in order that the two may thus be constantly and throughout compared. Not a feature of ecclesiastical authority is to be found. The Christian element as compared with the old Roman law can be detected only in the date "*anno Domini*," and in the provisions (Marc., *Inst.*, Lib. iii., tit. 1, § 2-7. Comp. Just., *Instit.*, Lib.

ii., tit. 1, § 7-10) for the protection of temples and burial places by the use of the singular "Deus," God, for the plural "Deis." Besides these two indications of change, some minor ameliorations in domestic and social relations, especially in provisions for the emancipation of servants, may be traced. The whole spirit of ecclesiastical domination is, however, thoroughly eradicated. The history of these two systems of Roman law, the Theodosian and Justinian, and the hope of religious liberty under each, may be very succinctly traced. Only the leading steps in the progress of that history can be noted.

Under the Roman system of the West the clergy were separated from the people by celibacy; they became a class by themselves, with their own laws, like those of a college, which separated them from the jurisdiction of civil courts; they soon came to be regarded as "the Church," the body of Christ, while the people had no part whatever in ecclesiastical affairs; and, as the Church proper, the cup at the supper was restricted to the clergy alone. Moreover, outside of their own body the hierarchy claimed entire supervision of marriage and burial, the direct control of schools and colleges, and indirect authority over the decisions of executive and judicial officers of the government. The rules gradually developed for their own internal government, and for this external authority, became the body of "Canon Law;" while the acceptance of these provisions as ruling in any kingdom or empire took the form of a "concordat." The final blow at all this claim has been struck within the last generation by such powers as those of Austria and Italy, Spain alone being behind. The relics of the system still live in the constitutional provisions in Protestant European kingdoms for State Churches; they crossed the Atlantic with the settlers of North America; they lived in all the States except Rhode Island till the war of American Independence, and were not eradicated from the Constitution of Massachusetts till A. D. 1833.

In the Eastern Empire, as already observed, the Theo-

dosian code jarred on the old Grecian spirit for about a century, and seemed likely, at first, to be continued under Justinian. As a striking illustration how the spirit of ecclesiastical domination once introduced becomes a part of the very thought and life of the most advanced intelligence, such a historian as Gieseler, already cited, repeatedly quotes from the early "Digest" of Justinian, which fills several volumes, and which, under the sway of the Roman hierarchy, was reprinted in German and French cities, as if it had never been superseded (*Hist.*, Per. 1st, Div. iii, sec. 55).

The attestations of the spirit of the Greek Church for centuries, as opposed to that of the Roman Church in their assertion of the right of religious liberty, is most emphatic in the centuries succeeding the age of Justinian, or the sixth century. Basil, the recognized head of the modern Greek Church fathers, in the fifth century, in the age before Justinian, when contending against the assumed authority of the Roman Church hierarchy, wrote (*Epist.*, 257): "Our fathers were persecuted by worshipers of images; now we are persecuted who bear the image of Christ;" the concealed thrust at the image worship of the Roman Church at this era, always opposed in the Greek Church, being indicated in an apparent double meaning of the expression, "bear the image of Christ." In the seventh century, that following Justinian, Evagrius, writing on the controversy of his day, between the Greek and Roman Churches, in his "Defense of Variety of Opinions," argues the necessity of independent judgment in order to that personal "faith" which is required by Christ. He says: "We adore the Trinity as fundamental; as to other topics, however, our Savior has left us the faculty of free thought about them" (c. xi). He argues that "the holy Catholic Church allows the same;" quoting the old Roman law confirmed by Justinian's Institutes and the action of the early Christian as well as pagan emperors in confirmation of his statement. He contrasts the spirit of the Theodosian and Justinian codes, whose working for a century could then be observed. Evagrius cites especially

the three precepts embodying permanent principles on which all law is based: *Juris præcepta sunt hæc; honeste vivere, alterum non lædere, suum cuique tribuere*—"the precepts of right are these: To live honorably, not to injure another, and to give to each one his own." In the *Regulæ Juris*, "Rules of Right," prepared by Ulpian for Alexander Severus, about A. D. 225, and in the Institutes of Justinian, finished A. D. 533, these precepts are word for word the same. Every intelligent reader must recognize in them the principles of natural and universal, as well as of permanent Roman, law; while at the same time, as the spirit of the New Testament teaching, they must be the principles of the true Church of Christ. The history of the conflict of these principles, as applied to the question of religious liberty, may be traced all along down the history of the Greek Church in the Byzantine Greek histories of Photius, Zonaras, Cedrenus, and others.

That these precepts of Roman law, and the Institutes of Justinian based on them, are the principles recognized now in the United States of America, the only nation where entire religious equality, and consequent liberty, prevails, is indicated by this fact. When the territory on the Gulf of Mexico, from Florida on the Atlantic to Louisiana on the Mississippi, was brought into the Union, and cases of contracts formed under old Spanish and French law were to be adjudicated, this nice question arose: according to what principles should the decisions of the United States Circuit Judges be given. As the old French law was substantially the Roman civil law of continental Europe, modified by old German precedents, and as the old Spanish law was a mixture of Gothic and Roman statutes, and as now the English common law must gradually, from the influx of American residents, become dominant, it was necessary to bridge over the transition period by a sort of equity jurisprudence. That profound scholar, Edward Livingston, after the labor of years, with the aid of able French and Spanish lawyers, prepared a digested code, which awakened

universal admiration; but which the sweep of events, especially the rapid transformation of society in the Gulf States, made impracticable for adoption when, in 1824, it was completed and published. Meanwhile American as well as English translations of Justinian's Institutes, especially that of Thomas Cooper, published in Philadelphia in 1812, seemed to be in every respect adapted to the American constitution and laws as a body of principles which could be applied as precedents. The writer has, as a gift from its owner, the copy which belonged to Judge James M. Wayne, of Georgia; which, as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and having his circuit in the Gulf States from 1835 till the war of secession, he was accustomed to quote as authoritative.

This code ruled in the Greek Empire until the fall of that empire with the city of Constantinople, A. D. 1453, before the Turks. Meanwhile Russia, a growing empire, had adopted the Christian faith as a branch of the Greek Church. On the fall of the Greek Empire, its inheritance was adopted by the czar then reigning, whose wife was a sister of the fallen Greek emperor, and the token of that adopted inheritance was a substitution for the old standard of the double-headed Roman eagle; also shared by Austria, which empire, on behalf of the Ostro, or Eastern Goths, asserted its succession to the Western Empire. Shortly after the fall of the Greek Empire, in order to resist the intrigues of Roman emissaries who, under the guise of religion, were regarded as political intriguers, a severe penal statute forbidding change of religion was promulgated in the Russian Empire, which remains in force to this day. This statute, however, was not inconsistent with toleration; and hence Jews, and even Catholics, as well as pagans and Mohammedans, in Central Asia have been undisturbed in their religious faith and practice. Under the Empress Catherine, a century ago, a specially liberal construction was put on the Russian constitution and laws, when a large body of Menonites in Eastern Germany were invited into the empire.

These Mennonites were Baptists in their religious faith, and Quakers in their scruples about bearing arms. As they were quiet and submissive subjects, industrious and skilled as mechanics and agriculturists, special exemption was granted by the sagacious empress. Their entire immunity from military service continued until the recent emancipation of the serfs, like that of American slaves, changed the principle on which that exemption was granted.

Within the last twenty years the recall of German governments and of the Russian Imperial Court to old precedents has been brought about through American statesmen and Christian philanthropists. During the administration of President Pierce, 1853-57, the case of Rev. A. Wiberg, a Lutheran minister of Sweden, who had become a Baptist, and, also, of Rev. J. G. Oncken and the Baptists of Germany, was called to the attention of Hon. Wm. L. Marcy, then Secretary of State. The disability put upon numerous American sojourners at German universities, and residents as merchants, in German cities was cited; and it was urged as a breach of international courtesy that they were subjected to social ostracism if, true to their religious convictions, they attended and communed at the church of their own faith. Prior to that, American ministers and consuls resident abroad had secured, as a matter of international law, religious freedom for those associated with their embassies and offices. About the same time, through the influence of the British ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the then reigning Turkish Sultan, Abdul Medjid, had issued a *Hatti-sherif* granting to his subjects nominal religious liberty; as to whose interpretation the ambassador had written to the Earl of Clarendon, then Minister of Foreign Affairs: "Her Majesty's government distinctly demands that no punishment whatever shall attach to the Mohammedan who becomes a Christian, any more than to the Christian who becomes a Mohammedan;" an interpretation regarded as fixed in the treaty of February, 1856, signed by the several European Powers after the Crimean War. The American Secretary,

after consideration, wrote unofficially to the Courts of Prussia and Sweden, and in a few months' time the privilege of any German or Swede to unite with the Church of his own choice was granted. He also shares in the Turkish treaty.

In 1869 the case of a Lutheran community in the Baltic provinces of Russia, some of whose families had for prudential reasons united with the Russian Church, while some of their members wished to return to the Church of their fathers, but were prohibited under the penal statute cited, was brought before the International Evangelical Alliance. A large delegation of different countries went to St. Petersburg with the result recounted in the introduction to this historic statement. At the International Convention which met in New York in 1873, the case of Baptists imprisoned and fined in the Black Sea provinces of Russia under the same statute was brought before the Convention, by whom it was referred to the American, and by them to the New York branch. This body appointed a committee, of which the writer was chairman. A memorial and argument embodying the historic precedents herein cited was laid before the Russian minister at Washington. He listened for an hour to each point, acknowledged the legitimacy of its reasoning, and reported it to St. Petersburg; and the decisions of the local courts were reviewed and reversed by the Imperial Courts. Since that time Baptist Churches have sprung up in Central and Western, as well as in Southern, Russia, and the result has brought this double recognition of the excellence of the principles maintained by the Christian Churches on whose behalf the successful appeal was made. During the late Turkish War gratuitous hospital service was proffered by members of the Baptist Churches, which the *Imperial Gazette* reported with the emperor's special gratification. Moreover in the threatening Socialistic combinations, which are demanding "no religion," instead of "free religion," and with it "no government," in place of "free government," the Baptist principle of religious equality and religious liberty is coming to its due place of honor and power.

That this is a Baptist principle is just now anew brought to the world's notice. In the fifth volume of Lord Clarendon's great work on the "Rebellion" of the Puritan Cromwell, an entire chapter is given to a paper on the distinction between civil and religious liberty, drawn up by an Anabaptist who was disappointed in Cromwell's establishment of a State Puritan Church, and who at the instance of large bodies of Quakers, Anabaptists, Presbyterians, and Independents went to France to seek the recall of Charles II on his promise to administer the government on the principles of religious liberty. In the late decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, on the appealed cases of polygamy in Utah, the Chief-justice, in support of his decision that marriage relations are justly controlled by civil law, and that the right to have two wives can not be a religious right, cites Mr. Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association of Virginia in 1789, in which this distinction is recognized as peculiarly that of Baptists. "I agree with you," says Mr. Jefferson, "that religion is a matter which lies solely between a man and his God." He cites as the *two* points of agreement, first, the provision of the first amendment to the Constitution, which he characterizes as "building a wall of separation between Church and State;" and second the fact that man "has no natural rights in opposition to his social duty." American law has revived Roman social law; the Baptist Church has ever kept alive its religious law.

ARTICLE V.

SWEDENBORG AND HIS TEACHINGS.

BY REV. HENRY M. KING, D. D.

CARLYLE says, "sympathy is the first essential towards insight." If this apothegm is true in its application to the writings of Swedenborg, many men, aye, most men, will be forever debarred from the ability to comprehend that religious system which has now been before the world for a hundred years. There can be no sympathy without acquaintance. But if acquaintance fails to produce it; if indeed, familiarity results only in aversion, true insight is impossible, and the arcana of Swedenborg must remain an unlocked chamber, the key being wanting. It must be insisted, however, that for the comprehension of truths purporting to have come from God, and to be for the good of man, average ability, a sincere desire to comprehend them, and an honest effort to do so, ought to be sufficient.

A writer on Swedenborgianism in the *Christian Review* for 1842 says: "It will be objected, again, that we have misapprehended the language of Swedenborg, and consequently have misrepresented him. And to this I reply, that I make no pretensions to a sixth or seventh sense, or to any supernatural insight into things darkly and dubiously disclosed. I claim only the ordinary intelligence of a man, and if, in the exercise of this, I have not understood the writings of Swedenborg, it is only because they *can not be understood* by one of ordinary capacity and powers." "I have read," he continues, "a large amount of Swedenborg's writings, and with all the attention of which I am capable. I have read the remarks and comments of his followers. I have honestly endeavored to understand them, and I do understand the ordinary meaning of the terms employed.

I have also intended to represent them honestly and fairly. And if it be said, after all, that I have misunderstood and misrepresented them, I can only reply that they are then unintelligible. They are *so* unintelligible that by honest minds of ordinary capacity *they can not be understood.*"

Professor Pond, in the preface of his revised edition of "Swedenborgianism Examined," a small volume which was first published in 1846, remarks:

"To those who take exceptions to the peculiarities of Swedenborg the most common reply has been, 'you are not in a condition to judge of him, you do not understand him, you have not read his works.' To obviate an objection like this, and at the same time to qualify myself for the undertaking I had proposed, I got together, first of all, the religious publications of Swedenborg, amounting to more than thirty volumes, and the works of his principal disciples and advocates, amounting to forty volumes more, and gave them an attentive perusal. Some of them were read more than once, and notes were taken of them. Meanwhile I was not able to find a single volume on the other side of the question. There was here and there a brief article in some periodical, or a few numbers in the columns of a newspaper; but a book, a volume, in opposition to the claims of Swedenborg was not to be found. Several works of this kind had been published years before in England, but they had scarcely found their way to this country, and were at that time unknown. Nor, with the exception of a little volume by the late Dr. Woods, of Andover, am I aware that any thing of importance in opposition to Swedenborg has been published since."*

Several reasons may be assigned why Swedenborg and his writings have been so generally let alone by those who have not believed in his pretensions, and have had no sympathy with his theological system. His followers have always been few in number and seemed little likely to undertake any aggressive movement with much prospect of success. They have never been regarded as opponents sufficiently prominent to merit serious attention. The character of Swedenborg's theological writings, based upon what seems to be an arbitrary and fanciful theory of interpretation, and including, as an important and essential part, numerous unauthenticated and ludicrous revelations of the other world, has repelled sober seekers after truth; while the great mass of material to be gone over before one

* This preface was written in 1860.

would be thoroughly qualified to undertake an exhaustive review of the doctrines of the New Church has made men shrink from a work so vast, requiring unusual powers of application and half a life-time for its accomplishment.

I can not claim to have made such extensive preparation for this brief paper as Professor Pond made for his volume, but such time as I have been able to secure in a period stretching over several months I have devoted to it, and I have availed myself of the results of the protracted labors of Dr. Pond and others, so far as they have been accessible. I propose to give a sketch of Swedenborg's life and character, and a presentation of his theological views which stand opposed to the prominent doctrines of evangelical Christianity.

Jesper Swedberg, the father of Emanuel, was born near Fahlun, in Sweden, in 1653. He is reported to have been a man of varied learning, of considerable influence, and of amiable private character. A clergyman by profession, he received several important appointments, all of which he filled honorably. He was court chaplain, professor of theology, and provost of the cathedral at Upsal, and subsequently was appointed bishop of Skara in West Gothland. For many years he was superintendent of the Swedish missions in England and America. "The character of this prelate," it is said, "stood high in Sweden; his voice was heard on great occasions, whether to reassure the people under the calamity of battle or pestilence, or to rebuke the vicious manners of the upper classes or the faults of the king himself; he labored with constant and vigorous patriotism to rouse the public spirit of the country for useful and Christian objects." From a book published by him in 1709, entitled "Divine Exercises and Comfortable Conversations with a Sorrowful Soul," and dedicated to his children and grandchildren, it appears that he had three sons and four daughters, viz., Anna, Emanuel, Eliezur, Hedwig, Catherina, Jesper, and Margereta. He was a voluminous author, and in this respect at least two of his sons resembled

him. "I can scarcely believe," he said, "that any body in Sweden has written so much as I have done, since I think ten carts could scarcely carry away what I have written and printed at my own expense, and yet there is much, yea, nearly as much, not printed. And my son Jesper has the same inclination, for he wrote much and with pleasure." He made no allusion in these words to his son Emanuel and his proficiency as an author, possibly because, though it is hardly conceivable, his works were so few in number in comparison with those of his father and his younger brother that they deserved no mention.

It is evident from the character of Bishop Swedberg, his love of good learning, and his public position, that his children were situated most favorably for the acquisition of a thorough education, and had every needful advantage for the development of natural powers. So honorable was the position of the Swedberg family that in 1719 it was ennobled by Queen Ulrica Elconora, and from that time the children bore the new name of Swedenborg, though the Bishop never assumed it. Wilkinson in his biography of Swedenborg says, however, that "the new rank conferred no title beyond the change of name; he was not either a count or a baron, as is commonly supposed."

Emanuel Swedenborg, who, according to Wilkinson's biography, was the third child and second son of the Bishop, was born at Stockholm, in Sweden, on the 29th of January, 1688 (not 1689, as he stated in a letter to Dr. Hartley written in 1769). Of his childhood we have no record except a letter which he wrote to Dr. Beyer in answer to his inquiries. In this letter he said: "With regard to what passed in the earliest part of my life, about which you wished to be informed: From my fourth to my tenth year my thoughts were constantly engrossed by reflecting on God, on salvation, and on the spiritual affections of man. I often revealed things in my discourse which filled my parents with astonishment, and made them declare at times that certainly the angels spoke through my mouth. From

my sixth to my twelfth year it was my greatest delight to converse with the clergy concerning faith," though, as he said, "I knew of no other faith or belief at that time than that God is the Creator and Preserver of nature; that he endues man with understanding, good inclinations, and other gifts derived from these. I knew nothing at that time of the systematic or dogmatic kind of faith, that God the Father imputes the righteousness or merits of his Son to whomsoever, and at whatever times, he wills, even to the impenitent. And had I heard of such a faith, it would have been then, as now, perfectly unintelligible to me." Thus early in life was the mind of Swedenborg turned to religious subjects, and in those early days he found the beginnings of the intense hostility which he subsequently manifested to the commonly accepted doctrines of grace.

The education of Swedenborg was carefully provided for, and he seems to have made good use of his advantages, acquitting himself with honor at the university of Upsal. His attainments in the study of languages, both ancient and modern, of mathematics, of mineralogy, and natural philosophy were more than ordinary. He took the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1709, at the age of twenty-one. The next four or five years he spent in travel, visiting London and Oxford, and then traveling quite extensively in Holland, France, and Germany. During this time he wrote to his brother-in-law that he was "alternating mathematics with poetry in his studies." Indeed, he seems to have exhibited not a little proficiency as a writer of Latin verse, and on his return from his travels, in 1715, he published a small volume of poems, characterized by a fruitful fancy and a vivid imagination. One of his admiring friends said: "I have now in my possession some remains of his Latin poetry, which Ovid would not be ashamed to own." That he possessed wonderful imaginative powers, no one who is familiar with his theological writings will be inclined to question. He had, however, a special fondness for mathematical and scientific studies, and, being allowed

by his father to choose his own profession and course in life, he resumed his connection with the university at Upsal, and gave himself wholly to his favorite pursuits. He became editor of a scientific periodical, and fell under the notice of Christopher Polheim, the Counselor of Commerce, who was called the Swedish Archimedes. Between them a very strong friendship sprang up. In 1716 Swedenborg was presented by Polheim to Charles XII, who received him with much favor, and was pleased to take him under his royal patronage. A professorship in the university was offered to him, but, declining this, he was appointed Assessor Extraordinary of the Board of Mines. This position he held for more than thirty years, and the income of it was continued to him until his death. "It is not upon an effeminate young man, destitute of talents," said Sandel, in his eulogy of Swedenborg, "that an enlightened monarch confers such employments. Swedenborg was already known both in the kingdom and abroad for his learning and his great qualities."

In 1718 Swedenborg gave a practical exhibition of his mechanical ingenuity in the invention of appliances for the successful transportation of several ships of war over the mountains which separate Sweden from Norway, that they might be brought to the support of the king in the siege of Frederickshall. The distance was fourteen miles, and the successful execution of the undertaking was certainly remarkable. Swedenborg himself was not present, having, it is said, "escaped the Winter campaign in Norway very narrowly, and not without employing some little management." It was at this siege that Charles XII lost his life, at the early age of thirty-six.

It could not have been long before this fatal Winter that an incident occurred which influenced the entire life of Swedenborg. He was twenty-nine, possibly thirty, years of age, and at the time was residing in the family of Counselor Polheim, being his pupil in mathematics, and at the same time his assistant in the erection of certain public

works. Polheim had two daughters. For the younger of them, then only a girl of thirteen years, a very tender affection sprang up in Swedenborg's heart. To Emerentia (that was the maiden's name) his attentions were unwelcome. Her father, whose attachment for Swedenborg seems to have been unbounded, gave to him an agreement, which she was compelled to sign, that at some future time she should be his. It is said that King Charles recommended, or at least favored, the marriage, wishing to unite his engineers by closer ties. But Emerentia was so depressed in spirit, by reason of the forced obligation, that her brother Gabriel (good angel that he was) stole the written agreement and destroyed it. Swedenborg, whose chief comfort was found in reading the cherished document from day to day, quickly missed it. His great grief was soon apparent to the father, and its cause discovered. Swedenborg, however, becoming convinced that Emerentia's aversion to him could not be overcome, relinquished all claims to her hand, and resolved never to marry. This resolution he kept, though he always showed great fondness for the society of ladies. Emerentia was subsequently married to Rückerskiöld, the Counselor of Justice. After her decease Swedenborg is said to have assured her children that he could converse with their departed mother whenever he wished. Whether this was any gratification to him, and whether she then returned his affection, we are not informed.

It should be stated that Swedenborg was not altogether happy in his relations to his own family. Wilkinson says: "In these years," referring to the period of which I am writing, "he was not without family discrepancies which caused him pain." For some reasons, which his biographers do not mention, the affections of his father and his mother were estranged from him, although it is said he "was using every effort to forward the interests of his family, and especially of his brothers, through his connection with the highest personages in the realm." His sisters married well. One became the wife of Eric Benzelius, who was afterward

Archbishop of Upsal. A second was married to Lars Benzelstierna, who was promoted to a provincial government. In the next generation there were at least two bishops in the family, and other relatives enjoyed positions of dignity and influence. Swedenborg lived on terms of friendship with all of the ten bishops of the Church, and also with the senators and the nobility. After the ennoblement of the family, in 1719, he "took his seat with the nobles of the Equestrian Order in the triennial assemblies of the States."

Notwithstanding his eminent social position, the royal patronage which he had received, and his increasing reputation as a scholar, Swedenborg was quite dissatisfied with his condition and prospects. He complained that his labors were not appreciated, "for," he said, "speculations and inventions like mine find no patronage or bread in Sweden, and are looked down upon by a number of political block-heads as a sort of school-boy exercise, which ought to stand quite back, while their presumptuous finesse and intrigue step forward." Nevertheless, for the next twenty-five years he devoted himself with great fidelity to his studies, which covered a wide range, and to the duties of his office. He traveled much, becoming acquainted with distinguished scholars in other countries, examining the principal mines and smelting establishments, and endeavoring to make himself more efficient in his official position. From 1719 to 1722 he spent most of the time abroad, and during this absence secured the favor of the Duke of Brunswick, who assisted him in his travels, and bore the entire expense of the publication of some of his works. In 1729 he was chosen a member of the Royal Academy of Sciences, in Stockholm. In 1733 he visited Berlin and Dresden, and in the following year he was made a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. In 1736 he set out, with the consent of the king, for an absence of three or four years in foreign lands, visiting Denmark, Holland, and France, and spending a year in Rome and Venice. During all these years he was very active with his pen, and

his publications, which were for the most part on scientific and philosophical subjects, followed each other in rapid succession. Previous to 1719 he had given to the public three or four small volumes of minor importance. In that year it may be said that he began his prodigious work as an author. A brief sketch of his publications will show the laborious life which he lived, and the nature and extent of his studies.

In 1719 he published four works: 1. "A Proposal for Fixing the Value of Coins." 2. "A Treatise on the Position of the Earth and Planets." 3. "A Treatise on the Height of the Tides." 4. "A Treatise on Docks, Sluices, and Salt Works."

In 1721 he published six small works on different subjects in chemistry, mechanics, and astronomy. These were published at Amsterdam.

In 1722 he published, at Leipsic and Hamburg, a work in four parts, entitled, "Miscellanea Observata circa Res Naturales," which treated particularly of minerals, fire, and the strata of mountains.

In 1734, after an interval of twelve years, there appeared at Dresden and Leipsic his "Opera Philosophica et Mineralia," in three volumes, folio, of about four hundred pages each. These volumes were distinct treatises, dedicated to different men, but published together, and at the expense of the Duke of Brunswick, at whose court Swedenborg received many attentions. The first volume, bearing the title of "Principia," was dedicated to the Duke. The full title was, "First Principles of Natural Things; being New Attempts towards a Philosophical Explanation of the Elementary World." In this volume he declared his belief that "no man can be a complete and truly learned philosopher without the utmost devotion for the Supreme Being. True philosophy and contempt for the Deity are two opposites." The second and third volumes were called "Regnum Minerale."

In 1734 he issued, at Leipsic, a small work, called "Outlines of a Philosophical Argument on the Infinite, and the

Final Cause of Creation; and on the Intercourse between the Soul and Body."

In 1740-41 he published his "*Œconomia Regni Animalis*," a quarto. The first part treats of the blood, arteries, veins, and heart, and contains an "Introduction to Rational Psychology." The second part treats of the motion of the brain, of the cortical substance, and of the human soul.

In 1744 he published another great work under the same general title of "*The Animal Kingdom*." This treats of the viscera of the chest and the abdomen, and of the different organs of sense.

In the same year, and also in London, he published still another volume, quite different in character from his previous works, called "*The Worship and Love of God*." Its style is beautiful and poetic.

These works compose the list of his publications up to this time, or at least those which can with certainty be ascribed to him. Some of them were regarded as of great value, and those upon the animal kingdom, it is claimed, contained important discoveries which were afterward attributed to others. He was certainly a diligent student and writer. He had secured a European reputation, and was in correspondence with learned men of other countries. He was already an independent thinker, and pressed on to new positions in the realms of science and philosophy. Many of his theories and speculations, however, were believed to be unsound, and were rejected by his contemporaries. One of his friendly biographers says: "So long as he confined himself to the practical sphere, his treatises met with a fair share of approval, both in his own country and throughout Europe; but the moment his own genius appeared, it consigned him . . . to temporary oblivion, a goal at which he arrived after passing through some preliminary opprobrium." As early as 1722 a reviewer said: "The author has displayed great abilities and equal industry; but how far he has followed truth in his theories let others decide." In 1735 he was charged with holding materialistic views; and, in 1747, a

reviewer of his "Animal Kingdom" concluded with these words—"So much for Swedenborgian dreams."

It will be remembered that Swedenborg's volumes upon the animal kingdom treated of the different parts of the human body. He was not a practical anatomist. The report that he attended the instructions of Boerhaave, at Leyden, with the elder Monro, the eminent English physician and anatomist, is purely traditional. It is acknowledged that "the object of Swedenborg, in investigating the organization of the human body, was to obtain a knowledge of the soul, which he was already convinced had some correspondence with the body." Another has said: "By the most careful research he was hoping to discover the hidden bond which linked the material to the immaterial—the earthly to the spiritual; or at least that he might acquaint himself with the properties of the latter, by means of its assumed correspondence with the former." It will be interesting to listen to Swedenborg's own statement of this important matter. In his Introduction to the "Animal Kingdom," speaking of his determination to discover the soul, he says:

"To accomplish this end I enter the circus, designing to consider and thoroughly to examine that whole world or microcosm which the soul inhabits; since I am persuaded she can not be sought for anywhere but in her own kingdom. For, tell me, where else is she to be found, but in that system to which she is *ad-joined* and *in-joined*, in which she is represented, and every moment exhibits herself for contemplation? The body is her image, resemblance, and type. She herself is the model, the idea, the head, that is, *the soul* of her body: and thus is she represented in her body as in a mirror. For this reason I am induced to examine attentively the whole anatomy of her body, from the heel to the head, and from part to part: and that I may come nearer to my subject, I have determined to explore the brain itself, where the soul has arranged her first organs. Next, I shall examine the fibres, with the rest of the purer organical forms, and the forces and modes thence resulting. But, whereas, it is not possible to make a leap from the organical, physical, and material, immediately to the soul, of which neither matter nor any of the adjuncts of matter are predicable, therefore it was necessary for me to prepare new ways by which I might be led to her, and might gain access to her palace. In other words, it was necessary, with the most intense application of mind, to unfold, extricate, and bring to light some new doctrines for my guidance, namely: The doctrines of forms, of orders and degrees, of series and society, of communications and influxes, of correspondences, representations and modifications. . . I have determined not to desist from my task until I have explored

the whole animal kingdom, even to the soul. And my hope is, if I bend my course continually inwards, that I shall be enabled, through the divine favor, to open all the doors which lead to her presence, and at length to be admitted to the view and contemplation of herself."

It is well known that a persistent search for the philosopher's stone, the elixir of eternal youth, the laws and principles which would result in perpetual motion; in a word, the attempted discovery of the undiscoverable, is either indicative of mental weakness or likely to result in a species of monomania. Such seekers form a class by themselves, and present to us illustrations of curious mental phenomena, which make a most interesting study. Whether Swedenborg, who devoted himself at this time with the most persistent application to the discovery of the mysterious and inscrutable connection between the soul and body, is to be put in the class of persons mentioned above must be determined by the consideration of his subsequent life.

We have now reached a point which Swedenborg regarded as the most important in all his life, at which he is believed by his followers to have entered upon a new career and to have been called by God to a special divine office. Now began what is called his "illumination." His previous years and studies may have been in some way a preparation for his new and sacred work, but his life from this time was distinct and peculiar. His "Animal Kingdom," in which he had recorded some of the results of his investigation of the relation of the soul to the body, appeared in 1744. This was to have been followed by another, a supplementary treatise, which, it seems, never appeared. While in London, thus absorbed in his exhausting and bewildering studies, he was prostrated by a severe sickness—fever accompanied by delirium. This fact has been disputed, but Dr. Hartley, the personal friend and follower of Swedenborg, alludes to it as a fact, and other testimony is not wanting. This sickness was probably in the Winter of 1744-5. Soon after his recovery, or during his recovery, the remarkable event occurred from which he dated his spiritual illumination and his divine call. The account of it he has left in his own words:

“I was at London, and one day dined rather late by myself at a boarding-house where I kept a room, in which at pleasure I could prosecute the study of the natural sciences. I was hungry and ate with great appetite. At the end of the meal I remarked that a vapor, as it were, clouded my sight, and the walls of my chamber appeared to be covered by frightful creeping things, such as serpents, toads, and the like. I was filled with astonishment, but retained the full use of my perception and thoughts. The darkness attained its height and then passed away. I then perceived a man sitting in the corner of my chamber. As I thought myself entirely alone, I was greatly terrified, when he spoke and said, ‘Eat not so much.’ The cloud once more came over my sight, and when it passed away I found myself alone in the chamber. This unexpected event hastened my return home. I did not mention the subject to the people of the house, but reflected upon it much, and believed it to have been the effect of accidental causes, or to have arisen from my physical state at the time. I went home, but on the following night the same man appeared to me again. He said, ‘I am God the Lord, the Creator and Redeemer of the world. I have chosen thee to lay before men the spiritual sense of the holy Word. I will teach thee what thou art to write.’ On that same night were opened to my perception the heavens and the hells, where I saw many persons of my acquaintance of all conditions. From this day forth I gave up all merely worldly learning and labored only in spiritual things, according to what the Lord commanded me to write. Daily he opened the eyes of my spirit to see what was done in the other world, and gave me, in a state of full wakefulness, to converse with angels and spirits.” *

* The same event is narrated in his diary as follows:

“A vision in the day-time of those who are devoted to conviviality in eating and indulge their appetites.

“397. In the middle of the day at dinner an angel spoke to me and told me not to eat too much at table. Whilst he was with me, there plainly appeared to me a kind of vapor steaming from the pores of the body.

Such is Swedenborg's account of the manner of his call and the nature of the duties and privileges to which he was summoned. He sincerely believed in the reality of this vision and in his interpretation of the will of God, which he supposed was then and subsequently made known to him. To Dr. Oetinger he wrote in 1766: "I can sacredly and solemnly declare that the Lord himself has been seen of me, and that he has sent me to do what I do, and for such purpose he has opened and enlightened the interior part of my soul, which is my spirit, so that I can see what is in the spiritual world, and those that are therein; and this privilege has now been continued to me for twenty-two years." With reference to the special work to which he felt himself called and the position which he was to hold as a religious teacher, it may be well to quote from his words still further. To the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt he wrote: "The Lord our Savior had foretold that he would come again into the world, and that he would establish there a new Church. He has given this prediction in the Apocalypse, xxi and xxii, and also in several places in the Evangelists. But as he can not come again into the world in person, it was necessary that he should do it by means of a man, who should not only receive the doctrine of the true Church in his understanding, but also publish it by printing; and as the Lord had prepared me for this office from my infancy, he has manifested himself in person before me, his servant, and sent me to fill it. This took place in the year 1743 [1745]."*

It was a most visible watery vapor, and fell downwards to the ground upon the carpet, where it collected and turned into divers vermin, which were gathered together under the table, and in a moment went off with a pop or noise. A fiery light appeared within them, and a sound was heard, pronouncing that all the vermin that could possibly be generated by unseemly appetite were thus cast out of my body and burnt up, and that I was now cleansed from them. Hence we may know what luxury and the like have for their bosom contents. 1745, April."

*In Swedenborg's letters several instances are found of the variation of a year or two in the use of dates from the accurate figures. This is probably to be explained by reason of the spiritual sense which he saw in

Swedenborg was now fifty-seven years of age. From this time he gave himself up entirely to the sacred duties, which in this strange and, to him, supernatural way were imposed upon him. He resigned his office as assessor of the Board of Mines, although, as before stated, he was still permitted to draw the salary of the office. He had inherited, according to Robsahm, considerable wealth from his father, who had died nearly ten years before. With such provisions he was able, though abstaining from all secular pursuits, to meet his personal wants, which were few and simple, and bear the expense of publishing the numerous volumes which were to make known and preserve his new doctrines and wonderful revelations. His residence alternated between Sweden and England. Much of the time he spent in London, since there he seems to have found greater facilities for the publication of his works. He read little, except the Bible in the original languages, devoting himself to its study and the exposition of its hidden or spiritual meaning. His study is said to have contained no books besides the Hebrew and Greek Testaments and the ever increasing indexes of his own works. His habits of life were exceedingly simple. He made his home with an old gardener and his wife. She made his bed for him, and brought to him a pitcher of water daily. As for the rest he cared for himself, making his coffee at the fire in his study, and drinking it often day and night. His dinner at home consisted of a small loaf or roll, and boiled milk. He was sometimes invited out to dine, and usually accepted such invitations, making himself agreeable in whatever company he was, talking freely of himself and his mission. He received many visitors at his home, who

them. When asked why in his letter to Dr. Hartley he had given as the date of his birth 1689, instead of the correct date, 1688, he replied: "Every cipher or number has in the spiritual sense a certain correspondence or signification. Now, when I put the true year in that letter, an angel present told me to write the year 1689, as much more suitable to myself than the other; 'and you observe,' answered the angel, 'that with us time and space are nothing.'" Such angels would hardly make very trustworthy historians.

were drawn to him, for the most part by curiosity, as his character and claims became more widely known. He had no stated hours of employment and repose, often laboring all night. "When I am sleepy," he said, "I go to bed." Mr. Shearsmith, the gardener, has made us minutely acquainted with his personal appearance at this time. He was in stature about five feet and nine inches, rather thin, and of brown complexion. His eyes were of a brown-gray color, nearly hazel, and quite small. He was never seen to laugh, but had always a cheerful smile upon his countenance. Sometimes in his dress there was an appearance of singularity or forgetfulness, though he generally wore a dark brown coat and waistcoat, with black velvet breeches, except in the morning, when he had on a long gown. When he was in full dress he wore his clothes all of velvet, and appeared with a cocked hat and a sword in a silver scabbard. He wore spectacles, and on the street carried a gold-headed cane. In his portrait Dr. Elliotson saw the absent, vacant look of "an amiable lunatic;" while Mr. Wilkinson saw an eye lustrous with the light of the souls of angels. "If there is a vacancy," he said, "it is only a space for spirits, and when it was filled by them, Swedenborg would no doubt shine from the borrowed souls to those who saw him." Thus he lived and studied and had visions of other worlds for a period of twenty-seven years, leading a somewhat eccentric and secluded, but upright and inoffensive life, called by some a heretic, by others a madman, by still others a prophet of the Lord.

His published writings during this period would amount to twenty-seven volumes octavo, of five hundred pages each. Twenty of these are devoted to the explanation of the spiritual sense of the Word of God. To this vast amount should be added six or eight volumes more, which he left in manuscript, made up principally of his spiritual diary and notes to some books of the Old Testament for his own use. These have since been edited and published by Dr. Tafel. Any account which can here be given of the con-

tents of these heavy and numerous volumes must, of course, be very meagre and imperfect. Of his exegetical writings the principal volumes are the "*Arcana Cœlestia*" (originally published in London in eight volumes quarto, containing 10,837 paragraphs, an exposition of the spiritual sense of the books of Genesis and Exodus), the "*Apocalypse Explained*," and the "*Apocalypse Revealed*." His explanatory notes are interspersed with long narratives, memorable relations of what he had heard and seen in the world of spirits. Of his other works some are doctrinal, some metaphysical (though he is said to have detested metaphysics), some ethical and moral, and some are descriptive of the spiritual world and of man after death. The titles of the more important of these miscellaneous writings are "*Divine Love and Wisdom*;" "*The Delights of Wisdom concerning Conjugal Love, and the Pleasures of Insanity concerning Scortatory Love*;" "*The Last Judgment*," and "*Heaven and Hell*." The style of Swedenborg is peculiar, and in it is the frequent recurrence of certain marked words and phrases, which his followers are ever repeating after him.

Before giving an account of his theological views, it will be necessary to say a few words upon his character as a prophet, and the nature of his wonderful visions. As to his state of mind when his spiritual senses were opened, Swedenborg himself said little in explanation, and his followers are not agreed. Dr. Hartley declares that "he was endued with heavenly gifts beyond any of the prophets that preceded him." His biographer, Mr. Hobart, confesses, however, that "Swedenborg can in no wise be compared with the ancient prophets." Mr. Bush and others think that "the psychological condition of the prophets was substantially the same" as his. Swedenborg claimed to be acting under divine guidance in all the doctrines which he unfolded, and in all the revelations which he narrated. There has been a disposition to find the miraculous in his life. But he made no such pretensions, and confessed that he could work no wonders. Two or three incidents are told, which seem to

be well authenticated, which show that he possessed the gift of second sight. While Swedenborg disclaimed all ability to work miracles, he professed to be in frequent communication with departed spirits, to visit them in their abodes, to be acquainted with their condition, which he minutely described, and to hold friendly conversation with them, and also with the inhabitants of other planets in the universe. His knowledge of the planets, however, was limited to those which were then known, and some of his positive statements have been proved false by the discoveries of modern astronomy.*

Of the "Earths of the Universe" and their inhabitants, with whom he conversed in vast numbers, he gives much ludicrous information. The inhabitants of Mercury are a very intellectual people, and have a great thirst for knowledge. They are haughty, petulant, self-conceited, and excessively loquacious. The women wear linen caps, and the men wear dark blue, closely fitting garments. The inhabitants of Jupiter marry young; love their children; have large, handsome faces; go on all-fours; are generally religious, and are devotedly attached to the doctrines of the New Church, though some of them are afflicted with a species of Popery, having been visited by Romish emissaries from the earth—an exhibition of propagandism, probably, for which the Church of Rome claims no credit. The inhabitants of Mars are a better class than those of Mercury or Jupiter; have no external speech or respiration, and no civil government; live in associations like our Fourier societies; have a great sense of their unworthiness, and acknowledge that all their goodness is from the Lord. The upper part of their faces is yellow, and the lower part black. They light and heat their houses with burning fluids. The inhabitants of Saturn

*Swedenborg stated positively that the planet Saturn was the farthest distant from the sun. Its distance is nine hundred and nine millions of miles. Uranus, discovered by Herschel, in 1781, is reckoned at eighteen hundred and twenty-eight millions of miles distant, and Neptune, which was first seen in 1846, is found to be twenty-eight hundred and sixty-two millions of miles distant.

are upright, modest, and very religious. They do not bury their dead, but cover them with the branches of trees. The inhabitants of Venus are divided into two classes: the one is mild and humane, the other savage and brutal. The latter are very large in stature, and very irreligious: but some of them will be finally saved, having passed through a kind of purgatory after death. On the other hand, the inhabitants of the moon are very small—not larger than children of seven years. They have ugly features, and ride on each other's backs. They do not speak from the lungs, but from the abdomen, and their voices are deep-toned, like the sound of thunder. "According to Swedenborg, there is no written language in any world but ours; and it was this circumstance which induced the Lord of glory to become incarnate, and to die upon the earth." Swedenborg conversed with the spirits of other planets, also, beyond the solar system, and he describes their peculiarities in a manner no less amusing and absurd. Some of them had been very much annoyed by visitors from the earth, who had endeavored to force upon them the doctrine of the Trinity. But so far as these distant peoples had any religious faith they seemed to be firm believers in the doctrines of the New Church. All this narration, which forms but a small specimen of what Swedenborg has made known, and which reminds one of nothing so much as of "Gulliver's Travels," is given with the utmost seriousness, and is to be accepted as trustworthy revelation, received by Swedenborg in the world of spirits, and published by divine authority.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

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ARTICLE VI. INSPIRATION.

BY REV. G. W. LASHER, D. D.

THE recent appearance, in a prominent and influential periodical, of six articles by six contributors representing as many different views, held by different classes of professed Christians, tends to attract special attention to this subject, and makes it evident that the question of Inspiration is emphatically *a living one*.

Having been doubted, discussed, and admitted, in the early ages of Christianity, it gave place to the "great doctrines" which it was held to establish. The Trinity, Original Sin, Predestination, Free Grace, arose and overshadowed it, because founded upon it as a postulate without which there could be no ground for discussion. Then came the drive of the School-men, the Shibboleths of so-called philosophers—the Real Presence, the Immaculate Conception, Supererogation, and Indulgence—"the hay, wood, and stubble" of a corrupt age and more corrupt Church. Then came the period of the great Reformation, and a return to the themes of the fathers; the re-opening and re-adjustment of the great doctrinal questions founded upon inspiration as an admitted fact. Then came the desperate efforts of Infidelity, passing beyond the fact of inspiration, and erecting its batteries over against the Credibility of the Word of God. It was not asked: "Do these books, called the Bible, teach infallible truth, set forth by the pen of Inspiration?" but, "Do they come to us bearing the ordinary and requisite marks of authenticity? Is Christianity reasonable? Can it be established on the ordinary principles of criticism?" The enemies of Christianity became bold—even reckless—and suffered an overwhelming defeat. Rousseau, Voltaire, Hume, Gibbon,

and Paine have gone "to their own place," and their works are rapidly following them. Now, he who would destroy the influence of the Word of God, overcome the Spirit of Truth in his convincing power, must do it, not by denying the authenticity or credibility of these records, as a whole, but by casting doubt upon their real authorship. In other words, it must be by so beclouding the question of their inspiration as to render the reader always liable to a serious doubt whether he has before him really the expressed "mind of the Spirit."

It was a conviction in the minds of the ancients, whether pagan or enjoying divine illumination, that a revelation of the Divine Being is not only desirable, but *necessary*. To use the words of a learned, forcible, and eloquent writer: * "Revelation is a postulate of human nature. . . . There comes up from the earliest ages which have left us their record, the cry of the inquiring, longing soul, 'Oh that I knew where I might find Him!' 'Wherewith shall I approach Him, and how shall I order my way before Him?' 'If a man die, shall he live again?' And with this cry comes the thought of a revelation as the only means by which it can be answered. The sense of this need found voice repeatedly among the philosophers of classic antiquity. Iamblichus, in describing the religious belief of Pythagoras and his followers, writes: 'It is manifest that those things are to be done which are pleasing to God: but what they are it is not easy to know, except man were taught them by God himself, or by some person who had received them from God, or obtained the knowledge of them through some divine means.'" And this want Iamblichus endeavored to supply when, not satisfied with the intuitive perception of the Divine Nature boasted by Plotinus and Porphyry, he devised the doctrine of a Theurgy, or a species of direct communication which is secured by bringing the god down to the sphere of mortals, an idea probably borrowed, indeed, from Christianity, but despoiled of all truth by its passage

*A. P. Peabody, D. D., LL. D.—"Christianity the Religion of Nature," p. 34.

through so corrupting a medium as the brain of the professed philosopher.

In this connection it is natural to inquire into the opinions of the great masters, Socrates and Plato; and we accordingly find a definite expression of the views of Socrates as reported by Plato. In a conversation with Alcibiades, whom the philosopher chances to meet on his way to a temple for the purpose of prayer, Socrates endeavors to teach him the need of great caution in prayer, because of the ignorance of man, not only as to the things most needful for himself, but also with regard to the nature of the gods.

"It is, therefore," says he, "necessary to wait until one may learn how he ought to be affected towards gods and towards men." "When," exclaims Alcibiades, "when, O Socrates, will that time be? and who is he who shall teach me? for it seems to me most desirable to see the man, who he is." "He is one," replies Socrates, "who has an interest in you. But it seems to me that just as Homer says Minerva took away the mist from the eyes of Diomedes,

'And set to view the warring deities,'

so, also, it is needful to remove the darkness which now rests upon your mind, and at the same time bring to you the means by which you shall know both good and evil; for now you do not seem to me to be able." "Let him take away, if he wishes," says Alcibiades, "either the darkness or any thing else; I am even now prepared to shun no one of those things enjoined by him, if only I may become better." *

These citations might be multiplied to prove that such was the prevailing idea among the thinkers of antiquity. And this spirit has not yet departed. As a result of such longings of the human soul, we find that all systems of paganism have, mixed up with other human inventions, what they call revelations. The Holy Books, Oracles, and Prophecies of all heathenism are but the human filling to this otherwise "aching void in the veiled heart." Missionaries

* 2 Alcibiades, xiii, xiv.

to the heathen tell us that while they have many and grievous obstacles to encounter from the inherent wickedness of the human heart, they seldom meet with difficulty in the matter of revelation. On the other hand, the fact that the missionary professes to possess a revelation from heaven does much to open the way to the minds, if not to the hearts, of his hearers.

This demand for a revelation being acknowledged, the next question suggested is: *Has the demand been met in the provisions of Providence!*

On *a priori* ground, we may argue that it has. He who has provided so fully for all the other wants of the soul, who adapted the universe to the demands of an inquiring mind, who has provided for the social as well as for the physical wants of man, certainly he has not created this longing desire for a knowledge of himself without having also provided for its gratification. "The voices of the soul" are, indeed, "answered in God," but the fact could be known to us only through a revelation of himself to the soul. We seek, therefore, for the

EVIDENCE OF THE FACT OF REVELATION.

We find the Jews declaring and maintaining, with a perfect unanimity, that they are the real possessors of this revelation. They are so thoroughly convinced of it that they had rather die than deny it, or cast any doubt upon the fact. We examine the books claimed to embody that revelation, and find them to contain just what we desire to know—just what Pythagoras and Socrates, Plato and Cicero did not know, yet so earnestly desired, longed for, and expected. The more carefully we examine these books, the more thoroughly are we convinced, until the doubts of skeptics, the sneers of cynics, and the open defamation of atheists have no power to shake our faith. Besides all this, we find the Jews not only claiming that these books are of divine authority, but that they were *divinely written*. In order to be convinced of this fact we have but to con-

sider the circumstances of their collection and compilation. We are aware that while these were detached, written at various times, and for various purposes, there were also others written, often by good men, and with good intentions, scattered throughout the Jewish nation, and attracting to themselves more or less attention. But, in the providence of God, there came a time when the sacred books should be gathered together, and all the spurious, whether pretending to an authoritative character or otherwise, eliminated. To the cursory observer it might be difficult to decide which of these were worthy and which unworthy of credence—which should be retained, and which cast out. This subject has attracted much attention, and the question has been settled, we think, to the satisfying of any but the most decidedly skeptical minds. “If we compare the writings produced by Jews immediately after the closing of the canon,” says Hävernich,* “we discover the most decided testimonies in favor of the inspiration of the authors of the canonical writings. Nothing can be more unhistorical than the notion of some that this was a theory which arose and took form all at once, for it is one supported most decidedly by the older assertions of the sacred books. Let us look at a few of these no less decided than universally concurrent testimonies, and all uncertainty will disappear as to the conviction that it was the *fact of inspiration* upon which depended the reception of some books into the canon, and the exclusion from it of others. God, we are assured by the weightiest in this respect of these witnesses, is the Author of his Law, by which he has established a Covenant with his people (2 Macc. vi, 23; Sir. xxviii, 7). Moses is a holy prophet (Wisd. xi, 1); his law is divine, contains all worth knowing, is the fountain of life, is from eternity to eternity (Sir. xvii, 12; xxiv, 23, ff; Wisd. xviii, 4; Bar. iii, 12, ff; Tob. i, 6). By the study of the law and the prophets a man becomes *wise* (Sir. xxiv, 18, ff), and for such a blessing one must part with all, even life itself (1 Macc: ii, 50–70). The

*Introduction to Old Testament, Chap. i, § 10.

ancient prophets are alone trustworthy in their predictions (Sir. xlvi, 15; xlviii, 22). The Canon is not a collection of ordinary writings; it is composed of *holy books* (1 Macc. xii, 9; 2 Macc. vi, 23). The men of God and the prophets obtained the highest wisdom (Wisd. vii, 27); their writings are divine dictations (*προστάγματα τοῦ θεοῦ*, Baruch iv, 1).” If we turn to Josephus, we find similar views. In his Antiquities (Book xii, chap. 2, § 14), he speaks of these books as divine, and says that no one dare to meddle with them, and that some who had ventured to do so had been afflicted with severe maladies, such as blindness, etc. In his work against Appian (Book i, § 8), he says: “For we have not an innumerable multitude of books among us, disagreeing from and contradicting one another [as the Greeks have], but only twenty-two books, which contain the records of all the past time; which are justly believed to be divine. . . . It is true, our history hath been written since Artaxerxes very particularly, but hath not been esteemed of the like authority with the former by our forefathers, because there hath not been an exact succession of prophets since that time; and how firmly we have given credit to those books of our nation is evident by what we do; for during so many ages as have already passed no one has been so bold as either to add any thing to them, to take any thing from them, or to make any change in them.”

Philo also is found agreeing with Josephus in all essential particulars; and emphasis is added to his testimony by his account of the translation of the LXX, wherein he claims that each translator wrought separately, and upon the whole Old Testament; yet, when they came to compare their versions, there was so little variation among them as clearly to prove that they were inspired for their work. He therefore held the LXX in equal veneration with the original Hebrew.

Still further, when we consider the character of the books received into the Canon, we must be convinced that something more than vanity or ordinary preference must

have actuated the compilers. When we find such denunciations as those uttered by Moses; such examples of perfidy and dishonor as many recorded in Judges; such defections and punishments as those recorded in Samuel and Kings; such violations of prejudice as those in Isaiah; such a family record of their kings and of their expected Messiah as is afforded by the names of two harlots, one adulteress, and one Moabite, and others of a like character, we can not account for their retention in the canon on any other grounds than that the writers were moved to their work and directed in it by the Spirit of God; and for this reason "not one jot nor one tittle" could be removed without the severest penalty.

Then notice the pains taken in the transcription of the sacred record. It was copied, as we are informed, on various strips of parchment, or skin, which were afterwards fastened together. If, now, the copyist should, by chance, misform a single letter, even though it were the last letter upon his parchment, he was not allowed to erase, or correct it, but the whole must be destroyed; so that to-day, of all the Jewish MSS. extant, collected and compared by the learned and indefatigable Kennicott and others, the variations are found to be so slight that Eichhorn, though a rationalist, and disposed to find all possible fault with the sacred text, declares that the discoveries do not pay for the labor they have cost.

There has been so much said by rationalists about the variations of the MSS. that it may be interesting, if not profitable, to give an illustration of the care with which the text has been preserved. About seventy years ago, the pious and learned missionary, Claudius Buchanan, while visiting the western peninsula of India, met with a race of men called the Black Jews of Malabar, supposed by some to have descended from those carried away by Nebuchadnezzar, on his first invasion of Israel. In their possession he found an immense scroll, composed of thirty-seven skins, dyed red, forty-eight feet long, and twenty-two inches wide,

and which, in its perfect state, is supposed to have been about ninety feet long. It contained all the Old Testament, except Leviticus and Deuteronomy, written with great care, in one hundred and seventeen columns. The missionary procured this MS. or parchment, and, taking it to England, deposited it in the library of the Cambridge University. It was then subjected to the inspection of the most learned and careful scholars. Infidelity, always ready to add to its little stock of objections, was in ecstasies, expecting that some discovery favorable to its cause would be made. Word by word, letter by letter, it was compared with the best copies of our Hebrew Bible. Forty variations were found, and no one of them amounted to more than the presence or absence of a *˙*, or a *˘*, equal to the dotting of an *i* or the crossing of a *t* in English. And this is a fair example of all the variations to be found in the MSS. of the Hebrew Bible. Thus we are taught the reverence in which the letter of the Scripture was held by the Jews, and are led to admire the providence of God which has preserved his own Word from error. So much attention, indeed, was then paid to the letter of the Sacred Writings that a masorite, or copyist, could tell just how many times any letter of the alphabet was contained in the whole volume; what was the middle letter of the Pentateuch; what was the middle letter of each chapter, or of each book, of the whole; the number of verses in each book, the number of words, the number of letters; and had he found in any MS. given him to copy a letter evidently misplaced he would not have taken the liberty to change it, but would have called attention to it by a note in the margin. With these facts before us, what must be our conclusion as to their views of Scripture inspiration?

But we come now to the New Testament, and consider the arguments for its inspiration, leaving one or two other thoughts to be considered with regard to both at once. And here our course of argument must be much like that pertaining to the Old Testament. In the first place, the

Christian Church has always received, not only the holy books of the Jews, but also certain others respected by them as inspired. As in the case of the Old, there were, at the time of compiling the New Testament, various other writings, the productions of good men, which were rejected from the Canon. The principle seems not to have been the reception of the writings of personal witnesses to the life and words of Jesus; for Paul was not such a one: nor was it to receive the writings of those called apostles; for neither Mark nor Luke was such: nor was it to receive those of men of learning; because, while Matthew and Peter and John were "unlearned," Clement, a disciple of Paul, and Barnabas* his associate, "the son of consolation," were men of learning. Yet, while the writings of Luke, one of Paul's disciples and companions, and Mark the disciple of Peter, were received, those of Barnabas and Clement were rejected—and all posterity approves the decision. The question then recurs, *Upon what principle was the discrimination made?* And we have to answer this question just as we did that with regard to the Old Testament canon. It was the fact of a claimed and universally acknowledged inspiration. And to the fact of such inspiration bear witness all the orthodox writers of that early age. These writings were collected and placed in the chest with the Old Testament Scriptures, while no man raised his voice against it. At the same time, the epistles of Barnabas, Clement, and others were revered, and read, on stated occasions, for the edification of the people, though by the well-informed they were never claimed or acknowledged to be divine. It may be that the gift spoken of by an apostle—the *power of discerning spirits*—was useful in determining a matter of so much importance.

The Christian fathers seem to have known no difference

* We are not forgetful that the authorship of the writings known as the Epistle of Barnabas is disputed; but we are safe in saying that no writing of the "son of consolation" was received into the Canon, while that known by the name of Barnabas was read at an early day, not as inspired, but as profitable for those who listened to it.

between the authority and importance of these books and those of the Old Testament. They used the same language when referring to the writings of Isaiah and Paul, the Pentateuch and the Gospels. "The ordinary style," says Lee, "was either to omit the writer's name, and say, 'Thus spake the Holy Ghost;' or, to supply it, thus: 'So spake the Spirit by Solomon,' or 'by Isaiah,' or 'by Paul.' 'It is needless to seek,' said Gregory the Great, 'who wrote the Book of Job, since we may faithfully believe that the Holy Ghost was the Author.' 'What avails it,' said Theodoret, 'to know whether all the Psalms were written by David? it being plain that all were composed under the influence of the Divine Spirit.'" Hence the numerous epithets applied to every part of Scripture—"The Scriptures of the Lord," "the Divine Scriptures," "Heavenly Letters." The phrase most usually employed, however, is that of Paul: "Scriptures given by inspiration of God." In a word, the evidence under this head may be summed up in the language of Clement of Rome, whose epistles are a part of those rejected as uninspired: "Give diligent heed to the Scriptures, the true sayings of the Holy Ghost."

We wish, by what has been said, to establish the fact that the books denominated by us the "Old and New Testaments" were received by the early Christians as divine, God-given, inspired; and still farther, we would show that the question of Inspiration is a modern one, and, therefore, we can not expect to find this subject treated by the early writers with the same elaborateness and precision which characterize their discussion of the other doctrines founded on the assumption of inspiration. During the first twelve centuries only two references were made to any doubt on this point; the one is an allusion to a sect of heretics called the Anamœans, who, when pressed by Scripture, used a device not unknown to some at the present day: "The apostle makes that statement as a man." And of these Epiphanius says: "Nor is it strange; for if they have called the Master of the house Beelzebub, how much more

shall they call them of his household? namely, his prophets and apostles." In the year 1116 a monk of Constantinople, Euthymius Zigabenus, ventured an objection founded on the saying of our Lord recorded in Mark xi, 27, compared with Matthew xii, 8: "For the Son of man is Lord even of the Sabbath day." He says: "We need not wonder at such variations, for the evangelists wrote many years after these words were spoken; and *since they were but men*, it is natural they should occasionally *forget* what had been said." And this Byzantine monk may be said to have sounded the key-note of the tune played by all the quibblers from that day to this. And while a single sentence might suffice to answer this and all like objections, volumes have been written to stop up the breach thus supposed to have been opened in the ramparts of truth.

And this was the state of the question at the time of the Reformation. It was natural that, when the Bible was again opened, and its doctrines submitted to new discussion; when, leaving the traditions of the Church and decisions of councils which had usurped the rightful dominion of the Word of God, the Reformers went, as they claimed, to the fountain head, and drank the unadulterated truth, there should have been more or less attention paid to the real character of the writings claimed to be "the only rule of faith and practice." The great question of the Reformation was, "*What is written in the Bible?*" "How readest thou?" But as the Reformers were themselves just merging from the mists of Catholicism they were met by expressions and declarations in the received Scriptures, for which they were unprepared, and which they were unable to harmonize with their already established views; so that, while the Church which they had left held these writings as given by inspiration of God, and yet elevated tradition and Church dogmas to the same level, and even above them, thus removing difficulties which it was otherwise unable to meet, the Reformers were led to look suspiciously upon the writings themselves, and ask themselves, "Can these really

be the inspired Word of God?" Failing to find certain books answering to the test which he had proposed—namely, that of the response of his own soul—Luther boldly rejected them as uninspired. Yet the Reformers, especially Calvin, Zwingle, and their coadjutors, held the general belief that the Canonical Scriptures are *the inspired Word of God*. Theological learning had only just begun to awaken from its long sleep. Biblical science was almost entirely lost sight of. We can not wonder that these men should have been confounded by many declarations of the Word. Our amazement is that they should have grasped its truths with such faith and such clearness of comprehension. The men of the Reformation must continue ever to be a wonder of the Christian world. It was not, however, until the Pantheism of Spinoza and Herder had burned its way into the existing systems of theology and thought that the fact of inspiration began to be seriously doubted, or call forth the energies of the defenders of the faith in its establishment. Nor did it even then receive the attention which it justly demanded. Its defenders were few, and by no means bold or outspoken.

MODERN DIFFICULTIES.

Semler, of Halle, may be said to have first opened the subject, and brought it to the attention of modern thinkers and writers about the middle of the last century. According to Semler, the inspiration of any portion of the Scriptures was to be determined, "not by its reception into the Canon, but only by its internal evidence of truth." Utility was his standard. If a book was adapted to benefit man in his relations to God, it was inspired; if not, not inspired. And as he, like many of our own times, could not discern the utility of certain books, he rejected a number of those in the Old Testament and the Apocalypse in the New as not inspired. He was the first to develop the doctrine of "Accommodation," according to which Jesus and his disciples accommodated themselves to the prevailing Jewish notions;

and therefore many of their sayings and doctrines are to be put aside as merely expressions of weakness. It may seem superfluous, and yet it ought to be said just here that, according to this system, either Semler must stand in the place of Jesus, and we must learn from him what is true and what is useful to mankind, or else every man must become his own judge, and then revelation and inspiration are both not only useless but chimeras. The answer of Michaelis to another like theory may well be applied to this: "An inward sensation of the effects of the Holy Ghost, and the consciousness of the utility of these writings in improving the heart and purifying the morals, are criterions as uncertain as the impulses of the human heart. With respect to that inward sensation, I confess that I have never experienced it in the whole course of my life; nor are those persons who have felt it either deserving of envy or nearer the truth, since the Mohammedan feels it as well as the Christian."

A student of Semler was Schleiermacher, who not only imbibed the rationalistic views of his master, but mingled them with materials drawn from the pantheistic system of Spinoza. The leading feature of Schleiermacher's views seems to have been, that the chief and only essential revelation which God has made of himself is in the person of Jesus Christ. The Old Testament to him had no significance, as bearing upon the question of man's relation to God, and the duties growing out of that relation. He did not quote from the Old Testament in support of his doctrines, but placed it beside the writings of heathen poets, legislators and philosophers. With him, the Old Testament went by the board at a single stroke. As to the New Testament, the writers of the Gospels and Acts were only honest men, liable to prejudice, catering to Jewish notions, and writing simply as they understood the events which they undertook to record, just as a modern historian would write the history of his own times. The Epistles and Apocalypse are simply the expression of individual opinion and feeling on the subjects to which they

relate. It was with them very much as with the modern Christian, when he tells his "experience." He tells what he thinks and feels; it may be right, it may be wrong.

According to their theory, every believer in Christ is to a certain degree inspired; and when he utters the sentiments of his heart they possess equal authority, and are equally divine with the writings of the Scriptures. The error is manifest. Proceeding from Schleiermacher's stand-point, Elwart makes the possession of religious truth in the apostles to depend, in a measure, upon their sinlessness; so that the holier a man becomes, the higher the authority of what he says; while Twisten proves the inspiration of the apostles to be free from error, because designed for the Church.

It is hardly necessary here to refer to the theory of Strauss, as it belongs to the subject of the credibility rather than to that of the inspiration of the Scriptures. But it may be well, in order to complete these notices, to say that he regarded the Scriptures as a mythological legend, founded, in some degree, on actual events; but designed to symbolize the moral history of mankind. The dogmas are true, but the history false.

In France, the subject of Inspiration has attracted but little attention. The peculiar character of French thought and life has not tended to fix attention, in any large degree, upon the text nor upon the interpretation of the Scriptures. It is, however, interesting to note, in passing, that so devout and so profound a thinker as M. Guizot has quite misunderstood the subject of inspiration, and has fallen into a serious mistake in attempting to define it. In his admirable "*Meditations on the Essence of Christianity*," he comes to this question, and finds trouble, because, as he says, there are marked grammatical inaccuracies to be found in the sacred writings. In order to give force to his reasoning, he required his son William to make investigations as to these claimed inaccuracies in the New Testament, while his confrere, M. Munk, was relied upon to point them out in the Old Testament. M. Guizot claims that the Scriptures are inspired,

to be sure, and says: "The more I have perused the Scriptures the more surprised I feel that earnest readers should not have been impressed as I have been, and that several have failed to see the characteristics of divine inspiration, so foreign to every other book, so remarkable in this one." But he still says: "Whoever reads without prejudice in the Hebrew and Greek original texts of the Scriptures, whether of the Old or New Testament, meets there, often in the midst of their sublime beauties, I do not say merely faults of style, but of grammar, in violation of those logical and natural rules of language common to all tongues. Are we to infer that these faults have the same origin as the doctrines with which they are intermixed, and that they are both divinely inspired? And yet this is what is pretended by fervent and learned men, who maintain that all, absolutely all, in the Scriptures is divinely inspired; the words as well as the ideas; all the words used upon all subjects; the material of language as well as the doctrine which lies at the base." He thinks, therefore to obviate the difficulty thus met by saying that it was not the divine purpose to teach men scientific or historical truth, but only spiritual, religious truth; and it is therefore simply "to the subject of religion and morals, and to these alone, that the inspiration of the Scriptures is directed."

To this theory of M. Guizot the late Prof. Tayler Lewis has made sufficient answer, holding that the grammatical errors referred to are simply apparent; that during the ages when the Old Testament Scriptures were written there was no standard of grammatical accuracy among the Hebrews, and that, therefore, Moses was just as truly a grammarian, in his age, as was Isaiah in his, and that so far from the objection of M. Guizot holding as against inspiration, the real wonder is that Ezekiel should differ so little from David and Isaiah, and not that there should be occasionally found in him some varying grammatical forms, or some few instances of peculiar orthography. Dr. Lewis, a profound Hebrew and Greek scholar, made personal examination of

the passages cited by Guizot to prove his objections well founded, and declares them irrelevant, and for the most part errors of copyists. He says that, in his intercourse with man, God must use human language; and the question that lies back of all is, "can *He* talk to man at all? Can the Infinite reveal himself in any way to us poor finite creatures? Then must he come where we are; he must come *down* to us, since we can not rise to him. . . . If God speaks to us, it must be in our own language; our own rhetoric, our own grammar, poor and defective as they all are."

If now, we refer to the phases which this question has assumed in England, by citing two or three writers, we shall have gone far enough to give a fair idea of the principal points made against the doctrine of inspiration, in general, since the question was opened with the Reformation in Germany. We come, therefore, to such writers as Priestley, Morell, and Coleridge, whom we may thank for the attention called to the subject through their errors.

Among English writers against inspiration the most widely known and celebrated is Dr. Priestley (now but lately deceased), whose views seem to have been in accord with those of Kant and the Kantian Philosophy, which made reason the supreme judge of all truth—even the Word of God. If the Bible declares a fact or a doctrine, the question arises: Is it reasonable? If it is, then it is true; if not, it is false. Thus, according to Priestley, there is no sort of inspiration, in either the Gospels or the Epistles. He admits that they are genuine, *i. e.*, the writings of the apostles, the persons to whom they are attributed; but he contends that the regard to be paid to them is to be measured entirely by the rules of criticism; by human reason judging how far that narration or assertion is essential to the Christian religion. In this respect the views of Priestley do not differ materially from those of Semler, before noticed. The theory leaves every person at liberty to deny any portion of Scripture which may seem to him unreasonable or unessential. There remains no standard of truth; but the Gospel

is just what each man may see fit to make it. One may say that the direction of Paul with regard to his "cloak" and "parchments" is unessential, and another may place in the same category the narration of facts and incidents connected with the resurrection. And who shall decide as to which is right? The influence of this doctrine may be seen in the fact that a work appeared under the auspices of this same writer, endeavoring to prove that our Lord was not free from sin.

The next English writer to whom we shall call attention is Morell, a follower of Schleiermacher, who, in his work entitled "The Philosophy of Religion," has fully developed his views of inspiration. His object was not only to give expression to these views and introduce the doctrines of Schleiermacher into England, but to meet the errors of the Kantian Philosophy, which made Reason the supreme arbiter of all truth, even to the word of God, and the influence of which we have just seen in the doctrines of Priestley. Morell was unwilling to admit this doctrine of Kant and Priestley—this rule for deciding spiritual things, many of which, though not contrary to reason, are yet above the reach of our reasoning powers. He therefore conjures another judge, which he places on the bench, and to which he gives the power of life and death, to the exclusion even of council. This judge is the consciousness, the intuition of the human soul. And this individual consciousness, this intuition, must determine for us whether the doctrines of God's Word are true or false. The Scriptures are the records of the individual consciousness, the intuitions of the writers. When, then, the writer and the reader are in harmony, there can be no question as to the truth. But when Brigham Young reads the words of the apostle, "Let every man have his own wife, and every woman her own husband," he says at once, "The apostle is in error, for my intuition tells me that a man may have as many wives as he can find means to support." And who shall say that the intuitions of Brigham Young are not just as reliable as

are those of the Apostle Paul? Speaking of the Old Testament, Mr. Morell calls it "the purest representation of their [the writers'] individual religious vitality." "In such a representation," he continues, "of course we could not expect to see described a *higher religion* or a more perfect morality than actually existed in those times; hence, accordingly, the imperfections both in moral and religious ideas which are mixed up with their sacred writings." And such is the inspiration conceded by Mr. Morell to belong to the Word of God.

The last theory to which we shall refer in this connection is that of Coleridge, whose "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit" have probably done more to call attention to the subject of inspiration than have any other writings in the English language, not so much because of the depth and power of their argumentation as because of their brilliancy of expression, the boldness with which the author's views were set forth, and the popular form in which they were presented. The difficulties with inspiration presented by Coleridge seem to have grown out of an entire misconception of the subject. He had before his mind the old exploded "Mechanical Theory" of the Fathers, and seems to have thought that the only possible view of the matter, apart from his own, was that which makes all the words of the Bible inspired, or, to use his own words, "dictated by the Spirit of God in their original utterance." For example, he cites the language of Job's three friends, and asks whether we are to believe that such "hollow truisms," "unsufficing half-truths," "false assumptions," and "malignant insinuations of these supercilious bigots" are to be received as dictated by infallible Intelligence. A moment's reflection ought to have shown him that, instead of this, these were the very things which the word of the Lord afterwards condemned. It was not the original expression of the language, but the committing it to writing which was under the direction of the Spirit of God. Who supposes that the words of Satan, when he came before the Lord among the sons of

God, were dictated by the Spirit? Yet who can doubt that the record of them in the Sacred Scriptures was directed by the Spirit? And so we might go on, exposing and refuting the errors of this brilliant writer, but had much rather advert to the testimony borne by this same caviler in favor of inspiration, expressed in his own beautiful language, when he turns from these various objections which have been stirring his own mind to the blessing which has flowed from its universal acceptance by the Christian world. "In every generation," says he, "and wherever the light of revelation has shone, men of all ranks, conditions, and states of mind have found in this volume a correspondent for every movement towards the better, felt in their own hearts. . . . As if, on some dark night, a pilgrim, suddenly beholding a bright star moving before him, should stop in fear and perplexity. But lo! traveler after traveler passes by him, and each being questioned whither he is going, makes answer, 'I am following yon guiding star!' The pilgrim quickens his own steps, and presses onward in confidence. More confident still will he be, if by the wayside he shall find here and there ancient monuments, each with its votive lamp, and on each the name of some former pilgrim, and a record that there he had first seen and begun to follow the benignant star."

And now these words shall be our directory, while we turn away from these adverse views, and in another article consider some of the arguments which go to establish the fact and the nature of the inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ARTICLE VII.

JOHN WYCLIFFE.

BY REV. C. E. BARROWS.

THE life and times of John Wycliffe are, for several reasons, worthy of most careful study. The age was a formative one in English history. To this period we must trace at least three streams of influence most beneficial to the realm, and which have continued with augmented volume to the present time. Here it is we find the rise of English literature, of the English Parliament, and of English Protestantism. In these several movements, literary, civil, and religious, which had their origin in this century, Wycliffe bore no inconspicuous part.

His name must always stand by the side of those of Chaucer and Gower and the unknown author of "Piers Plowman," men who gave the first impulse and direction to English composition. Up to this time Latin was the language of the learned, of the schools, and of books, as it was that of the court until superseded by the French. The English was a barbarous tongue, used only by rustics and the illiterate. Intent on reaching this very class, Wycliffe ventured to make a new departure, and essayed to train this rough English speech to do service for the truth. He honored the despised vernacular by employing it in several of his treatises, and at the same time improving, elevating, and enlarging it, making its vocabulary more copious, by supplying it with words of French and Latin derivation. With Wycliffe and Chaucer the history of English literature begins. This was part of a more general movement known as the revival of learning, which had appeared in several countries of Europe, but more especially in Italy and France.

Previous to this time the government of the land was of the most arbitrary kind. The king's sovereignty was absolute, his will was law, his supremacy limited only by such checks as the great barons of the realm could impose. The government was at times little more than a system of checkmating; sometimes it was the king who was restrained by the nobles, and at other times the nobles who were thwarted by the king; and between the two the people at all times fared ill. They were beneath the iron heel, whichever party was in the ascendant. Their condition was in many respects quite abject—a kind of serfdom. Life itself was often precarious. As the king had the power of life and death over his great barons, they in turn had the same power over their dependents, and even the squires exercised the same over their tenants. The government centered in the king and his nobles. And so far from the people's having any voice in it, it was scarcely administered in their interest. It is true that the barons had, in order to enhance their own power or to insure the success of some cherished enterprise, occasionally taken representatives of the English gentry to councils called to consider questions of national importance. It was, however, as stated by one historian, in the reign of Edward III that the Commons are first mentioned as a constituent part of the English Government, as an integral branch of the Parliament. But from this time they steadily grew in importance and power. Various circumstances conspired towards this growth. Among other favoring circumstances were the labors of Wycliffe, which during the major portion of his life were largely directed to the enlightenment and elevation of the untitled and unprivileged masses. The system of feudalism slowly dropped in pieces, and the "third estate" emerged and assumed an important position.

Marked as was Wycliffe's influence in these directions, in the shaping of the English Government and especially in the formation of the English language, his influence was still more marked and powerful in England's religious his-

tory. The hierarchy of Rome was all but supreme in the land. It was during the preceding century that the Roman pontiff reached the height of his power. Innocent III had compelled John to surrender his realm and consent to hold it as a fief of the Vatican, and to pay a very large annual sum as tribute money into the papal treasury. And during several generations Rome was enriched at the expense of England. The statements made as to the amounts annually taken from England to Rome are almost incredible. The king's treasuries were impoverished, for his revenues were drained into the coffers of the Church. In retaining her supremacy in the land, and especially in drawing thence so much treasure, Rome was materially aided by her ever zealous agents, the mendicants, who were every-where present and every-where active. They had captured the Church and well-nigh the state. All ecclesiastical preferments were at their disposal. They made desperate efforts to gain control of the universities. They sought to absorb all the sources of influence and power. And what was true of them here was true of them also elsewhere. They overran Europe, and filled many of the highest offices. Some of the popes were mendicants, and many of the higher ecclesiastics, and not a few university professors. And so, also, were many of the schoolmen, who were divided between the black and the gray friars. While Anselm was a Dominican, Scotus was a Franciscan. These mendicants composed the aggressive portion of the Church and were chief agents in the aggrandizement of the Papacy. Their influence in England was far-reaching and still growing when Wycliffe was born.

In 1340 he became a student at Oxford University, when he was sixteen years of age, having been born in 1324, in Yorkshire, in the village of Wycliffe, whence his name; which, in the Norman dialect, was written John de Wycliffe. He first entered Queen's College, a new foundation; but soon removed to Merton, at the same university, founded the preceding century, and having already become very celebrated

by the number of eminent men it had attracted to itself. During Wycliffe's residence there, the divinity chair was filled by Thomas Bradwardine, a profound reasoner, and at one time confessor to the king, Edward III. And among the names enrolled as students were those of Simon de Islep, afterward Archbishop of Canterbury, and till his death a personal friend and patron of Wycliffe; of William Occam, subsequently a distinguished philosopher, and connected with the faculty of the University of Paris, and an opponent of Duns Scotus, who had a few years before begun his own brilliant career as professor at Merton; also of Geoffrey Chaucer, a name that was destined to become familiar in every English household.

The studies pursued by Wycliffe at the university had conscientious reference to the holy calling he had chosen. Latin he learned to write with as much correctness as the taste of the age demanded. And he acquired, what was much less usual at the time, an excellent English style. He paid considerable attention to both civil and canon law; but much more to philosophy, for which he had special aptitude. He became a proficient metaphysician, an adept scholastic, an earnest realist, a disciple of John Scotus and Anselm of Canterbury, whose opinions dominated in England at the time, and for a long period afterward. To Wycliffe's high attainments as a scholar the strongest testimony is on record, given by a contemporary writer who was a bitter opponent of Wycliffe's opinions on reform, and whose words are therefore all the more noteworthy: "As a teacher in theology, he was the most eminent of his time; in philosophy, second to none; in scholastic erudition, incomparable; in controversy, at once subtle and profound." Another writer adds—"almost more than human."

There was another class of teachers at the university, never large, but enrolling a few names of rare lustre, that had a great molding influence upon our scholar. This class refused to make philosophy supreme in the realm of morals and divinity; but insisted on making holy Scripture

co-ordinate authority, who were therefore styled, perhaps in derision, "Biblicists." Robert Grosseteste, during the preceding century chancellor of the university, was doubtless one of these "Biblicists;" although Mr. Hallam seems to think it absurd to reckon him among the precursors of our reformer. He has, nevertheless, left on record several strong testimonies to the value of the sacred oracles. Another of these "Biblicists" was the present divinity professor at Merton, who made the Scriptures prominent as authority for his instructions in theology. The Latin Bible must be regarded as one of the text-books carefully perused by Wycliffe during his residence at Oxford. It was this study that was to give him his clearness of vision and his directness of attack, in his subsequent encounters with the established Church. It was this study, pre-eminently, that was to render him the able champion of the government, the resolute defender of the rights of the people, and the formidable antagonist of the pretensions of Rome.

Thus was he qualified for his future work. The editor of Dr. Mosheim's history describes him as "a hard student, a profound scholar, a sarcastic writer, and a subtle disputant." Wycliffe's whole life was, either directly or indirectly, to be devoted to a reform of the Church. To this work he was providentially led, step by step. His studies at the university, all unknown to himself, pointed in this direction. He must stifle most sacred convictions, or he must protest; and protest conducted to conflict. Although the current of Church life was exceedingly strong, bearing down in its might all opposition, the volume of protest was already considerable. There was not an unbroken silence in regard to abuses. Strong efforts had been made to remove them, to lift the burdens which bore heavily, and with increasing weight, not only upon the industrial classes, but upon the gentry; and even upon the nobility and the king himself.

The opinions of those who pleaded for reform were, however, far from being harmonious; the ends sought were quite diverse. These may be considered under a fourfold

classification. 1. The cry was almost universal for a reform in the manners and morals of the ecclesiastics. All felt that the immoralities and vices tolerated if not fostered by the Church, yet so gross and notorious, ought by all means to be purged away. In this all sincere Christians and good citizens were agreed. 2. There were many in the land who would go much further, and curtail the temporal authority of Rome, and humble her proud pretensions. Here we find not only large numbers of the best citizens, but such men, also, as John of Gaunt, and Lord Percy, and the Earl of Gloucester, and perhaps a majority of the great barons of the realm. 3. Still others, a much smaller and even choicer company, dared to hope and even labor for a reform that should embrace doctrinal errors and corruptions. This was a long stride in advance of the other positions. It caused the more devout to stand aghast. It questioned the deliverances of the infallible Church. It "blasphemously" affirmed that the teachings of the Church contained somewhat that was wrong and pernicious. 4. A smaller and selecter number, gifted beyond all others with spiritual discernment, and deeply versed in the oracles of God, taking a profounder view of the whole subject, were eager for a far more radical reformation; a reformation that was equivalent to a revolution—the removal of the existing hierarchy and the substitution of a Biblical Church with a Biblical worship. These are some of the phases of dissent as it then existed. Wycliffe seems in the course of his ministry to have passed through them all; from the mildest form of reformation sought—the improvement of morals, to the very strongest, reformation at the roots of the system—the demolition of the Papacy and the building on its ruins of a New Testament Church.

These several currents of religious thought naturally resolve themselves into two: a superficial, and a deeper and broader one. As at a later day, in the reign of Henry VIII, and again in that of Charles I, and as, perhaps, in all reforms, every where and at all times, there were here to be observed two strongly marked movements; the one political

and the other spiritual; a reformation in the interests of the throne, and one in the interests of truth.

It is not our purpose to give a detailed account of Wycliffe's life, but to touch only the more salient points in his eventful career. He first drew public attention to himself in 1360, while still at Oxford, by a controversy in which he became involved with the mendicants; a controversy which was to be repeatedly renewed in subsequent years—which had, indeed, scarcely a cessation during his life. Richard Fitzralph, Archbishop of Armagh, had, during the preceding century, exposed with great boldness the glaring corruptions of these orders, and had called for a reform, carrying his case to the pope, but without success. Aware of these proceedings and of their miscarriage, Wycliffe determined to make his appeal at a different bar. He appeared before the people, and compelled them to know the facts and to pass judgment. It was a bold step to take, whether we consider the bar at which the appeal was made, or the object against which the attack was directed. "The controversy was one," says Vaughan, "conducted against some of the most powerful minds of that generation, involving principles of the highest importance, and leading to results the most momentous in the history of religion since the age of inspired teachers." He nevertheless preferred against the friars charges of the gravest nature. He accused them, and most publicly, of grossest corruptions; of double-dyed hypocrisy; of wantonly perverting the Gospel and hindering its progress. He held them up, indeed, to public odium and detestation. And these several charges he fully substantiated by facts of the most authentic kind. Though living entirely by mendicancy, these "brothers" had accumulated immense treasures, so that the Franciscans could offer, a half century before, forty thousand gold ducats to the pope for the privilege of violating one of their earliest rules—one with respect to property.

Armacanus and others would reform the orders; Wycliffe would abolish them. The evils connected with the system

he affirmed to be the necessary consequence of the mendicant discipline itself. The principle of mendicity on which these orders rested was itself false and pernicious. And celibacy, one of the corner-stones of monachism in all its forms, he assailed with peculiar vehemence. Monkery could never by any amount of pruning be made beautiful, or agreeable to truth. It was itself an ugly deformity; an unsightly excrescence upon the Church of God. It was more; an impertinence, a lie, outraging the strongest and purest instincts of our nature, and trampling on the laws God has given for the government of his creatures in their social relations.

The boldness of the reformer will be the better appreciated if we recall the fact that monasticism had now existed for centuries; that in the popular estimation it was closely identified with the Church itself; that to touch it was to lay hands on the foundations of the hierarchy; that among its votaries and adherents had been many whom the faithful had delighted to honor; that members of these "religious" orders were invested with peculiar sanctity, and seemed the special favorites of heaven; that to be buried, indeed, in the cast-off clothes of a monk was a privilege earnestly coveted even by princes and kings, since, thus robed, the departed were assured of a heartier welcome to the land of the blest; that, in fine, it was the sentiment of such men as Bonaventura that there is greater merit in the fulfillment of monastic vows than in common morality. The position of our reformer was not only unprecedented, but perilous. To the claim that these orders had a divine origin, and were a special gift of God to his Church, Wycliffe retorted that if it be true, the gift must have been bestowed for the same reason that God gave to his people a king, as a chastisement because of their sins.

Made master of Balliol College in 1361, perhaps in some sense as a recognition on the part of the university of these services; and four years later of Canterbury Hall, by the appointment of his old-time and intelligent friend,

Simon Islep, now Archbishop of Canterbury, Wycliffe was led into still further complications with the mendicant orders, since almost immediately after the appointment Islep died, and his successor in the primacy, Peter Langham, himself a monk and hence a patron, removed Wycliffe to make room for one of that order. It was an aggravated case of tyranny and oppression; the expressed will of the founder, the late archbishop, was ruthlessly set aside, and his benefactions perverted and turned from their rightful channel. Wycliffe sought redress by an appeal to the pope, Urban V, who, after a delay of four years, authorized his exclusion from the wardenship, and confirmed the incumbency of Woodhall, the monk. In the meanwhile, Wycliffe wrote vigorously in defense of the university and against the further encroachments of these aggressive orders. He did not, however, confine himself to the evils thence arising; there were others needing to be removed, and among them was the secularizing of the clergy. This evil was twofold. It appeared, first, in their excessive wealth, and secondly, in the almost exclusive attention they gave to secular affairs.

While insisting that the poverty of Christ gives no support to the miserable system of beggary which the friars inflicted on the people, he maintained most zealously that the lowly condition of Christ and his apostles was a severe rebuke to the wealth accumulated by the clergy and to the luxury in which they indulged. The higher dignitaries had annual incomes that rivaled the king's. They lived in opulence, maintaining great establishments which became an end in life, to which all else was subordinated and their spiritual offices were made directly to minister. It was a gross departure from the example of the great Bishop of souls, who came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for others.

The clergy, moreover, neglected the duties properly belonging to their office to engage in work that should be left to laymen. All the high offices at court were filled by ecclesiastics, a fact which Wycliffe deeply deplored. Eccle-

siastics governed in the state as well as the Church, in civil as well as religious affairs. This condition of things had a very natural growth. For generations the clergy had a monopoly of education, and they were looked to for counsel, especially in all the more difficult and important matters, whether of a private or a public nature. They were the natural leaders of the people. Wise sovereigns drew clergymen around them because of their intelligence and wisdom. This is one side of the question. For quite other reasons ecclesiastics often sought and obtained these appointments. They thus gratified both their personal ambition for promotion and their ambition for the aggrandizement of the Church. By virtue of being rulers in the Church they had the right to rule in the state, because the latter was subordinate and subsidiary to the former. The state was regarded, perhaps, as a department of the Church, or more properly, as a kind of police regulation, to do its police work. Wycliffe had wholly different views of the ministry. "Neither prelates," he observes in a work on the government of the Church, "nor doctors, priests, nor deacons should hold secular offices—that is, those of chancery, treasury, privy seal, and other such secular offices in the exchequer; neither be stewards of lands, nor stewards of the hall, nor clerks of the kitchen, nor clerks of accounts; neither be occupied with any secular office in lords' courts, more especially while secular men are sufficient to do such offices." The persistent advocacy of these opinions was followed by the most serious consequences. Parliament, under the inspiration of his thoughts, took action looking towards the exclusion of its clerical members. The powerful William Wykeham, Bishop of Winchester, was forced to resign the office of chancellor of the realm, and the Bishop of Exeter that of treasurer. These efforts to check the ambition of the prelates awakened their deepest animosity towards our reformer, which soon involved him in a perilous conflict with them.

We have abundant testimony, however, that in these

attacks upon their worldliness he was moved by no narrow jealousy, but rather by a high regard for their good name and character as ministers of Jesus Christ. He was willing and desirous that they should receive the honor due both to their office and to their good works. He even urged upon the Churches the duty of loving and reverencing their pastors, who labor for their spiritual welfare. "Thy second father," so he counsels the disciple of Christ, "is thy spiritual father, who has special care of thy soul, and thus thou shalt worship him. Thou shalt love him especially before other men, and obey his teaching as far as he teaches God's will. And help according to thy power, that he have a reasonable sustenance when he doth well his office. And if he fail in his office by giving evil example, and in ceasing from teaching God's law, thou art bound to have great sorrow on that account, and to tell meekly and charitably his default to him between thee and him alone." This instruction significantly implies the right of private judgment, the right to appeal from the teaching of the priests, and of the Church, to a higher and an ultimate standard, even "God's law." As long, however, as the minister approves himself to be a true servant of the Lord Jesus, he would have him loved and obeyed. And such approval he would have every minister seek to receive, by "a holy walk and a godly conversation." This wholesome advice he gives to him who ventures to minister in holy things: "If thou be a priest, and by name a curate, live thou a holy life. Pass other men in holy prayer, holy desire, and holy speaking; in counseling and teaching the truth. Ever keep the commandments of God, and let his Gospel and his praises be ever in thy mouth. Ever despise sin, that men may be drawn therefrom, and that thy deeds may be so far rightful that no man shall blame with reason. Let thy open life be thus a true book, in which the soldier and the layman may learn how to serve God and keep his commandments. For the example of a good life, if it be open and continued, striketh rude men much more than open

preaching with the Word alone. And waste not thy goods in great feasts for rich men, but live a frugal life on poor men's alms and goods." The latter sentence suggests that the minister is not to look to the state for support, but that he is, nevertheless to be supported, and by the voluntary offerings of the saints.

The questions thus far discussed had a wider reach than at first appeared. Wycliffe was being prepared to take still bolder steps, and to challenge the temporal authority claimed by the hierarchy. He had, also, a growing influence in his university and in the Parliament, and even over the higher nobility. When Pope Urban demanded from the king the payment of England's annual tribute to the papal see, which had been neglected for more than thirty years, the demand was submitted to the Parliament, in accordance with a law already enacted, that no tax should be imposed on the people without the consent of their representatives, the Commons. The Parliament refused, with great spirit, to acknowledge the indebtedness, and pledged the resources of the realm to maintain the decision. England had grown since the reign of John; the battles of Cressy and Poitiers had given her a renown second to no country in Europe. The attitude assumed toward Rome ill pleased the clergy; but their attack upon the action of Parliament was successfully repelled by Wycliffe. The king expressed his gratitude by conferring upon him the title of "Royal Chaplain." He was honored by his Alma Mater, also, in 1372, with the title of Doctor in Divinity, and still further by a call to the chair of theology in one of her colleges. Oppressed with a sense of the moral corruptions which prevailed in society at large, he made it one of his first duties to expound the decalogue. He also continued to direct his attention to the abuses which had crept into the Church. A large proportion of the benefices of the realm were in the hands of foreigners, French or Italian, who knew nothing of the English language, and many of whom never took the trouble to visit the island. These

rich livings were bestowed by the pope, either as rewards for past services, or to purchase future favors. Upon representations made by the Parliament to the king, commissioners were appointed to visit Pope Gregory XI, but with very unsatisfactory results. A second embassy, Wycliffe being one of the number, succeeded, after delays continued through two years, in obtaining assurances that the cause of this grievance should be removed.

While engaged in these negotiations Wycliffe, being brought nearer to the head of the Church, was led to study his character more closely and to examine anew the grounds of his authority. He discovered in the pontiff the same corruptions as in the bishops, the same greed for money, the same thirst for power, the same chicanery in the conduct of his government. The effect of the study was deep and lasting. The reformer was filled with disgust and loathing. Henceforth he attacked the head of the Church with unsparing severity. On his return from Bruges he was presented by the king with the rectory of Lutterworth, with which name his own was to become indissolubly associated. The Parliament which next assembled was dominated by his principles. "The attack conducted by the House of Commons," says Vaughan, "during this session, on various branches of official corruption, is one of the most determined efforts in the cause of religion and of general freedom to be found in our Parliamentary annals."

While influential in the last Parliaments of Edward III and the first of Richard II, and having many friends among the nobles, and a numerous following among the people, there was a growing animosity toward him on the part of the clergy, who made several ineffectual attempts to secure his downfall. They sought to alienate the university, which, however, from the beginning to the end, through all his troubles remained loyal and true to him. The city of London was permeated with his teachings. When William Courtney, a man of imperious will and a devoted son of the Church, became Bishop of London, he at once instituted

proceedings against this troubler of Zion, and summoned him to attend a synod at St. Paul's. But the accused was delivered by the friendly interference of the Duke of Lancaster and Lord Percy. Courtney was not the man, however, to be discouraged by trifles. The authority of the pope was invoked, who issued mandatory letters to the Archbishop of Canterbury, to the Bishop of London, to the University of Oxford, and to the king. While the king and the university treated their letters with indifference, the prelates proceeded to action. Simon Sudbury, the archbishop, summoned a convocation to meet at Lambeth. Wycliffe was cited to appear before it, where he was examined as to his teaching—especially as to the limits of the papal authority. In the paper presented by him to the body he maintained the separation and independence of the state from the Church. He put limits to the power of the Church that seemed little short of blasphemy, in that age of churchly arrogance and priestly assumptions. His opinions were, of course found worthy of condemnation. But the joy of the prosecutors was not unalloyed. During the progress of the examination they were compelled to witness the gathering of admiring crowds, and to hear their shouts of attachment to the reformer and to his sentiments. And the inquisitors were finally to be circumvented in their plans by a mandate from the queen mother, forbidding any definite sentence being passed, either on the person or the doctrines of the accused.

His protracted and arduous labors began seriously to affect his health. After presenting an elaborate reply to several questions of gravest moment proposed to him by one of the early Parliaments of Richard, he was entirely prostrated and seemed near his end. But he had no regrets for any steps he had taken in the direction of reform, nor did he soften at all towards his old antagonists, the mendicants. Visited by them to obtain from him a confession and a recantation of his opinions, he gathered up all his strength and exclaimed, "I shall not die, but live; and shall again declare the evil deeds of the friars." Events proved

the reformer to be a true prophet; he was raised up, and was permitted to deal some heavy blows for the truth. He took still higher and bolder ground. There was growth in his opinions; a growth constantly away from the hierarchy and towards Scriptural views of the Church, the ministry, the sacraments and worship. He observed that many were intimidated from avowing their convictions of truth through fear, not of persecution, not of being impoverished, not of physical tortures, but of incurring the displeasure of the hierarchy. They had a pious horror of being excommunicated from the Church, and so shut out of heaven. Their minds were held in the thralldom of a hoary superstition. Upon this point, therefore, the spiritual power claimed by the Church, he now turned all his heaviest enginery.

When Wycliffe entered the spiritual domain of the Church and began to destroy images, many of his more powerful friends fell away from him. They were deeply interested in delivering England from the dominion of Rome, but they had no desire to liberate souls from her toils. When there was no political capital to be made out of his labors, they deserted him. In his further endeavors Wycliffe was not as powerfully supported as was Luther, subsequently, in his work. He proceeded nevertheless without wavering, fearlessly urging his principles to their logical consequences, following the teachings of the Book he had made his study through the years and his supreme guide in all his controversies. He wrote much and elaborately upon the power of "the keys," upon spiritual censures, and upon transubstantiation. "We ought to believe," he says, "that then only does a Christian priest bind or loose, when he simply obeys the law of Christ; because it is not lawful for him to bind or loose but in virtue of that law, and, by consequence, not unless it be in conformity to it." The reformer sought not only to correct improper uses of the power, but to show that the power itself, as generally understood, was fictitious. "Let it once be admitted," he observes, "that the pope, or one representing him, does indeed bind or loose when-

ever he affects to do so, and how shall the world stand? For if, when the pontiff pretends to bind, with the pains of eternal damnation, all who oppose him in his acquisition of temporal things, either movable or immovable, such persons assuredly are so bound; it must follow, as among the easiest of things, for the pope to wrest unto himself all the kingdoms of the world, and to subvert, or to destroy, every ordinance of Christ. On the ground of this impious doctrine, it would be easy for the pope to invert all the arrangements of the world; seizing, in connection with the clergy, on the wives, the daughters, and all the possessions of the laity, without opposition; inasmuch, as it is their saying, that even kings may not deprive a churchman of aught, neither complain of his conduct, let him do what he may, while obedience must be instantly rendered to whatever the pope may decree." This doctrine, he further declares, gives to every obscure parish priest almost unlimited authority to invade the most sacred rights and privileges of his parishioners. It was no small matter to incur the displeasure of a priest clothed with such power, the power to open and shut the gates of heaven to waiting souls. And this terrific power was often employed on trifling occasions and for trivial offenses, and even to gain secular advantage. Wycliffe sought to break the spell of this power—to disenchant the minds of men.

His doctrine, that the pope was fallible and peccable, received most substantial indorsement, in 1378, from an unexpected quarter. In the attempt to remove the papal residence from Avignon to Rome a division was produced, and the head of the Church was cleft violently asunder. The monstrous spectacle thus presented was improved by the reformer to advance the interests of the truth. He made it the occasion of powerful invectives against the hierarchy, and of earnest appeals to his fellow country people. He counseled them to trust in Christ for succor, who, he continued, "hath begun already to help us graciously, in that he hath clove the head of Antichrist, and the two parts

fight against each other." While he was thus busy, the clergy were not idle. His denial of the real presence in the eucharist became ground for fresh hostilities against him. In a short treatise he explained the phrase, "This is my body;" but the explanation was not satisfactory. Courtney, now raised to the see of Canterbury, commenced vigorous proceedings against the reformer. His high office invested him with great authority—next, perhaps, to the king. He succeeded in compelling the chancellor of the university to bend to his will. He obtained the sanction of the king to a statute, "the first in England's Parliamentary history, providing for the punishment of the variable crime designated heresy." Thus a weapon was forged that was to have a conspicuous place in subsequent events. Courtney was proud to describe himself as "chief inquisitor of heretical pravity for the province of Canterbury." The university made a noble defense for Wycliffe, who was regarded as one of its brightest ornaments; but the power of the primate secured his withdrawal. In the Parliament to which his case was carried he had numerous friends, but not a few felt that he was now overstepping the bounds of propriety, if not of truth. Wycliffe therefore retired from the university and took up his abode at Lutterworth. But he receded from no doctrinal position he had assumed. He still maintained, not only that the pope was corrupt, but that his office was a usurpation.

During his residence at Lutterworth he preached constantly and wrote much. He did not cease entirely from controversy, because he could not. While, therefore, some of his writings were polemical, more were practical, designed to instruct the people in godliness. Most of the sermons or homilies he has left to us were penned during this period. It was in 1384, while in his pulpit, discoursing on the Gospel of Christ, which was so precious to him, that he was stricken down, and his spirit passed from earth.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ARTICLE VIII.

PROGRESS OF BIBLICAL SCHOLARSHIP.

BY REV. J. O'B. LOWRY.

THE progress of Biblical science, like that of language, has been from the agglutinating to the scientific state. However perfect Bible truth may ever have been, progress has been made in 'crystallizing its *formulae*; and, very naturally, the present period retains many of the peculiarities impressed by every preceding epoch in the history of Scripture interpretation, whether mystical, apologetic, dogmatic, or critical.

1. The mystic period was unscientific, although characterized by great devotion to the Gospel. Indeed, it approached almost to the letter worship which Jewish rabbis rendered to the Hebrew law. Cabalistic teachings, doctrines of numbers, shadows, symbols, and types, abounded in connection with great practical godliness.

The Alexandrian school felt the influence of Origen's scholarly ability; but its force was impaired by an ill-advised exile. Later, Jerome labored to diffuse a more accurate knowledge of the Scriptures, but it required time for his influence to become widely felt. Nor is it unusual for the agglutinating tendency of the earlier centuries to display itself to-day. Many find the doctrine of the *Trinity* in the first chapter of Genesis (verse 26), where God, in the fullness of his majesty and powers, says: "Let us make man in our image." Although the law of progress in revelation is markedly visible, not a few would have a doctrine flashed on Israel in his infancy which he could not learn in his maturity.

So with the *Shiloh* prophecy: "The scepter shall not depart from Judah . . . until Shiloh come." Notwithstanding

the fact that the word "Shiloh" is in the accusative case, and refers to the place Shiloh, to which Judah led the other tribes, a direct reference to the Messiah is pressed. Only in the atmosphere which surrounds this "peace"-full word can any natural allusion to the Messiah be discovered. Judah was typical; Shiloh was, at best, only symbolical.

Solomon's Song has been similarly dealt with. Designed to dignify forever pure conjugal affection—second only to love for God—it has been made to typify the Church, the bride of Christ, almost universally. It would not be unnatural to refer to the central figures of this sacred drama as capable of representing most appropriately Christ and his bride. It is another thing to say that they were designed to typify them.

The spirit which would insert the word "God" in the book of Esther (designed to exalt theocratic piety) is restless until the teachings of the New Testament are inserted in the law and the prophets.

2. The Apologetic era was a necessity. When the sword of the Roman emperor was robbed of its power, and was serving only to precipitate the noblest testimony to Christ, the enemies of the Gospel found it necessary to resort to the pen—"mightier than the sword." Christian writers replied to their assertions of Scripture inconsistencies in eloquent defense; vindicated the purity of the lives of Christ's followers, and sealed their testimony with their blood.

It is not strange that the influence of that grand martyr-day should linger with us, moving Germany, England, and even the Western hemisphere to multiply the evidences of that Christianity which has so nobly commended itself to universal acceptance. The mantles of Justin and Tertullian have fallen upon worthy shoulders.

3. But the Apologetic blends freely with the Dogmatic period. We mean no disrespect to dogma, or the Romish Church, when we say that this period is, in the main, co-ordinate with Roman Catholic supremacy; and that it was characterized by the rapid promulgation of doctrines, in part

Scriptural and in part unscriptural. It was in this period that the doctrine of Christ's Divinity was crystallized at Nice. Then followed the clear affirmation concerning the Holy Spirit; and later came the formation of the Canon.

The Papacy moved from supremacy of influence to supremacy of authority and infallibility. Transubstantiation was grafted upon the simple witness-service. Infant baptism arose and was perpetuated as the logical result of superstitious formalism. Mariolatry and the doctrine of Purgatory followed.

In the Reformation period we find a large amount of mysticism, apologetics and dogma commingled. Luther was the central figure; at first desirous of reforming the Romish Church from within; later, driven against his will to organize a new movement with the doctrine of "Justification by Faith" as his positive and revolutionizing theme. Surrounded by such men as Melanchthon and Æcolampadius—with Zwingle and Calvin in the distance—he towered above them all.

Retaining all that he dared of Romanism, he was nevertheless enabled to infuse new religious life into his fatherland and Europe. He made mistakes and taught errors, as did Calvin in Geneva; but he was a noble pioneer in practical theology, just as Calvin and Arminius were pioneers, of different merit, in dogmatic theology.

4. The Critical period. The reaction against dogma was led by Baur, of Tübingen, a man of phenomenal ability, but fettered by a theory that became a "hobby." Satisfied that the case of Peter *vs.* Paul had never been sufficiently studied, he traced out all the supposed evidences of hostility between the Petrine and Pauline Christians, of the early Church, and made them an important factor in dealing with the composition and meaning of the Epistles, rejecting such epistles as opposed his theory. Subsequently, Strauss surpassed his teacher in the practical and popular presentation of his views. And Rénan fascinated feverish Paris with his modern Apocrypha—written in accord with the theories of the Tübingen genius.

But a divine power was in control while these storms were clearing the atmosphere for a brighter day. It was reserved for the nineteenth century to reap the fruits of laborers, from Origen downward, and move forward to a sphere of fruitful activity, which scarcely presented itself to the most far-seeing vision.

The collection and study of Greek manuscripts employed the minds of Lachmann, Griesbach, and the great Tischendorf of Germany, and the faithful Tregelles of England—to say nothing of humble workers. At the same time Robinson caused new light to gleam from the pages of Scripture history, as he pictured the surroundings of the once living Teacher. Rawlinson, Thomson and others followed; and, to-day the geography of Palestine is better known to many in America than that of England.

This is the day of exegesis. Never before have scholars insisted so energetically and so universally upon the natural deduction of the meaning from the very language of Gospel writers, in which process all the elements that enter into the formation of a scientific interpretation are duly emphasized. The teachings of the “schools” are respected as aids. Calvin is no more than Ellicott, save where the former is right and the latter wrong. It is no longer considered heresy to “pray like a Calvinist, work like an Arminian, and be neither the one nor the other.” Scholars willingly part company with the greatest and the best, when they deviate from the written Word—interpreted to-day with the aid of facilities unknown to Chrysostom himself.

But will the elevated taste and tendency of present scholarship last? It is reasonable to hope that they will. Can they meet the demands of sensationalism and mystic pietism, that move above the Word? It should cost little pain to answer, No. Let us hope that if any thing is lost, it will only be in exchange for something better.

A scientific-philosophical study of the Gospel writings is perfectly compatible with increased practical piety. Al-

ready we are able to put ourselves in sympathy with Paul, as he dictated his sublime letters, or wrote them "at white heat." The aim of the sacred writers, their environments and their characteristic presentations of the truth, we are learning to appreciate. And this capacity to appreciate is revealing itself in the pulpit as well as the seminary, and in the pew as well as the pulpit.

But the golden age is before us. The realities of future scholarship may yet surpass the ideals of the past and, indeed, of the present. Wisdom will not die with the nineteenth century, however brilliant Divine Providence may have made it. A progress like that which characterizes man's study of the world in which he is tenting for a time will not be denied to him in the study of that world in which he shall live forever—whose features are sketched so charmingly in the inspired outlines of heavenly history.

The unity of truth should stay our fears, and make us welcome every honest effort to disclose its many-sided beauty. Philosophy has its place, and, under the guidance of a wisdom higher than that of man, it will accomplish its appointed work. Science will lay its treasures at the feet of truth, and the knowledge of God's Word will move on apace. No longer will the pure metal, though dross-encumbered, be rejected, because alien hands unearth it; but the genius of true scholarship, which is appreciative and constructive, will acknowledge its indebtedness to every worker and every method—whether crude and agglutinating, or mature and scientific.

Our denomination should honor the exegete who explores the written Word, and the scientist who reads the language of nature; for, as Baptists, we should yield absolute allegiance to pure truth. Were it otherwise, we should be ready to transcend the high choice of Henry Clay, and say, We'd "rather be right" than be Baptists!

ARTICLE IX.

DALE'S THEORY OF BAPTISM.

BY PROF. H. HARVEY, D. D.

1. *Classic Baptism.* 2. *Judaic Baptism.* 3. *Johannic Baptism.* 4. *Christic and Patristic Baptism.*

THESE volumes, by Rev. James W. Dale, D. D., of Pennsylvania, contain a remarkably full investigation of the form of baptism, with copious citations from classic, Jewish, Biblical, and patristic writings. They give ample evidence of the industry, patience, and learning of the author. It is claimed for them, that they have settled forever the form of the rite, and have proved conclusively that Christian baptism is never an immersion. This claim is indorsed by many of the most eminent pedobaptist theologians and scholars of this country; though in some instances it is done in a manner so guarded as to suggest an unwillingness to commit themselves to the author's reasoning, while finding no little satisfaction in his conclusions.

The results reached in this work may be best stated in the author's own words. At the close of his last volume, he says:

"1. The baptism of inspiration is a thoroughly changed spiritual condition of the soul, effected by the power of the Holy Ghost, through the cleansing blood of the Lord Jesus Christ, and so making it meet for reconciliation, subjection, and assimilation to the one fully revealed living and true God—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

"2. This one baptism of inspiration is, by divine appointment, ritually symbolized as to its soul-purification by pure water, poured or sprinkled, or otherwise suitably applied to the person, together with a verbal announcement of the spiritual baptism thus symbolized.

"3. Dipping the body into water *is not, nor* (by reason of a double impossibility found in the meaning of the word and in the divine requirement) *can it be* Christian baptism. That Christian baptism is a water-dipping is a novelty unheard of in the Church for fifteen hundred years. This idea is not merely an error in the mode of using the water (which would, comparatively, be a trifle), but it is an error which sweeps away the substance of the baptism without leaving a vestige behind."

We propose, in this article, to examine the premises from which these remarkable conclusions are drawn. It is not our purpose, however, to investigate in detail the immense mass of matter gathered in these bulky volumes; such an investigation is wholly unnecessary for the determination of the truth or falsity of the theory advanced. We shall restrict the discussion, therefore, to an examination of those fundamental positions of the author, which, either as underlying assumptions, or as formally stated propositions, constitute the basis of his theory and are essential to its truth.

1. *Βαπτίζω* is derived, he affirms, *not from the primary, but from the secondary meaning of βάπτω*. The latter has two meanings: (1) To dip; to plunge: (2) To dye; to stain; which was often, but not always, effected by dipping. *βαπτίζω*—the derivative—is derived, not from the primary sense, To dip, but from the secondary, To dye. It does not, however, take the signification, To dye; but, as *βάπτω*, when signifying To dye, indicates a thorough change in the condition of the subject as to color, so the derivative, *βαπτίζω*, takes as its meaning “thoroughly to change the condition of an object by introducing it into some new condition.” Consequently, *βαπτίζω* never means To dip, or plunge, as a physical act. This fundamental position of the author is very feebly supported, and is little better than a pure assumption. The chief argument offered is the alleged presumption that a derivative would not take the principal meaning of the parent word. He says: “That any language should give birth to a word which was but a bald repetition of one already in existence is a marvel that may be believed when proved.” But in assuming this Dr. Dale is plainly in error: for, as a matter of fact, derivative words in Greek often take the main signification of the parent word, and sometimes, in whole or part, supplant the parent word, because the derivative has a stronger form, and is on that account preferred. Cremer's Lexicon will furnish any Greek scholar with numerous examples of this. Thus,

καθαρίζω, derived from *καθαίρω*, 'to cleanse'; *δαντίζω*, from *δαίνω*, 'to sprinkle'; *μεθόσχω*, from *μεθύω*, 'to be drunk'; these are all derivatives which, in whole or part, displaced the parent words; but which retained, as their most common meaning, precisely the signification of the radical form. These are only a few instances of many that might be adduced; and the Dale theory thus utterly fails, even in its initial proposition. Nor is he more successful in the passages cited in support of this novel definition. For none of them require the proposed sense of "a thoroughly changed condition;" on the contrary, most of them imperatively demand the primary sense of *βάπτω* as the fundamental idea. Thus, a drunken man is described as "baptized in wine:" where the man may, indeed, be conceived as placed in "a thoroughly changed condition" by the wine; but it is far more natural to interpret the expression as a figure, in which he is represented as overborne—overwhelmed under the influence of wine. A person "baptized in debts," "in sleep," "in night," "in grief," may possibly thereby have come into "a thoroughly changed condition:" but this would be equally true if they were overwhelmed, immersed, enveloped, in these; yet no one would thence infer that the verbs overwhelm, immerse, envelop, signified simply "to thoroughly change the condition." Plainly, in all these cases the verb expresses not only a condition produced, but also the form in which that condition is produced. And, indeed, Dr. Dale virtually admits this view when he affirms that the act by which this change of condition is effected usually involves an "intusposition," or the placing of the baptized within some element.

2. *Βάπτω* and *βαπτίζω*, he further assumes, *belong to distinct classes of active transitive verbs, the one expressing action, the other condition.* *Βάπτω* belongs to the first class, always expressing the act by which a condition is produced; *βαπτίζω* belongs to the second, always expressing a condition produced, and never the act, or the form of the act producing it. *Βαπτίζω*, therefore, always expressing condition

only, never means to dip, to plunge, or any other definite form of an act: it always expresses the condition which results from an act, without reference to the form of the act effecting it. This distinction the author insists on with special emphasis, denying in the most positive manner that “βαπτίζω expresses a definite act of any kind.” The same distinction, he holds, exists in the Latin and the English. Thus, the English words *dip* and *plunge* represent the first class; but the words *whelm*, *soak*, *wet*, *bury*, belong to the second, and describe a result, or a condition effected, but do not indicate the act by which the condition was effected. But in this distinction Dr. Dale is singularly unfortunate. For what he affirms of βάπτω is true of it only in the active voice, since in the passive it often expresses condition only; and what, on the other hand, he affirms of βαπτίζω is true of it only in the passive, since in the active it commonly expresses action, and a definite form of action. Thus βάπτω, in Rev. xix, 13, “clothed in a garment dipped (βεβαμμένον) in blood,” certainly does not express the act of dipping, but the condition, or state, as having been dipped. On the other hand, when Plutarch (On Superstition, III) says: “βάπτισον σεαυτὸν εἰς θάλασσαν, *plunge thyself into the sea*,” and Chrysostom (Discourse III, 7) praises David because “he did not (βαπτίσαι) plunge in the sword, nor sever” the head of Saul, both clearly indicate an act of definite form. To translate these passages, *Thoroughly change thyself into the sea*; *He did not thoroughly change the sword into Saul's head*, would be the veriest nonsense. A multitude of similar examples might be cited. The classification is equally untrue, as applied to the English words. Thus, it is said *plunge* belongs to the class always denoting action, and never condition. But the slightest attention to the English usage suffices to disprove this. Our author himself furnishes the needed examples. Thus:

“Plunged in the deep forever let me lie
 Whelmed under seas.”

“Or plunged in lakes of bitter marshes lie,
 Or wedged whole ages in a bodkin's eye.”

e may also add the familiar couplet of Watts:

“Plunged in a gulf of dark despair
We wretched sinners lay.”

is evident that in these examples, as in many others, the word *plunged* does not denote the act of plunging, but a condition or state, as plunged. This fundamental position of the theory, therefore, utterly fails when tested by actual usage.

3. “*Βαπτίζω*,” according to Dr. Dale, “*in its primary sense expresses condition characterized by complete intusposition, without expressing, and with absolute indifference to, the form of act by which such intusposition may be effected, as also without other limitations—to merse.*” It will be observed here, the author admits, as he needs must, that *βαπτίζω*, in its primary sense, expresses a condition which involves “a complete intusposition,” or the putting of the person baptized into some element; but he contends that the manner of the intusposition is not indicated. He further insists that, while intusposition is implied, the taking out of the baptized from the element is not implied; so that, in the case of a man being, the intusposition implied in *βαπτίζω* would be ongoing. But here it must be noted that all we affirm of *βαπτίζω* is that it involves an actual intusposition; the manner of effecting the intusposition is immaterial. And in regard to the taking of the baptized out of the element, it is not necessary that the word should, in itself, express this part of the act of baptism, since the circumstances, in each instance of its use, sufficiently indicate the fact. Thus, the word *immerse* does not, in itself, either in Latin or English, express the emersion of the person or thing immersed; nevertheless, it is used in numberless instances for a momentary immersion, wholly equivalent to *dip* or *plunge*. As a matter of fact, however, *βαπτίζω* is often used to express momentary immersion, or the putting in or under a liquid and immediately withdrawing from it. Plutarch describes the soldiers of Alexander as dipping (*βαπτίζοντες*) with cups from large wine jars and mixing bowls, and drinking to one another: where Liddell and Scott define its meaning, Vol. I, No. 1.—10

“To draw wine from bowls in cups,” and add, “of course by dipping them.” Hippocrates (on Epidemics, book v), describing the respiration of a patient, says: “She breathed as persons breathe after having been immersed (ἐκ τοῦ βεβαπτίσθαι). And Achilles Tatius (Story of Clitophon and Leucippe, Book iii, chap. 1), speaking of the manner in which the Egyptian boatman drinks water from the Nile, says: “He lets down his hand into the water, and dipping (βαπτίσας) it hollowed, and filling it with water, he darts the draught towards his mouth and hits the mark.” In all these cases as in a multitude of others, the word is plainly used as the English word *dip*, to express an action which includes not only the putting of an object in or under some element, but also the immediate withdrawing of it. When, therefore, Dr. Dale concedes that an intusposition, or the putting within an element, is involved in the primary use of the word, he has conceded the main point insisted on by us: the manner of the intusposition, and the withdrawal of the baptized out of the enveloping element are decided necessarily by the circumstances and the relations in which the word is used.

4. “*Βαπτίζω*,” the author adds, “*in secondary use expresses condition, the result of complete influence, effected by any possible means, and in any conceivable way.*” By this he means, as he further explains, that no form of the act effecting the condition is implied, but that baptism expresses a condition resulting from complete influence, irrespective of the form in which that influence is exerted. Thus, a man under a sense of his sins says: “Iniquities baptize me;” that is, he is in a condition thoroughly under the influence of iniquities. A sleeping man is “baptized in sleep;” that is, he is in a condition thoroughly under the influence of sleep. The word here, the author insists, is not used figuratively; but has its literal, natural sense. *Βαπτίζω* simply expresses the condition of these men as under a complete influence; the one, from iniquities; the other, from sleep. On this construction of the word the theory of this work chiefly

rests. But precisely here is one of Dr. Dale's fatal mistakes. The figurative usage of βαπτίζω he treats as a secondary literal usage. This word, however, had no secondary literal meaning. No lexicographer gives it any literal signification which does not involve an immersion; nor do the passages quoted in this work sustain the author's position. Βαπτίζω has a marked and rich range of figurative usage; but, unlike βάπτω, it has no secondary literal usage. A sleeping man is represented, by a beautiful figure, as "baptized;" that is, immersed, enveloped in sleep. A man's iniquities "baptize," that is, overwhelm, him; presenting an image of the multitude and greatness of them. To confound in this manner the figurative and the secondary use of words, and make the figurative a literal sense, is to confound all language, and to destroy all certainty as to its meaning. There is hardly a word, in any language, which, if one may insist that its figurative uses must be treated as literal, will not be rendered wholly uncertain in import. Human speech, under such a process, would cease to be a reliable vehicle of thought. The author, it seems needless to add, here stands alone. All linguistic authority, German, English, and American, is arrayed against him.

The above propositions constitute the basis of Dr. Dale's theory of baptism. They appear and re-appear throughout his work, either as formal statements, or as underlying assumptions. With them the whole elaborate structure he has erected stands or falls.

We now proceed to consider his method in applying this theory to the use of the word in the New Testament. Here his fundamental position is, that βαπτίζω "in religious usage neither expresses dipping nor any physical baptism of any kind;" but always denotes a thorough change of spiritual condition: and the receptive element after βαπτίζω is never water, or other material element, but is always the new spiritual conditions and relations into which the baptized pass. When ritual, or outward baptism, therefore, is intended, it is not indicated in the word βαπτίζω, nor in the words express-

ing the receptive element, but by accessory words, such as, ἐν ὕδατι, "with water;" and these words, he affirms, express, not the receptive element, but simply the instrument, and in no instance imply that the ritual act was an immersion, but the contrary. Here three points are to be noted:

1. He insists that the prepositions and cases used with βαπτίζω do not indicate that the ritual act was immersion. The preposition ἐν, *in*, when used with water or with the Holy Spirit, is, in his view, not a proper Greek idiom, but is a Hebraism, equivalent to the simple dative of instrument or means, to be translated *by* or *with*. Hence the form of the act is not indicated; all that is indicated is, that the water or the spirit is the instrument by which the baptism was effected. But in this the author, while making a pure assumption as to the Hebraistic use of ἐν in such cases, is again refuted by plain facts in the language. For (*a*) the preposition ἐν is often used by Greek writers to indicate the element in or within which the action of βαπτίζω takes place; and it can not, therefore, be treated in the New Testament in such relations as a Hebraism, or as expressing merely the instrument. For example: Polybius (*Hist.*, Lib. v) represents a body of soldiers, when attempting to cross a morass, as "immersed and sinking in (βαπτίζόμενοι καὶ καταδύνοντες ἐν) the pools." Plotinus (*Ennead.* I., B. viii) describes the corrupt and vicious soul as "yet immersed in the body (ἔτι ἐν τῷ σώματι βεβαπτισμένη)." Basil speaks of steel as "immersed in (βαπτιζόμενος ἐν) the fire." Here ἐν with the dative plainly does not denote merely the instrument, but, as often elsewhere, points to the element within which the act takes place. (*b*) The simple dative, without a preposition, is also used where the instrumental sense can not be supposed, and where it must denote, as the simple dative often does, the sphere within which the act is performed. Thus an ancient medical writer, Alexander of Aphrodisius, speaks of the soul as "much immersed in the body (βεβαπτισμένην τῷ σώματι)." Chrysostom (*Exposition of Psalm vii*) describes Absalom as desiring "to

plunge his right-hand [the weapon it held] into his father's neck (τῷ λαιμῷ βαπτίσαι τῷ πατρικῷ).” Another writer (Homeric Allegories, ch. 9) says: “A mass of iron drawn red hot from the furnace is plunged in water (ὕδατι βαπτίζεται), and the fiery glow, by its own nature quenched with water, ceases.” Now in these, as in frequent instances, the dative is used without a preposition, where it clearly denotes the sphere within which the act was performed. To translate here as the instrumental dative would make nonsense. The author, therefore, entirely fails to show that the preposition or the case used after βαπτίζω does not define the form of the act; the reverse is evidently the fact. (c) The word expressing the element of baptism is construed in the New Testament as follows: Once with εἰς, *into* (Mark i, 9); thirteen times with ἐν, *in*, followed by a word denoting either water or the Holy Spirit; three times with the dative without a preposition, that case being employed, as the context shows, to denote the sphere within which the act was performed. Other examples of the verb construed with prepositions occur, but these are all in which the construction involves the element of baptism; and it is evident that in these the construction not only indicates the form of the act, but also requires the form of immersion.

2. Dr. Dale affirms that βαπτίζω, in its primary use, as implying an intusposition, never is, nor can be, used of the ritual, or outward act, because it makes no provision for the withdrawal of the intusposed from the enveloping element, and therefore, if applied to the ritual act, it would involve the drowning of the baptized. In its religious usage, therefore, the word implies intusposition only when used of the inward, spiritual act; and in this case, the receptive element, that is, the new spiritual condition into which the soul has passed, is put in the accusative with εἰς. Thus, John baptized (εἰς) into repentance: Christians are baptized (εἰς) into Christ; that is, they experience a thorough change of spiritual condition by passing into the new relations and conditions involved in being “in Christ,” and this spiritual

change is expressed in the word "baptized," which is here used, not figuratively, but literally. This position of the author, however, is fully refuted, not only by the arguments before adduced against this literalizing of figurative language, but also by the following considerations: (1) If the spiritual act is, as he affirms, an intusposition, or the placing of the soul within the relations and conditions implied in being "in Christ," then, evidently, the ritual act, the outward symbol of the spiritual, must, in order to symbolize it, also be an intusposition: otherwise the symbol does not set forth the thing symbolized. Submersion, if not emersion, would, according to the Dale theory, be essential to ritual baptism. (2) According to Scripture, "as many as were baptized into Christ were baptized into his death," and were "therefore buried with him" by means of the baptism. But, though thus intusposed into Christ's death, they were not left intusposed there: for the apostle says: "Buried with him in baptism wherein,"—that is, *in baptism*—"ye are *risen* with him, through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from dead." Plainly, then, to be baptized into Christ, according to Paul, involves not simply an intusposition into his death, but also a rising with him, a resurrection; and whether our author accepts the word here as referring to the inward spiritual act or to the outward ritual act, his theory is in either case at utter variance with the apostle. For Dr. Dale represents the baptized as remaining forever intusposed, whereas Paul represents the baptized as *in baptism* not only intusposed but also raised out of that intusposition. It is evident, therefore, that this theory wholly misconceives baptism alike as a spiritual and as a ritual act. (3) The simple and natural view, however, which in all the ages linguistic authority and common sense have sanctioned, regards βαπτίζω in such passages as figuratively used, the word denoting the outward symbol being employed figuratively to designate the inward act it symbolizes. Any other interpretation of necessity leads to some such absurdity as that

just pointed out. For we are said to be "baptized into Christ," "baptized into his death," because baptism is the divinely appointed symbol of union with Christ in his death and resurrection. This construction of βαπτίζω as denoting primarily the outward, not the inward, act, is required, not only by its constant use for ritual baptism in the New Testament, but also by its common usage in Greek literature, where the element of it is ordinarily material, not ideal. Josephus (*Jewish Wars*, B. ii) says of Simon: "He plunged (ἐβαπτίσε) the whole sword into his own neck (εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σφαγὴν)." Plutarch (*Gryllus* vii) speaks of Agamemnon as bravely "plunging himself into (ἑαυτὸν βαπτίζων εἰς) the lake Copais." Chrysostom (*Select Discourses*, xxix) speaks of persons "exhorting to plunge the sword into (βαπτίσαι το ζῆφος εἰς) the enemy's breast." Dr. Conant, to whose admirable work on "The Meaning of βαπτίζειν" we are indebted for many of these citations, gives no less than fifteen examples from Greek writers in which βαπτίζω is thus followed by εἰς and an accusative, and in most of these instances the receptive element is material, not ideal. It is in accordance with this established Greek usage Mark, in describing the baptism of our Lord, chapter i, 9, says: He "was baptized in (εἰς) the Jordan by John," where the preposition εἰς expresses the action of ἐβαπτίσθη, the immediately preceding verb.

3. This theory also requires that βαπτίζω in religious usage must always be understood of the inward, spiritual act: it is the context only, which, by some added expression, can indicate that it was accompanied by the outward symbol. Hence several of the New Testament baptisms, ordinarily accounted ritual, are in reality instances of the spiritual act. The baptism, for example, of the three thousand at the Pentecost, and the baptism of Saul, at Damascus; and, indeed, this baptism of the Holy Spirit, and not the ritual act, is that which is enjoined in the great commission. To this we submit the following reply: The assumption that βαπτίζω in religious usage does not denote

the outward act has already been shown to be false. When John "did baptize in the wilderness," the act affirmed in the verb is clearly defined as outward, by other passages: to translate, John "did change the spiritual condition in the wilderness," is to destroy the sense. When "the multitude" of Pharisees and Sadducees "came forth *to be baptized* of him," they certainly did not come to obtain "a thorough change of spiritual condition;" for John calls them a "generation of vipers." When, in speaking of the baptisms under Christ's ministry, it is said, "Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples," it is impossible to understand the word of other than outward baptism: for surely, if baptism was "a change in the spiritual condition," it must have been effected by Christ, and not by the apostles. When Paul, in writing to the Corinthians, declares that he was not sent to baptize, and thanks God that he baptized none of them, except Crispus and Gaius, and the household of Stephanas, he surely does not intend that "a thorough spiritual change" in them was not the object of his ministry, nor that it was a matter of thanksgiving to God that this "thoroughly changed spiritual condition" had been wrought through him only in the persons named. Such a supposition is utterly absurd. The theory thus hopelessly breaks down when tested by actual New Testament usage, where βαπτίζω often stands in relations such as to compel its expression of the outward act.

It remains true, therefore, as all the ages have taught, that βαπτίζω in the New Testament, as elsewhere, designates, primarily, the outward act of immersion. That this outward act symbolized a great change of spiritual condition and relation, and that the inward change thus symbolized is unspeakably more important than the outward symbol—all this is plain, and this we affirm with all emphasis. So potent is this conviction with us, that we dare not administer the outward symbol, except in the presence of evidence that the higher spiritual reality it symbolizes already exists in the candidate, and that the outward sign

is thus a real representation of the great inward fact symbolized. But surely this higher importance of the spiritual act is no ground for setting aside the ordinary force of language, and restricting the word by which the Holy Spirit designates the symbol to the expression only of the thing symbolized.

Patristic baptism is the closing subject of these remarkable volumes. Here the main position of the author is, that "Christian baptism is always represented by the patristic writers as a spiritual baptism." He admits, indeed, as he needs must, that in the ritual act "the bodies of the baptized, when in health, were momentarily covered in water, in ancient times;" but he denies, with special emphasis, "that this momentary covering in water was believed to be Christian baptism, or, indeed, any baptism whatever." It was not this outward act at all, but the resulting spiritual effect only, which the fathers called baptism. In support of this novel proposition, he devotes one hundred and fifty pages to citations from patristic literature, subjecting the passages to an exegesis even more surprising than that employed on the Scriptures. We give one example cited for this interpretation, as illustrating the whole. It is the first cited under *βαπτισμα*, and is taken from Basil the Great. We adopt his translation:

"What is the purport and power of baptism?"

"The baptized is thoroughly changed as to thought and word and deed, and becomes, according to the power bestowed, the same as that by which he is born."

Plainly, Basil here declares his view of "the purport and power," that is, *the effect*, of baptism; but he certainly does not call this effect baptism; he only states the result of baptism to the baptized. An examination of the citations shows that nearly all of them are either—as in this example—such as present literally the supposed effect of baptism, or such as, by a metonymy, designate the thing signified by the sign, or the effect by the cause. The marvel is, that the author should have mistaken so plain a matter, and

should have made such sheer waste of labor and learning in attempting to establish a proposition which, to any ordinary student of patristic literature must seem simply preposterous.

For no fact is more evident than that the Fathers everywhere designate the outward, ritual act as baptism, and often sharply distinguish between this and the spiritual change it represents. Thus, Justin Martyr (Dialogue with a Jew) says: "For what is the benefit of that (*βαπτίσματος*) baptism which makes bright the flesh and the body only? Be baptized (*βαπτισθῆτε*) as to the soul, from anger and from covetousness; from envy, from hatred; and behold the body is clean." Cyril, of Jerusalem, in his Preface to Instructions, speaking of Simon Magus, says: "Simon, also, the Magian, once came to the bath: he was (*ἐβαπτισθῆ*) baptized, but he was not enlightened; and the body, indeed (*ἐβάψεν*), he dipped in water, but the heart he did not enlighten. And the body went down, indeed, but the soul was not buried with Christ, nor was raised with him." Certainly Cyril here calls the outward act baptism, and distinctly discriminates between it and "a thorough spiritual change;" for Simon "was baptized," but experienced no spiritual regeneration. The same writer, in his Instruction VII, speaking of the baptism of the apostles by the Holy Spirit, says: "As he who sinks down in the waters, and (*βαπτιζόμενος*) is baptized, is surrounded on all sides by the waters, so, also, they were completely (*ἐβαπτισθῆσαν*) baptized by the spirit." Chrysostom, in his Commentary on 1 Corinthians, Discourse xl, 1, says: "For to be baptized (*βαπτίζεσθαι*), and to sink down, then to emerge, is a *symbol* (*σύμβολον*) of the descent to the underworld, and of the ascent from thence. Therefore Paul calls the baptism the tomb, saying, 'We were buried, therefore, with Him by the baptism into death.'" The same writer, on the Gospel by John, Discourse xxv, speaking of baptism, says: "Divine *symbols* are therein celebrated; burial and deadness, resurrection and life, and all these take place together: for when we sink

our heads down in the water, as in a kind of tomb, the old man is buried, and sinking down beneath is all concealed at once: then when we emerge, the new man comes up again." Here the golden-mouthed father calls the outward act baptism, and affirms of baptism, not that it is the inward experience, but that it is the *symbol* of the new birth. Ambrose, in his work on the sacraments, Book iii, ch. 1, 2, says: "In baptism, since there is a similitude (*similitudo*) of death, without doubt, whilst thou dost sink down and rise again, there is also a similitude of the resurrection." Such citations might be multiplied indefinitely, but it is needless to adduce more. For these passages clearly show that the fathers did understand the outward act as a baptism, and distinguished between this and the inward spiritual change which was symbolized by it. The main proposition of Dr. Dale thus wholly fails when subjected to the test of actual patristic usage.

This singular proposition, however, even were it proved, would not affect the form of the ritual act; for as to this, the author admits that, in the patristic period, "the bodies of the baptized, when in health, were momentarily covered in water," that is, were immersed. He declares that he has "no purpose to deny or to question, or to shadow this fact; but, on the contrary, to give it the most unhesitating acknowledgment." In this, therefore, he is in full agreement with us: the external form in that period was "a momentary covering of the body in water." Whatever weight, therefore, may belong to the authority and example of the earliest ages of the Church, as to the form of ritual baptism, is thus freely conceded to the Baptist position. It is true, he regards the use of this form by the fathers as an error, and attributes it to their mistaken interpretation of Scripture; but, after the many and strange mistakes we have detected in Dr. Dale, as an interpreter, he will surely pardon us for the doubt, whether possibly the exegesis of the Fathers, despite their many errors, may not in this matter be more safely trusted than his. Besides, if we accept his

assertion, that immersion was a patristic perversion of the apostolic rite, then we must also accept the following most incredible things: 1. That this important change was made by the Fathers in the form and reason of the initial ordinance of the Christian religion, and no record, or even trace, of the time and manner of the change has come down to us: for, confessedly, the ritual act was an immersion at the earliest point of which we have knowledge next to the apostolic age, and neither history nor archæology furnishes the slightest hint that it was a change from the apostolic form. 2. That this great change was made, not in one Church only, but in all the Churches of Christendom; but among the vast multitude of martyrs and confessors of that heroic age of the Church, not one was found to resist this impious perversion of a divine institution and defend its heaven-given form and purpose; for in the immense literature of the patristic period, much of which was written by men who suffered and died for their faith, there is not a single objection raised against immersion as the ritual form of baptism. 3. That, notwithstanding most of these Fathers spoke the language of the New Testament as their vernacular, as did also the Churches to whom they ministered, they either strangely mistook the meaning of this word *βαπτίζω*, belonging to their own mother-tongue, or they willfully perverted it; and not one of them, or of the Christian people, throughout the wide extent of the Churches, either perceived the mistake or had the courage to rebuke the perversion. Now, it is evident, these propositions necessarily follow from the author's position; and we think it can hardly surprise him that our courage is inadequate to the acceptance and maintenance of a position involving propositions so formidable, and that we leave it to be maintained, therefore, by his own more courageous and venturesome logic.

But the theory of this work in rejecting immersion as the Scriptural form of baptism is opposed, not only by the authority and practice of the earliest Christian centuries, but also by the scholarship and the usage of the larger part

of Christendom in subsequent ages. On this point we submit the following facts:

1. The Greek Churches, which extend over Greece, Russia, Egypt, Abyssinia, Arabia, Palestine, and the whole of Western Asia, and in some of which the Greek language is, and ever has been, vernacular, have always practiced immersion, and insisted on this as the true import of the word. Throughout the vast Christian communions of the Orient they have in all ages steadily refused to recognize sprinkling or pouring as baptism. Coleman (Ancient Christianity, ch. 19, § 12) says: "The Eastern Church has uniformly retained the form of *immersion* as indispensable to the validity of the ordinance, and repeat the rite wherever they have received to their communion persons who have been baptized in another manner." This is seen in all their authorized rituals for baptism. Alexander de Stourdza, Russian State Councilor of the Orthodox Greek Church (quoted by Dr. Conant), says: "The distinctive characteristic of the institution of baptism is immersion, βαπτισμα, which can not be omitted without destroying the mysterious sense of the sacrament, and contradicting at the same time the etymological signification of the word which serves to designate it. The Church of the West has, then, departed from the example of Jesus Christ; she has obliterated the whole sublimity of the exterior sign; in short, she commits an abuse of words and ideas in practicing *baptism* by *aspersion*, this very term being in itself a derisive contradiction. Βαπτίζω, *immergo*, has, in fact, but one sole acceptation. It signifies literally and always *to plunge*. Baptism and immersion are, therefore, identical, and to say *baptism by aspersion* is as if one should say, *immersion by aspersion* or any other absurdity of the same nature." But citations of authorities are here needless, as all Church historians unite in affirming immersion as the theory and practice of the Greek Churches. Now, unless it be supposed that the Greek Churches, consisting largely of Greek-speaking populations, have through all the ages mistaken the

meaning of their own language, the inference from their uniform doctrine and practice would seem irresistible, that βαπτίζω signifies, and has always signified, to *immerse*, when used of the Christian rite.

2. In the Roman Church the form of baptism continued to be immersion until the thirteenth century, as all authorities show. Thomas Aquinas, as late as the middle of that century, said: "It is safer to baptize by immersion, because this is the common practice." Bossuet says of immersion: "We are able to make it appear, by acts of councils and ancient rituals, that for thirteen hundred years baptism was thus administered." Hagenbach (*Hist. of Doctrines*, Vol. ii. p. 81) says: "From the thirteenth century sprinkling came into more general use in the West. The Greek Church, however, and the Church of Milano still retained the practice of immersion." Brenner, an eminent Catholic, after an elaborate investigation, closes his work, entitled "Historical Exhibition of the Administration of Baptism from Christ to our Times," with the following statement: "Thirteen hundred years was baptism generally and regularly an immersion of the person under the water, and only in extraordinary cases a sprinkling or pouring with water; the latter was, moreover, disputed as a mode of baptism; nay, even forbidden." The change thus made in the practice of the Roman Church, from immersion to sprinkling, was, however, not based on any change of conviction as to the original form of the rite; Catholic theologians hold, and have ever held, that this was immersion, and they rest the validity of the change solely on the authority of the Church to alter rites and ceremonies.

3. Among the reformers, Luther and Calvin, with all scholars of that age, unitedly affirmed, in emphatic language, that immersion was the original form of the ordinance; as, indeed, do all Continental scholars of the present age. Luther, in his work, "*De Sacramento Baptismi*," said: "The name baptism is Greek; in Latin it may be rendered immersion, as when we immerse any thing in water that it may

be all covered with water. And, although that custom has now grown out of use with most persons (nor do they wholly submerge children, but only pour on a little water), yet they ought to be entirely immersed and immediately drawn out. For this the etymology of the name seems to demand." Calvin, in his *Institutes*, Book iv, chapter 15, wrote: "The word baptize itself signifies immerse, and it is certain that the rite of immersing was observed by the ancient Church." But in establishing the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, these eminent men disregarded the form as non-essential, and continued sprinkling, which in the sixteenth century had become the common practice on the Continent. And this form of the rite has remained in those Churches, notwithstanding the universal admission that it was not apostolic.

4. In the English Church, however, immersion had remained; and at the Reformation it was continued in the establishment. Lingard, in his "*History and Antiquities of the Anglo-Saxon Church*," describing the canonical regulations for baptism in the ante-reformation period, says of the adult candidate: "He then descended into the font, the priest depressed his head three times below the surface, saying: 'I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.'" And of the child: the priest "plunged it thrice into the water, pronounced the mysterious words, and then restored it to the sponsors." No change was made in this until the reign of Edward VI, when, in 1549, it was ordained: "If the child be weak, it shall suffice to pour water on it." The rubric of the English Church was finally settled in its present form under Charles II, 1662, in the following words: "Then the priest shall take the child into his hands, and shall say to the godfathers and godmothers: 'Name this child,' and then, naming it after them (if they certify him that the child may well endure it), he shall dip it in the water discreetly and warily, saying: 'I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.' But if they certify that

the child is weak, it shall suffice to pour water upon it, saying the aforesaid words." This has ever since been the law of the English Church; and though, under it, sprinkling, the exception, has become, in practice, the rule, this practice is not based on any change of conviction as to the meaning of *βαπτίζω*, or of the original form of the rite. For scholars and historians of the English Church, with almost unanimous voice, unite in affirming that immersion is the true and original form of the sacrament. In the Scotch Church John Knox, following Calvin and the Continental Churches, established sprinkling. Among the English Puritans, however, there was an earnest party in favor of retaining the original form. In the Westminster Assembly, 1644, when the "Form of Public Worship" was under consideration, there was warm discussion on the subject; but, as the result, sprinkling was adopted by one majority, the final vote standing, twenty-four in favor of insisting on immersion only, and twenty-five in favor of allowing, also, sprinkling.

5. If, moreover, we examine the results of Christian scholarship, as they appear in the highest authorities in Greek lexicography and New Testament exegesis, we find the decision of Greek scholars nearly unanimous for immersion, as the proper meaning of *βαπτίζω*, and the original form of the ordinance. It is needless here to quote the words of the earlier lexicographers and scholars, such as Scapula, Schleusner, Bretschneider, Passow, and the long array of other names distinguished in Greek and New Testament literature; for the late Prof. Moses Stuart, of Andover, in his work on "Baptism and its Subjects," affirms that "all lexicographers and critics of any note are agreed that *βαπτίζω* means to *dip*, *plunge*, or *immerse*, in any liquid." Of the most recent lexicographers, Liddell and Scott, the acknowledged lexical authority in classic Greek, define *βαπτίζω*, to *put in*, or *under*, *water*; and they explain its figurative uses, such as to *soak*, to *drown*, to *sink*, as derived from this. Cremer, in his *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*, recently translated, says, in defining *βαπτίζω*: "The pecul-

iar New Testament and Christian use of the word" is "*immersion, submersion* for a religious purpose." He gives no other literal sense. Wilke's Lexicon of New Testament Greek, edited by Grimm, and lately issued in Germany, defines βαπτίζω: 1. *To immerse, submerge*: 2. *To wash or bathe* by immersing, or submerging: 3. *To overwhelm*. He affirms that baptism in the New Testament is "an immersion in water." Prof. Sophocles, of Harvard University, a native Greek, in his Lexicon of the Greek of the Roman and Byzantine Periods—B. C. 140 to A. D. 1000—defines it in the same way, as signifying to *dip, immerse, sink*, with figurative uses derived from this; and he insists that "there is no evidence that Luke and Paul and the other writers of the New Testament put upon this verb meanings not recognized by the Greeks." The most eminent scholars of the recent period, as Fritzsche, Lange, and Meyer, in Germany, and Conybeare and Howson, Alford, Lightfoot, Ellicott and Plumptre, of the Anglican Church, are in full accord with these latest utterances in New Testament lexicography.

The results of the above historic survey of the subject may be summed up in the following statements: 1. The patristic Churches universally practiced immersion, except in extreme sickness, and based their practice on the meaning of the word and the symbolic import of the rite. 2. The orthodox Greek Church, ancient and modern, with all the Oriental Churches not of the Roman faith, has always insisted on immersion, as being the true meaning of the word, and as necessary to the validity of the sacrament. 3. The Latin Church for more than thirteen centuries continued to use immersion; and the change afterwards made to sprinkling was based, and is still based, by Catholic theologians, not on any altered view of the original form of the rite, but only on the authority of the Church to alter ceremonies. 4. The practice of sprinkling, among most of those who use it, is not defended as resting on the true meaning of βαπτίζω, or as being the original form of the rite (both of which positions they deny); but in the Catho-

lic and Anglican Churches, it rests on an alleged authority in the Church to change ordinances, and in the Lutheran and Reformed Churches on the doctrine that the form, though properly immersion, is not essential. 5. Immersion, as the proper significance of βαπτίζω and the original form of the rite, has been affirmed through all the Christian ages, and is still affirmed, by the highest scholarship of Christendom—Oriental, Catholic, and Protestant; the reverse has found advocacy only among a portion of the scholars in a few pedobaptist sects of Great Britain and America. The great body of Christians throughout the world are, and ever have been, Baptist in theory on the form of baptism. Few facts connected with the Christian religion have received a sanction so earnest and united from the ripest scholarship and piety of the Church of God in all ages as the fact that baptism, alike in the form of the original command and in the practice of the apostolic Churches, was an immersion “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

Now, against this *consensus* of the Church of God, which itself creates a strong presumption of truth, Dr. Dale distinctly opposes himself; and in defiance of the collective learning, and intellect, and spiritual intuitions of the Christian ages, he boldly affirms that their united convictions were false. Surely the author might well need four ponderous octavos to sustain a position so forlorn and hazardous; and, considering the odds against which he has been compelled to contend, it can not be deemed strange that even these, notwithstanding the amazing courage and industry they display, have failed to accomplish a work so Herculean and hopeless.

EDITORIAL.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE desire, so frequently and generally expressed, for a denominational Quarterly which will rank with the ablest representing other religious bodies originates in an intelligent appreciation of the important services it can render to the cause of Christ. The repeated calls for such a periodical "utter a wide and deeply felt want." This desire is creditable to the parties expressing it. It is moved by a noble anxiety for the highest possible efficiency in the ministry and their most helpful co-laborers in general Christian work.

NEEDED.

In view of all that has been said, and so wisely, upon the importance of having a first-class Quarterly Review, we find it unnecessary to do more at this time than recall some passages in Dr. Lucius E. Smith's editorial, in the first number of the *Baptist Quarterly*, issued in 1867:

"A denomination so numerous and widely diffused needs a common literary organ for the cultivation of conscious unity. Writers in different parts of the country bringing their contributions together will become mutually acquainted. Their free exchange of thought can not but invigorate their fraternal sentiments. The better we know each other the more highly shall we esteem each other in love. By calling out, also, young writers, and encouraging their literary endeavors, a service will be done, both to them and to the public, which will gain the benefit of their success."

"Our people have been liberal in their contributions for seminaries of learning, to the end that by providing a well trained and well instructed ministry they might promote a higher intelligence in the mass of Christians. The forethought which discerned this capital want of the Churches, and the enlightened public spirit that has done so much to

supply it, are worthy of all commendation. But *something more than the education of candidates is required in order to secure a thoroughly furnished ministry.* Those who are actively engaged in the ministerial office need means of continuous culture, that impulses communicated by their preparatory discipline may not be soon spent and forgotten in the task-work of life. *Something to suggest and freshen thought, to invite to investigation, to stir up the old enthusiasm, to allure to new paths of research; something to keep the mind in communication with the prevailing currents and tendencies of opinion, while yet faith in the eternal verities of the Gospel is strengthened—something of this kind is needed.*" . . .

"But while the wants of ministers and students have a prominent place among the motives for sustaining a periodical of this kind, it must discuss topics that deserve the attention of every enlightened Christian, and it is hoped that among our intelligent laymen will be found many supporters of the work and some valued contributions to its pages."

ITS SPHERE.

"A publication such as we hope, with the help of our brethren, to make this has a place that no other periodical existing among us can fill. It is no disparagement of our weekly religious newspapers to say that the work we propose to do is one they do not attempt, and could not hope to succeed in. Valuable as they are, invaluable as is the service they render to the spiritual and intellectual culture of our people, there is, besides, and partly by reason of their success, a place and demand for something more. And it is only just to add, that the enterprise we now inaugurate owes to their encouragement much of its hopefulness."

The above statements apply as aptly and as truthfully to-day as they did twelve years ago.

THE BAPTIST REVIEW.

Though especially devoted to the furtherance of the distinctive doctrines held by Baptist Churches, the REVIEW will not overlook the many concerning which we are at one, in sentiment, with our brethren of other names. In this, as well as in its representative character, it hopes to be of interest and value to the general Christian public.

It will contain articles of permanent value, giving the

richest fresh thought with the choicest fruits of advanced scholarship; such as will be most stimulating and suggestive in the study, and most helpful in Christian work.

It will treat matters bearing on the present and future welfare of the Church, giving especial attention to the more potent currents of religious thought and feeling.

It will be conservative in doctrine, independent in utterance; presenting solid thought without dullness, and the enrichments of learning without obscurity of language.

It will be invaluable to the pastor or layman who studies to show himself approved, a workman that need not be ashamed.

Both the contributors and editor will endeavor to make it such a representative of the spirituality, doctrines, and scholarship of the denomination as will readily receive the most cordial approbation, and a *general, liberal* support.

All sections of the country will be represented in its contents, and subscriptions will be sought from all.

The REVIEW is published at a central point, affording facilities for ready communication with all sections; and is free from any association with societies, parties, or schools, which could awaken apprehensions as to partiality in its friendships.

It should not be necessary to make any appeal for the support of a periodical of this kind in a denomination embracing over two millions in its membership, and having a ministry numbering nearly fifteen thousand. Those who appreciate it understand that such a Review can not be maintained without their co-operation. It will need their good will, effectively expressed. We shall appreciate any assistance rendered in our efforts to make it worthy of the highest favor, and to secure a general and ample subscription list.

THE BAPTIST REVIEW.

It affords no little gratification to be able to lay before our own denomination and the Christian public so much excellent matter as is contained in the able and scholarly

articles in this number of the BAPTIST REVIEW. These may be accepted as an earnest of the many good things to follow. No efforts will be spared in our endeavors to make it the ablest and best of its kind in the country.

Pastors who study to maintain a good, living position in the ministry, and to have their services sought for, will find in the contents of the REVIEW indispensable aids. It will be no less helpful to laymen who avail themselves of its fresh, stimulating thought, and rich fruits of sound scholarship. We ask all reading this to AID in promoting its circulation.

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Please favor us with your *prompt* subscription, with names of any in your Church whom you would advise us to address regarding subscription to the REVIEW. Please write plainly your name, post-office, County, and State. Address J. R. BAUMES, *Baptist Review*, Cincinnati, Ohio.

LITERARY NOTES.

Wilford's Review of the Wave Theory of Sound in "*The Problem of Human Life*."*

THIS reviewer has attacked the "*wave, or undulatory theory*" of the propagation of light, heat, electricity, magnetism, and sound, which has enjoyed almost unquestioned acceptance by the learned world since the days of Pythagoras, two thousand five hundred years ago, with a boldness that will create astonishment in his readers, even though they may decline to adopt his opinions. His arguments convict the whole line of scientists, from Pythagoras to this day, of unaccountable obtuseness in accepting arguments for the *wave theory* that are utterly groundless. He shows that they all proceed upon an *assumption* of the existence of ether, an exceedingly subtle, attenuated fluid, that pervades the whole space of the universe, and which Tyn-dall says, in his treatise on "Light," pages 57-60, "*is almost infinitely more attenuated than any gas, though its properties are those of a solid rather than those of a gas. It resembles jelly rather than air.*" Now, so far as these subtle agents are supposed to operate beyond our atmosphere, the wave theory falls to the ground, and must rest there till its existence and properties shall

* Hall & Co., 234 Broadway, New York, Publishers.

have been demonstrated. To *assume* this indispensable factor without proof, and then found such a sweeping theory of the universe upon it, is, to say the least, unwarrantable and absurd. Facts demonstrated in this review show that the wave theory is baseless even within our own atmosphere. It looks like unpardonable conceit to attempt to supplant what has had the unanimous consent of the learned so long—not only the tacit consent, but the mature, thoughtful, and scientific consent of those who have been the world's teachers; and yet our reviewer has boldly stood up to the task, and produced impregnable proofs that these subtle agents are governed by no such law. In this notice it is proposed to consider only the application of the theory to *sound*. (Wilford's Review, chapters v and vi.)

Several eminent scientists have suggested the corpuscular theory in respect to light and heat; but, by common consent, sound has been given to the wave theory, and the tendency, for many years, has been to appropriate all the other subtle agents to the same, as being the easiest. The concentric waves produced upon the surface of water by any thing dropped into it has always been supposed to furnish the type of sound propagation; but it is very easy to show that sound is conveyed through the air much more rapidly than waves travel, even if we were to grant that sound is conveyed in concentric waves. It is clear that the particles of air do not advance with sound, as any boy can testify who has amused himself with throwing pebbles into the quiet surface of water, to see the beautiful circles form and spread. He has seen a little chip or straw lifted by the wave and gently dropped at very nearly the same point as wave after wave has passed. A wave of water formed by dropping a pebble of one pound weight into it will advance about three feet in a second, while sound, made under the water by the collision of that pebble with another, will travel to an ear about four thousand six hundred feet distant. The same sound in air would reach an ear one thousand one hundred and twenty feet distant in a second. Sound, therefore, is evidently conveyed by some other means than the wave. Waves in water have a velocity proportioned to the force by which they are formed, and a wave-length in air according to the number of the vibrations of the sonorous body. How, then, do we account for the harmony of music made by the vibrations ranging from sixteen to two thousand in a second in a full orchestra? Can waves be formed by all these diverse notes so as to strike the ear, respectively, in time to preserve the harmony of the music? The open G string of a violin vibrates one hundred and ninety-eight times in a second, and the swing of the string is only about one-sixty-fourth of an inch, so that the string actually moves through only about three inches in a second? Do all these various notes create waves of their own? Why, then, do they not break each other up, as water waves do when a handful of pebbles are thrown into water at once? One would suppose that a thousand voices with the great organ in the Music Hall, in Cincinnati, would produce *silence*, if sound depends upon the formation of waves from each sonorous body, according to its pitch and power. It is plain, to any observer, that there are no waves that are distinguishable in a rain shower on the surface of the water not otherwise disturbed. Every drop that falls starts a

circle, but it is immediately lost by contact with others on every side. So the notes of many voices or instruments in concert can not possibly generate distinct air waves, so that each musical sound shall reach the ear by a wave of its own. Sound must be conveyed by some other means. Professor Helmholtz, who is "the highest living authority on physical science," says, "sound waves in air and water waves are essentially identical; of precisely similar nature, and travel exactly in the same way." If sound travels only in waves, let the advocates of that theory explain, if they can, why it travels much the most rapidly through solids. One would suppose that the mobility and flexibility of air and gases would be much more favorable to the rapid transmission of sound; but instead of it, the most solid and inflexible bodies convey it much the most rapidly and perfectly. The mobility of the air seems not to have had due consideration on the part of the scientists in defending the wave theory. They seem to take it for granted that an impulse that moves the air at all must, of necessity, reach the surrounding air to an indefinite extent. It is reasonable to suppose that the particles of the fluids are globular, and, therefore, when one particle is pressed in a fluid so confined in all directions except one, that the pressed particle could move only in that direction, it would, of course, obey the impulse in that direction; but if it is free in all directions except one side, it may roll out of the way in any other direction without conveying the impulse to the particles adjacent, except for a very limited space. In bodies so thin and rare as the elastic fluids, there is plenty of room for the particles to slip aside without disturbing their neighbors to any great extent. The wings of a gnat do not move the whole air of a continent or of the world. It moves the air through which it flies; each particle retreats by slipping aside right or left, up or down, and rolls back so quietly that the influence is felt but a few inches around. In a perfectly still world we can easily imagine, on the wave hypothesis, that a *single* sound might be very easily distinguishable; but we can not, without violence to our reason, accept the supposition that each of the myriad noises can so monopolize the air as to convey to us its separate report, so that we can make it a distinct object of thought, as is eminently the case in music by hundreds of voices or instruments. A cultivated musical ear can distinguish all the parts in a concert of numerous voices and instruments, and even the quality and expression of different voices and instruments. Could any one, standing on the shore of a quiet sheet of water into which a troop of boys were throwing stones, trace and distinguish the waves produced by each, there would be more propriety in supposing that the wave theory is a symbol, and accounts for the propagation of sound. Or if it were found that a great number of noises would produce silence, just as a great number of pebbles thrown into water destroys and renders undistinguishable all waves, we might believe "that water waves aptly illustrate the transmission of sound. The common notion is, that sound is nothing but air in motion—a notion that no man can prove. There are some experiments that seem to favor that idea, but many more that contradict it. The fact that no sound can be heard in a vacuum does not prove it. It only proves that without a medium sound can not travel. Air in motion, with nothing to resist it, is

silent, and the nature of the resistant object determines the quality of the sound. What sound is no man can tell.

Wilford thinks it is a *real entity, a something—infinitesimal corpuscles*. That is his hypothesis. And since the wave theory must be given up, we may accept this, if we please. It is certain that if it be corpuscular, it is too attenuated for our organs to examine. We can only know it by its effects, and we may as well accept this hypothesis as the hypothetical *ether*, which the advocates of the wave theory pronounce “almost infinitely more attenuated than any gas.” The question in this discussion is, How is sound transmitted? The answer is, By radiation. Then the question arises, What is radiation? Wilford answers, in substance, “A tendency which the Creator has imparted to all these subtle agents to diffuse themselves in every direction by a power which is not yet, and, perhaps, never will be, subject to our inspection.” It is with the fact only that we may have to do for the present. Any one may form a hypothesis, and it will be good for all it will account for. Wilford’s is, that sound, light, heat, and magnetism, like odor, are all real corpuscles raying out in every direction. What gives the impulse we may never know. We do know the fact that an odoriferous body left exposed will fill the surrounding air with something that is capable of powerful physical effects. We know that heat will diffuse itself with a silent, invisible power throughout a room. We know that magnetism will exert a powerful influence even through some intervening solid bodies. We know that light comes flying with inconceivable velocity from the sun, but by what means it is impelled we do not know. And we know that all these subtle agents are capable of powerful physical effects, too powerful for a nonentity to produce. Radiation, by a law of conduction, seems to be a natural attribute of all these subtle agents, and why may not sound be placed in the same category? Wilford occasionally claims to have demonstrated some things which he really leaves us in a problematical state. But it must be confessed that he has left very little room for doubt that sound may be classed among entities, and subject to the laws of radiation like the other subtle agents. No man can read his arguments without conviction that he has struck a line of thought which will revolutionize long accepted theories of these several agents of nature. Whether the human soul is corpuscular may still hang in doubt. There need be no theological objection to Wilford’s supposition, though at first it may startle Biblical scholars, because they are apt to see in it a revival of the materialistic notions, that have given no little anxiety to those holding the doctrine of the soul’s spiritual nature. But so far as his views are contained in the problem of human life, there is nothing to fear. The book deserves profound study and a wide circulation, and will no doubt secure both.

Evangelical Rationalism ; or, A Consideration of Truths Practically related to Man’s Probation.* By LOREN L. KNOX, D. D.

THE author holds that “religious truths are valuable chiefly as they are adapted to come home to every human heart and affect personal life

* Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden. New York: Phillips & Hunt.

and character." He aims "to present those doctrines which have the most direct tendency to effect this object." The volume opens with a chapter on "Truth in Religious Systems," but does not attempt a discussion of any system of doctrines, or of any truth in its relations to a creed. It adheres to a consideration of the bearings of great central doctrines, such as "Faith in God," "Faith in Christ," "The Atonement," "Probation," and "Retribution," upon life and character. It is such a presentation of religious truth as is most needed, and will accomplish much good. Though "practical," it is a work exhibiting a high order of ability, a mind capable of discerning truth in its relations to human life, and of teaching it as did Christ and his apostles. It is a wholesome and valuable volume, and deserves an extended reading and acceptance.

Christian Baptism: Its Subjects and Mode.* By S. M. MERRILL, D. D.,
Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

THE Bishop was moved to the publication of this volume of discourses by the discovery of a surprising neglect on the part of many in the ministry of his Church. He says:

"In many sections our people scarcely ever hear the subject [baptism] from our pulpits. There are hundreds of congregations in which the younger members never heard a sermon on Infant Baptism, and probably never more than a very hasty explanation of our practice concerning the mode."

Such reticence upon one of the two ordinances—that around which are grouped all Scripture teachings regarding regeneration and guiding to public profession of Christ—an ordinance which, because of its symbolizing the termination of the carnal life, and a resurrection to a new, spiritual life in Christ, has been the occasion of nearly all the great and significant divisions among professed Christians; that there should be such reticence on this in a ministry so thoroughly drilled in their denominational tenets and polity is astonishing. It can only be accounted for on the supposition that conscientious adherents to Bible language, so well informed as those pastors, are not willing to encounter such embarrassments as they would experience in attempting to justify or explain practices for which they can find no "Thus saith the Lord." In this view, it is not so surprising that such teachers in Israel should remain silent, even though the result be, as the Bishop informs us, "that, so far as such communities are educated at all, on this subject, it is under other auspices." He offers this work "to meet a real want," and recognizing the fact that something should be done to remove "serious difficulties from the minds of earnest seekers after truth."

From our stand-point there is discoverable but little ground for his encouragement in this effort. He talks too far behind and too far in advance of what is really decisive on the questions involved. Extended discourses on the "Spiritual State of Infants," "The Abrahamic Covenant," "Oneness of the Church," and "Spirit Baptism" are not calculated to generate such concentric rays as will disperse the long ages of darkness which these good bishops insist upon wading through to arrive at a knowledge of what,

* Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden; New York: Phillips & Hunt.

to "earnest seekers after truth," seems to be very plainly stated in the account given us of Christ's baptism, in the third chapter of the Gospel by Matthew. He brings obscurity to his aid, at the very outset, by assuming that "we must accept it as a fact" "that there is in the great commission a command to baptize the nations," and that it "is not very discriminating." He proceeds to say that this command "did not restrict the apostles to males or females, to old or young." Certainly not. A teacher of teachers in Israel ought to know that there is not to be found in the Scriptures any command "to baptize the nations"—that is, all classes in all nations irrespective of qualifications. Nor is it very reverential, even on the part of a bishop, to speak of the great commission as not being "very discriminating." Nor can we suppose any one would who has not a point to make that can not be reached by the direct aid of what is written. "Beyond this *general commission*"—sad that it should have been so loosely stated to beings so prone to divisions as we are—"we have *no* authoritative guide in determining the proper subjects of baptism, other than the example of the apostles, as recorded in the book of Acts, with incidental allusions in the inspired epistles," etc. All this arguing for indefiniteness and ambiguities is to prepare the way for the supposition that children and unconverted "penitents" are not excluded. In making a plea for baptizing "penitents who can not claim to have entered into the rest of faith," he is candid enough to admit that "we have some examples in the Acts of the Apostles of persons being baptized *after* they had become true believers." This is as instructive as his previous statement, in which he informs us that the apostles "administered baptism with water." The innocency with which he tells us that on this he assumes "that the duty is imposed on the Church to continue the practice of baptizing with water" suggests that he never heard of Jordan, and finds himself surprised that water was chosen as the element in which the rite was to be administered.

It is remarkable that one writing to aid "earnest seekers after truth" should quote and requote whatever in the Scriptures will permit a construction favoring the shadow of a supposition in favor of a practice resting wholly on a hypothesis, and carefully omit all passages which define and, to unprejudiced readers, would be decisive on questions involved. Thus he holds before us Christ's blessing the little children, calling the child unto him, the baptism of households, and the like, but overlooks the passages which bear directly on the requisites to baptism—such as that stating John's refusal to baptize those who had not repented; that in which Christ says, "he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved;" and the answer of Philip to the eunuch's request for baptism, "If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest." Before complaining that the command by which Christ sent out his apostles "*is not very discriminating*" (that is, does not plainly inform us as to the proper subjects of baptism) the Bishop should admit that he can not understand whether those who are old enough to be taught—"discipled"—do or do not, as a class, include infants. The command that requires *discipleship* as a requisite to an ordinance is as plain and decisive as to qualifications as language can make it. So are such passages as, "Repent and be baptized," "He that believeth and is baptized."

No good can follow the admission of the unconverted to the ordinances and fellowship of the Church. Every anxiety for the purity of the Church and the welfare of souls, as well as fidelity to Christ, should prompt those who assume to teach to the strictest regard for the limitations of his commission. We have no warrant for the assumption that baptism "is a means of pardon," or in any manner a blessing to one who is yet in his sins. The individual and the Church are both harmed by any action or hope based upon it.

The Bishop gives us a work displaying tact and shrewdness in argument as well as thorough knowledge of the current arguments on his side of the questions involved. Those desiring to know the grounds on which Pedobaptists rest their practices, or their explanations of their practices, will do well to read his book.

Life and Times of John Knox.* By CHARLES K. TRUE, D. D.

FINDING no "American book on the subject [Knox] above the size of a pamphlet," the author prepared this, "that the young who read may know how to value that religious freedom and independence we now enjoy, and learn for themselves to dare to be right and to be true." These are lessons of the greatest importance to people of all ages, and "their inculcation was never needed more in this country than at the present." John Knox, "the soul of the Reformation in Scotland," furnishes the needed material for the inculcation of such lessons,— "the one man," as Froude aptly said, when summing up his services to the cause of a pure Christianity, "without whom Scotland, as the modern world has known it, would have had no existence." It is a careful and well-arranged compilation of what has been said by eminent historians of England and biographers of Knox. It exhibits those grand virtues which gave character to the Reformation, and abide as enduring examples to all ages.

Young Folks' History of Germany.* By CHARLOTTE M. YONGE.

A BRIEF outline of the history of the German Empire is presented in language well adapted to the mind and taste of the young reader. The work appears in embellished binding, pleasing to the eye, and is made still more attractive and interesting by numerous illustrations. Parents and teachers will serve the interests of the young folks under their care by enlisting them in the study of books containing such valuable historical information as given in this.

Young Folks' History of Greece.* By CHARLOTTE M. YONGE.

THIS is another volume of history of the same kind, and designed for the same class of readers—the young folks—as the history of Germany, noticed above. If the young folks shall be diverted by such attractive works from the trashy novels in secular and Sunday-school libraries to the study of reliable histories great good will have been accomplished. Both author and publishers deserve thanks for such volumes as these. Now let parents and teachers improve the opportunity afforded by such publications.

* Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden; New York: Phillips & Hunt.

THE , BAPTIST REVIEW.

ARTICLE I.

SOME MISTRANSLATIONS OF THE GREEK ARTICLE IN THE AUTHORIZED VERSION.

BY REV. J. M. STIFLER, D. D.

OUR King James's Version of the New Testament holds the field against all competitors. It will hold it during the life-time of the generation now using it. Jerome's Revision of the Vulgate battled two centuries before it fully displaced its imperfect predecessor. Our King James's Version was a long time winning its way against the Bishops' Bible and the Genevan, which it finally dislodged from the pulpit and the fireside. And let no one dream that history will not be true to itself. Never was a version dearer to the hearts of its readers than our present one.

In many respects our present English Bible is perfect as a translation. But it has also its failings. And since, as readers and teachers of it, we shall be compelled to use it for years to come, we should know these. They are not so numerous that a little care will not make us acquainted with every one. Such an acquaintance, too, can be gained by those who do not read the original. There are books which plainly set before the English reader the errors, both in the text and in the translation.

It has often been asserted that there is no variation in the original text affecting a vital doctrine. Such can hardly be said of the translation. While no doctrine may be perverted, more than once our translation obscures one. It

has been noticed, too, by scholars that our version is especially defective in the rendering of the tenses and of the article. It is asserted that the King James's translators obtained their knowledge of Greek from the Latin, which they constantly wrote and often spoke. The Latin having one less tense than the Greek, and no article at all, the translators, it is claimed, did not know what to do with either the extra tense or the article. Lightfoot says (Revisions, page 80): Our translators' "accuracy fails just where the Latin language ceases to run parallel with the Greek." This may account for their failure in the tense. It hardly can for that in the article. For Lightfoot himself quotes Tyndal's statement: "The Greek tongue agreeth more with the English than with the Latin." How is it, then, that our translators, or more properly revisers, were not instructed by their own vernacular in that in which the Latin failed them? Many of the laws governing the article are common to every language having an article. The English article is by no means parallel in its use with the Greek, but enough so to have saved our revisers from many of their blunders. They certainly understood it in English. Why should this not have helped them so far in Greek?

To answer this question, it is a fact to be noticed that they very frequently translate the article by the words *this* or *that* when they do not translate correctly. "Art thou *that* prophet?" (John i, 21.) In this first chapter of John the article is wrongly rendered five times—each time by the word "that" instead of "the." One is led, therefore, to suspect that two hundred and sixty-eight years ago, when our translation was made, the words *this* and *that* did not have that strict demonstrative character which they now possess, and that our translators were not as wrong then as they have become by the mutations of the language. The words *this* and *that*, by which they translated δ (*the*), have in two hundred and sixty-eight years taken on different meanings, just as have hundreds of other words, *e. g.*, "let," "prevent," "conversation," etc. Our translators are not to

blame that their rendering of Psalm cxix, 147, is nonsense now: "I *prevented* the dawning of the morning and cried."

As some proof of identity between the "that" of former centuries and our present "the" we may note that anciently "the" was spelled t-h-a-t in one of its forms. It may be noticed, too, in Chaucer that the word "that" is used precisely as we now use the word "the." Describing the Yeoman (Pro., l. 113), he says:

"Upon his arm he bar a gay bracer,
And by his side a sword and a bokeler,
And on *that* other side a gay daggere."

To-day he would write,

And on *the* other side a gay dagger.

Again, in naming two young knights (Knight's Tale, l. 155), he says:

"Of whiche two Arcite highte *that* oon,
And *that* other knight highte Palemon."

We now say, not *that* one (oon) and *that* other, but *the* one and *the* other.

Again (Knight's Tale, l. 341), we read:

"So wel they lovede as olde bookes sayn,
That when *that* oon [one] was dead," etc.

Here we would say not *that* one, but *the* one.

The first line of a translation (made, I do not know when, but printed in this country in 1812) of the Imitation of Christ, reads: "He that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, . . . says *that* Christ who declares himself the light of the world." In Malcom's edition of the same work the word "that" is omitted. These examples only hint at what might be proved, that our translators were not as ignorant of the use of the article as they are charged with being, and that the words *this* and *that*, by which they so frequently translate it, have shifted their meanings, for which they are not responsible. But in many cases the broadest charity can not but own that King James's revisers have erred outright. They either did not know, or else were very careless.

It is the purpose of this paper to show some of the errors in the translation of the article, and at the same time to suggest the true rendering. But the reader who is conversant with Middleton, or Lightfoot, or any modern critical commentary, will find little that is original here, except in arrangement and suggestion. This field has been well worked, ever since Bishop Middleton issued his treatise on the Greek Article, seventy years ago—a work of whose principles Moses Stuart speaks lightly, but whose examples must remain a thesaurus to the end of time.

1st. A faulty rendering often obscures a doctrine and dulls its keen edge. This is very noticeable in the writings of the Apostle John. The word *σκότια* (darkness) is used by him fourteen times, and in ten of these it is preceded by the definite article *ὁ* (the). But in eight of these cases our translators give no sign of its existence in the original. They have been scrupulously careful to mark by italics the words they inserted. How well it would have been if they could have given some sign of the words they omitted! In John viii, 12, we read in our version, “He that followeth me shall not walk in *darkness*.” Again, in 1 John i, 6: “If we say we have fellowship with him, and walk in *darkness*, we lie.” Now, to say, “He that followeth me shall not walk in darkness,” conveys a definite idea, but by no means John’s. The idea was concrete with him, and not abstract, as the translation makes it. The word darkness (*σκότια*) is peculiar to him, except Matt. x, 27, and Luke xii, 3. He conceived of Christ as *the* light, and of all that was not in him as *the* darkness. The world, its works, and its men, were to him darkness. Paul (Eph. v, 8) presents the same idea, though using a word (*σκότος*) slightly different: “Ye were sometime *darkness*, but now are ye light in the Lord.” Often Christ’s children, even when in full fellowship and sympathy with him, must confess that from one cause and another they are in darkness. A gloom is upon their soul, and they mourn it. But John had not this in mind. What he said is, If we say we have fellowship with him, and

walk in *the* darkness," the spirit and ways of the world. In 1 John ii, 11, it is not simply, "He that hateth his brother is in darkness." He is in *the* darkness, and walketh in the darkness, . . . because *the* (not *that*) darkness hath blinded his eyes. The case is much worse than our faulty version would make it. He who hates his brother has not only a wrong experience—a darkness; he has an utterly wrong and perilous position. He is not in Christ, but in the spirit and temper of the world—in the darkness. For John must be consistent with himself. He says (iii, 15): "Whosoever hateth his brother is a *murderer*, and ye know that no murderer hath eternal life abiding in him." Again (iii, 14), "He that loveth not his brother *abideth in death*." In the verse under consideration John is not looking at the man's heart and depicting its darkness, but at the man's relation to Christ. He is not in him, but in the darkness, and the subsequent teaching on the matter of brotherly love makes it perfectly certain that by *darkness* John means much more than our articleless translation would convey. So 1 John ii, 9, should be rendered: "He that says he is in the light [in Christ] and hates his brother is in *the* darkness" (in the world, unrenewed). How it improves John i, 5, to bring out the article: "The light shineth in *the* darkness"—the two concrete ideas being set the one over against the other, the Christ and the not Christ. "The darkness" is a theological term with John just as much as "the light" is. In the foregoing passages the Bible Union version translates correctly each time. John i, 8, mars the sense by saying of John the Baptist, "He was not *that* light." It should be, he was not *the* light, not the Messiah. The verse should read, "He was not *the* light, but came to bear witness of the light," John being true to his terms—Christ the light, all else the darkness, even the Baptist himself, except as he was made luminous. Hence John iii, 19, should be rendered, "And this is the judgment, that *the* light has come into the world, and men loved *the* darkness (*σκότος* here) rather than *the* light." How rigidly the article here

binds our view to Christ and to the concrete opposite. The Bible Union revision misses this, translating, "Light has come into the world." The Union evidently took the word "light" as abstract in this verse. But this is far from the truth. Light had been in the world from the days of Moses. *The* light—that from which all previous illumination had emanated—had now come. The word $\phi\omega\varsigma$ (light) is not abstract here. It is Christ himself. This is no trifle. It is not pedantry. There is a world-wide difference between lamp-light and the lamp itself. One is expressed by the word light, the other by the words *the* light. There is a vast difference between darkness and the darkness. And our translators, by failing to render the article which the Holy Ghost gave, have not only made this text to say what God has not said, but bedimmed utterly this doctrine about the darkness.

A less serious fault is found in Matt. vi, 23: "If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that [it ought to be *the*] darkness." Here the faulty word "that" serves only to identify the second mention of darkness with the first, and our thought is inevitably confined to a single darkness. But when we read "the" we see there is a twofold darkness. It is not, if your lamp be darkness, how great must *that* darkness of the lamp be, but how great must the darkness of the room be. Alford seems to give the sense correctly: "If the light which is in thee is darkness, how dark must the darkness be" which is also in thee. Luke xi, 34, where there is the same thought, makes this clear. "But when thine eye is evil [dark], thy whole body *also* is full of darkness." The twofold constitution of man is considered in our passage. It is much the same doctrine as that in Romans vii, 14, fg., as summed up in the 25th verse: "So, then, with the mind I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin." Now, where the mind fails to serve the law of God, as it often does fail, what darkness there must be in the flesh. If the conscience is darkness, what must the appetites and passions be! If the

light that is in thee be darkness, how great the darkness that is also in thee.

In John vi, 32, not only is the flow of thought interrupted, but a precious doctrine is obscured by the faulty rendering of the article. But, worse than all, Jesus is made to tell a falsehood. The Jews had just said (verse 32), Our fathers did eat manna in the desert as it is written, He gave them bread from heaven to eat. The reply in our translation is as follows: Verily, verily I say unto you, Moses gave you not *that* bread from heaven. Now, the fact is, Moses *did* give them *that* bread, the manna. As Jesus could say, "Moses gave you circumcision" (John vii, 22), so they could say, "He gave us *that* bread from heaven." For "that" read "the," as the Greek warrants, and how plain the whole passage becomes. They say, "He gave them bread from heaven." He replies, "Moses gave you not *the* bread from heaven, but my father giveth you the true bread from heaven. I am the bread of life" (verse 35). Jesus does not deny Moses' agency in the giving of the manna. He denies that it was the real bread. It was an emblem of that substantial reality now in their presence.

Again, in John vi, 48, the sense is marred by translating the article by the demonstrative "that." It should read, "He that believeth on me hath everlasting life. I am the bread of life." In John ix, 4, the translators have inserted an article without authority: "I must work the works of him that sent me while it is day. *The* night cometh when no man can work." It should read either as the Bible Union renders, "Night cometh when no man can work," or, more properly, "*A* night cometh"—the Savior referring either to the brief period when he should be a corpse, or, possibly, by a far-reaching prophecy to that time when mediatorial grace shall be no more, the harvest passed, and the Summer ended. It may be remarked, in passing, that no book in the New Testament has suffered at the hands of our translators, so far as the article is concerned, as the Gospel according to John. "This" or "that" is

constantly used for "the." In two consecutive chapters thirteen errors have been noted.

1 Cor. ix, 9. "It is written in the law of Moses, thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn. Doth God take care for oxen?" In this it is implied that God does not take care for oxen, and the truth intended to be taught is lost. If he notes the fall of a sparrow, and feeds the young ravens when they cry, why should he not take care for oxen—these patient dumb helps of man? The insertion of the definite article before the word oxen makes the passage harmonize with the general teaching of the Bible (that God cares for the brute creation), and brings out the whole force of the verse. In proof that the Gospel-laborer is to have pecuniary support, Paul adduces the passage, "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox." Now, he asks, does this Old Testament injunction mean *only* that God takes care of the oxen? Its meaning is broader—that he who *does* care for the laboring oxen much more cares for the Gospel-laborer. And he implies that this was the very intent of the direction in the Old Testament as to the ox. The passage is quoted again in 1 Tim. v, 18, without note or comment, but in a similar connection, to prove that the laborer is worthy of his hire.

One more example must suffice under this head, to which Lightfoot calls particular attention—1 Tim. iii, 11. The first part of this chapter is concerned with the qualifications of the bishop. At the eighth verse those of the deacon begin. And in the eleventh we read in our version, "Even so must *their* wives be grave, not slanderers," etc. The word "their" implies there is an article in the text, and makes these wives to be the wives of the deacons just mentioned. Neither is true. There is no article in the text, and these are not the deacons' wives. The verse should read, "Women in like manner must be grave, not slanderers," etc., the reference being not to wives of deacons, but to women who served in the diaconate. Lightfoot says (Revisions, p. 114): "Our translators ought to have seen that

the reference is to women deacons or deaconesses, and not to the wives of the deacons." Alluding to Romans xvi, 1, Phebe, a servant (*διδάσκουσα*, deaconess), of the Church at Cenchrea, he continues: "If the testimony borne in these two passages to a ministry of women in the apostolic times had not thus been blotted out in our English Bibles, attention would probably have been directed to the subject at an earlier date, and our English Church would not have remained so long maimed in one of her hands." As to the meaning of the passage, both Alford and Ellicott agree with Lightfoot. The Bible Union inserts "their" in brackets.

2d. By a failure properly to render the article, interesting and instructive customs are often obscured, and matters that belong to Bible lands and scenes are hid. In Mark iv, 38, we read in our King James's Version that "Jesus was asleep in the hinder part of the ship on *a* pillow." It ought to be on *the* pillow—a part of the ship, so called. No pillow of down rested the weary head then. The pillow was, most likely, the hard hinder cushion on which the rowers sat. Liddell and Scott translate the word, a boat-cushion.

In John iv, 27, in the account of Christ's interview with the woman at the well, we read, at its conclusion, verse 27th: "And upon this came his disciples and marveled that he talked with *the* woman." This suggests that they knew her scandalous history and bad reputation. And, if they knew, Christ must have also known, and so there was not much in "telling her all things that ever she did." Any one of the twelve could have done as much, and thus proved himself a Messiah. But, when we reflect, we see that they could not have known her history. They were in a strange country, between which and their own there were no dealings. The verse should read, They marveled that he talked with *a* woman. Had it been so rendered, the Church would long ago have asked why their astonishment at his talking with a woman, and as long ago have learned the custom of that day, that "teachers, according to the Talmudists, were bound to hold no conversation with women" (Jahn's Ar-

cheology, § 106). Jahn quotes our passage in proof of the prohibition. They marveled, then, not that he talked with *this* particular woman, but that he talked with any woman. And we learn two things: first, that in the early intercourse of the twelve with Jesus, since they were surprised, as were the Pharisees, at his violation of the traditions, these must have been known and respected by the twelve; and, secondly, that to talk with one poor, sinful woman, Jesus would disregard the conventionality which would make the act improper.

The next example is in John viii, 7, in the account of the woman taken in adultery. The Pharisees asked the Savior, to whom they brought the woman, what his judgment was in the case. Our translation makes him answer, "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast *a* stone at her." How much more pointed this answer becomes, how definitely it alludes to the law of Moses, when translated in accordance with the plain requirement of the original: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast *the* stone [prescribed in Deut. xxii, 24] at her." In Matt. xvii, 24, a double mistranslation obscures the reference and hides the theology of the entire passage: "And when they were come to Capernaum, they that received tribute money came to Peter, and said, Doth not your master pay tribute?" Here our version omits the article before the word "tribute" in both cases. And the word tribute is itself at fault. As the ordinary reader peruses our Bible the idea of the Roman civil impost will most likely occur to his mind. But the reference is to matters purely Jewish. The Rheims Version (1582) translates, "Does your master pay *the didrachmes*?" Campbell, "*the didrachma*." The Bible Union is still better: "Those who received *the half-shekel* came to Peter, and said, Does not your teacher pay *the half-shekel*?" The little word "the" will raise the question, what half-shekel? Every male Jew above twenty years paid a half-shekel toward the expense of the temple service (Exodus xxx, 13, 2 Chron. xxiv, 6-9). The collectors, going about,

asked Peter whether the master paid *the* half-shekel, which introduces the reader properly to the significance of this event in Christ's history.

The proper rendering of the article often makes the account graphic, renders it more concrete, and suggests that the writer or speaker was an eye-witness. For instance, in Matt. v, 15, we read, "Neither do men light a candle and put it under *a* bushel, but on *a* candlestick." It should be, "Neither do men light a candle and put it under *the* bushel [the common well-known utensil in every house], but on *the* candlestick [lamp-stand]." The articles permit us to look into the Jewish household. Our version, by its abstract rendering, sacrifices all sprightliness.

Where we read (Matt. xxi, 12; Mark xi, 15; John ii, 14) of his cleansing the temple, it is said he drove out those who *sold doves*. It ought to be in each case, Those who sold *the* doves—the doves which were kept there for sacrifice, and which an eye-witness would see. In Matt. xxiii, 24, we read, "Ye blind guides, which strain at *a* gnat, and swallow *a* camel." It should read, "Which strain out *the* gnat, and swallow *the* camel." The expression is not a proverb, as in our translation. "The Jews strained their wine that they might not violate Lev. xi, 23;" and the reference is probably to some fable or proverb then known.

A single example further must suffice. In Luke xii, 54, we read: "When ye see *a* cloud rise out of the west, straightway ye say there cometh a shower." Many translators here refuse to translate *the* cloud—for why should Jesus say: *the* cloud? It is possible that the event recorded in 1 Kings xviii, 44, made such an impression upon the consciousness of the Jews that they were accustomed to speak of clouds rising over the Mediterranean as "the cloud," alluding to Elijah's. On this example Bishop Middleton remarks what is true in every similar case: "A single instance of the suppression of a local custom or popular opinion, which can be shown to have existed among the Jews in the age of the apostles, appears to me to be of infi-

nite importance, because, by concealing from the notice of the reader circumstances which are beyond the reach of fabrication, we withhold from him perhaps the strongest evidence of the authenticity of the Scriptures, and consequently of the credibility of our religion." (Middleton, Greek Art., p. 229. Ed. Rose.)

3d. The sequence is often destroyed, and thus the continuity of the thought broken, by a failure in rendering the article. This statement is illustrated by examples already cited. Still, others can be given. In 1 Peter ii, 7, we read: "Unto you, therefore, which believe he is precious." The word "therefore" indicates a sequence. But where is it? The translation makes a threefold error here, unwarrantably inserting the word "he," omitting the article altogether, and converting the noun preciousness into an adjective, "precious." It should read, "To you that believe is *the* preciousness." The verse just preceding describes Christ as an elect, precious corner-stone, declaring that he that believeth on him shall not be confounded. Then comes the conclusion, "Unto you, therefore, which believe is *the* preciousness" of that corner-stone.

In Romans xii, 19, what can one make of this: "Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath: for it is written, vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord." Here there is the form of an argument, as indicated by the word "for." But neither sense nor sequence can be found as it is here read. To give place to wrath, moreover, is to cherish it, to make room for it in the heart, which is contrary to the spirit every-where else inculcated in the New Testament. But Paul did not write "wrath"—that is, such as is found in the human heart. He wrote of that which is coming in God's great day—*the* wrath. "Avenge not yourselves, but give place to the wrath [which is coming]: for it is written, vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord."

1 Thess. iv, 6: "Let no man go beyond and defraud his brother in *any* matter." In the antecedent context Paul

is speaking about the sanctification of the Thessalonians in reference to a particular crime which he names, fornication. Apparently from delicacy, when his argument brings him to the mention of the foul sin again, he alludes to it as "the matter," thus: "Abstain from fornication. Let no man go beyond and defraud his brother in *the* matter." This our translation quite defaces, breaks the continuity of the thought, and leads to the inference that *fraud* in *any* matter is the topic in hand. The whole passage, as translated, is badly confused. But read "*the* matter" for "any matter," remembering that it is a euphemism for decency's sake, and all is plain. It is surprising to see that the American Bible Union follows the King James Version in the mistranslation, especially when they correct the latter in the only similar passage in the New Testament, 2 Cor. vii, 11, where Paul, in alluding to the same sin, uses the words, "Ye commended yourselves as pure in *the* matter." But the Bible Union is undoubtedly wrong, though it has the authority of about every version previous to itself. Middleton says, "Business or commercial dealing has no relation whatever to the context. . . . I have, therefore, no doubt that Macknight's way of understanding the passage, 'in this matter,' is the true one, except that *the* matter suits the place as well" (page 378). Ellicott translates, "in the matter," and adds that the article "obviously involves reference to carnality and adultery" (Comment. in loc.). Lightfoot says on the passage, "The sin of dishonest gain is substituted for the sin of unbridled sensuality by the mistranslation" (Rev., p. 107). And finally, Alford writes: "The sense is utterly confused by a mistake of our translators. By rendering 'in any matter' they have made it appear as if the sin of defrauding another generally were that against which the apostle is warning, and thus the whole passage becomes incoherent and loses its solemn force. The words which they have rendered 'in any matter' stand in the original 'in the matter'—that is, in this matter which is now in hand, namely, the unclean lusts of the flesh." (How to

Study the New Testament, in loc., p. 49.) Hence, we have every warrant for saying that the King James's Version and that of the Bible Union are both wrong.

Finally, John vii, 8: "Go ye up unto this feast. I go not yet up unto this feast, for my time is not yet full come." This passage is a puzzle. It does not fully so appear, however, in our version, where the translators' text, rather than their skill, was at fault—in part, at least. The first "this" should have been translated *the*, and the first "yet" should not appear in the rendering at all. It is spurious. The passage would then read as in the Bible Union revision: "Go ye up to *the* feast. I go not up to *this* feast, because my time is not yet fully come." The difficulty is, that after stating emphatically, "I go not up to this feast"—mark, the word "yet" is spurious—he *did* go. Alford's explanation is ingenious: "He does not say I will not go up, which would deny his intention, but I am not going up now." But this both fails to account for the emphasis on the word *this*, and presents no reason for the last clause—"because my time is not yet fully come"—to depend upon. The true explanation is to be found, doubtless, not in the words themselves, but in the Savior's method of using them. On another occasion (John ii, 19), when the Jews asked for a sign, he answered: "Destroy *this* temple, and in three days I will raise it up." The hearers understood him to mean (and his disciples, too, until after the resurrection) Herod's temple. He had something else, quite else, in mind. So here. "Go ye up unto the feast." "I go not up unto *this* feast." He had another in mind when he should give his flesh to be eaten. Hence the last assertion, "because my time is not yet fully come." It is to be noticed, too, that in both statements—both that of the temple and this of the feast—the word "this" is emphatic. "Destroy *this* temple. I go not up to *this* feast." There is no inconsistency, then, in his conduct. His statement, "I go not up to this feast," was not a reply to his brethren, who wished him to go. It was rather a meditation, in

which his mind reverted to the crucifixion, when his flesh would become "meat indeed" for the world's feast.

4th. Such are some of the more important passages in which our translation fails to render the article properly. There are scores of others of minor importance, where a better rendering would add to the interest of the lively oracles. In Rev. xiv, 1, we read: "I looked, and, lo, a lamb stood on Mount Zion." It should be, "I looked, and, lo, the lamb stood on Mount Zion." In Rev. iii, 8, we read of the Church at Philadelphia: "Thou hast a little strength, and hast kept my word." It ought to be, "Thou hast little strength, and hast kept my word." It is not that they had some strength and kept his word, but rather none, and yet kept it. In Rev. vii, 14, we read: "These are they which came out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes," etc. It ought to be, "These are they which have come out of the great tribulation"—possibly that mentioned in Matt. xxiv, 21. In Rev. x, 1, we read of an angel clothed with a cloud, and a rainbow was upon his head. It should be, "The rainbow was upon his head." In 1 Thess. v, 5, we read: "Ye are all the children of light and the children of the day." Corrected, it is: "Ye are all children of light and children of day. Ye are not of night nor of darkness." *The* children means all of them; children, some of them. In 1 Peter i, 12, we read: "Which things the angels desired to look into." "Which things angels desired to look into" is more pointed and correct. In 1 Peter iv, 8, we read: "Charity covers the multitude of sins." It ought to be just as it is generally quoted: "Charity shall cover a multitude of sins." In Matt. iv, 5, it is said: "Then the devil . . . setteth him on a pinnacle of the temple." It ought to be "the pinnacle of the temple," which is doubtless described in Josephus's Antiquities, xv, 11, 5. In Matt. ii, 4, Herod is made to inquire of the scribes "where Christ should be born." It ought to be, "Where *the* Christ should be born." The failure with the word—Christ—is almost total throughout the Gospels. The

original, with very few exceptions, presents it with the article, for, in the Gospel period, the word had not become a proper name, as later in the epistles. Sometimes the article is translated as in John i, 20, iv, 29, 42. Again it is mistranslated by "that" or "very" (John i, 25, vii, 26). But oftener it is not translated.

Of the failure in the translation of the article in connection with the word law, a single example must suffice. How can the statement in Romans iii, 31, be harmonized with that in Eph. ii, 15? The former asks, "Do we make void [abolish] the law?" The other declares Christ did abolish (the word is the same in the Greek in both passages) in his flesh the law of commandments contained in ordinances. The article is wanting with the word law in the first passage. And this, with an understanding of the subject of law, will reconcile the two.

The examples here presented, while embracing most of the serious failures in our version, do not include all. The list is not intended to be complete, but rather to illustrate, that due attention to the article may yield interesting and profitable results to the Bible student.

ARTICLE II.

INFALLIBILITY: IN CHURCH, POPE, OR SCRIPTURES?

BY PROF. J. L. M. CURRY, LL. D.

1. *The Theory of Development: a Criticism of Dr. Newman's Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.* By J. B. Mozley, D. D. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1879.
2. *Catholicity in its Relations to Romanism and Protestantism.* By F. C. Ewer, D. D. Religious Newspaper Agency. New York. 1878.

1. CHRISTIANITY is a revelation embodied in the Scriptures, and rests upon evidence of fact. Holy men wrote the Bible, as they were inspired by the Holy Ghost. "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God." Apostles and other writers were informed by inspiration, and, being informed of the facts and doctrines of Christianity, wrote and taught. God reveals his thoughts and will in nature, but in a somewhat different and higher sense reveals himself also in his Word. The *continuance* of revelation is guaranteed against perishing, and its *purity* is guaranteed against corruption. "The gates of hell," the counsels and machinations of the wicked, "shall not prevail against it."

2. By Romanists, who boast of unity of faith, very contrariant opinions are held as to the finality and completeness of the New Testament as a divine revelation. Every half-instructed person knows that the popes have often and flagrantly contradicted one another; and so have Roman Catholic writers of acknowledged ability and learning. Two directly conflicting hypotheses are put forward in the Roman Church on the completeness of the New Testament. One party holds that the whole of the Christian faith was revealed entire from the first. Dr. Wiseman says, "We believe that no new doctrine can be introduced into the Church, but that every doctrine which we hold has existed and been taught in it ever since the time of the apostles."

Quotations of similar tenor could be made abundantly from European and American divines of the Romish faith. On the other hand, John Henry Newman, lately appointed cardinal, whose secession from the Church of England Gladstone says has never been estimated to the "full amount of its calamitous importance," insists that the whole of the Christian faith has been a development from the first; that "Christianity came into the world as an idea," and that time was required for its full comprehension and perfection. Facts in the history of the Church of Rome verify very fully the hypothesis of development, of successive increments of revelation.

3. Conceding the divine origin of the Christian religion and the full inspiration of the New Testament, a question of serious import arises—whether there is not lodged somewhere an infallible interpreting power, some unerring living authority to decide *ex cathedra* upon the meaning of revelation. Not a few men, engaged in business, with minds preoccupied, have expressed a wish for some competent tribunal to decide authoritatively on revelation, and save them the trouble of investigation and decision. Some persons, to be saved from incertitude, are quite willing to accept a vicarious guide. In matters involving eternal interests it certainly is of vastest importance to know and be assured of the truth. With much arrogance and a sublime contempt for history and reason the Roman communion proclaims that there is lodged in it an infallible interpreting power. It must be conceded that Romanism, in asserting divine vicegerency and the possession of the supernatural gift of infallibility, has commended itself to many persons, perplexed by painful doubts.

4. There are two schools which equally assert the authority of human guidance in matters of faith and, of consequence, the insufficiency of the Scriptures as a rule of faith and practice.

5. By the theory of one school a transmitted residuary authority to interpret infallibly the Word of God is sup

posed to be deposited in "the Church." The "Holy Catholic Church" is claimed to be the visible, audible, recognizable, mystical body of God on earth and the fountain of infallibility. This "Holy Church" exists with superhuman prerogatives in its apostolical ministry. The Greek Church holds that the Church universal, in a truly œcumenical council, is infallible. "Gallicanism," says Dr. Schaff, "secures a periodic and intermittent infallibility, which reveals itself in an œcumenical council." Archbishop Kenrick said, in his speech prepared for the Vatican Council, that "General councils, in declaring the faith, can not err." Puseyism, in England, in "Tracts for the Times," held that if private interpretations of the Scriptures were yielded to the sense of the Church Catholic, all difficulties in the interpretation would be removed, or nearly so. Dr. Forbes, in his inaugural as dean of the General Theological Seminary of the Episcopal Church of the United States, said: "To the Church and her teachings we are bound, under all circumstances, to adhere, claiming only for ourselves, individually, the right we accord to others, namely, the right of private judgment in all those matters in which God and his Church have left us free." To the young ministers, the dean said: "Begin early to pursue the road which the Church dictates. You must no longer think your own thoughts, or form your own plans, but learn what the Church teaches and obey what she commands."

6. This claim of Church infallibility was, prior to 1870, the creed of the Romish Church, as it is now of the Greek Church and of some very High-church Episcopalians, although a Church, in corporate capacity, or an aggregation of Churches, is gifted with no supernatural or interpreting power denied to the private believer in Christ. The Church—whatever may be understood by that term—has no information, nor means of enlightenment, nor grace, that is not equally accessible to every individual Christian.

From Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles it is clear that the early converts did not continue as isolated believers,

but organized themselves into local and separate Churches. The union grew out of fraternity and Christian sympathy and the spiritual nature of the teachings of Christ. Christianity is not a national religion nor a mere creed or collection of opinions, but a new relationship, a brotherhood, by virtue of a common union with Christ, the elder brother. When the great Head and Teacher withdrew himself, his followers, by an elective affinity, and as a result of Christian doctrine and principle, formed themselves into Churches, organized communities for Christian worship, mutual help and sympathy, and the propagation of the new religion. Christ had taught and impressed the principles of brotherhood, of an elect assembly, of separation from the world. He inculcated the duty and privilege of diffusing the light of the Gospel, and his loving disciples were drawn necessarily into Churches. The inspired writings refer to the various Churches which early grew up as admitting members, as enforcing discipline, as dispensing alms, as sending missionaries, and there is not the slightest intimation of a universal Church with any powers, much less with infallible wisdom, nor of local Churches subordinate to some higher organization. The primitive Churches are nowhere, in the New Testament, spoken of as the holy, apostolical Church. There was then no Catholic Church nor Œcumenical Council to which was intrusted the interpretation of the Scriptures or the decision of doubtful questions. The New Testament will be searched in vain for a scintilla of evidence that any one or more of the Churches ever, in a single instance, assumed to interpret infallibly or authoritatively the teachings of Christ. The apostles were divinely commissioned to utter divine truth, the Holy Spirit was given to them in special measure therefor, but when they passed away they left no successors as such, and the canon of inspiration was closed.

7. In 1870 the Vatican Council, convened and held under Italian and Jesuitical influence, decreed the infallibility of the pope, so that, what has been known as the Roman

Church, becomes, in truth, the Papal Church.' The decree recites,

"That the Roman pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*—that is, when in discharge of the office of pastor and teacher of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that his Church should be endowed for defining doctrine, faith, or morals; and that, therefore, such definitions of the Roman pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church."

A school of Roman Catholic theologians, commonly called *Ultramontanes*, had for long upheld the opinion of papal infallibility. Bellarmine, as quoted by De Pressensé, in "*La Liberté Religieuse en Europe*," said, "*avec une audace qui n'a pas été dépassée*:"

"Si le pape faisait erreur en commandant des actes mauvais et en interdisant des actes vertueux, l'Eglise devrait penser que le mal est le bien, et le bien mal."

Prior to the decree above cited the dogma was not, however, a doctrine of faith, nor contained in the symbols, nor was its belief made essential to salvation. Gallicans and liberal Catholics repudiated it. In 1810, the National Synod of Ireland declared that no Roman Catholic could be required to believe or profess that infallibility. Bishop Baynes, in 1822, published as his belief that no one in his communion, throughout England and Ireland, believed in the infallibility of the pope. The bishops and clergy of the Roman Communion in Ireland, in 1825, under oath and under circumstances calling for transparent frankness, put on record their denial that the infallibility of the pope was an article of the Catholic faith. Preceding councils had asserted in unmistakable form the peccability or errability of popes. Roman standards declared that papal decisions were not binding, unless prescribed by the body of the Church. Many ecclesiastical dignitaries, before and during the council, protested against papal infallibility as contradicting history, tradition, and the Scriptures. Now "a perpetual divine oracle in the Vatican" is accepted by the Ro-

man Church, and all who reject it do so at the risk of eternal damnation! It is not easy to write calmly, or repress pious indignation, when this deification of an erring mortal, this ascription to a man, possibly to such a monster as Pope Alexander VI, of infallibility as the vicar of Christ and the organ of the Holy Ghost, is proclaimed as a truth of equal authority and obligatoriness with any precept in the New Testament. The *ipse dixit* regarding faith or morals, of an old man who exhibited petulance and impatience at the loss of temporal authority, and ridiculously pretended that he was a prisoner when he was as free to come and go as any man in Europe, was put by the council on a plane of verity with the utterances of Jehovah. Catholic belief is hereafter not a mere moral certainty, but an absolute certainty, admitting of no possibility of doubt or mistake or criticism, because authenticated by the infallible warrant of a mere man invested with the tiara. Not merely Pius IX, but all future and past popes have official utterances on matters of faith and duty put on an equality of authority and inerrability with the Sermon on the Mount. Papists distinguish betwixt infallibility and impeccability, but by what process is not readily seen. Apprehension of spiritual truth is not merely an operation of the intellect. Sin taints, blinds, distorts the mental vision as well as the moral character, and is to be excluded; "for every sin," says Christlieb, "tends to develop in a wrong direction the moral, and thereby also the intellectual, faculties of man." It would be easy to cite numerous instances of corruption or depravation of moral judgment growing out of the misdirection of moral sentiments.

8. But why an infallible human interpreter? Why is it absolutely necessary that there should be some supreme arbiter, to whom difficulties in Scriptural interpretation are to be carried, and who can prevent the evils apprehended from private interpretation? Who can assume to lay down rules for God's dealings with man? How can we *a priori* anticipate or infer what Omniscience is likely to do

in any given case? There are ten thousand insoluble mysteries in human life. Ignorance and sin and crime abound. Why not compel obedience to divine laws, as well as provide an interpreter of them? Men refuse to accept and obey what they do understand; why not coerce acceptance? These questions border on the sacrilegious. In his providential relations with man, God has never established such an infallible human exponent. According to the present constitution of the human mind he can not so utter himself, directly or through representatives, as that doubt shall not at times darken the human understanding. In the realm of nature, infallibility is not to be found. In the ordinary affairs of life, probable evidence is the only guide that exists. The acquisition of knowledge, the ascertainment of scientific truth, is by slow and painful processes, after tentative efforts and repeated failures. The progress of Christianity is slow. It was three centuries before Christianity spread over the Roman Empire. It now makes headway with such feebleness against hoary superstitions and corrupt religions that good men cry out, How long, O Lord, how long? The hasty impatience is repressed by the remembrance that God reigns, and that his ways are not as man's ways.

Under the typical, adumbrating, educatory dispensation of the Old Testament, God appointed no vicegerent to whom his people might always and infallibly apply. Priests and prophets could aid, but not supersede, investigations into the written law and testimony. Under the new covenant all are directed to search the Scriptures, which are able to make wise unto salvation through faith in Christ Jesus, and the obligation is individual and universal. The New Testament makes no mention of infallible teachers. The passages ordinarily cited by Romanists are susceptible of an easy, contrary interpretation, and Romish commentators differ widely in their expositions of them. Peter, from whom the succession is claimed, had no official primacy, and no instance of authority by him over other apostles can be adduced. No inspired writings are further removed than

Peter's from the hierarchical or episcopal spirit. Paul at Antioch "withstood Peter to the face, because he was to be blamed" (Gal. ii, 11). The primitive Churches had neither infallibility nor indestructibility, for they exhibited a sad lapse of faith, and perished. History is fruitful of similar examples. It is a bald assumption that the gift of infallibility in Church or man is taught in the Bible, or is demonstrable as a necessary element of Christian revelation.

9. Christianity and the Scriptures are inseparably identified. Christianity has no real or vital existence apart from the inspired records. Our knowledge of Christian facts and Christian doctrines is dependent on the Scriptures. Inspired men are no longer commissioned to declare the oracles of God. The Savior taught the infallibility of the Scriptures, and they, rather than Church or pope, are an infallible guide to religious belief and practice. Committed to his followers, to one no more than to another, they are of universal obligatoriness, and pope or Church has, in corporate character or *ex officio*, no sources of information, no illumination from the Holy Spirit, which are not equally within the potential attainment of thousands of Christians. Each man is endowed with conscience, intellect, will, and personal responsibility, and he is commanded and privileged to search and to study. The revelation of the Divine Mind, as embodied in the Bible, is conclusive of all questions of religious belief, and binding on every life. The simple and sole study of the Bible, candidly, intelligently, prayerfully, reverently, under guidance of the Holy Spirit, will lead into all truth, necessary for salvation and the government of moral conduct. Every Christian has the promise of the continued presence and the assurance of the help and guidance of the Holy Spirit. "If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him." To hold the rational mind in conference with God, asking and heeding, with intelligent assent, the teaching of the Spirit, is a surer guide than decision of pope, synod, or council. The true

Christian will thus find in the Word an abundant satisfaction for all spiritual desires.

10. Whenever the insufficiency of the written Word is directly or covertly assumed, the mind is separated from the only infallible standard, and the most mischievous consequences ensue. By authority of the Roman Church, sprinkling has been substituted for immersion in baptism. The Douay Bible, with Haydock's Notes, specially approved by Pius IX, and commended by various cardinals, archbishops, and bishops, published in New York in 1852, has this note on Matt. iii, 6:

“Baptized. The word baptism signifies a washing, particularly when it is done by immersion or by dipping, or plunging a thing under water, which was formerly the ordinary way of administering the sacrament of baptism. But the Church, which can not change the least article of the Christian faith, is not so tied up in matters of discipline and ceremonies. Not only the Catholic Church, but also the pretended Reformed Churches, have altered this primitive custom in giving the sacrament of baptism, and now allow of baptism by pouring or sprinkling water upon the person baptized; nay, many of their ministers do it nowadays by filliping a wet finger and thumb over the child's head, or by shaking a wet finger or two over the child, which it is hard enough to call a baptizing in any sense.”

What incalculable evils have resulted from this tampering with infallible truth! So the Romish Church has developed transubstantiation or the extension of the incarnation into the bread and wine of the supper, invocation of saints, prayers for the dead, auricular confession, baptismal regeneration, sacerdotalism in the ministry, immaculate conception and worship of the Virgin Mary, and infallibility of the pope. Earth and humanity groan under these departures from infallible truth.

11. Every appeal to human authority, to public opinion, to convenience or worldly propriety, to excuse disobedience to commands, or palliate a modification of the strictness of divine law, is a departure, more or less criminal, from what has been prescribed as the all-sufficient rule. An appeal to the Scriptures is the safe test, and the only unerring standard. In all revivals, in all honest efforts for reforms of re-

ligious or ecclesiastical errors, the New Testament has increased study and homage. Luther, in his conflict with Rome, found the Word of God the source of personal strength and the best weapon of warfare, and he failed just in so far as he did not quadrate all his doctrines and opinions by the unerring rule. All creeds, to be correct guides of religious belief and action, must be clearly derived from the Word. Christians are successful permanently in contests with errorists, just as they rely on the pure truth. Popular acquaintance with the New Testament, and cheerful recognition of its authority, instead of being dangerous or leading to schisms, promote true religion and unity, preserve soundness of doctrine, and prevent heresy. What has been accomplished for popular liberty, in elevation of the masses, in true civilization, in genuine progress, is attributable not to submission of intellect and will and conscience to Church and papal vassalage, but to individual study of the Bible, and reliance upon it as the divine and only infallible standard of morals. As a source of national power and prosperity, as security for national honor and greatness, as a defense of civil liberty, as a means of popular enlightenment, no agency is comparable to general acquaintance with the Bible and a cordial acceptance of its teachings as the complete and authoritative guide of religious belief and personal conduct.

12. The completion of the Scriptures is not inconsistent with their better understanding, their larger unfolding, or the law of gradual growth, of progressive development. In one sense, and a good sense, the law of development harmonizes with an inspired and completed divine record. As Christianity was to operate on human life and thought, it must develop itself. Christian truth is capable of clearer explanation, of more vigorous and general application. Ideas of Christ's office and work, of the spirituality and universality of Christ's kingdom, of the brotherhood of man, were enlarged and clarified, even in apostolic days. From small beginnings there have been manifested increasing capa-

bilities and adaptabilities. This is not in the sense of progress from Judaism to Christianity, from law to grace. It is not a change of dispensations or the developing of the preparatory and shadowy and incomplete. Christianity, complete in itself, is slow in manifestations and in its reception. The ignorant and superstitious and hostile take hold reluctantly. Even the enlightened and pious advance in comprehension and appreciation. Although the records are complete, Christianity is not stagnant and lifeless. There is a growing adaptedness to environments. As civilization improves, as education becomes more general, increased fitness is seen. There are some categories of thought, *a priori* cognitions, having the criteria of universality, necessity, and originality, which exist in the mind before they are explicated by conscious exertion of the intellect, and yet are dependent upon experience as the occasion of their development. They underlie the commonest observations of the most untutored mind, and are applied also in the loftiest and abstrusest speculations of Kant and Kepler, of Bacon and Calhoun. So the New Testament or Christianity, in its perfect form, finds constantly renewing and most beneficent application in the highest attainments of the human soul. The more humanity is enlightened and sanctified, the superior the fitness of the ever-unfolding truths of Scripture. Let the march of mind, of science, be what it may; let questions of rights in most complicated forms of civil polity arise; let casuistical difficulties occur with the most sainted; all these never transcend, but find harmony and solution in, the Word of God.

13. These Scriptures, of divine origin and supernatural communication, remaining as they were with the death of the last inspired writer, are better understood in the nineteenth century than ever before. Christians of the present day know more of the Bible than their predecessors did. The common appeal to the Fathers for elucidation of Holy Writ is most unreasonable. They were not inspired, and had no more succession of the peculiar powers and functions

of the apostles than equally pious and intelligent Christian men and women of the present day. They lived in times of superstition and paganism, and labored under more disadvantages than we do. There were then Jewish prejudices and predilections and very inadequate opportunities for reading and studying the Bible. Some of the Fathers, while rebuking heresies rife in that day, were themselves maintainers of egregious errors. Now there is an ever-improving interpretation of the Scriptures. The means of study are greatly increased and improved. Effort and money and piety and learning are bestowed on the ascertainment of the true text. Every scientific discovery throws light on and harmonizes with revelation. God, as author of all truth, never contradicts himself. All the substantiated discoveries—not vague speculations and hypotheses—instead of being hostile to Christianity and the New Testament, add proofs of both, and emphasize their indispensable necessity for man.

An “infallible” Church or “infallible” man may condemn Galileo to death, approve Bartholomew massacres, anathematize Magna Charta, liberty of the press, liberty of conscience and of worship, common-schools, unification of Italy, modern progress, and civilization, but the infallible Scriptures are pure and spotless, have no admixture of error, contain the seeds of all good, the inspirations for all nobleness and virtue and holiness.

ARTICLE III.

SWEDENBORG AND HIS TEACHINGS.

(Continued from Page 99, No. I.)

BY HENRY M. KING, D. D.

SWEDENBORG is no less minute in his description of the condition of spirits who once lived on the earth. Says Hobart, "He was ever ready to communicate freely to those who were disposed from proper motives to inquire of him concerning their departed relatives and friends." He often thought himself visited by spirits both good and bad. He was frequently heard talking as if engaged in conversation, though it was known that he was alone. A young Finlander, calling upon him in London, found him talking earnestly in Latin, though no companion was visible. He was discoursing upon the state of Rome in the time of the Emperor Augustus, and, as he supposed, to the spirit of Virgil, who was present. The young Finlander could get no hearing until the curious conversation was concluded, and Swedenborg had politely conducted the invisible poet to the door and dismissed him. He was often heard to speak loudly and vehemently. He had sometimes restless nights, during which he would cry out, and in explanation would say that bad spirits had attempted to injure him, and therefore he had spoken as he had. He would be much exhausted after one of these trials, and once is said to have remained many days and nights without rising. He was at one time afflicted with toothache, but said "my pain proceeds not from the nerve of the tooth, but from the influx of hypocritical spirits which beset me, and by correspondence cause this plague."

On the other hand, his supposed voyages to the spirit world must have been very frequent, so full are his writings

of the things which he there saw and heard. He has brought back an answer to almost every conceivable question, and has described the communities of the saints in heaven as particularly as a careful observer would describe any earthly community. Moreover, the difference between the two descriptions would not be very great. The heavens are divided into many societies, each of which, according to Swedenborg, is in the human form. The universal heavens are frequently spoken of as *the grand man*. This he represents as "a great arcanum," attaching to it much importance and unfolding the idea at great length, pointing out the correspondences between the members and organs of the body and the grand man, and showing what kinds of people go to make up the different parts. So, also, the hells resemble "one grand devil, and may be presented in the effigy of a devil." Similar correspondences are found here, and are dwelt upon in the most disgusting manner. The hells are full of the most intolerable stench, and the employments and pleasures of those who are there are detailed in language too shocking to be repeated. In the heavens the people of different countries and religions dwell in separate places (at least so Swedenborg says he found them), the English by themselves, and the Dutch, the Mohammedans, the Africans, and the Jews, each by themselves. The inhabitants of one community despise those who live in another. They carry on business similar to that in which they were engaged in this life. The Jews trade especially in precious stones, being traveling merchants or peddlers, and dealing largely in stolen or counterfeit diamonds. The people generally raise vegetables, pursue the mechanical arts and trades, have museums, gymnasiums, colleges, and libraries. Swedenborg speaks in several places of seeing some of his own published works in the other world. A part of the inhabitants of heaven wear garments, but those in the inmost or third heaven are unclothed. They have houses "which are altogether like the houses of earth, only more beautiful. In them are chambers, inner rooms, and

bedchambers in great numbers." They have also temples in which they have preaching and public worship. Swedenborg says he was once present at a council in the spiritual world, called for the discussion of the subject of faith and the justification of the elect by it, in which he was publicly denounced as one "having neither gown, cap, nor laurel, who has pulled down their faith from heaven and cast it into the Styx." But the apostolic Fathers who were present declared themselves in favor of the New Church doctrines, and called upon Swedenborg himself to defend them. The result was that nearly all in the council were converted to that faith.

Swedenborg describes minutely the angelic speech and the heavenly chirography. The writing "consists of various inflected and circumflected forms, and the inflections and circumflections are according to the form of heaven." "Each letter involves arcana of wisdom," and "those arcana are contained in the inflections and curvatures of the letters."* The printed Word operates like an electric battery, for when a person who is "in the falses" touches it, "an explosion takes place, and he is thrown to the corner of the room, and for an hour lies there as if he was dead." Swedenborg saw this repeated frequently. A poor orthodox prelate, who had been a preacher of the doctrine of justification by faith, boldly asserted that he had not thereby falsified the Word, and was willing to attest the

*The New Church people seem to attach great importance to the very forms of the letters of the original Scriptures as containing in themselves some spiritual significance. They are seriously discussing the introduction of instruction in Hebrew into their Sunday-schools "with a view to the spiritual uses of the language as a vehicle of heavenly association." The plan proposed at their last General Convention in this country was to have the children "learn to sing in a fitting chant a single short and very familiar Psalm—say the twenty-third or the first—in the Hebrew, by constant repetition committing it to memory, and associating the sounds of the words always with the *Hebrew character* before the eye. This would have to be taught orally, as I very much doubt whether any correspondential force of the language is felt while the eye rests on the *English* spelling by which the pronunciation is represented. The sound to the ear should exactly accompany the forms of the letters as presented to the eye."

truth of his assertion by touching it. But the poor doctor and his doctrine were brought to shame, and he quickly paid the penalty of his rashness.

In heaven the prince has his hours for business and his reception hours, and also his feasts with his invited guests, before whom are set various dishes in order, with "sweet cakes and condiments." The processions, the displays, the court-dress and customs, as well as the amusements of earth are repeated in heaven. There are also weddings in heaven. According to Swedenborg there are no proper marriages anywhere else, and one great source of heavenly bliss is conjugal love. He gives much room to the revelations on this subject, for there is nothing, he says, that is matter of more intense interest throughout the heavenly world than this. Angels make it the theme of frequent and protracted conversations, to many of which Swedenborg was permitted to listen. New-comers wish to know, first and above all, about this important matter, and angels are assigned to them as instructors in it. Those who die in infancy are first welcomed by their angelic nurses, who "wash them, dress them, ornament them, amuse them, and by sports and songs and toys and lessons and in a thousand ways unknown to us give form and beauty to the dawning affections and thoughts of the little mind." In about a month of our time they learn to speak the language of heaven, and at an early age they are united in marriage, the boys at the age of eighteen years, and the girls at fifteen. Adults who have lived here in a state of celibacy, especially those who have desired marriage and sought it without success, have blessed marriages provided for them in heaven. Swedenborg was permitted to see his allotted wife, who was waiting for him in the spiritual world, and to know the name she bore while living on the earth. She was not the daughter of Polheim, for whom he had cherished an unsuccessful affection in his youth.

But we dwell too long on such details. Swedenborg's revelations embrace almost every subject, and no brief ac-

count can give any accurate conception of the extent to which they are carried. Every-where he shows a bitter hostility towards the doctrines of orthodoxy, the Trinity, justification by faith, and election, putting those who hold them in the frigid zone of the spiritual world, and caricaturing their faith, and their worship there, which he says he attended. His visions of heaven are grossly material and sensual. They show the workings of a wild, uncurbed fancy and of a mind and taste far removed from the Christian standards of purity. "Some of his relations are," says Dr. Pond, "pretty, so far as the imagery is conceived; some are silly; some obscene; some monstrous; and all are strange." Yet Swedenborg evidently considered them of great value and importance, republishing some of them several times, and declaring them all to be worthy of credence as divine revelations. Some of his friends, it is stated by at least two of his biographers, endeavored to persuade him to omit these revelations and visions from his published works, knowing that they would excite only ridicule and disgust, and would therefore destroy all hope that his theological views would find general acceptance. But he positively refused, saying that they were an essential part of his heavenly message, and that he had orders from the Lord to publish them. It should be borne in mind that in the judgment of Swedenborg all of his teachings rest upon the same authority, and are to be accepted with equal confidence, and that to accept a sublime truth or chapter here and there, and overlook the rest, as is done to-day, is in direct violation of his positive prohibition as expressed again and again to his immediate followers, in spite of their earnest protests.

Swedenborg took advice from no man. He did not hesitate to trample upon the deepest convictions of Christian men, and the distinct moral sanctions of the written Word. It is not a little startling to be told by one, who professes to speak from actual observation, that David and Paul, as well as Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, and others whom the

Christian Church has honored, are in the lowest hells, associated with the worst devils; while on the other hand the licentious Elizabeth of Russia, of whom it has been said that "her vanity equaled her gross sensuality," is the most splendidly served and honored in all the world of spirits. The reason of this unexpected exaltation, Swedenborg says, "few would surmise, viz., that with all her faults she had a good heart, and a certain consideration connected with her neglect or indifference, which induced her purposely to postpone signing many edicts and papers that were from time to time presented to her, and for that reason they were multiplied to such a degree that at last she could not examine or peruse them, but was obliged to believe the representation of her ministers and sign as many as possible; after which she would retire to her closet, fall on her knees, and beg forgiveness of God, if she had against her will signed any thing that was wrong." The morality of such conduct seemed to Swedenborg to be of a very high order, and to atone for her wicked and adulterous life. If such ethical teaching is to be accepted as divine, there ought to be added a new beatitude—Blessed are the weak and the cowardly who shirk responsibility as long as they can, and then rush blindly on, for such shall be splendidly served and honored in the kingdom of heaven.

The minuteness and particularity of Swedenborg's visions and revelations of future things have given to them a fascinating power over some minds. Yet this very characteristic puts them in striking contrast with the revelations of the Bible, and prevents all confidence in their divine origin. Against these new revelations as a whole Mr. Emerson has presented this serious objection, the force of which must be acknowledged—"They destroy their credi by running into detail. If a man say that the Holy Ghost has informed him that the last judgment (or the last of the judgments) took place in 1757; or that the Dutch, in the other world, live in a heaven by themselves, and the English in a heaven by themselves, I reply that the spirit

which is holy is reserved, taciturn, and deals in laws. The rumors of ghosts and hobgoblins gossip and tell fortunes. The teachings of the high Spirit are abstemious, and, in regard to particulars, negative."

After what has been said (and the representation which we have given of the character of Swedenborg and his revelations can not justly be charged with unfairness), the question naturally arises, how much authority should be ascribed to him as a theological teacher? He is held up before the world as "the herald of the New Church," a divinely appointed teacher, who represented in himself the second coming of Christ, and whose system "was to supersede and dispense with the Gospel dispensation." Have we sufficient reason to accept him as such? Does he come divinely accredited, or must he be classed with pretenders like Montanus, in the second century, or Manes, in the third century, with Mahomet (whose cruel, blood-thirsty, immoral religion Swedenborg declared to be divine), with Ann Lee and Joseph Smith? Before we undertake the examination of his theological system, do we find his credentials such as to inspire reverence for his character and confidence in his teachings? It is confessed by his followers that "he made no pretensions to miracles. He did not need them. His doctrines themselves are a sufficient proof that they must have been received from heaven." The "memorable relations" of Swedenborg can hardly be said to have upon them heaven's "stamp and imprint;" his theological views, however sublime, can not escape the damaging influence of such a mixture. These, however, must be tested by the simple Word of God.

The religious system of Swedenborg embraces some truths which evangelical Christians accept as being taught in the Bible, viz., the unity of God, the deity of Christ, the free moral agency of man, and future states of happiness and misery which are eternal. But it should be remarked that "these truths are stated in terms and held in connections, which go very much to modify and restrict

their value." We can not go over the whole ground of Swedenborg's doctrines, but will mention those which distinguish his system and put it in disagreement with the commonly received doctrines of Christianity.

Swedenborg taught the unity of God in such a way as to exclude the doctrine of the Trinity. We have already alluded to the bitter hatred which he manifested towards this doctrine. He excused himself from going often to the Swedish Church in London, saying, "he had no peace in the church on account of spirits who contradicted what the preacher said, especially when he spoke of three persons in the Godhead, which amounted in reality to three Gods." The first article of a summary of his faith which he published, does indeed read, "That there is one God, in whom is a divine trinity, and that he is the Lord Jesus Christ." It is however said in explanation, "He is one, both in essence and in person, in whom, nevertheless, is the divine trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, which are the essential divinity, the divine humanity, and the divine proceeding, answering to the soul, the body, and the operative energy in man; and that the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ is that God." Swedenborg denied the personal existence of the Holy Spirit, teaching that there is one person in the Godhead, and that this is the person of the Son or Word. When the Holy Spirit is called "the divine proceeding," or in the illustration used "the operative energy" in distinction from the soul, it is evidently a distinction without a difference. Such an illustration utterly fails to account for the distinctive use of the personal pronouns as applied in the Bible to the Spirit, or to set forth the relations which Father, Son, and Spirit are said to sustain to each other. As another has said, "this comparison of the Trinity to the soul, body, and operation of one human person, reduces it to a palpable absurdity. For if this comparison of the Divine Trinity as represented in the Scriptures is just, we must suppose a man whose soul and body speak of one another—address one another—have

distint wills—whose soul sends his body and whose body sends his operation,” etc. The trinity of Swedenborgians, if it may be called such, is a kind of *official* trinity, which Mr. Barrett illustrates as follows: “Suppose the same individual to hold several different offices at the same time, as president, judge, and priest. Now such an individual, when spoken of in his presidential capacity would be called president; in his judicial capacity he would be called judge; and in his priestly capacity he would be called priest. Yet we should not, on this account, call him *three persons*; for all the while he would be but one and the same man.” Apply this illustration to the statements of God’s Word, and the result is the most beautiful nonsense. We have I, the president, sending forth myself, the priest, in the name of myself, the judge; or again, I, the judge, praying to myself, the president, that I would send forth myself, the priest. The whole thing is but a weak attempt to hold the appearance of a trinity, while denying its meaning and substance. Moreover Swedenborgianism, while acknowledging that the Lord Jesus Christ is the one God, has a conception of him which is gross, shocking, and profane. Before the advent of Christ it says that God existed “in a perfect human form,” and when Christ came into the world he assumed “humanity with all its evil loves and false persuasions, and put himself into every possible state that man ever has been in or can be in.” He is represented as “not pure and holy” when on the earth, as having inherited from his mother “the evils of the Jewish nation,” and as “full of impure, unhallowed, and even of infernal principles.” Yet this is he whom Swedenborg acknowledges to be God, and who solemnly averred his own sinlessness, and of whom it is said that he was “holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners.”

Swedenborg repudiated the doctrine of the atonement by the death of Christ. It will not be easy to express or to understand his views of the mission and redemptive work of the Son of God. “The first act of redemption,”

he says, "was the subjugation of the hells. The second act of redemption was the separation of the evil from the good, the casting of the evil into hell, and the raising of the good to heaven. Afterwards followed the reduction of all to order in hell, and of all to order in heaven; also instructions concerning truths which will be of faith, and in goods which will be of charity, and thus the establishment of a new Church." The second article of the creed in the Book of Worship of the New Church in America is as follows:

"That Jehovah God himself descended from heaven as divine truth, which is the Word, and took upon him human nature, for the purpose of removing from man the powers of hell, and restoring to order all things in the spiritual world, and all things in the Church; that he removed from man the powers of hell, by combats against and victories over them, in which consisted the great work of redemption; that by the same acts which were his temptations, the last of which was the passion of the cross, he united in his humanity divine truth to divine good, or divine wisdom to divine love, and so returned into his divinity, in which he was from eternity, together with, and in, his glorified humanity; whence he forever keeps the infernal powers in subjection to himself; and that all who believe in him, with the understanding from the heart, and live accordingly, will be saved."

Not for the sake of throwing light on this dark subject, but to give another specimen of clear elucidation of the redemptive work of Christ, we quote from the article on the New Jerusalem Church in Appleton's "New American Cyclopædia:" "At the time of the advent of the Lord, such was the accumulation of the evil in the world of spirits, that this equilibrium was in danger of being destroyed, and human freedom lost. The hells had, as it were, risen up out of their proper places, devils were taking possession of the souls and bodies of men; and the human race was threatened with impending destruction. The work of redemption consisted in rolling back this tide of evil; in casting out the devils and subjugating the hells, and thus restoring and preserving human freedom, which would otherwise have been lost. By this it was made possible for all to keep the commandments of God and to attain to heavenly life and happiness." That is an explanation what is an explanation, as Mr. Weller would say. If we ask why Christ

came into the world, and gave up his life upon the cross, we are informed that it was simply this—"to save the equilibrium from being destroyed," "to cast out the devils and subjugate the hells," in a word, "to preserve human freedom." Whatever all this may mean or may not mean, Mr. Hindmarsh tells us that "the work of redemption did not, as is too generally supposed, consist in the Son's offering himself as a sacrifice, in the room of mankind." This is the main point with which we have to do, and about this there is no uncertainty. Swedenborg distinctly and utterly discards the cross and death of Christ as being the means of human redemption. He says, in the "Universal Theology," 95. "It is imagined that the passion on the cross was the true and very act of redemption; whereas it was not the act of redemption, but of the glorification of his humanity;" and again, he says in "Universal Theology," 132, "To believe redemption to have consisted in the passion of the cross is a fundamental error." This puts the system of Swedenborg in direct and irreconcilable antagonism to the religion of Christ, and makes it "another Gospel, which is not a second," which Paul anathematized. For if there is one truth in the Gospel of our salvation more central, more vital, more ineradicable than all others, it is this—"in whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace."

Swedenborg also rejected, and with much vehemence, the Scriptural doctrine of justification by faith. He says, "I have at times conversed, in the spiritual world, with those who maintain the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and have told them that their doctrine is erroneous and absurd, and that it occasioneth a false security, blindness, sleep, and darkness, and thereby bringeth death to the soul."

Regeneration, in the system of Swedenborg, is "a change carried on gently and gradually in a way consistent with the state and capacity of man, and his own co-operation." The manner in which this doctrine is explained seems to be

in direct violation of his all-important theory of correspondences, for if regeneration or the new birth corresponds to the natural birth, it must be an act taking place at some fixed and definite time, and can not be a process gradually brought about, which would confound it with sanctification, otherwise the man of fifty years of age must say, instead of "I was born in 1829," "I have been born all the way from 1829 until now;" and if his life continues, he is not yet really born.

Swedenborg's views of the sacred Scriptures, and his method of interpretation, are not a little remarkable. In unfolding their hidden spiritual meaning he spent a great portion of his time after he had received his divine call. It is affirmed that "until by the divine mercy it was revealed to Emanuel Swedenborg, men were unaware that there is in God's Word any other than the literal meaning." For nearly seventeen centuries after the canon of the New Testament was closed, the disciples read its pages blindly, and indeed most of them are doing so to-day. But Swedenborg, it is said, was divinely commissioned to make known a new system of interpretation and to open the Word. He allegorized or spiritualized every thing, finding an inner meaning in every name of place or person or object, in every historic fact or miracle or simple statement of truth. Here he brought to bear his great law of correspondence. "The style of the Word," he says "consists throughout in correspondences, and thence effects an immediate communication with heaven." This is further explained by one of his followers—the word "is written in a manner analogous to that in which the world is created according to the correspondence of natural things with spiritual. It has a spiritual sense throughout within the literal, as the spiritual world exists within and animates the natural world, and as the soul exists within and animates the body. This spiritual sense does not relate to things pertaining to the natural world, but wholly to those which are spiritual, thus to regeneration, to redemption, and the glorification of the

humanity of the Lord." There is also, according to Swedenborg, "a sense still more interior than the spiritual; it is called the heavenly. It can not be easily unfolded, not being so much the subject of thought as of affection." These three senses, and sometimes even a fourth sense, Swedenborg found in the Scriptures, and they "answer to the three degrees of the human mind."

A striking resemblance has been traced between the method of Swedenborg and that of Origen and his school, and some of the disciples of the Swedish teacher speak of the early allegorizers with great commendation. Origen believed in "a twofold world, a visible and an invisible, and that the one is emblematic of the other," that "the heavenly world corresponds in all its parts with the lower world, which was formed after its model," and that "the Scriptures resemble man. As man consists of three parts, a rational mind, a sensitive soul, and a visible body, so the Scriptures have a threefold sense." Swedenborg and Origen had the same principles of interpretation. They were both led to depreciate the literal and obvious sense of the Word of God, and there is great sameness in many of their views. The method of Swedenborg, therefore, is not so recent by many centuries as it is claimed that it is.

This system of interpretation led Swedenborg to reject the following books of the Old Testament: Ruth, First and Second Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon. He also rejected all of the New Testament except the Apocalypse and the four Gospels. The canon of the sacred Scriptures is thus diminished by about one-half. The rejected books are acknowledged to be good and useful for the Church, but they are the word of man and not the Word of God. Their rejection is not based upon any just grounds of Biblical criticism, but upon the supposed lack of the hidden or mystical sense. The science of correspondences can not be made to apply to them. "With regard to the writings of St. Paul and the other apostles," says Swedenborg, "I have not given

them a place in my Arcana Cœlestia because they are dogmatic writings merely, and not written *in the style of the Word*, as are those of the prophets, of David, of the Evangelists, and the Revelation of St. John." That part of the Bible which is preserved is wholly figurative. The accounts of the creation and of the flood, though written in the historical style, are not true in the literal sense. "Adam, Seth, Enoch, Noah, Ham, Shem, Japheth, etc., did not exist as individuals, but signify respectively Churches, or states of mankind or of religious belief." "By Egypt is signified what is scientific; by Assyria, what is rational; by Edom, what is natural; by Moab, the adulteration of good; by the children of Ammon, the adulteration of truth; by the Philistines, faith without charity; by Tyre and Sidon, the knowledges of good and truth; and by Gog, external worship without internal." The meanings applied to words and objects are fanciful and altogether arbitrary. The horse corresponds to intellectual truth, while the ass corresponds to scientific truth—a statement which our scientists would hardly be willing to accept. "By a garden, a grove, and a wood are meant wisdom, intelligence, and science; by the olive, the vine, the cedar, the poplar, and the oak, are meant the good and truth of the Church, under the different characters of celestial, spiritual, rational, natural, and sensual; by a lamb, a sheep, a goat, a calf, and an ox are meant innocence, charity, and natural affection of different degrees; and by mountains, hills, and valleys are meant the higher, the lower, and the lowest things relating to the Church." And so on *ad infinitum et ad nauseam usque*. So far as reason can determine an object could as well signify any one of a hundred things as the one which it is made to signify. Indeed, in the famous dictionary of correspondences the same word will be found to have a dozen significations, entirely opposite, between which there is no resemblance whatever, but which are ascribed to it regardless of all reason or consistency.

It is obvious that such a method of interpretation, instead of making the Word of God more valuable by finding

new and higher truth in it, must result in utter confusion of mind, must expose the Scriptures to the charge of teaching any thing and every thing, and virtually destroy their influence for good and rob them of all value. The followers of Swedenborg do not hesitate to speak disparagingly and contemptuously, in many instances, of the obvious meaning of the Bible, and treat it in much the same way as infidels treat it. According to Swedenborg the Scriptures are a closed book to ordinary minds, and indeed to all minds, until they have received from his hands the key—and a wonderful key it is, this science of correspondences, which, like the flaming sword at the entrance of Eden, seems to turn every way, and it is to be feared is no less successful in “keeping the way of the tree of life.” Two illustrations of the manner in which the Bible is treated are here given:

Gen. ii, 8: “And Jehovah planted a garden eastward in Eden.” “By garden is signified intelligence; by Eden, love; by the east, the Lord.” The verse must mean then—Jehovah planted intelligence Godward in love.

Gen. vii, 7: “And Noah entered, and his sons, and his wife, and his sons’ wives with him into the ark.” “By Noah’s entering into the ark is signified that he was protected in temptation; by sons are signified truths; by wife, goodness; by sons’ wives, truths joined with goodnesses.” It will be remembered that Noah is said to have been not a person, but to represent “a Church, or state of mankind, or religious belief.” The flood was “the prevalence of enormous errors or falsities.” And thus this bit of old Testament history, believed by the Jews, confirmed by national traditions, and indorsed by Christ and his apostles, vanishes in thin air.

A Mr. Tulk, himself a Swedenborgian, denies that there has been a single Swedenborgian writer who has correctly understood this wonderful science of correspondence. He affirms that the language of Swedenborg needs also to be spiritualized, else we shall be compelled to receive greater

mysteries in the New Church theology than those from which we have escaped in the Old. Professor Pond remarks: "We honor the frankness of this Mr. Tulk. At the same time we are anxious to know where this labor of spiritualizing is to end. Swedenborg spiritualizes the Scriptures; and Mr. Tulk spiritualizes Swedenborg; and the next improvement will be to spiritualize him."

It should be borne in mind that the spiritual meaning of the word which is unfolded by Swedenborg has for its support no discovered or discoverable reason, in fact absolutely nothing but the bare statement of a strange, unaccredited man, who also declared that he had received information from spirits from the interior of Tartary that the people there possessed a written revelation, which was given previously to that given to the Israelites, and that from it Moses copied the first eleven chapters of Genesis, and that the Book of the Wars of Jehovah, spoken of in Numbers, and the Book of Jasher, referred to in Joshua and Samuel, were parts of it.

Swedenborg asserted that the last judgment had already taken place. It took place in the world of spirits; that is, in the intermediate place between heaven and hell, in the year 1757. This, also, must be accepted on the authority of his own statement. The new Jerusalem Church takes its place from that period, succeeding the Christian Church, as the latter succeeded the Jewish Church at the first advent of Christ. "There have been four Churches or dispensations on the earth which have been entirely distinct from each other in their character." "At the end of each of the first three there has been a general judgment, in the spiritual world, of those who have lived during that dispensation." The first judgment is figuratively described in the account of the flood. The second judgment took place, also in the world of spirits, at the first coming of Christ, when the Jewish dispensation came to an end. The second coming of Christ in the clouds of heaven, which he foretold, occurred in the call of Swedenborg and the unfolding of his doctrines.

At that time the third and last judgment took place, the Christian Church came to its end, and the New Jerusalem came down. A Mr. Brockmer averred that "Swedenborg once called himself the Messiah." His followers all believe that the second coming of Christ was fulfilled in him. The New Jerusalem, being the last and crowning dispensation, is to have no end. In the eschatology of Swedenborg there is to be, therefore, hereafter no general judgment, neither will there be any bodily resurrection. Both of these doctrines, which are revealed with the utmost distinctness in the Word of God, Swedenborg boldly denied, and thereby classed himself with profane and vain babblers, "who concerning the truth have erred, saying that the resurrection is past already." Death, or the departure of the soul from the body, is a gradual process, rather than a sudden flight, and is commonly effected in three days after all appearance of life has fled, and immediately the spirit is clothed with its new spiritual body. Those who die now are judged soon after death, and it is said that "none now remain in the world of spirits [which is a kind of preliminary or purgatorial state] for a longer period than thirty years." Swedenborg asserted also that every man is attended in this life by two angels from heaven and two evil spirits from hell, by whom he is held in freedom to turn either to the heavens above or to the hells beneath. The angels, moreover, do not constitute a distinct order of beings, as the Scriptures declare, and as is commonly believed, but are only human beings in an advanced stage of their existence,* and are represented by Swedenborg, in opposition to the plain teaching of Christ on the subject of angelic marriages in

* The text frequently cited in proof that the angels are not a distinct order of beings, but were once men, is Rev. xxii, 9, which reads in our version, "For I am thy fellow-servant, and of thy brethren the prophets," etc., which is supposed to teach that the angel confessed that he was human and one of the prophets. Any one who is familiar with the Greek Testament, knows that this is not the meaning of the text. The true meaning is better expressed as follows: "I am a fellow-servant of thee and of thy brethren the prophets," etc. See Alford, Lange, etc., and compare Heb. i, 14.

Matt. xxii, 30, as "living as husband and wife in perpetual youth, innocence, and peace."

We have presented, as briefly as possible, some of the doctrines of Swedenborgianism as they stand opposed to the commonly accepted truths of the Bible. By its own confession it is "an entirely new system, contradicting in many things all known prevailing religions in all their different parts." Swedenborg was violent in his denunciation of religious views which differed from his, and caricatured and misrepresented those views in a manner which was hardly becoming in a man who professed to be directly instructed by the Spirit of God and divinely commissioned as a teacher of truth. He has unfolded and unfolded his peculiar doctrines in a style which can be described only as Swedenborgian, and in language which is often utterly incomprehensible. And this system, with all its daring vagaries, absurd visions, and plain contradictions of the Word of God, containing some truth and much error, men are called upon to accept as a substitute for the Christian faith, or possibly we should say, as a new development of it, and as clothed with an equal, divine authority in all its parts, though it has in support of its amazing claims simply the assertion of an old man, whom the most of his contemporaries believed to be insane. During the sitting of the diet, in 1769, it was proposed "to bring him on trial, and in the first stage of the hearing to declare that he had lost his mind and become insane by excessive endeavors to explore religious mysteries." It is acknowledged that nothing saved him but his position as a member of the House of Nobles, and his relationship to noble families.

There is one other topic which can not be omitted in our review of Swedenborg and his teachings. We refer to his views of marriage and the relations of the unmarried to each other, and the gross license and immorality which he permits and even inculcates. These views, which are expressed in the most open and unblushing manner in a volume which Swedenborg seemed to regard very highly,

his biographers appear to pass over with a discreet silence, or to say as little about as possible. We have already alluded to the prominence which Swedenborg gives in his writings to the delights of conjugal love, making it a chief source of the joy, both of this world and of the heavenly world. He teaches that a *Christian* should not have more than one wife, and that *formal* divorce is not permissible except for the single cause assigned by Christ; yet he declared that "polygamy is not sin with those whose religion sanctions or permits it, or who are in ignorance concerning the Lord," as for instance the Mohammedans and all heathen nations. The Mohammedans in the lower heaven, he says, continue to "live with many wives and concubines as in the world." Swedenborg visited one of them, and had a prolonged discussion with him upon the subject of marriage. "We do not live with one wife," said the angelic Mohammedan, "but some with two and three, and some with more, because variety, obedience, and honor delight us; and these we have from our wives if they are many. With one wife there would be no pleasure from variety, but disgust and sameness." Swedenborg endeavored to reason with this glorified saint, but did not succeed in making much impression upon him, for he replied, "What else makes a man blessed but the emulation of wives contending for the honor of the husband's highest favor?"

But although Swedenborg teaches that a man who has received the law of Christ should have but one wife, and has but one sufficient ground for *formal* divorce, yet he mentions nearly fifty causes, "legitimate, just, real, and sufficient," for separation and concubinage; and besides those mentioned he says there are many others. His instructions to Christians are exactly as follows: Concubinage "*conjointly with a wife*" is unlawful, but *apart from a wife*, that is, when following separation for any one of these numberless causes, it is not unlawful. These causes which he calls "legitimate, just, real, and sufficient," include a great variety of bodily diseases, severe and trivial, chronic and

acute, such as consumption, palsy, general debility, malignant fevers, putrid breath exhaled from vitiated blood or lymph, abscesses, cancers, warts, pustules, etc.; also almost every thing which can be called mental disease, such as mania, loss of memory, severe hysteria, stubbornness of will, great talkativeness about insignificant things, and a disposition to disclose family secrets; and also all habits of extravagance and immorality, such as lying, stealing, profanity, excess, luxury, neglect of infants, and general impiety. All these and many others constitute in this religious system "legitimate, just, and truly sufficient causes" for separation and concubinage. Surely the most licentious free-lover could not ask for greater license than is here granted by this divine teacher. "That these are just causes," he says, "reason sees without a judge." They are to be "adjudged by the man alone," that is, "to be decided by the man himself." In a matter so important as this, affecting the morals of society and the peace and sanctity of the family, every man is left to determine without restraint or fear of punishment when and for what slight cause he may violate the holy marriage relation and trample upon a primal law of God!

In like manner, with reference to fornication, Swedenborg teaches that it is not only allowable in certain circumstances, but is commanded and enjoined. He specifies no less than six reasons why it should be indulged. "With some," he says, "the love of sex can not, without damage, be totally restrained from going forth into fornication." Again, he says, "Conjugal love—with those who for various causes can not as yet enter into marriage, and can not govern their lusts—may be preserved, if the love of the sex be restricted to one mistress." Upon this he seems to insist, for "by this means promiscuous fornications are curbed and limited," "adulteries are guarded against," etc. It is admitted by one of Swedenborg's biographers that when he was at one time asked by General Tuxen if in his youth he would keep free from temptations with regard to the other

sex. He replied, "Not altogether; in my youth I had a mistress in Italy." According to his own teachings he probably felt that he was perfectly justified in this course.

We need not dwell longer upon this topic, nor defile these pages with additional quotations from the writings of Swedenborg in confirmation of what has been said. It is not necessary to contrast such views with the requirements of Christian purity and chastity, or to speak of their degrading and corrupting influence upon public morals and social life, if they should be openly and widely promulgated under the sanction of religion. It is stated that the early disciples of the New Church in London undertook to act upon these teachings of their great master, and quickly brought shame and contempt upon their whole system, of which, as originally given, these instructions formed an inseparable part, and must now be taken into consideration in passing judgment upon its claims and pretensions. We are convinced that Swedenborgianism can make little progress in any intelligent community except as suppression and concealment are practiced. In addition to the wild and absurd character of its revelations, its extremely fanciful and arbitrary method of interpreting the Word of God, and the nature of its doctrinal teachings, which are, some of them, difficult to be comprehended, and many of them, contrary to the teachings of the Bible, it has to bear the incubus of a charge easily substantiated of being grossly sensual in its spirit and grossly immoral in its tendencies. We speak now of Swedenborgianism as a system, as it came from the hands of its founder, and not of that modified form which is held by men of refined tastes and pure morals, who, while exalting Swedenborg literally to heaven as a teacher, do virtually repudiate no small part of his teachings, and while accepting some of his doctrines as wholly divine in their origin and authority, must, if they pronounce judgment at all, declare others to be wholly devilish. The term "Swedenborgian" is now pretty much discarded as a distinguishing title, and "New Churchman"

is substituted in its place, and the spirit of a wise eclecticism or a judicious silence prevails with reference to doctrines. It is more than probable that the charge of ignorance which has been often made against the opponents of Swedenborg may be brought with equal justice against very many of his professed friends. Being captivated by certain features of Swedenborgianism by certain views published in brief *excerpts*, they live and die in ignorance of the great mass of absurdities and immoralities which the system contains. It is not necessary, it is said, to read so vast a library as the complete works of Swedenborg make; from two or three treatises the whole system can be comprehended.

Swedenborgianism has its attractions. Some persons are fascinated by its views of divine love, or its central doctrine, the curious theory of correspondences, which has in it, of course, some germs of truth, for Christ himself sometimes employed natural things to set forth spiritual truths; but this is a very insufficient justification for the extravagant and unreasonable system which Swedenborg unfolded. Others are drawn to it by its minute and intensely human descriptions of the future state, its employments and blessedness. And still others accept it in order to escape some unwelcome doctrine of orthodoxy. Swedenborgianism offers a place of refuge for those who would flee away from the doctrine of the atonement, of the resurrection, of the general judgment, and especially of the Trinity, while it still allows them to hold fast to the deity of Christ, though its views of his humanity are degrading and unscriptural in the extreme. Yet one can hardly be surprised that, though more than one hundred years have passed away since the death of Swedenborg, his doctrines have found so few adherents. The largest numbers are in England and the United States, though, according to the latest statistics there are less than one hundred ministers of that faith in both countries. A recent American writer says, "In its organized form Swedenborgianism seems to have gained no great success in this country. It is nearly


ninety years since the doctrines of Swedenborg were first openly proclaimed in America, and now the avowed believers in them do not number over four or five thousand."

It should be added that Swedenborg stated positively, saying that it was revealed to him from heaven, that there was "an important branch of the New Church" in the interior of Africa, where the people had abjured the worship of idols and held to the doctrine of correspondences and other doctrines of the New Church. He said they had been visited by Europeans, and were not unknown in other countries. But Swedenborg is our only informant. It is doubtful if his followers put any faith in the statement. They have never shown any disposition to attempt its verification, and thereby complete their Church statistics. Probably Dr. Livingstone and Mr. Stanley found it easier to discover chimpanzees and gorillas in Central Africa than Swedenborgians.

Swedenborg died in London on Sunday, March 29, 1772, at the age of eighty-four years and two months. In December of the previous year he had a stroke of palsy, and was temporarily deprived of his speech. After a few days he recovered it, but remained weak and infirm. Richard and Elizabeth Shearsmith, with whom he lived, made affidavit thirteen years later, before the Lord Mayor of London, that one month before his death Swedenborg foretold the day on which it would occur, and that he died on the day foretold. He was visited during his sickness by Rev. Arvid Ferelius, minister of the Swedish Church, who urged him to recant either the whole or a part of what he had said, if untrue, as he had now nothing more to expect from the world. It is said that he "raised himself up in bed, placed his hand on his breast, and said with great zeal and emphasis, 'As true as you see me before you, so true is every thing which I have written; and I could have said more, had I been permitted. When you come into eternity, you will see all things as I have stated and described them, and we shall have much to discourse about

them with each other.'” Mr. and Mrs. Shearsmith also affirmed that they never heard him utter any thing that looked like recantation. At the solicitation of Mr. Ferelius, Swedenborg received the Lord's-supper from his hands, though he said he did not need it, being a member of the Church of the other world, but would partake of it to show the union between the Church in heaven and the Church on earth. A short time before his death he was deprived of his spiritual sight, and was in great distress of mind, crying out, “O my God, hast thou then wholly forsaken thy servant at last?” It being restored to him, he was again peaceful and happy. On Sunday, the day of his death, hearing the clock strike, he asked his landlady and her maid what time it was. When they answered five o'clock, he said, “It is well; I thank you; God bless you both,” and soon died.

Probably no man has ever lived about whom there has been greater diversity of judgment than about Emanuel Swedenborg. That he had great natural powers all admit; but as to his mental condition and the value of his works produced during the last half of his public career, opinions are widely divergent. The position which he holds in the judgment of his few followers is a very exalted one; they lavish their praise upon him with a liberal hand, while the world at large is disposed to regard him as charitably as it can. On the one hand it is said: “He must and will be considered at no distant period, the Zoroaster of Europe, and the Prometheus of a new era of reason, however at present the clouds of prejudice may intervene, or the storms of passion obscure the coruscations of his intellect.” On the other hand, he is called a mere “visionary and elixir of moonbeams.” On the one hand, he is regarded as “the herald of the New Church,” whose teachings are no less divine than the teachings of Jesus Christ, indeed without whose interpretations the inspired Word would be of little value. On the other hand, he is said to be “one of the most ingenious, lively, entertaining madmen that ever set



pen to paper, but whose waking dreams are so wild, so far remote both from Scripture and common sense, that one might as easily swallow the stories of Tom Thumb or of Jack the Giant-killer." On the one hand, a disciple of Swedenborg thinks that no person could have written the work on "Conjugal and Scortatory Love," who had not been in heaven. On the other hand, it is asserted that, "except Rabelais and Dean Swift, nobody ever had such science of filth and corruption." On the one hand, it is declared that he was permitted to pay frequent visits to the world of spirits, and hold communication with its inhabitants, that he might bring back to earth accurate information of knowledge there received and minute descriptions of things there seen. On the other hand, it is believed that these records were but the offspring of a vivid but disordered imagination, that "his angels and spirits were just what we might expect them to be, considering his previous studies, habits, opinions, and character," that their knowledge was measured by his, their feelings and opinions were determined by his, and that where he was ignorant they blundered—in a word, that "his interlocutors all Swedenborgize." On the one hand, he is held up as "the leading man of the ages, the central man of many knowledges, the typical man of comprehensive achievements, the man without an equal, a model or a shadow." On the other hand, he is regarded as no more than a deluded monomaniac. On the one hand, he is supposed to represent in himself the second coming of the Son of man in the clouds of heaven. On the other hand, he is put down, if sane, as a profane impostor.

Emerson, in his inimitable manner, contrasts Swedenborg with Behmen. "Strange, scholastic, didactic, passionless, bloodless man, who denotes classes of souls as a botanist disposes of a carex, and visits doleful hells as a stratum of chalk or hornblende. He has no sympathy. He goes up and down the world of men, a modern Rhadamanthus, in gold-headed cane and peruke, and with nonchalance and the air of a referee, distributes souls. The warm, many-

weathered, passionate-peopled world is to him a grammar of hieroglyphs, or an emblematic freemason's procession. How different is Jacob Behmen! *He* is tremulous with emotion, and listens awe-struck, with the gentlest humanity, to the Teacher whose lessons he conveys; and when he asserts that 'in some sort, love is greater than God,' his heart beats so high that the thumping against his leathern coat is audible across the centuries. 'Tis a great difference. Behmen is healthily and beautifully wise, notwithstanding the mystical narrowness and incommunicableness. Swedenborg is disagreeably wise, and with all his accumulated gifts, paralyzes and repels."

ARTICLE IV.

JOHN WYCLIFFE.

(Continued from Page 135, No. I.)

BY REV. C. E. BARROWS.

A CAREFUL review of his work shows that, warrior as he was, Wycliffe was also a builder of the things that make for peace. Though he took an active part, Neander intimates a too active part, in the political movements of the period, in reformation in the outward form, this was because he deemed such participation necessary to the highest success of a spiritual reformation, a reformation in religion and the Church. He sought to break the power of the papacy over the land, in order to make the latter movement possible. His attack upon hoary superstition was not an end in itself, only a means of subserving the true, the beautiful, and the good. Bold and brave in his labors to demolish error, he was zealous also in his efforts to raise on its ruins the fabric of truth. He was not an indiscriminate iconoclast. He was vastly more than an image breaker. Large as was his destructive work, his constructive work was even larger. We are almost amazed at the amount he did for the instruction of God's people. His efforts were never so one-sided as to leave men in doubt about spiritual realities, to drift into uncertainty and infidelity; with positive convictions himself as to truth he endeavored to establish his disciples on the sure foundation. His aim reached beyond negative results. He never dislodged the false without substituting the true. In the very process of unsettling the minds of men in the existing order of things, a process necessarily attended with more or less of doubt and skepticism, he would settle and strengthen faith in eternal verities. And this was the main task to which he addressed himself.

Any estimate we might put upon the teachings or upon the influence of Wycliffe would be essentially defective that did not recognize the importance he attached to Holy Scripture, and the supreme place he gave to it in determining doctrine and duty. This supremacy of Scripture was a cardinal principle with him, and entered as a prominent element into the religious movement of the fourteenth century, of which he was the head and soul. The entire movement was directed towards the Bible as to an almost forgotten book, towards lifting it from its obscurity into a commanding position as the Word of God, and enthroning it as the law book of the individual conscience and of the Church. That our reformer assigned this high place to Scripture appears from several considerations: first, from his solicitude to cover England with preachers of the Word; secondly, from his noble purpose to put the inspired volume into the hands of the people rendered into such speech as they could understand; thirdly, from his constant appeal to Scripture as ultimate authority in his several controversies; and, fourthly, from the fact that he endeavored to build up his own theological system from its teachings.

A study of Wycliffe's doctrinal beliefs indicates to us a steady growth; his later opinions being more mature and Biblical than his earlier. We can attempt, however, only an outline of his articles of religious faith. While the substance of his theology was derived from Holy Scripture, its form was largely determined by his speculative thinking. "His philosophy and theology," says Neander, "were closely interwoven; accordingly the antagonism between realism and nominalism entered deeply into his theology. Nominalism in fact appeared to him something heretical." He denied any opposition between philosophy and theology, strongly maintaining their interdependence. He affirmed "a correspondence between truth *in thought* and *being* as it is grounded in God." "Some men," he says, "are so strangely mistaken, as to suppose that the light of faith is contrary to that of nature; that what may seem impossible

to the latter, should be implicitly received upon the testimony of the former. But the truth is, men call their own darkness the light of nature, and hence weakly suppose that the light of reason and of Scripture are at variance with each other."

The election of grace was a prominent article of his religious creed. It contemplated primarily the lifting of men out of sin into holiness, and secondarily their deliverance from hell and admittance into heaven. "We are predestinated," he observes, "that we may obtain divine acceptance and become holy, having received that grace through the humanity of Christ, by which we are rendered finally pleasing to God. And to me it appears that this grace, which is called the grace of predestination, or the charity of final perseverance, can not by any means fail." Foreordination, in his view, "covers all the events of time;" "whatsoever is future must necessarily come." This doctrine concerning the divine decrees was not only a necessity to his speculative conception of God, but held a very close relation to his practical life. This underlay all his other articles of faith. It is the opinion of Vaughan that "No language can be more explicit than that in which he asserts the dependence of man for the remission of sins on the satisfaction made for them by the obedience and death of Christ. To the one offering presented on the cross, every descendant of Adam, it is declared, must be indebted, not in part merely, but entirely, for the removal of his guilt." The doctrine of justification did not receive that attention from Wycliffe, and hence not that fullness of treatment, that it did from Luther two centuries later. And yet he seems to have clearly apprehended this truth. At any rate, he did not hesitate to condemn the common belief in the intercession of saints and in the worship of images, and to direct attention to Christ alone for salvation. "Marvelous it is," he says, "that any sinful being dare grant any thing to another on the merit of saints. For without the grace and power of Christ's passion, all that any saint ever did may

not bring a soul to heaven." After commenting on the brazen serpent, he concluded that "Christ died not for his own sins as thieves die for theirs, but as our brother, who, since he himself was sinless, died for the sins that others had done." Idolatrous was the worship paid to the Virgin, and to saints, and to angels, and vain the look given to them as intercessors with God, since there is but "one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus." Terrific were his denunciations of priestly absolutions and priestly indulgences, since these were mere pretensions, a criminal arrogance, a blasphemous assumption of power. Many passages in his writings must have caused the godless ecclesiastics of his day to quail with alarm. He laid great stress upon personal character, upon purity and uprightness of life, as evidences of a gracious state. The grace of God is imparted for the purpose of making men holy. In a treatise on prayer he inveighs against an opinion then prevalent that the religious forms and costly offerings of vicious men, of hypocrites and formalists, avail at all with God.

In regard to the Church, Wycliffe differed widely from the accepted teaching of his time. He denied that it embraced only the ecclesiastics, and was equivalent to the hierarchy. "When men speak of holy Church," he says, "anon, they understand prelates and priests, with monks and canons and friars and all men who have tonsures, though they live accursedly, and never so contrary to the law of God. But they call not the seculars holy Church, though they live never so truly, according to God's law, and die in perfect charity." He takes a different view, and includes many thus ruled out, and excludes many herein embraced; "all who shall be saved in the bliss of heaven are members of holy Church, and no more." He also deprecates the confounding of the true Church of God with the building in which they may meet for worship. "Christian men taught in God's law," he observes, "call holy Church the congregation of just men, for whom Jesus Christ shed his blood, and not mere stones and timber and earthly dross,

which the clerks of antichrist magnify more than the righteousness of God, and the souls of men." Nor is the Church an infallible body; a device of Satan for the destruction of the authority of Holy Writ. These four positions Wycliffe controverted: "First, That the Church is of more authority and credence than any Gospel; secondly, That Augustine said that he would not believe in the Gospel if the Church had not taught him so; thirdly, That no man now alive knows which is the Gospel except it be by an approval of the Church; and hence, fourthly, if men say they believe this to be the Gospel of Matthew or John, they do so for no cause but that the Church confirmeth it, and teacheth it." Nor has the Church any *visible* head. If not an ecclesiastic, much less a layman, and still less, we might add, a woman; if not a spiritual dignitary, much less a civil ruler; if not the pope, much less the king or queen. Such a monstrous assumption of spiritual power was never entertained till long after Wycliffe's day. The spectacle he contemplated was less revolting, but the assumption of headship of the Church, received his severe condemnation. In one of his last sermons he employs the following language: "So long as Christ is in heaven, the Church hath in him the best pope, and that distance hinders him not in doing his deeds, as he promises to be with his own always, even to the end of the world. We dare not," he adds, "put two heads, lest the Church be monstrous." Again, "Prelates make many new points of belief, and say it is not enough to believe in Jesus Christ, and to be baptized—as Christ says in the Gospel by St. Mark—except a man also believe that the bishop of Rome is the head of holy Church." He pertinently asks, "How shall any sinful wretch constrain men to believe that he is head of holy Church, while he knows not whether he himself shall be saved or lost?" And, once again, he affirms that "a more perilous heresy was never feigned by the fiend than the teaching that the pope is head of holy Church, and that whatsoever thing he affects to do is performed of Christ."

In the Church of Christ Wycliffe finds, according to the New Testament, but two offices, those of bishop and deacon. Speaking of the ministry, he declares that they should be men "next to Christ, next to heaven, and most full of charity," and should illustrate the simplicity of the Gospel in their character and office, and should all be "of one religion as priests and deacons." "But," he continues, "the fiend has changed this part to many colors, as seculars and religious. And these have both many parts, as popes and cardinals and bishops and archdeacons; also monks, canons, nospitalers, and friars." Upon Wycliffe's strictures his biographer, Vaughan, remarks: "Had Wycliffe seen the members of the Christian aristocracy, distinguished by their piety and pastoral zeal, as they were by name and jurisdiction, it is probable that the source of their peculiar dignity would have attracted but little of his attention." But Wycliffe rests his statement upon the Word of God. Having shown how this "Christian aristocracy" grew up, he continues: "I boldly assert one thing, viz., that in the primitive Church, or in the time of Paul, two orders of the clergy were sufficient, that is, a priest and a deacon. In like manner I affirm that in the time of Paul, presbyter and bishop were names of the same office. This appears from the third chapter of the first Epistle to Timothy, and in the first chapter of the Epistle to Titus. And the same is testified by that profound theologian Jerome." Concerning their marriage Wycliffe writes, "God ordained in the old law that priests should have wives; and in the new law never forbad it, neither by Christ nor by his apostles; but rather approved it." The "religious" orders he believed "to be ruled more according to the ordinance of sinful men and idiots, than according to the pure ordinance of Christ."

Wycliffe did not, however, free himself from all popish errors even of doctrine. He adhered apparently to the close of life to the dogma of baptismal regeneration. Though baptism wrought no change, it was the medium of a spiritual change wrought in the soul. "Bodily baptizing,"

he says in one of his parochial discourses—"is a figure showing how man's soul should be baptized from sin." "Baptizing is a token of the washing of the soul from sin, both original and actual, by virtue taken of Christ's death." He was uncertain as to the future condition of an unbaptized infant, though he considers it "probable that, without this washing, Christ may spiritually baptize infants, and in consequence save them." Mr. Vaughan "regrets the force of that superstition which could thus far enslave even the mind of Wycliffe. But," he continues, and with evident satisfaction, "these facts place his doctrine relating to the subjects of baptism beyond dispute." To which we reply that, if Wycliffe could have shaken off the one error, he would probably have freed himself also from the other. For his infant baptism grounds itself in baptismal regeneration. This dogma exerted such a controlling influence upon the minds of men, being regarded as the very door into the kingdom of heaven, that eyes were holden from seeing some of the plainest teachings of the Word. Wycliffe seems, indeed, not to have made baptism the subject of special and careful study. He accepted the traditionary teaching. If he had applied to it the same discriminating thought that he did to the eucharist, he would probably have held as sound views of the one ordinance as of the other.* In one respect, at least, the primitive ordinance had remained unchanged. The act was that performed at the beginning. Immersion held its own, though being gradually superseded by another and easier act. "It may with truth be affirmed," Robinson remarks in his "History of Baptism," "that during the whole establishment of the Catholic religion in

* Possibly a closer study of his writings would show that Wycliffe's teachings on the subject of baptism are susceptible of a different interpretation from that given in the text; that when he speaks of water baptism being the baptism of the Holy Spirit, he means that the one *represents* or *symbolizes* the other; that in his latest works he discarded infant baptism altogether. We know (1) that he believed, as intimated above, that children would not be damned even though dying unbaptized, a great advance on the papal doctrine; (2) that he held principles, and very tenaciously, which, carried to their logical consequences, inevitably conducted to the

England, that is, from the close of the sixth to the middle of the sixteenth century, a period of nearly a thousand years, baptism was administered by immersion, except in cases of necessity." Wycliffe believed that "It matters not whether the persons baptized are dipped three times or have only water poured on their head." He had not reached "the few drops of water" which many of the Western Churches have since substituted for the primitive bath.

On the doctrine of the eucharist Wycliffe was more orthodox than was Luther. He denied that by the act of consecration the bread was changed into the body of Christ, or that it contained the body of Christ, affirming that the bread simply but truly represented the body of the Lord. Both transubstantiation and consubstantiation he stoutly opposed, maintaining that the bread was not to be considered "as Christ or as any part of him, but as an effectual sign of him." He applied himself to demonstrate, and in the dialect of the schools, "that this venerable sacrament is *naturally* bread and wine, but *sacramentally* the body and blood of Christ." Wycliffe compelled his opponents to admit that the bread had the same properties, as for example whiteness and roundness, *after* as *before* the act of consecration. They, nevertheless, contended that, although the properties remained, the bread as such had ceased to be, having become the body of Christ. This led to much subtle disputation upon "subjects" and "attributes," "substance" and "quality," Wycliffe maintaining that, to affirm the existence of an attribute without a subject is to affirm an absurdity. The rite of confirmation he condemned. "It would be more devout," he says, "and more conformable

position held by Baptists; and, finally, (3) that subsequent papal writers who had access to his productions, including the many now lost, charged him with Anabaptistical errors, and especially with denying the dogma of infant baptism. When we remember the vigorous efforts made to destroy all of Wycliffe's works, the number of his writings still extant is surprising. Large as this number is, it comprises only about three-fourths of all he wrote. One quarter of his pieces, it has been estimated, are known only by name. Others, however, there may have been whose very names have perished.

to Scripture language, to deny that the bishops give the Holy Spirit or confirm the giving of it." He expresses it as his conviction that it was introduced with its attendant ceremonies "at the suggestion of Satan, that the people may be deceived as to the faith of the Church, and that the state and necessity of bishops may be the more acknowledged."

Wycliffe demanded, as we should naturally expect from his principles, for every disciple the right to study the Bible for himself, and to exercise his own private judgment as to its teachings. This demand for freedom of thought and freedom of worship was far in advance of the thinking of the age; but Wycliffe was led to make it by his views of Scripture. By the right of private judgment was not meant a right to override Scripture, to force its meaning, but to be led by its teachings. When it has spoken, obedience is to follow. "The law of God and of reason," says the reformer, "we should follow more than that of our popes and cardinals; so much so that if we had a hundred popes and all the friars were cardinals; to the law of the Gospel we should bow more than to all this multitude." Apostle as he was of intellectual freedom, his advocacy never disparaged the authority which the Bible should have in the realms of thought and of feeling. The relation of the human reason and of the divine Word he thus briefly but happily expresses: "It appears to me that the believing man should use this rule—if he soundly understands the sacred Scripture, let him bless God; if he be deficient in such perception, let him labor for soundness of mind. Let him also dwell as a grammarian upon the letter, but be fully ware of imposing a sense upon Scripture which he doubts the Holy Spirit does not demand. For such a man, according to St. Jerome, is a heretic; and much more he who rashly blasphemes by imposing a meaning on Scripture which the Spirit himself declares to be impossible." The study of the Bible he fostered in various ways. As we have before intimated, he made constant appeals to the sacred oracles in

his many and prolonged controversies. This appeal to Scripture was one of their marked peculiarities. He was not content to appeal to civil law, to canon law, to tradition, to the Fathers, or even to philosophy,—all of which were constantly appealed to during this period,—he went back of all these, as he says, to an ultimate authority, to the words of Christ and his apostles.

Such value did he put upon Scripture, not only as a rich store-house of truth, but as a practical guide in the affairs of life; and so impressed was he with the importance of this guide to all of God's children, and that it was intended by its divine Author to be a book for the people, that he conceived and finally executed the noble idea of putting the Book into an English dress in order to make it accessible to the common people, even the humblest. It was a herculean undertaking. One never before attempted. The translation of the Bible has been considered, and very justly, Wycliffe's great work. Its immediate influence has, however, been perhaps underestimated. We can make but a brief reference to this work; a critical history would require a volume. When the task was commenced is not known; it was completed about the year 1380. The question has been raised whether Wycliffe traveled a path already made or along an unbroken way; whether he was a pioneer in English translation or entered into the labors of others. No doubt a few fragments of Scripture had been rendered into the vernacular, but they had had slight influence and were scarcely known when Wycliffe's work appeared. This is evident from the violent opposition which it at once awakened. The Bible had for ages been a prohibited book. "Not to mention other proofs," says Anderson, in his "Annals of the English Bible," "more than a hundred and fifty years before Wycliffe had finished his determined purpose, or in the year 1229, at the Council of Toulouse, when forty-five canons were passed and issued for the extinction of heresy and the re-establishment of peace, one involved the first court of inquisition, and another was the first canon

which forbade the Scriptures to the laity, or the translation of any portion of them into the vulgar tongue." The latter was in the following terms: "We also forbid the laity to possess any of the books of the Old or New Testament, except, perhaps, the Psalter or Breviary for the Divine Offices, or the Hours of the Blessed Virgin, which some, out of devotion, wish to have; but having any of these books translated into the vulgar tongue *we strictly forbid*." Wycliffe, notwithstanding this, commenced and prosecuted his work to a successful completion. How the results of his protracted labors were regarded by the clergy of the time we learn from a contemporary writer, Henry de Knyghton, a canon of the church, who uttered this lament: "Christ delivered his Gospel to the clergy and doctors of the Church, but this Master Wycliffe hath translated it out of Latin into English [the Latin reads: *Transtulit de Latino in Anglicam linguam, non angelicam*, etc.], and thus laid it more open to the laity, and to women who could read, than it had formerly been to the most learned of the clergy, even to those of them who had the best understanding. . . . And in this way the Gospel pearl is cast abroad and trodden under foot of swine. . . . The jewel of the Church is turned into the sport of the people, and what was hitherto the principal gift of the clergy and divines, is made forever common to the laity." The Canon of Leicester, all unconsciously, pays in this language high tribute to his great antagonist.

The feeling of the clergy towards the translation expressed itself also twenty-five years later in an English council, held in 1408, in which Archbishop Arundel presided. It declared that "the translation of the text of Holy Scripture out of one tongue into another is a dangerous thing. . . . Therefore we enact and ordain that no one henceforth do, by his own authority, translate any text of Holy Scripture into the English tongue, or any other, by way of book or treatise; nor let any such book or treatise now lately composed in the time of Wycliffe aforesaid, or

since, or hereafter to be composed, be read in whole or in part, in public or in private, under pain of the greater excommunication." These several quotations illustrate some of the difficulties which encompassed this champion of the Word of God. Wycliffe, however, was not slow in justifying himself, and his method of justification commends itself to every enlightened conscience. "Honest men," he says, "are bound to declare the doctrine which they hold, not only in Latin, but in the vulgar tongue." "As the faith of the Church is contained in the Scriptures, the more these are known in an orthodox sense the better." "Since men are saved by faith, why should not the things of faith be disclosed to the people, so that they may comprehend them more clearly." "The laws made by prelates are not to be received as matters of faith, nor are we to confide in their public instructions, or in any of their words, but as they are founded on Holy Writ." "Christ and his apostles evangelized the greater portion of the world by making known the Scriptures in a language which was familiar to the people. Why, therefore, should not the living disciples of Christ do as they did, opening the Scriptures to the people so clearly and plainly that they may verily understand them?" These sentiments sound very familiar to us, and it does not seem that special courage was required to declare them. But let us remember that the "orthodox" view at the time was that expressed by Walden, a known antagonist of Wycliffe, when he affirmed that "the decrees of bishops in the Church are of greater authority and dignity than is the authority of the Scriptures."

In the work of translation Wycliffe was assisted by learned friends, especially by his disciple and friend, Purvey. Anderson traces a special providence in the fact that this translation was from the Vulgate and not from the original languages. The New Testament first appeared in print, in black letter, in 1580; it was again published by Mr. Lewis in 1731, and by Mr. Baber in 1810. Not till 1850 was the entire Bible printed, when it appeared from the Oxford

press in a royal quarto edition. The influence of this translation upon the language and religious thought of England has been immense. Copies were rapidly multiplied and scattered over the realm. One writer has even ventured the conjecture that it determined Chaucer to give his "Canterbury Tales" in English rather than in Latin. It directed without doubt the course of religious thought for generations, and lighted many a pilgrim on his way from earth to heaven.

Not content with this work of translation, Wycliffe sought to cover the land with preachers of the Word. He laid emphasis upon preaching, urged it upon those seeking entrance into the Christian ministry, assured them it was their great work, made it take the precedence even of prayer; he means doubtless the going through with the liturgical services of the Church. In this he was certainly anticipating the dissenting bodies of England who have always assigned to preaching a pre-eminent place in public worship. There was so little preaching in the Established Church at this time, that it was almost forgotten that it was one of the functions of the clergy. It was one of the tasks our reformer assigned himself, to qualify and send forth a ministry patterned on the New Testament model.

Wycliffe never left the Catholic fold, never attempted to organize a new sect, but hoped to reform the existing body. He became the head of a school within the Church. He gathered to himself a company of earnest Christian men, many of whom were skilled in human learning, and all were versed in the Holy Scriptures, who became preachers in London and throughout England. They were known as "poor priests," for whose instruction and in whose defense Wycliffe often wrote. They were itinerants, evangelists, missionaries. Each one provided with the Word of God, they scattered the seeds of truth every-where. They illustrated the reformer's teaching in regard to the priesthood. When we remember the venality and dissoluteness of the recognized clergy; that for the sake of gain vacant bishop-

rics were filled by mere boys of eleven and even five years of age; that as many as twelve and fifteen and even twenty benefices were held by one person; that livings were conferred on the ignorant and depraved for the sake of political influence, so that Wycliffe could write that "while for money, the brokers of that sinful city [Rome] promote many, who were altogether unlearned and unworthy, to a thousand marks' living yearly, the learned and worthy can hardly obtain twenty marks, whereby learning decayeth;" that the Church could be described as a mart, "where who can bring the most gold shall soonest be appointed to greatest benefices;" that of a clerk it could be said, "he is a mere collector of pence, who can neither read nor understand a verse in his psalter, nor repeat the commandments of God," who, nevertheless, produces a pope's bull declaring "that he is able to govern many souls;" that, in fine, a contemporary could truthfully write these words: "The greater part of our prelates having but little knowledge of divinity, and having been little used to preaching in their youth, when they become bishops, and are sometimes obliged to preach, are under a necessity of begging and borrowing the sermons of certain novices, in which there is neither sublimity of style nor depth of wisdom, but much childish trifling and folly unsuitable to the dignity of the pulpit;" when we remember, I say, this state of things, we can not wonder at the almost marvelous influence Wycliffe's "poor priests" had upon the people. He counsels them "to visit those who are sick or in trouble, especially those whom God hath made needy by age or other sickness, as the feeble, the blind, and the lame, who are in poverty. These," he says, addressing them singly, "thou shalt relieve with thy goods after thy power, and after their need, for thus biddeth the Gospel." For "men who love not the souls, love little the bodies of their neighbors." These visits of love and charity were after all only preparatory, to qualify them the better to preach the Word. Priests who neglect the work of preaching are denounced as traitors, "for this Christ enjoined on his dis-

ciples more than any other; by this he conjured the world out of the fiend's hand; and whosoever he be that can but bring priests to act thus hath authority from God, and merit in his deed." The reformer could even use this strong language, "The highest service that men may attain to on earth is to preach the Word of God." Thus Wycliffe taught. His writings abound with similar sentiments. His disciples were deeply imbued with them. And as heralds of the cross they were a power in the land. The people were profoundly stirred. Thought was awakened. The mind was freed. The tongue was loosed. The spell of the Papal Church was broken. The Word of God shined into many hearts. The morning of a better day was breaking for both the Church and the state.

There can be no question that Wycliffe made a powerful impression upon his own generation, upon all ranks of society, from the highest to the lowest. He could count among his followers some of the brightest names of the period. Members of the royal family were not only his warm personal friends, but espousers of his doctrines, devout and humble Christians. In this number we must reckon Joan, wife of the heroic Edward, and mother of Richard II, known in her youth as "the fair maid of Kent;" also Anne of Luxemburg, daughter of the Emperor Charles IV, and wife of Richard, of whom Wycliffe speaks in terms of highest praise, to whom Chaucer pays a most touching tribute, who was a proficient in three languages, the Bohemian, German, and Latin, and afterward in the English, in which she became a diligent student of the Bible; and the reformer inquires whether to "hereticate her on that account would not be Luciferian folly;" of whom the primate, Arundel himself, was compelled to confess, when he came to preach at her interment which took place in 1394, that "although she was a stranger, yet she constantly studied the four Gospels in English; and in the study of these, and reading of godly books, she was more diligent than even the prelates themselves, though their office and business re-

quire. this of them." He acknowledged having received from her hand a copy of the Gospels in English, with the hope expressed that he would give them a perusal. Through her we may trace Wycliffe's influence in the Bohemian reformation; his principles, Hume says, "were carried over to Bohemia by some youth of that nation, who studied at Oxford;" and the reformation under Huss prepared the way for the more extensive one in the sixteenth century under Luther. Wycliffe had also a very respectable following among the nobility, many of whom enrolled themselves as the disciples of Christ. A larger number of "knights favored the Gospel, and had a mind to read it in English." Copies of Wycliffe's Bible found place in many noble homes. Through the liberality of the wealthy, copies of the sacred Scripture were multiplied and "poor priests" were largely supported. Among the common people the number of Wycliffe's disciples was exceedingly large. His followers had already been designated "Lollards," a word that has been variously derived, but Mosheim connects it with the singing which characterized the worship of these believers. While these Lollards grew rapidly in numbers, they grew also in knowledge of the truth. Though the editor of the "Cyclopædia of Religious Knowledge" is wrong in regarding Wycliffe as having reached the position of the Baptists,* it must, nevertheless, be confessed that his teachings conducted thither, and that many of his disciples followed the direction and became avowed Baptists. As already intimated, the Scriptural act of baptism had scarcely yet been questioned. All Christians were virtually immersionists. The spiritual meaning of the rite had long before been corrupted: then followed, and necessarily, an innovation in regard to the subjects of the rite; and just about this time a change in the act itself was being gradually introduced. The great Earl of Warwick, a contemporary of Wycliffe, was immersed; and subsequently Arthur, eldest son of Henry VII, as still later were also Edward VI and Elizabeth.

* See, however, the note on page 233.

At the time of Wycliffe's death it is reported that every second person in the kingdom was a Lollard. Knyghton seeks to awaken the clergy to action by the statement that "the number of those who believed in Wycliffe's doctrine very much increased, and were multiplied like suckers growing from the roots of a tree. They every-where filled the kingdom; so that a man could scarcely meet two people on the road but one of them was a disciple of Wycliffe." Indeed, he adds, Wycliffe and his disciples "so prevailed by their laborious urging of their doctrines, that they gained over the half of the people, or a still larger proportion to their sect." Sir Thomas More makes a reluctant concession to the same effect. The city of London was especially permeated with the principles of the reformer. With indignation Walsingham admits that the Londoners were nearly all Lollards. Hume, following the latter authority, states that "the Lollards were every day increasing in the kingdom, and were become a formed party, which appeared extremely dangerous to the Church, and even formidable to the civil authority." It was the same alarm that was sounded in later times. The doctrine of the separation of the Church from the state was interpreted as destructive of both.

The day so auspiciously opening for England was destined to be early and suddenly shrouded in darkness, deeper, if possible, than any the land had hitherto known. Richard was succeeded on the throne by a usurper, who, to strengthen his hands, formed an alliance with the clerical party, and relentless war was waged against the Lollards. The story is a sad one, but it is relieved by examples of heroic faith worthy of the brightest page of the history of the Church. In the reign of Henry IV the fires of persecution were kindled that were for years to cast their lurid light over the land. In 1401 Rev. William Sautre suffered martyrdom, being the first person ever burned in England for his religious opinions. In the following reign, that of Henry V, in 1418 Sir John Oldcastle, the noble Lord Cob-

ham, a man who did much and eminent service in behalf of the truth, was burned at St. Giles's Field, being the first among the English nobility to suffer the extreme penalty of the law for the same cause. So intense had become the bitterness against the Lollards, that even the remains of Wycliffe must be disturbed, removed from their resting place, and dishonored. The Council of Constance, which convened in 1414, and condemned John Huss and Jerome of Prague, anathematized also the writings of Wycliffe and decreed that his memory should be infamous and his bones burned. Reduced to ashes, they were thrown into a stream flowing through Lutterworth. "Thus," says Thomas Fuller, the historian, three hundred years later, "this brook did convey his ashes into Avon; Avon into Severn; Severn into the narrow sea; and this into the wide ocean. And so the ashes of Wycliffe are the emblem of his doctrine, which is now dispersed all the world over."

Though hidden for a time from sight, the stream of Wycliffe's influence continued to flow, until it reappeared in the reign of Henry VIII. In his magnificent "Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing," Milton thus refers to our hero: "Had it not been for the obstinate perverseness of our prelates against the divine and admirable spirit of Wycliffe to suppress him as a schismatic or innovator, perhaps neither the Bohemian Huss and Jerome, no, nor the name of Luther or of Calvin, had ever been known." One of Wycliffe's biographers thus compares him with the German reformer: "Allowing, if we must, to Luther the highest niche in this sacred department of the Temple of Renown, I know not who can be chosen to fill the next, if it be denied to Wycliffe." But it was not for personal glory he lived; this evidently never found a place in his thoughts. He towered far above all such ambitions. He lived for God, for Christ, for the truth, for the good of men. He devoted himself, mind and heart, to making known the Gospel. His followers partook of his spirit. And though for a time passing through the fires of persecution, they

were destined to survive the ordeal and reappear, with commanding influence, in succeeding generations. The day which was for so long a period shut in with darkness has again and long since opened, and is still shedding its light more broadly and benignly than ever. The figure of the quaint historian, Fuller, expressive of the growing influence of Wycliffe and his teachings on England and the world, the poet Wordsworth has amplified in the following familiar yet beautiful lines, with which we will close:

“ Wycliffe is disinhumed ;
Yea, his dry bones to ashes are consumed,
And flung into the brook that travels near ;
Forthwith, that ancient voice which streams can hear,
Thus speaks (that voice which walks upon the wind,
Though seldom heard by busy human kind) ;
As thou these ashes, little brook, wilt bear
Into Avon—Avon to the tide
Of Severn—Severn to the narrow seas—
Into main ocean they—this deed accurst,
An emblem yields to friends and enemies,
How the bold teacher’s doctrine, sanctified
By truth, shall spread throughout the world, dispersed.”

ARTICLE V. INSPIRATION.

(Continued from No. I, Page 118.)

BY G. W. LASHER, D. D.

It is a fact equally true and humiliating that the bold attacks upon the divine records, by the men and the schools of thought hitherto referred to, have had the effect not only to shake the faith of many honest men as to the inspiration of the Scriptures, but to drive even those who attempted their defense from the strong fortress erected for them by their Author, to scatter them, and lead to a sort of guerrilla warfare. Instead of standing firmly by the truth, and defending it with the heavy artillery provided, many have seemed rather to hang out the white flag and invite to parley, negotiation, and compromise. Various theories have been adopted, and various words and phrases introduced by which it was hoped that the enemy might be placated and even made a friend.

Instead of maintaining the inspiration of the entire Word, some have been led to admit that, while the larger portion, and especially the prophecies, were inspired, other portions, as the historical books, were not. The formula, "The Bible is a revelation from God," is, by such, changed into "The Bible contains a revelation from God." Others still have held to different degrees of inspiration, something after the manner of the Jews, who claimed that there were three degrees. The first and highest they attributed to Moses, with whom God spake not in dreams and visions, but "face to face;" the next was the gift of prophecy, of which there were various subordinate degrees; the third and last, the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, from which proceeded those books called the Hagiographia, or Holy Writings.

But while the advocates of "degrees" can easily refute the Jewish error, they themselves fall into an equally egregious misconception of the subject, and an equal fallacy in reasoning. The Jewish theory is overthrown by such an answer as this: "Whatever God has condescended to communicate to his servants must be equally infallible and true, whether derived from an external voice, from dreams or visions, or, lastly, from the internal and enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit. The mode of communication, when the agency of Providence is established, can in no respect exalt or depreciate the intrinsic character of the thing revealed."

The modern theory of "degrees" divides inspiration into four species, *superintendence*, *direction*, *elevation*, and *suggestion*. By the "inspiration of superintendence" is meant a sort of review of the writings produced by the agents selected of God, by which they are preserved from any material errors; and in harmony with this theory a sort of apology is sometimes offered for supposed inaccuracies, by saying with Warburton, "The Holy Spirit so directed the pens of these writers that *no considerable* error should fall from them, . . . by preserving them by the more ordinary means of Providence from any *mistakes of consequence*." And to this remark he adds the singular conclusion: "This seems to be the true idea of the inspiration in question. This only doth agree with all appearances, and will fully answer the purpose of an inspired writing which is to afford an *infallible rule* for the direction of the Catholic Church."

It ought to suffice to say in refutation of this theory that the superintendence claimed, if divine, and really worth any thing, ought to guard against all errors—those of little consequence as well as those of great—and that it is not a matter of little consequence that the "superintendence" does not suffice to keep some men from admitting that even small errors are to be found in the sacred text as given from the pen of God's chosen instruments. If such an inspiration is sufficient to satisfy the demands of Bishop Warburton, it is not sufficient for some obdurate sinners whom we know. There must be

more authority than this to preserve *us* from the practice of sins which the Word of God forbids. By the "inspiration of direction" is meant, in the language of Bishop Wilson, "such assistance as left the writers to describe the matter revealed in their own way, directing only the mind in the exercise of its powers." And, as to this, we may say that it meets nearly all the requirements of the case as it regards the whole Bible, yet does not satisfy our idea of the inspiration needed to secure the highest respect for Scriptural authority.

The third degree above mentioned—"elevation"—is, in the language of Doddridge, "that which prevailed when the faculties, though acting in a regular and common manner, were elevated or raised to some extraordinary degree, so that the composition was more truly sublime, noble, and pathetic than what would have been produced merely by the man's natural genius." And of this we may say that the poets, both heathen and Christian, have always claimed the same thing, and without some further proof, we are as willing to concede it to the one as to the other.

The last degree—that of "suggestion"—was held to take place, according to the last named author, "when the use of the faculties was superseded, and God, as it were, spoke only to the mind, making such discoveries to it as it could not otherwise have obtained, and dictating the very words in which these discoveries were to be communicated to others." Our objection to this view is, that it makes no distinction between inspiration and revelation. It seems to us that there is a material difference between the influence exerted upon the mind in the suggestion of thoughts and expressions, as by vision or otherwise, and the direction of a writer in recording those thoughts or expressions for the guidance of others.

In developing what appears to us to be the true idea of inspiration, we may say, first of all, that it is no part of our business to discuss the possibility of a revelation from God, nor the question as to the state of the prophets when re-

ceiving their revelations. It is ours simply to deal with the influence which controlled the writing of these revelations and these records of facts. We suppose it settled that a revelation is possible and reasonable; nay, that it has really been made. This is the fact generally conceded by those who interest themselves in the question of inspiration. The question now is, Have we a reliable record of such revelation? and in what does its reliability consist? We are to distinguish between two different influences at work in the minds of the writers of the sacred Scriptures—the one the work of the Logos, the revealer, the other the work of the Spirit, the inspirer. For example, the giving of the law from Sinai, and the narration of the facts connected with the wanderings of Israel are very different things. The one was revealed by him who stands as the *declarer* of God; the other passed under the observation of the historian; but the direction of the pen of the writer, whether in recording the law as revealed, or the narrative of the journeyings, is one and the same. We have no idea that the greater part of Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy were committed to writing in the mount of God; indeed, we are convinced of the contrary; yet the revelation was all made there by the mouth of the Lord speaking “face to face” with Moses. The same may be said of the Gospels—Jesus spake the things which he had heard with his Father in the ears of his disciples; but long years afterward, these disciples committed his words to writing, under the direction of the Holy Spirit. We do not suppose that the exile on Patmos had the writing materials before him on that “Lord’s-day,” and committed the vision to writing at the moment of its reception. The writing was done doubtless months, perhaps years, afterwards; and it was then that the aid of the inspiring Spirit was required and given.

To the external evidence that the record which we possess is reliable we have already pointed; it remains now to say that, if these Scriptures are worthy of respect at all, it is because they tell the truth; and if they are truth-

ful, then must their witness concerning themselves be good. And at the risk of being regarded by some as not abreast of the "advanced thought" of the age, we venture the opinion that these Scriptures are to be taken as an organic whole, that in the plan of redemption they all are important, and bear equal claim to authenticity. We are not prepared to allow any set of critics to break up the Bible into detached portions and then proceed to destroy it piece-meal. Now, all through these writings we have repeated reference to "the Word of the Lord," not only because he is represented as speaking many of their truths, but because they are his recorded revelation. The cxix Psalm, as well as a part of the xix, is devoted to the exaltation of this Word—the "commandments," the "statutes," the "precepts," the "judgments" of the Lord. This is made the rule by which a young man is to "cleanse his way," and every generation has proved its efficacy. But the strongest testimony to the divine character of the Old Testament is found in the New. If Jesus is to be believed in any case, it is when he speaks of the Old Testament Scriptures, quoting them as the Word of God, and declaring them to be they which testify of him; that though heaven and earth should pass away, yet no jot nor tittle of these should fail of fulfillment. In making quotations from the Old Testament, Christ made use of the divine and the human agents interchangeably; as, for example, having prefaced his quotation from one of the Psalms with the words, "David himself saith by the Holy Ghost," he immediately adds, "David himself therefore calleth him Lord, and whence is he then his son?"

In Matthew it is recorded that Jesus, on one occasion, quoted the fourth commandment, with the remark, "For God commanded, saying," while in the parallel narrative, in Mark, we read: "For Moses said, Honor thy father and thy mother." In like manner Paul applies to the Jews the language of prophecy, "Well spake the Holy Ghost, by Esaias the prophet," while John simply says, "These things said Esaias." Olshausen, on the "Genuineness of the New

Testament Writings," says: "The references to the description given by Moses of the holy of holies, and of the rites connected with the temple ceremonial, are followed by an exposition introduced in these words: 'The Holy Ghost this signifying.' (Heb. ix, 8.) The words of Jeremiah are applied with the remark, 'The Holy Ghost also is witness to us.' (Jer. x, 15.) The elaborate argument founded on Psalm xcv commences, 'Wherefore (as the Holy Ghost saith) to-day if ye will hear his voice' (Heb. iii, 7). In this remarkable Epistle, God, or the Holy Ghost, is constantly named as the speaker in the passages which are adduced from the Old Testament, and this not only in regard to those in which some man speaks; for instance, David, as the author of the Psalms. Herein is clearly exhibited the view of the author in relation to the Old Testament and the writers of it. He regarded God as, by his Holy Spirit, the living actor and speaker in them all; so that, consequently, the Holy Scriptures were to him purely a work of God, although brought forward by man. Here we have the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms, the grand divisions of the Old Testament all quoted as spoken by the Holy Spirit."

But there is one passage which can not be passed over, without the appearance of blunder, and that is the oft-quoted passage in Second Timothy, in which the apostle, when about to take leave of his spiritual son, tells him where he will find an unerring teacher to take the place of him whom he is about to lose. He tells him to give heed to the Holy Scriptures with which he has been familiar from his youth; and then, lest Timothy may fail to fully appreciate the treasure found in this teacher, he adds: "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." We do not overlook the fact that some have striven to get rid of this passage by giving it another construction, as follows: "All Scriptures given by inspiration of God is profitable," etc.; but we can not stop to

expose the subterfuge and fallacy, which has been done again and again. The passage still stands intact, and forever lifts up its voice in favor of the whole Old Testament Scriptures—all that was known to Paul and to Timothy—and declares that every part and parcel has its own office-work in the perfection of the Christian's knowledge and character.

The New Testament is full of testimony to its own inspiration. It was the promise of Jesus to his disciples to send the Holy Spirit, in his name, who should teach them all things, and bring all things to their remembrance, whatsoever he had said unto them. "Howbeit," he says again, "when he the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth; for he shall not speak of himself, but whatsoever he shall hear that shall he speak, and he shall show you things to come." And this Spirit the apostles claim to have received. Paul tells us, in the name of his brethren, that they have received the Spirit of God, that they might know the things which are freely given them of God, "which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual." Of himself he affirms that he has "the mind of Christ;" that the things which he writes are "the commandments of the Lord;" that the Gospel which he preaches he received "by revelation of Jesus Christ;" whosoever despised the teachings of either himself or his brethren, despised "not man but God, who has given them the Holy Ghost."

And the apostles also claim for their writings the infallibility of inspiration. They never so much as intimate that they may be mistaken, nor charge each other with error in writing, although Paul once had occasion to condemn Peter's words. Luke wrote his Gospel, as he says, in order that Theophilus might know the *certainty* of the things wherein he had been instructed. John says that he has written his Gospel in order that his readers might "believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing they might have life through his name." And Paul admonishes the

Thessalonians to stand fast, and hold the traditions which they had been taught “whether by word or *by his Epistle.*” And so we might go on to weariness.

But it is asked, How did these men—how could they—know that they were inspired? To this question we can answer only that to us, who have never experienced it, it may seem to be accompanied with difficulties and uncertainties; but it must be taken much as the idea of colors is received by one born blind, or as the existence of ice is received by the inhabitants of the tropics. He who was born blind never saw colors, and can form no correct conception of them, yet he does not doubt that others can see and distinguish them. Or we may say with Bishop Blackall, that to deny the certainty of their [the writers of Scripture] inspiration is to deny the possibility of revelation. “For if an apostle could not be sure of his own inspiration, or of a revelation made to himself, how could *any man* nowadays be sure of the same, if God should vouchsafe to speak to us now, as ’t is said he did in former times to the prophets and other inspired men by himself or an angel?” We remember that the question has been asked, “How do we know that we really see what comes to the mind by way of the eyes?” “Is it not merely ideal, subjective?” “Is not all knowledge merely the result of mental processes?” To deny the knowledge of their inspiration to the Scripture writers is to deny its usefulness altogether.

But suppose the fact of inspiration settled as it pertains to all except the historical portions of Scripture. Then it is objected, first, That there is no need of inspiration in the recording of historical facts and events which generally passed under the eye of the writer; and God does nothing that is unnecessary. To this view we reply that the writings which contain the histories referred to were not generally composed until some time after the events recorded, and the aid of the Spirit was therefore necessary not only to bring the events to remembrance—the language used as well as the deeds performed—but in order that just such facts

might be recorded as would unfold and display the great purpose and end now so clearly seen to underlie all the history written in these books. It is at just this point that Strauss makes one of his strongest points, as he supposes, against any inspiration; for he has well said, "It is contrary to all the laws belonging to the human faculty of memory that long discussions, such as those of Jesus given in the fourth Gospel could have been faithfully 'recollected and reproduced.'" So, also, we may say with regard to the historical portions of either the Old or New Testament; for we remember that these writers were dependent upon their own memories, having none of the advantages of modern historians, and their works are to be admired perhaps more for what they do not say than for what they do say. It can not be presumed for a moment that all facts and all words of interlocutors are recorded. These books are not mere chronicles, but most consummate histories. They never neglect the sublime philosophy which underlies them. They never wander into mere detail, or incidental fact. In this respect they are in world-wide contrast with all the uninspired writings of their age. The more we examine the character of these historical writings, and the more we reflect upon their design, the more thoroughly are we convinced that they were penned under the inspiration of God.

Another objection urged against the inspiration of the historical portions of the Scriptures is founded upon supposed errors and discrepancies, and this objection is worthy of as much respect as is the preceding. But these two, taken together, are mutually destructive, and we have only to place them side by side and leave them to annihilate each other. For if the historical writer needed no inspiration, it must be because his work is perfect without it; but if his work is perfect, then there can be in it no error or discrepancy. The truth is, that the errors and discrepancies once supposed to exist have gradually and surely yielded before the investigations of science, whether critical or natural, until but very few remain, and

these are rapidly disappearing under the treatment of such men as Rawlinson, Wilson, Warren, and the late George Smith. The greatest difficulty with these objectors seems to be the harmonizing of the Bible histories with those of profane writers; but none of these differ more than do the profane writers among themselves. On what principle can it be accounted for that while the younger Pliny describes very particularly the eruption of Vesuvius and the death of his uncle, he says nothing of the burial of two large cities which went down together into the grave? The truth is, that nothing can ever be established simply by the silence of historians.

Suppose, now, the general question settled: The Scriptures are the inspired Word of God. But some one refers to certain passages in which the apostles declare that they speak *as men*, etc. For example, in 1 Cor. vii, 10, the apostle says: "And unto the married I command, yet not I but the Lord," and then immediately follows it by saying in the twelfth verse, "But to the rest speak I, not the Lord." Now, if this objection is worth any thing, it can apply only to those particular passages in which the writer declares that he speaks in his own name, and then the inspiration of all the rest is emphasized. But the objection is not worth any thing, because the apostle is here referring, not to the fact of his inspiration, not to a revelation making at the time of his writing, or, indeed, at any other time, but to language used by Jesus himself, as recorded in Mark x, 11, 12, concerning the putting away of husband or wife. And to this view so great a rationalist as De Wette gives his sanction. In the twenty-fifth verse of the same chapter the apostle says: "Now, concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, yet I give my judgment." And, in harmony with this declaration, no command of Jesus bearing upon **this** subject can be found in the Gospels. He had said nothing about it. But now it was the will of God that something be said on this point, through the pen of Paul. Not to dwell longer upon this objection, which has been fully

answered in what has gone before, we assume it to be admitted that *the sacred Scriptures are a divinely inspired revelation to man.*

But now the question arises, Are these Scriptures *altogether inspired*? Or, did the Holy Spirit simply put the thoughts into the minds of the writers, and then leave them to express those thoughts in their own language, simply seeing to it that they committed no important error? We observe among the different writers a great variety in mode of expression. Isaiah and Moses, Jeremiah and David, Ezekiel, Daniel, Matthew, Luke, John, Paul have each his own peculiarities. We notice that many of the quotations of Jesus and the apostles are made from the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, while others are made from the Hebrew, and still others conform to neither the one nor the other. There are also said to be many variations in the readings, especially in the New Testament. There are errors as respects matters of science; for example, the sun is represented as moving, rising, setting, standing still, etc., instead of these motions being attributed to the earth. There are apparent contradictions as to facts, and discrepancies in statements which look very much like slips of the pen, or a want of knowledge on the part of the writer. Besides, we have access to no original copy, and if we had, the people in general have to read by means of a man-made translation. Now, in view of all these facts, is it not enough to suppose that God revealed his will to the minds of the writers, and while helping them to write the more difficult portions, such as involve a new revelation, left the rest to their own skill, simply preserving them from error? Let us look at this theory. The individuality of the writers is preserved; each has his own style. But we are told that many times they were writing, as Baalam, Saul, and Caiaphas prophesied, without knowing what they were saying. Peter says, "Of which salvation the prophets have inquired and searched diligently, who prophesied of the grace that should come unto you; searching what or what

manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ and the glory which should follow." Now, unless the Spirit of God is able to adapt himself to the mental and moral characteristics of the individual writer, and thus enable him to retain his own style and peculiarities, we shall find at least all such passages bearing a peculiar stamp. But the fact is, that there is no difference in this respect whether the writer is narrating facts of the simplest nature or the loftiest and most far-reaching prophecies. It is the same Daniel who tells of the trial and triumph of the three worthies, and of the vision of the ram and he-goat; it is the same Ezekiel who tells us of the restoration of the temple and its worship, of the valley of the bones, and of the cherubic figure which appeared to him at the river of Chebar. He is no more himself when he is talking of the scenery of Moriah than when he is weaving in the peculiar imagery furnished by the sculptures of Assyria. It is the same Isaiah who tells of the sickness and recovery of King Hezekiah and of the vision of the Lord upon the throne "in the year that King Uzziah died."

Jesus and the apostles did make their quotations sometimes from the Septuagint, and sometimes without regard to the language of either that or the Hebrew. But we must remember that the Septuagint was the version in common use, and when it suited the purpose as well, it was better to use the form best understood, just as the minister of Christ to-day quotes the common version rather than the Hebrew or Greek. At other times, when the Lord or his apostles wished to show in what sense they used a passage, they were accustomed to paraphrase it to suit the case in hand, much as we frequently do now. But a paraphrase by Jesus or an apostle is an exposition of the original.

There are variations in the readings; but by the good providence of God these variations are so slight as not to affect in the least degree a single doctrine of the Bible; and the best manuscripts are remarkably free from even

these. Besides, it is not the modern manuscripts of which we are now speaking, but the original writing. If God originally gave his truth in an inspired form, it becomes the fault of men, if errors afterwards creep into the text. And yet, after all that can be said, the variations of the best manuscripts amount to almost nothing at all.

The inspired writers did not correct the erroneous ideas of their age as to matters of science. It was not their business. But they spoke very much as men do nowadays in the ordinary intercourse of life. Even men of science speak of the sun's rising and setting, and whole systems of astronomy are constructed so as to impute all motions to the heavenly bodies, instead of to the earth, not because of erroneous views, but, as the authors say, "for convenience." The closest inspection, however, does not discover any statement contradictory of any fact of true science, whether physiological, zoological, astronomical, or geological. And when we reflect upon this fact, it becomes the strongest argument against the theory in whose support the objection is raised.

It is true that we have access to no original manuscripts. But it is a most significant fact that great pains is taken to discriminate between those in our possession, some being regarded as much more reliable than others; and why, but because we desire to obtain the real "mind of the Spirit"—the thought—and can not be satisfied unless we have the very *words* used by the Spirit to express the idea. We find the most acute scholars of the age spending years and writing volumes to develop the laws pertaining to the use of a single word; and why, but because the word is so important to the expression of the thought? It is held that there are no absolute synonyms among words. We must have the *identical word* originally used in order to the identical thought. It is not enough, therefore, that the Spirit inject a thought into the mind and disregard the words in which that thought is to be expressed. The thoughts of God are great and precious, but we can never know them

except by the words—signs of ideas—in which he may see fit to express them.

It is true that the people in general have to receive the Word of God by the aid of translations, and that all these translations are more or less imperfect. But it is equally true that no paraphrase, though made by the very best scholar or theologian, was ever equal, or ever can be equal, to a literal translation; and why, but that the nearer we get to the fountain-head—the original expression—the better? because the very word is so important to the expression of the thought. And therefore no expositor can be successful unless he is able to examine the passage before him in the original tongue—the words chosen by the Holy Spirit. It is also true that translators are always striving to find purer manuscripts; and for what, but that they may get at the original language—the *original words*, so important to the expression of the thought of God. The contrast between the apocryphal and the inspired Scriptures is not so much in the thought as in the very power of the words and phrases used to express that thought. Besides all this, we are to remember that the most important doctrines are frequently drawn from the use of a single word. Jesus again and again put his enemies to silence by the quotation of single words. For example, David had written in the lxxxii Psalm, “I have said ye are gods;” and Jesus quotes the passage to the utter confusion of his adversaries. So the phrase, “Son of man” is used only by the Savior himself, save in one or two passages, when it is used in a peculiar connection, and for a special purpose, showing an evident design. Again, in Gal. iii, 16, the apostle, arguing the individuality of the promise made to Abraham, dwells upon the use of the singular instead of the plural: “To Abraham and his seed were the promises made. He saith not, And to seeds, as of many; but as of one, And to thy seed, which is Christ.” And still further, we never find the slightest intimation, by Jesus or his apostles, that a single word ever written was wrongly used. And this is the more remark-

able when we remember how often they are reported as having erred in their conception of the nature of the Gospel, and with regard to the person and work of the Master—how one disciple took occasion to rebuke and correct another.

But it is admitted by the theory which we oppose that the writers of the sacred Scriptures were preserved from error. If so they are the very best witnesses on this point, and one of them says: "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God"—not the thoughts, not the ideas, not the revelation, but *the writings*. And what is the writing but an arrangement of words, and those best adapted to express the idea of the author? The apostle does not say all the doctrines, nor all the thoughts, nor all the writers, but "all Scripture [*πᾶσα γραφή*]" is given by inspiration of God"—is *God breathed*. And now to sum all up in one word: It is held by the advocates of the theory referred to that the inspiration of the thought is sufficient, and that by this the writers have been preserved from error, so that we have the very mind of God, the wisdom of God, the will of God complete. Yet they ground their objection to what is called the "verbal" theory upon supposed inaccuracies or errors. If the thought is sufficient there can be no errors in the language which expresses that thought; and if there are no errors in the language, then there are no inaccuracies, the words must be given under divine direction, and are therefore inspired.

For ourselves, then, we are satisfied with nothing less than the conviction that the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments were given by inspiration of God, and that the idea and fact of inspiration extends to the very language employed to convey God's revelation and will, and that the language employed by the writer was that which the inspiring Spirit saw to be best adapted for the purpose, so that one jot or one tittle of the Word can not be removed or altered, without rendering it thus far imperfect.

ARTICLE VI.

LAW AND DIVINE INTERVENTION.

BY N. S. BURTON, D. D.

DR. DRAPER at the opening of the ninth chapter of his "Conflict between Religion and Science" makes this statement: "Two interpretations may be given of the mode of government of the world. It may be by incessant divine interventions or by the operation of unvarying laws." He assumes evidently that the two methods can not be combined—that a "divine intervention" must conflict with "unvarying law." This assumption rests upon certain conceptions of "unvarying laws" and of "divine interventions."

What do such scientists as Dr. Draper mean by "unvarying laws?" In the statement quoted above it is implied that a law is something that operates. But operation implies force of some kind. Is a law, then, a force? Over and over again attention has been called to the fallacy involved in the use of the word *law* by scientists. I quote a single example. Dr. Leifchild, in his work, "The Higher Ministry of Nature," quotes Darwin as disclaiming the deification of his law of natural selection in these words:

"It has been said that I speak of natural selection as an active power or deity. Every one knows what is meant and implied by such metaphorical expressions, and they are almost necessary for brevity. So, again, it is difficult to avoid personifying the word nature, but I mean by nature only the aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us."

"So far," replies Dr. Leifchild, "this is clear enough, and we learn that natural selection is merely a metaphorical expression; but we are not told for what. Yet the principal agent in an enormous series of long-continued operations must surely be something more than a metaphorical expression. Some power is said to operate universally and

uninterruptedly. That power has wrought through countless ages, and has changed the face of the world. What, then, is it? What underlies the metaphorical expression? Wonderful attributes are given to this metaphorical expression. . . . It exercises a prescient and elective will; it chooses and rejects," etc. Darwin's own words are, "Natural Selection is a power incessantly ready for action, and is as immeasurably superior to man's feeble efforts as the works of nature are to those of art." And what are we to understand by "the aggregate action and product of many natural laws," if we are to take Darwin's definition of law as the "sequence of events as ascertained by us?" Can a "sequence of events" *act*? Is a "sequence of events" a force which has *products*?

What does Dr. Draper mean by the "*operation* of unvarying laws?" If law is but a sequence (or order) of events as ascertained by us, is there any intelligible sense in which an order of events can operate and govern the world? What can scientists mean by "creation by law?" If their meaning be "the sequence of events in creation as ascertained by us"—the method of the Creator in creation—that is intelligible, and the only question is, What was the order of sequence in creation? But if, as it seems, they mean creation by law to be contradistinguished from creation by an intelligent personal Creator, then the "metaphorical expression" is deified and substituted for a divine Creator.

It is not this metaphorical use of the word law, for the sake of brevity, to which objection is made, but to the substitution, unconsciously or stealthily, of the literal for the metaphorical sense. As Dr. Leifchild says, "When any symbolical expression is used to support a theory, and to form an important theological or antitheological or philosophical distinction, inadequacy can not be pleaded; and the evil effect of proposing a broad distinction between creation by law and other creation, is an illustration in point."

It may savor of presumption to attempt a definition of

law which shall apply to all that we are accustomed to call by that name, physical, civil, and moral, but it ought not to be difficult to form a distinct notion of what we mean by law. An illustration may be better than a definition. When a lady buys a sewing-machine she receives from the agent of whom she buys a little book of printed rules or directions. This set of rules is a more or less perfect statement of the *law* of the machine put into didactic form. It has no authority or value except in so far as it is a true statement of facts respecting the machine. Learning this law, she learns to operate her machine successfully. This law is not something arbitrarily imposed on the machine or the purchaser by the maker. It is not enacted, but learned as the structure and working of the machine are carefully studied. The sewing woman is in no danger of supposing that the rules in her little book are going to operate her machine. She understands perfectly well that it requires force to operate it, and that force implies the exercise of will power. But she will learn in due time that force needs to be used according to the rules in her book; that is, according to unvarying law.

If now, some Dr. Draper shall say to her: "Two interpretations may be given of the mode of using a sewing-machine; it may be by incessant human interventions, or by the operation of unvarying law:" may she not reply that both are necessary? that there will be no sewing done without human intervention with both feet and hands; and such intervention must be according to the unvarying law of the machine? Human intervention might be in violation of law, in which case bad work or none at all would be done, and perhaps the machine ruined; but human intervention in harmony with law produces good work. Law alone can not operate even a sewing-machine. Is it proper to say that it can create and govern a world?

Accepting Darwin's statement that a "law is the sequence of events as ascertained by us," we inquire what determines that sequence. If the answer be that it is the nature and

relations of things, as, for example, that the nature of powder and fire and their relations determine the sequence of events which we call explosion,—then the further question arises: who constituted this nature and relation? Theists reply, the Divine Creator. But if the doctrine of “creation by law” be true, then “a sequence of events” created the cause which produced itself. To such absurdities are we brought by playing fast and loose with the word law.

Let us next inquire what such men as Dr. Draper would have us understand by “divine intervention.” Is it intervention when the lady seats herself at her machine and, putting the cloth under the needle, applies her foot to the treadle and sets the needle in motion, and, guiding the cloth with her eye and hands, sews a seam? Here is surely no interruption or violation of unvarying law. The machine operates strictly according to law, and yet the product depends upon the voluntary action of the operator. Does any one suspect that there is conflict here between such intervention and unvarying law? But if man can construct a machine which allows human intervention without violating or suspending the law of the machine, can not a Divine Creator construct a world in which divine intervention may harmonize with unvarying law?

Theists claim no divine interventions in the government of the world, physically or morally, which interrupt or interfere with law. All divine interventions which they plead for are such as the engineer makes in running his engine—interventions in harmony with law.

The two interpretations of the mode of government of the world are really that it is by an intelligent Being, or by non-intelligent force. If the world is governed by non-intelligent force, whether it obey unvarying laws or not, there will be no interventions, since there is no Being to intervene. If, on the other hand, it is governed by an intelligent Being, it may obey unvarying law none the less for being directly under his controlling and guiding hand. What we call interventions may be found to be as strictly

according to unvarying law as events which we call by other names.

The notion of law suggested already is, that law exists in the nature and relations of things as constituted by the Creator, and that man learns law as he learns the nature and relations of things. A few of these laws men have learned. Many more may yet be learned, and perhaps many more are forever beyond the reach of his finite faculties and knowable only to him who made all things. The builder of a great organ may be supposed to understand it better than any one else. He may instruct another so that, by practice, he can evoke sublime music from it. But there may be power in the organ which the builder chooses not to reveal to another. On some suitable occasion he may seat himself at the organ and cause it to pour forth miracles of delicious sweetness which no other hand can ever draw forth. Is such intervention a violation or suspension of the law of the organ? Rather is it in strictest harmony with its law, and possible only for one who thoroughly understands that law. As well might the tyro in mathematics charge the astronomer with violation of law because in measuring the distances of the stars he does not work by the "rule of three" in arithmetic, as the savant deny the possibility of events which his philosophy is inadequate to explain. The differential calculus is not inconsistent with the multiplication table, albeit it may be in a higher plane.

When we apply the name *law* to a "sequence of events ascertained by us" it is not our ascertaining it that *constitutes* it law. It was law before we discovered it. So if there are sequences of events which we have not yet ascertained, they are as really laws as those we have discovered. And if there are sequences of events which we shall never ascertain, but known to minds of a higher order or in other spheres, they are none the less laws because our finite faculties can not grasp them. And if we witness an event whose order of sequence we can not trace, while intuition

compels us to attribute it to an adequate cause, we have no warrant to call it a deviation from law because we can not place it under some law already known to us.

For many centuries men made wine by cultivating the vine and crushing the fruit. The law of wine-making was unvarying. The conditions all complied with—the law perfectly obeyed—the result was sure. But this law was positive, not negative. It said: By this process you may surely have wine. It did not say: By no other means may you have wine. If He who created the vine and by means of the sun's rays filled the purple clusters with wine knows a more rapid process for producing wine, and when there is a fit occasion produces wine without planting the vine or crushing the grape, there is no violation of the old law, but the disclosure of a new one. And if the Creator choose to reserve to himself the knowledge of this new process, is it less an unvarying law because we can not trace the sequence of the events? Can God have no law hidden from us?

The Christian scientist readily admits the immutability of law, and only insists that law is not self-administering, but is an unvarying order of sequence established and maintained by a being of infinite intelligence and goodness. He believes it reasonable to suppose also that such a Being should have methods of working which are beyond our finite ability to trace or comprehend. The results are seen, not the methods.

Those events, whose sequence he can not trace, he is content to call divine interventions, inasmuch as he attributes them, as he does those events whose sequence he is able to discover, to divine agency, but he does not regard them as arbitrary interferences. God does not interfere with himself.

Admitting that law is unvarying the theist may yet claim that unvarying law does not exclude divine interventions in the government of the world; for it is only claiming that there are laws not known or even knowable to men—laws

whose sphere is in a plane above that in which man is a worker with God.

Our belief in the immutability of law rests on such arguments as the following:

First, all experience points to it. We plant an acorn and an oak grows from it. We repeat the operation with a thousand acorns with the same result. We make inquiry and find that human experience is uniform. Acorns produce nothing but oaks; oaks grow from nothing but acorns. Hence, we conclude that the law is unvarying. But this is by no means all. Believing God to be infinitely wise, we believe that his methods—laws—are the wisest possible. His infinite wisdom is a law to himself, making it certain that whatever he does he will do in the best way. If the way he has chosen is the wisest he will not change it for another less wise. Moreover God's methods—laws—are adopted with special reference to his creatures wherever they are to be workers with him, as a parent would with his children. If man is to sow in hope he must have assurance that he shall reap what he sows. This God gives him through unvarying laws. Law having its source in God's nature—a nature infinitely wise and good—and being the manifestation of that nature, does not limit and restrain him, and being by infinite wisdom and goodness adapted to creatures of finite powers and capacities, does not limit and restrain them, but affords them opportunity to be workers with God in securing all possible good to themselves.

Within the narrow range of our finite vision, in which man is a worker with God, all our observation goes to prove that his laws are unvarying; and our very conception of him as without variableness or shadow of turning constrains us to believe that in the boundless sphere beyond the limit of our vision, where he works alone, his method is, like himself, unvarying.

But it does not follow that his methods in the limited sphere known to us are the same as those which he employs where he worketh alone. The teacher of mutes will

not use sign language in addressing an audience who have ears to hear. Divine wisdom will adapt means to ends.

We find ourselves, then, under a system of unvarying law. We rely with confidence on the stability of this system, and we expect with fearful certainty the penalty of transgression. The uniformity in nature raises the expectation of equal uniformity in God's moral government, and conscience adds its voice in strong and distinct confirmation of this expectation. The law is the same in the physical and in the spiritual realms, and expressed in the same words: "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." It is not the law of non-intelligent force, for "*God* giveth to every seed its own body as it hath pleased him."

The question of the compatibility of unvarying law with divine interventions is an intensely practical one, because man is a transgressor of law. His only hope of deliverance from that sequence of events which the Scriptures call "the law of sin and death" must be in divine intervention. If unvarying law allows no interventions then a transgressor is without hope.

Christianity claims that there have been divine interventions. Whatever may be said of special providences and answers to prayer, miracles, if miracles are realities, are entitled to be called divine interventions. It is proposed now briefly to consider the relation of miracles to the forgiveness of sins, and that of these two forms of divine intervention to unvarying law.

First, there are some facts plainly within the realm of law as defined by Darwin, that awaken at least a slight presumption in favor of divine intervention. There can be no conflict of laws which lie in different planes. No law is violated when a stronger force overcomes a weaker. We call the force that causes the fall of an apple from the tree, gravitation. We call the force that lifts the sap from the root of a tree to the topmost branch, vegetable life. We do not say that the law of gravity is violated or suspended when the sap rises. There are laws and laws, and matter obeys

the stronger force. Man transgresses the physical laws of health. He resorts to remedies and escapes death. He swallows poison, but if an antidote be taken in season the poison spends its power on the antidote and the death penalty is averted. He breaks a limb, and the vital energies of nature set to work to restore it to soundness. These facts are but straws, but whether they are moving in an eddy or in the great current it may not be easy to determine. Certain it is, that all violations of the laws of health subtract something from the stock of vitality, and the death penalty comes sooner or later. It can not be proved that, within the range of those laws which govern human activity, there is any provision made for averting the penalty for the transgression of physical law. Reason and conscience seem to affirm that in the higher realm of God's moral government law must be no less unvarying, and every transgression and disobedience must receive its just recompense. The law which has its source in the justice of the divine nature must be an unvarying law.

If now a Gospel of forgiveness of sins be proclaimed, what credentials can it offer that our reason can recognize as sufficient? If a transgressor of law can be delivered from the penalty of the law it must be by "divine intervention." Within the range of human action—the causes which men can put in operation—neither miracle nor deliverance from the penalty of moral law is possible. Are there methods out of this human range—known only to God—by which that which is impossible with men is possible with God? If there are methods not discoverable by man, and means forever above his reach by which wine may be made without the slow process of grape-growing, by which bread can be provided without sowing or reaping, by which sickness may be cured without the use of remedies known to science, and even the dead can be restored to life, then may we not hope that there is a method—not in conflict with justice—by which a sinner may be delivered from the death which is the wages of sin? It will not satisfy us to be told that

the few laws known by us so imperfectly, reveal God to us very inadequately—his power or his wisdom or his goodness—and that beyond all that nature can teach us of God there are infinite depths which we can not fathom, and that in these unfathomed depths there may be found wisdom and goodness adequate to the great problem of saving a sinner. We want something better than a guess at the possibility. A Gospel of forgiveness must be certified by unmistakable credentials. We feel sure that no created hand can hold back the sword of justice. The only hand that can hold it back is the hand that wields it—the same hand that guides the stars in their courses, and moves all the wheels of nature according to unvarying law. Let him who proclaims a Gospel of forgiveness of sins show us that he can wield forces of nature unknown to man, so that when he says, “Son, thy sins be forgiven thee,” he can say also to the palsied, “Arise and walk.” Here, then, we find the purpose of miracles. They attest him who performs them (or in whose name they are performed) as the author of nature and the author of law; who, when he speaks, speaks with authority. If such a thing as the suspension of law were possible and necessary, then a suspension of physical law might argue the power to suspend moral law. But a miracle does not involve even a suspension of law. It is but the bringing in of a higher force acting according to law. This higher force, indeed, is beyond the reach or scrutiny of men. We can not trace its action and so can not discover its law. Divine intervention needs not—allows not—human co-operation, and so its method—its law—is not laid open to the finite understanding. How the dead are restored to life at the word of command, or how health is restored to the sick at a touch, we understand as little as how the worlds were made. We can only know the fact on the evidence of our senses, or on competent testimony. We may as little understand the grounds on which God pardons a penitent sinner. Whether we think we comprehend God's plan of salvation through the atonement

or not, we can accept it because He who declares it gives us proof of his authority by works which no other man ever did. He who can take a man out from under the penalty of a physical law which he has transgressed, and save his body from death, may challenge our faith when he claims to have power to deliver him from the penalty due to sin.

It may be said that the possession of power to bring into exercise unknown physical forces does not prove the possession of authority to declare the forgiveness of sins, since there is this radical difference between physical and moral laws, that while the latter have no other basis than created matter, the former have their ground and reason in the nature of God himself. The force of this objection lies entirely in the assumption that miracles and the forgiveness of sins are violations or suspensions of law. But if, according to the views now presented, all law is unvarying, and no law is violated or suspended either in miracles or in the forgiveness of sins, the objection has no force. Christ distinctly asserts that he came not to destroy the law, and Paul, in discussing the doctrine of salvation by faith, denies that the law is made void by faith, but affirms that God declares his *righteousness* in the Gospel and is *just* while he *justifies* him that believeth in Jesus. The power of vegetable life, which lifts the sap to the top of the tree without suspending the law of gravitation, is as much a mystery to us as the power that withered the fig-tree. We know it as a fact merely. So, though we know not according to what law Lazarus was restored to life or according to what law a sinner is justified, we can believe the latter on the authority of him who does the former.

Had we lived in the geologic age of upheavals and convulsions, these phenomena would have revealed to us only God's attribute of power. Later, as the purpose of God in these convulsions began to appear, his attribute of wisdom would be manifest to us. Later still, we might get the notion of his justice. But our minds would get no conception

of these elements of the divine nature till they were manifested to us in his works. So, till there was an occasion for God to exercise mercy we could have no knowledge of this attribute in him. As wisdom guides and so modifies the exercise of power, and there is no conflict between them, so may mercy guide and modify the exercise of justice with equal harmony. One of the first declarations God made in Scripture respecting himself is that he is merciful and gracious, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin, though he will by no means clear the guilty. If mercy be an element of the divine nature, it will manifest itself when there is just occasion for its exercise, and infinite wisdom will make its exercise consistent with justice. Those who accept the doctrine of the atonement see in it the law of life in Christ Jesus, which makes us free from the law of sin and death.

What man, conscious of sin, needs more than all things else is, to know that God can forgive sin. A revelation, however attested as from God, which does not assure him of this falls short of his great want. Nature does not do it, even if it does not drive him to despair. He sees that nature's laws, though ordained unto life work, death to the transgressor. Reason and conscience assure him that God's moral laws must be equally inflexible. Law—the sequence of events—so far as he has become acquainted with it, is all against him when once he has transgressed it. If there is a law that can help him reason can not discover it. Now if there is any such law how shall God give the penitent sinner an assurance of it? The answer to this question must come, not from philosophy, but from the source of authority. Jesus gave the answer when he accompanied the declaration of the forgiveness of sins with a miracle of healing.

All law has its source in the bosom of God, and when "ascertained by us" is a revelation of God to us. We know God only so far as he has revealed himself to us. We know him as omnipotent by the exhibitions he has made to us of power. We know him as just by the sequence

of events in his treatment of sin. Whether he is merciful or not we can know only as he shall be pleased to manifest himself as one that forgives sin. Whether, as vegetable life lifts the sap in spite of the unvarying law of gravitation, the divine mercy can lift a sinner out from under the law of sin and death, we can know only as God shall declare it. What miracles are to the sequence of events ascertained by us, that the forgiveness of sin is to moral law; not violation of law, but the revelation of higher laws, having their ground and reason in the divine nature. The natural reveals and attests the spiritual. Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual. The exercise of supernatural power in nature attests the authority of Him who promises pardon to the penitent sinner.

ARTICLE VII.

MIRACLES, AS ATTESTING A DIVINE REVELATION.

BY AUGUSTUS H. STRONG, D. D.

THE Christian religion claims the acceptance and obedience of all men upon the ground that it is a system of truth and duty revealed by God. It professes to give evidence that it is from God. It points to its internal characteristics as proof that it has come from God's wisdom; it points to its external accompaniments as proof that it has come from God's power. By its internal characteristics, we mean a supernatural adaptation to human wants, as attested by those who have really received it. By its external accompaniments, we mean a series of supernatural events attending its original publication, such as only God could work, and such as leave no reasonable doubt that the Author of nature is also the Author of the scheme of doctrine promulgated in his name.

Among the Christian apologists of the last quarter-century there has been a tendency to lay the stress of argument upon the internal evidence. Much has been done to show the supernatural character of the Scripture teaching. The unity of revelation, the superiority of the New Testament system of morality, the conception of Christ's person and character presented there, the witness of Jesus to his own divinity and lordship, have all been adduced as proving its divine origin. But while we gratefully accept the results of these recent studies of the book itself, we must still record our belief that the internal evidence of Christianity is necessarily secondary and supplementary. Of itself and by itself, it is insufficient to substantiate the divine authority of the Christian system.

For in the Christian system we include more than the

New Testament morality; we include all that teaching with regard to the divine nature and methods of dealing, in view of which we speak of Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, Regeneration, Judgment, Immortality. Internal evidence might possibly suffice to secure acceptance of the Christian morality, for reason can recognize its sublime elevation; but the doctrines which chiefly make the Bible what it is—a revelation of supernatural and saving truth—are all beyond the power of reason to discover, or even to demonstrate after they have been made known. “Of what use,” says Lessing, “would be a revelation that revealed nothing?” But if the Scriptures be in any proper sense a revelation, an unveiling of truth which is above and beyond our natural powers, it is necessary that they be accompanied by some external proof that they are from God,—else the very greatness of the truth may only perplex and affront us.

It has been suggested, indeed, that God’s testimony to the truth of a revelation might be given, not externally, but internally, by direct action of his Spirit upon the mind, and that for this reason any external certification by miracles must be regarded as unnecessary. But can we be sure that the method of internal certification is the preferable one? It labors under certain manifest disadvantages. It can not in the nature of the case furnish so clear an evidence of its divine authorship. Being internal, how can it be known that it comes from a God external to the soul? What is needed is absolute certainty on the part of the recipient that the communication is from such a God, and that the truth communicated is not subjective, but independent of the mind’s consciousness of it. But it is essential to inward communications that to the person receiving them they appear at least in the beginning as original discoveries of his own. Only by reflection can it be determined that they come from without, not from within; and in the case of doctrines or commands that stagger the reason, some other assurance than mere logic can give is absolutely needed to convince the recipient that these seeming communications

from God are not the vagaries of his own brain. Thus we very naturally find Gideon begging for an outward sign that he is not self-deceived. Even in the case of the original recipient of a revelation, outward certification seems to confer an important advantage. But what is an advantage to the person to whom the revelation is first communicated is an absolute necessity to the multitude to whom he proclaims his message. If his possession of new ideas of doctrine and duty is not proof even to himself that these ideas are true, much less is it proof to others. Without some external sign that God has sent him, his mere declaration of the fact is utterly untrustworthy. As a communicator of new truth, of which reason is incompetent to judge, he needs and he must have divine credentials before his words can bind the moral action of men. Is it said that God can make the same revelation at the same moment inwardly to the mind of each separate individual of the race? Granting this to be true, as an abstract proposition, is it not manifest that the methods of God's working are actually different from this? Great secular truths are first made the possession of some favored nation, and of some favored individual in that nation, in order that through the individual they may be imparted to the nation and through the nation to mankind. So we may expect religious truths to be directly communicated by God not to all, but to single members of the race, and then indirectly, through their voice and testimony, to the world. There is economy in the use of natural force; shall there not be also economy of the supernatural? Shall we have exertions of supernatural power by the thousand million, in the internal life of all of earth's inhabitants, in order to communicate the divine ideas? And then shall these be supplemented by miracles wrought in the case of each, to convince each that the original communication is from God? Surely in place of a scheme of internal certification which requires for its execution such a multitude of supernatural acts, we may well prefer the plan of external certification which requires but few. If one act

of divine certification will answer the purpose, we may believe that God will not employ a million. But a million are needed if internal evidence alone is admissible, while upon a plan which admits external evidence, we need but a single one. In condescension to human weakness, God may give us more; yet it still remains true that a single miracle, like that of Christ's resurrection, may substantiate the divine authority of all his claims and teachings, and bear upon its Atlantean shoulders the weight of Christianity itself.

Nor is the defense of the Christian miracles an optional matter with those who accept the internal evidences. For the internal and the external are so inextricably interwoven that loss of faith in the one involves loss of faith in the other. However impressive the doctrine of Scripture may be, if it be accompanied by falsehood in matters of fact, it is proved thereby to have not a divine but a human origin. But facts are not merely accompaniments here—they are the center and core of its teaching. Its main doctrines claim to be facts as well as doctrines, and to be doctrines only because they are facts. The incarnation and resurrection of Jesus Christ are valuable for purposes of doctrine only as they are first allowed to be facts of history. But such facts as these are miracles. And therefore Christianity stands or falls with its miracles. As a scheme of faith and a method of salvation it has no claim upon us unless the supernatural facts which constitute its essence, and by which it declares itself attested, were historical realities. If Jesus did not take human flesh in other than the common method of natural generation, if he did not do works beyond all human or natural powers to accomplish, above all, if he did not rise from the dead, he is a proved impostor, his claim to be a teacher commissioned by God is falsified, and Christianity, as a system divinely authoritative and obligatory, exists no longer.

While we however, urge, the primary importance of these external evidences of our religion, we would never sunder them from the internal. There is something of truth

in the maxim of Pascal, that the miracles prove the doctrine and the doctrine proves the miracles. The two go together. Miracles do not stand alone as evidences. Power alone can not prove a divine commission. Purity of life and doctrine must go with the miracles to assure us that a religious teacher has come from God. The miracles and the doctrine mutually supplement each other and form parts of one whole. The absence of either would throw suspicion upon the teacher who failed to produce it. In the case of apparently supernatural works wrought by a teacher of flagrant immorality, any explanation would be preferable to holding that they were wrought by God. We are even willing to grant that over certain minds and certain ages the internal evidence may have greater power than the external. It is probable that men in the present generation are more frequently led from faith in the transforming efficacy of the Christian religion to faith in its outward facts, than through the reverse process. Still we must not be blinded to the fact that the order of chronological apprehension is not necessarily the order of logical connection and dependence. The internal evidences have power to convince only because the external facts are assumed to be worthy of confidence; they lose all independent value so soon as the external facts are found to be without historical foundation. While, therefore, we claim other evidence than that of miracles, we hold that this is logically the prior and the more important. It has been well said that a supernatural fact is the proper proof of a supernatural doctrine, but a supernatural doctrine is not the proper proof of a supernatural fact.

Nor do we, with these explanations, regard the Christian miracles as a burden rather than a support. We may press into our service the illustration given by Mr. Mozley. To the beginner in geometry the first proposition is a burden until he has mastered it; then it becomes the firm basis and foundation of the second. So we hold that the possibility and probability of miracles may be proved to the candid mind,

and that the Christian miracles may be shown to be not incredible, but, on the other hand, to rest upon evidence sufficient to warrant rational conviction of their historical reality. So much having been done, the miracles will take their place as solid substructions of the edifice of doctrine; we shall walk the upper floors with confidence because we know the foundation is secure. We are persuaded that the very prevalent suspicion of the miraculous, which so frequently prevents the acceptance of Christianity and prejudices even the examination of its records, ought to vanish before a reconsideration and restatement of the doctrine of miracles. That miracles have been in the least discredited is doubtless due in some degree to the partial view of the universe which modern physical science has given us. But other science has made progress likewise. The sciences of mind and of morals have right to be heard also. We are persuaded that that one who embraces these as well as the science of matter in his scheme of knowledge, and who regards nature and the supernatural together as constituting the one system of God, ought to find no serious difficulty, either intellectual or practical, in the acceptance of the Christian miracles.

But not to anticipate, let us define at once what we mean by a miracle. We mean an event in nature so extraordinary in itself, and so coinciding with the prophecy or command of a religious teacher or leader, as fully to warrant the conviction on the part of those who witness it, that God has wrought it with the design of certifying that this teacher or leader is commissioned by him. Here are several elements, which, for the sake of distinctness, it may be well to state separately. A miracle, then, is an event in nature. By nature we mean what is not God and what is not made in the image of God—in other words, the physical world. The realm of mind and will, inasmuch as this is free and not embraced in the chain of physical causation, is not a part of nature, but belongs to the supernatural. Regeneration, therefore, as a spiritual work of God, does not occur

in the realm of nature and is not a miracle. A miracle is an event that can be witnessed. There is something in it that is palpable to the senses. In the restoration of sight to the blind, though the method of the wonder is not manifest, the change from blindness to sight is visible. In resurrection of the dead, although the reëntrance of the spirit into its mortal tenement is not matter of observation, the fact that the man was dead, and that now he lives again, is patent to all. But creation is not a miracle, because, among other reasons, there was no eye to witness it.

Again, the miracle is an extraordinary event in nature. It can not be explained as part of a series of regularly recurring sequences. It falls under no law of nature in the sense of being referable to any order of known facts. It is exceptional, unique. If there be any law that regulates its occurrence, it is not a law which otherwise manifests itself in the present system of the physical universe. And yet the apparent want of connection with the present physical order is not so remarkable as the actual connection with another and higher domain, that of intelligence and will. For the mere description of the unique physical event does not complete the account of the miracle; else the falling of a meteoric stone might be a miracle. The miracle is a combination of two things—an extraordinary occurrence in nature, and the coinciding prophecy or command of a religious teacher.

Still further, in the case of the miracle, the extraordinariness of the event and the prediction or command of the messenger are so connected, that our intuition of design leaves us no alternative but to infer that God is the author of the coincidence, and that with the purpose of giving evidence that the messenger has been sent by him. Here we see the difference between miracle and special providence. In the latter the connection of the event with the religious purpose to be served thereby is not so close as to render an opposite explanation impossible. Some warrant is furnished for believing it designed for a particular religious end, but

not what may be called full warrant.* With the miracle it is otherwise. When Christ appeals to his works as evidences that the Father has sent him, and declares that in still further testimony to this fact he will rise from the dead on the third day, the believer in his resurrection must also be a believer in his commission from God, or else hold that God could and did work a miracle in support of falsehood. So inevitable is such a conclusion that we find even Spinoza declaring that he would break his system in pieces and embrace without reluctance the ordinary faith of Christians, if he could once be persuaded of the resurrection of Lazarus from the dead.

It will be observed that in our definition, we take no ground with regard to that much disputed question whether the miracle be a suspension or violation of natural law, nor with regard to that other question as vigorously pressed of late, whether the miracle absolutely dispenses with all physical means and antecedents, and is the result simply of an immediate volition of God. It is our belief that the Christian miracles might be successfully defended, even if both these questions were answered in the affirmative. But, on the other hand, it is our belief also, that Christian apologists have here allowed themselves too frequently to fight their battle upon ground chosen by their enemies. It was Hume who first stigmatized the miracle as a violation or suspension of natural law, and the transgression of the order which God had himself appointed was declared to be the greatest of absurdities and enormities. But Scripture gives no sign that the miracle is thus conceived of by those who wrote it, nor is there the slightest necessity that we should accept Hume's assumption as to the method in which God must work, if he work at all. Again, it is too often taken for granted, that miracle is equivalent to divine fiat, reaching its goal with absolute exclusion of natural means. But Scripture compels us to no such view. On the other hand, it points to the east wind as the means by which the Red Sea was parted at the Exodus, and leaves it not improbable

*See Mozley on Miracles, Bampton Lectures.

that the sinking of a considerable area in Western Asia was the physical cause of the deluge, and a simoon of the desert the physical cause of the destruction of the host of Sennacherib. What was God's method here, what was his method in the working of any particular miracles, we do not know. We would have it distinctly understood that we do not have, and that we do not think it necessary to have, any particular theory as to the method of them. But when the opponents of the Christian miracles first identify our doctrine with their preconceived notions of it, and then triumph because they have, in their own estimation, proved those notions to be absurd, it is time for us to show that other conceptions are at least possible.

Miracles, we claim, may be wrought by God, while yet no physical law is suspended or violated. To sustain this proposition, it is only necessary to refer to facts within the range of our common experience. We know that lower forces and laws in nature are counteracted and transcended by the higher, while yet these lower forces and laws are not suspended or annihilated, but are merged in the higher and made to assist in accomplishing results to which they are altogether unequal when left to themselves. Imagine, for example, that no forces or laws were in operation except the purely mechanical ones, such as gravitation and cohesion. In such a merely mechanical creation, let the reaction of carbonate of lime and sulphuric acid for the first time occur. Here is disintegration and effervescence, such as no merely mechanical law can explain. And why? Because a new force of a higher sort has begun to act, namely, a chemical force. This accomplishes what gravitation and cohesion never could; it counteracts these tendencies to knit together, while it transcends them. But no one will maintain that the laws of gravitation and cohesion are annihilated or suspended or violated in the least degree. They are still active and operative, and influence to a considerable extent the disposition of the material particles under the action of the higher force. And yet, to the merely mechanical creation,

this same reaction of carbonate of lime and sulphuric acid is a chemical miracle.

Again, imagine a world where as yet no forces or laws exist except the mechanical and chemical. In such a world let a seed corn be planted and begin to grow. Here is a new force that abstracts from the soil and bears aloft to every portion of the organism the moisture and the nutriment suited to its need. Mechanical laws, such as gravitation and cohesion may say nay, but they are obliged to yield, and even to help the growing structure and make it strong. Here is a new force that conquers chemistry also and presses it into service, for every leaf performs the wonderful feat which man accomplishes only with long art and imposing mechanism—the feat of decomposing carbonic acid, taking the carbon for food and throwing the oxygen away—yet performs it so quietly that the leaf is not even stirred by the process. To the merely mechanical and chemical creation this vegetable transformation is a vital miracle. The new force does what gravitation and chemistry never could to the end of time. But is any mechanical or chemical law annihilated, suspended or violated? By no means. Both sorts of law are operative all the time. Partly because they are operative, does the plant preserve its balance, maintain its strength, secure its proper sustenance.

These are instances drawn from nature only. But we know equally well that an event in nature may be caused by an agent outside of and above nature. The human will can act upon nature and can produce results which nature left to herself never could accomplish, while yet no law of nature is suspended or violated. To put this in a clear light let me remind you of the German philosopher Fichte's illustration of the unchangeableness of natural sequences. He bids us imagine a pebble swept on to a high place upon the beach, by the strongest wave of a stormy day, and then speculates upon the changes in nature which would have been requisite to land the pebble one foot further upon the sand. The wave must have been of greater volume,

the wind that drove it of greater force. "The preceding state of the atmosphere by which the wind was occasioned and its degree of strength determined must have been different from what it actually was, and the previous changes which gave rise to this particular weather must have been different also. We must suppose a different temperature from that which actually existed and a different constitution of the bodies which influenced that temperature"—not only in distant Africa where the wind took its rise, but in every other country of the globe. In short, the philosopher must suppose a different make-up of the whole system of things from the beginning, in order that a single pebble might lie in a different place. So he argues the impossibility of any modification in the existing condition of material agents, unless through the invariable operation of a series of eternally impressed consequences, following in some necessary chain of orderly connection.

But Mansel suggests the answer to Fichte. The answer is as follows: Let us make one alteration in the circumstances supposed. Let us imagine that after the winds and waves have done their utmost, I go down to the beach, and, lifting the pebble from its place, I deposit it a foot further up upon the strand. Is the student of physical science prepared to enumerate a similar chain of material antecedents which must have been other than they were, before I could have chosen to deposit the pebble on any other spot than that on which it is now lying? In other words, is human thought and will determined in its sequences and conclusions by natural laws? No one except the fatalist will say this. We know, on the contrary, that while nature's laws are rigid, there is a power superior to these laws and exempt from their control, namely, the power of the personal will, and that in the will of man we have an instance of an efficient cause in the highest sense of that term, acting among and along with the physical causes of the material world and producing results which would not have been brought about by any invariable sequence of physical causes left to

their own action. We have evidence, in fine, of an elasticity in the constitution of nature which permits the influence of human power on the phenomena of the world to be exercised or suspended at will, without affecting in the least the stability of the great system of things. If I throw a stone into the air, its fall is determined by natural laws, but can any man say that my throwing it was the mere result of natural laws? Nay, my free will, something above nature, has done it, nor has any law of nature been violated thereby.

An additional illustration will enable us to apply this principle to the subject in hand.* Suppose I stand by the side of a swiftly running stream and hold a heavy piece of iron upon my flat, extended palm in such a way that my hand is submerged and the top of the iron is just visible above the surface of the water. Why does not the iron sink? Because my hand is underneath it. Is the law of gravitation suspended? No; nothing but the axe is suspended. How do I know that gravitation still operates? Because the axe has weight. I hold it steadily in its place only by effort. If gravitation were not acting, the axe would be swept away like a straw by the rapid current. I have counteracted the working of gravitation; I have pressed it into my service and compelled it to do what, left to itself, it never would, namely, keep a piece of iron immovable at the surface of the water; I have transcended the powers of natural law by bringing in a new force, namely, the force of my own personal will. From the point of view of mere physical nature, here is a miracle of will. Yet no law of nature is annihilated, suspended, or violated. And now if man can do as much as this, can not God do the same, and by putting his hand beneath the iron, make the axe to swim at the prophet's word?

But it is urged that the analogy is far from complete, for the reason that man's body at least is a part of nature. and that here is a use of means. The hand is put under-

*See Fisher: "*Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity*;" chapter on miracles.

neath the axe. But God has no hands. We reply that before man puts his hand under the axe, he must move his hand. And in moving his hand, his will comes directly in contact with his own physical organism. We do not know how spirit operates upon matter, but we do know that in the human body this operation is a fact. Every time I lift my arm, I know that I rule matter and compel it to serve me. I do this freely, and no law is violated or suspended therein. With this constant proof before me that spirit can act directly upon matter, I must surely believe that the Spirit that is every-where present can act directly upon matter. And this we can maintain without holding that God is confined to the universe and finds in it his sensorium; that he is in nature does not prove that he is not also above nature. What the human will, considered as a supernatural force, and what the chemical and vital forces of nature itself, are demonstrably able to accomplish, can not be regarded as beyond the power of God, so long as God dwells in and controls the universe. In other words, if a God be possible, then miracles are possible. The same God who created the second causes that exist in nature, can supplement their action when it pleases him. It is no more impossible for him to multiply the five loaves so that they feed five thousand than to multiply the handful of wheat in the earth so that it produces the harvest. He who provides remedial agents for the diseases of the body can dispense with these agents and can heal diseases by his word. He who gives life at the beginning can say, "Lazarus, come forth!" Being more directly in contact with nature than is the human will with its physical organism, he can produce new results in nature. The impossibility of the miracle can be maintained only upon principles either of atheism or of pantheism—either upon the ground that there is no God, or that there is no God except the God that is immanent in nature, a God without consciousness, freedom, or holiness,—a God identical with the universe itself.

A second question was proposed, this, namely: Does

the miracle, so far as it is a merely physical fact, necessarily involve an immediate volition of God at the time of its occurrence? It has been intimated that there are certain of the extraordinary events of Scripture which seem capable of explanation without this hypothesis. The wonders of the Red Sea, of the deluge, of Sennacherib's destruction were such. If these were miracles, the immediate act of God may have been simply the communication to the prophet of such knowledge of the event, that he was enabled to foretell or command in virtue of that communication. Archbishop Trench has proposed to set such instances as these by themselves and call them "providential miracles," thus intimating that the wonder of them consisted not in immediate intervention or change in the order of nature, but in the providential arrangement of the event and of the prophecy so that they coincided with one another, and together gave evidence of the divine commission of the prophet who foretold or commanded them. The outward event may be part of a chain of physical antecedents and consequents, the remarkable and exceptional result of merely natural causes, yet in its connection with the prophet's word it may be a visible token from God. Let us again remind ourselves of the definition of a miracle. A miracle is not simply an extraordinary physical event, but an extraordinary physical event in peculiar connection with the word of a religious teacher or leader. Even if we should grant, therefore, that no divine volition goes to the production of the physical event except what goes to the production of any other event in nature, still we should not deny the direct agency of God in the prophetic announcement with which this event was accompanied. The immediate volition would simply be relegated to the mental and spiritual world and find its sphere of working there. Even if all miracles should be explained in this way, we should not lose the evidence of the divine presence and working in the miracle as a whole. The prophet's knowledge would prove God to be with him, and would completely substantiate his claims.

This theory of the miracle was broached by Babbage, in his celebrated "*Bridgewater Treatise*." Babbage, it will be remembered, was the inventor of the great calculating machine to whose construction Parliament made so large appropriations. In his treatise he illustrates his view of the miracle by the working of his arithmetical engine. It was so constructed that upon setting it in motion the regular series of whole numbers presented themselves at an aperture in the front of the machine,—one, two, three, four, and so on to ten, eleven, twelve, each successive number consisting of the last preceding with the addition of a single unit, till the hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions were reached. After observing this uniform sequence for days and weeks together, the spectator might not unnaturally conclude that succession by regular additions of one was the law of the machine. But lo! after the number ten million is reached, there is a sudden leap. We have not ten million and one, but one hundred million, and thereafter the machine reverts to its former law of succession. Suppose now that the maker declares the provision for this sudden leap to have been made in the original construction of the machine. Suppose him to foretell the change just before its occurrence. Do you esteem his skill greater or less than you would esteem it if he should directly cause the change by touching a secret spring before your eyes? Evidently the proof of skill would be the greater, the more clearly it could be shown that the final result was all provided for in the original making. "So," says Mr. Babbage, "the universe may be a vast machine. It may be constructed in such a way that the general law of it shall be uniform phenomena, but with special provision for isolated events which this general law is insufficient to explain. The regular sequences of nature are the successive appearances of the integral numbers. Miracles are the sudden leap from ten millions to a hundred millions. But both the regular sequences and the sudden leaps were all ordained at the beginning, the only difference between

them being that the former occur according to known law, while the latter reveal a law unknown except to the Contriver of the system."

Now, to such a view of miracles as this, we would not oppose a direct and universal negative. Certain of the Scripture miracles may be harmonized with this view. That miracles are called "wonders," "signs," "works," "powers," "new things," "wrought by the finger of God," does not disprove the theory, for God is said to work all things. "My Father worketh hitherto and I work," said Christ, though here he spoke of his perpetual upholding of nature and government of history. The miracles might be "works of God" *par excellence*, simply because they awaken in men's minds more distinctly the thought of the divine Being who is always present and always active whether men recognize him or not. Miracles on this view would be "unusual, while natural law is habitual, divine action. The natural is itself only a prolonged and so unnoticed supernatural." We could readily grant that that man was a believer in miracles who held this theory, provided he also held to a supernatural communication from God as coincident with it. Perhaps we can not even demonstrate that this conception of the miracle is incorrect. At the same time we prefer the view which holds to immediate divine operation in the realm of nature as well as in the realm of mind, and that because of its greater fitness to accomplish the object aimed at in the miracle.* That object is the giving of a sign. What is needed is the most indubitable proof of the divine intent to attest the commission of the person in connection with whose prediction or command the work is wrought. It is probable that the miracle, if wrought at all, will be so wrought as to secure its own signalness. But upon the view here considered, this signalness does not seem to be perfectly secured. For it would always be possible for the objector to assert that the so-called prophet had by merely human skill penetrated into the secrets of nature and discovered the

* See Smith's "Bible Dictionary:" article "Miracles," by Dr. Edwards A. Park.

law of the machine. There have been navigators who have used their knowledge of an approaching eclipse to convince a savage chief that they possessed superhuman powers and were entitled to divine homage, and threats, backed up by an immediate darkening of the sun, have proved very effectual. In the Middle Ages the telephone could have been used with great success to simulate a voice from heaven. Now, apart from the accompanying purity of life and doctrine which must distinguish the genuine miracle, we should naturally expect that there would also be such a method of bringing about the outward phenomena, that there would be the least chance of ascribing the knowledge of it to mere natural or scientific foresight. As Dr. Newman has said: "It is antecedently improbable that the Almighty should rest the credit of his revelation upon events which but obscurely implied his immediate presence."

Still another illustration of this view is given by Ephraim Peabody,* and the mention of it may enable us to fix attention more clearly upon another defect inherent in this method of explaining the miracle: "A story is told of a clock on one of the high cathedral towers of the older world, so constructed that at the close of a century, it strikes the years as it ordinarily strikes the hours. As the hundred years come to a close, suddenly, in the immense mass of complicated mechanism, a little wheel turns, a pin slides into the appointed place, and in the shadows of the night the bell tolls a requiem over the generations which during a century have lived and labored and been buried around it. One of these generations might live and die, and witness nothing peculiar. The clock would have what we call an established order of its own; but what should we say, when, at the midnight which brought the century to a close, it sounded over the sleeping city, rousing all to listen to the world's age? Would it be a violation of law? No; only a variation of the accustomed order, produced by the intervention of a force always existing, but never appearing

* Quoted in J. Freeman Clarke's "Truths and Errors of Orthodoxy," pages 64, 65.

in this way until the appointed moment had arrived. The tolling of the century would be a variation from the observed order of the clock; but to the artist in constructing it, it would have formed a part of that order. So a miracle is a variation of the order of nature as it has appeared to us; but to the Author of nature it was a part of that predestined order—a part of that order of which he is at all times the immediate author and sustainer; miraculous to us, seen from our human point of view, but no miracle to God; to our circumscribed vision a violation of law, but to God only a part in the great plan and progress of the law of the universe.”

Now, it is evident that here, as in the illustration from the calculating engine, there is a law of recurrence. What happens with the clock at the end of one century will happen at the end of another. What happens at the ten million and first turn of the machine will happen again with the next series of similar turns. In the matter of miracles, however, such recurrence is wholly unproved. No one miracle is like another; they do not occur at regular intervals; both in quality and in quantity they bear all the marks of proceeding from spontaneity and freedom. If, therefore, we are to look to some unknown law of nature as the immediate physical cause and explanation of them, it must be a law which has in each case only one application. The theory would then assert only this, that God has provided in the construction of the universe for isolated and exceptional events along the course of history,—isolated and exceptional events which have for their office the confirmation of the claims of teachers sent by him,—isolated and exceptional events which can not be brought under the law of the general order, nor under any law of special order among themselves. It is evidently a misuse of the term law to speak of it as embracing such events as these, for law respects classes of phenomena, not isolated facts. Or if we strain the term law to embrace them, what does it mean more than simple command, the ordaining of an individual result? And how can this be distinguished from the direct volition of God except in the one respect that his volition in the former case is

executed by the use of means, whereas in the latter he simply speaks and it is done? But those with whom we argue are the last to claim that even the ordinary operations of nature are carried on without God. The world, while it has a separate existence and a measure of independence, is yet upheld by God's mighty will, so that nothing comes to pass in which he is not active as preserver and maintainer. He who imposed upon the universe the law of miracles must himself supervise its execution. Does such a law as this—a law which can not execute itself—differ so essentially from divine volition, to make it worth while to quarrel about the name? And since we have evidence of the divine will in miracles, but no evidence in the vast majority of cases that natural means are employed in the working of them, is it not best to define them from the known rather than from the unknown? We know that they are the result of divine volitions; in most cases we have no knowledge of intermediate agencies used in producing them. It seems most accordant with our knowledge, therefore, to regard the miracle even apart from its coincidence with the word of a religious teacher, as an event in nature which, though not contravening any natural law, the laws of nature even if they were fully known to us, would not be competent to explain.

That miracles are possible, however, does not prove them to be probable. To this question of the probability of miracles, let us now address ourselves. And here we find too frequently among apologetical writers a prior assumption that miracles are as probable as other and ordinary events. The attitude of these same apologists toward so-called modern miracles sufficiently shows that this assumption very imperfectly represents the facts. We are compelled to grant, and we as frankly acknowledge, that so long as we confine our attention to nature, there is a presumption against miracles. The experience of each of us testifies that so far as our observation has gone, the operation of natural law has been uniform. We perceive the advantages of this uniformity. A general uniformity is necessary in order to make possible a rational calculation of the future

and a proper ordering of human life. But while we acknowledge this, we deny that this uniformity is absolute and universal. It is certainly not a truth of reason, that can have no exceptions, like the axiom that the whole is greater than either of its parts. Perhaps the most striking instance of belief in the uniformity of nature is that which leads mankind to expect the rising of to-morrow morning's sun. But no one can examine this belief without being convinced that there is no necessity about it like the necessity that two and two should make four. Attempt to conceive of two and two making five and you violate a first principle of reason. But there is no self-contradiction in the thought that to-morrow should see no sunrise. Experience of the past is not experience of the future. Experience of the past gives no absolute certainty of the future. "Like the stern-lights of a ship," as Coleridge says, "it illuminates only the track over which it has passed." Hence, experience can not warrant belief in absolute and universal uniformity, except upon the absurd hypothesis that experience is identical with absolute and universal knowledge. Nor is it of any avail to point to the principle of induction—as if this bridged the gulf and converted the probable into the necessary—for induction of observed instances warrants only an expectation of the future—it never can prove that future to exist or to be of any definite character. Says Mr. Huxley: "It is very convenient to indicate that all the conditions of belief have been fulfilled in the case of gravitation, by calling the statement that unsupported stones will fall to the ground a law of nature. But when, as commonly happens, we change 'will' into 'must' we introduce an idea of necessity which has no warrant in the observed facts, and has no warranty that I can discover elsewhere. For my part, I utterly repudiate and anathematize the intruder. Fact I know, and law I know, but what is this necessity but an empty shadow of the mind's own throwing?"

Any proper account of the inductive process must regard it as presupposing the uniformity of nature. But this uniformity of nature is not itself an ultimate truth—there

is a greater truth back of that, namely, universal design. From one or more observed instances I can argue to those which have not been observed, only upon the assumption that the universe has been rationally constructed, so that its various parts correspond to one another and to the investigating faculties of man. But this is virtually to say that the principle of final cause underlies the principle of efficient cause, and that this latter must find its limit in the former. In the words of Dr. Porter:* “If efficient causes and physical laws must acknowledge themselves indebted to final causes in order to command our confidence, then they must also confess their subjection to the same and be ready to stand aside and be suspended whenever the principle of final cause shall require. In other words, the order of nature may be broken whenever the principle of final cause shall require; that is, whenever the claims of the so-called reason of things, or of alleged moral and religious interests, may demand an inroad upon its regularity either in special acts of creation or in exertions of miraculous agency.” “The principle of final cause will not only render the service of sustaining our confidence in the stability of the laws of nature under all ordinary circumstances, but will also account for such extraordinary deviations from this order as may be required in the history of man.” The qualifications to be made in the phraseology of Dr. Porter, as to suspension of law, will readily occur to us, after what has previously been said. The substantial truth remains intact that since we can not conduct the process of scientific induction at all without assuming that a principle of design pervades the universe and constitutes it a rational whole, the uniformity which we see about us is a uniformity which has its limitations in the very principle of design and may be expected to give way when there exists a sufficient reason therefor in the mind of him who made it. If induction itself is founded upon design, then design is greater than induction, and may embrace facts for which mere induction can never account.

* “Human Intellect,” pages 602, 603.

Not only is it not true that the uniformity of nature is a truth of reason, which admits of no exceptions, but it is true that science herself reveals the existence of breaks in this uniformity. The limited explorations of European geologists have given rise to the uniformitarian theory of the earth's progress. But the later investigations of Clarence King, Superintendent of the United States Survey of the Forty-ninth Parallel, conducted over an extent of territory such as British scientists have never traversed, have apparently demonstrated that cataclysms occurred in the past history of the planet so vast and so tremendous in their influence upon the various forms of life that only the most plastic of these forms survived. The edict went forth to every living creature: "Change or die!" So the geological leaps were accompanied with biological leaps so great as to be equivalent to new creations. But not only in the changes from one organic form to another do we see evidence adverse to the theory of perpetually uniform sequences in nature. The introductions successively of vegetable life, of animal life, of human life, and finally of the life of Jesus Christ, are utterly inexplicable from their respective antecedents. Science knows absolutely nothing of spontaneous generation, absolutely nothing of the evolution of the organic from the inorganic, or of man's intellectual and moral powers from those of the brute. The new beginnings I have mentioned can not be rationally accounted for except by the coming down upon nature of a power above nature; in other words, by new creations in the absolute sense. When science can produce bacteria from ammonia and water, change any lower creature into a responsible being, construct a Christ out of a man consciously guilty, then, and only then, can she afford to speak slightly of miracles.

The testimony of nature, then, is simply this: Although there is a presumption against miracles, there is nothing in experience or in the primitive ideas of the mind which renders investigation of their claims unnecessary. But there is another world than that of nature. The physical is supple-

mented by the moral and finds in the moral its explanation and end. It is unscientific to conclude that miracles are improbable simply upon the testimony of the physical universe, for the reason that the physical universe is but the half and the lower half of the great system. What is improbable when judged from the point of view of mere physics may be eminently probable when judged from the point of view of morals. If, then, we can show that even the physical universe has relations to the moral and is made to serve it, we do much to compel a transfer of the controversy from the physical to the moral realm. And this we maintain. There is a moral law inlaid in nature. We could conceive a system in which the violation of moral obligation might be accompanied with the highest physical well-being. Pride and even licentiousness might be the path to health. But the present order of the world is different. As the universe is at present constructed, honesty is the best policy. Sin is its own detector and judge and tormentor. In the very frame-work of matter and of mind is inwrought the tendency to punish vice and to reward virtue. The universe does not exist for itself alone—a great dumb show from age to age. The mere circling of world about world, growth and decay, life and death—these are not all. The universe has an end beyond and above itself. It is for moral ends and moral beings. So much is made plain to us by the in-working of the moral law into the constitution and course of nature. And if the universe is made to subserve moral ends, if it exists for the contemplation and use of moral beings, if it is constructed for the purpose of revealing to them God's law and the God who is the source of law, then it is probable that the God of nature will produce effects aside from those of natural law, whenever there are sufficiently important ends to be served thereby. In short, if the moral ends for which the universe exists are not attained by the operation of natural law alone, it is probable that these ends will be attained by methods beyond and above those of natural law. All that is needed to render mira-

cles probable is a "*dignus vindice nodus*," an exigency worthy of the interposition.

Is there such an exigency? We claim that the moral disorder of the world is such an exigency. This moral disorder is not a part of the original creation, nor is it the work of God. If it were, we should not hope for rectification. But it is man's work, and results from the free acts of man's will. To deny that man may mar the Creator's handiwork is to deny consciousness and conscience. These testify to man's freedom and sole responsibility for moral evil; these testify that God is the hater and punisher of it. If now, through no fault of the maker, the watch has been suffered to get out of order so that it no longer fulfills its end of keeping time, shall my fancied sacredness about its mechanism prevent the rectification of that disorder and the touching of the regulator by the maker's hand? In the original design of the watch the winding up and setting of the regulator were provided for. Subsequent repair and readjustment are but the carrying out of the ultimate purpose of the mechanism that it should correctly mark the hours. And when the moral world, through no fault of its Author, has ceased to fulfill its end of representing and reflecting the divine holiness, shall it be thought improbable that God should make bare the arm which the garment of nature had hid, and make known his power by setting at work new principles of holiness and life? When the lower world has become so sundered from the higher as to forget its true meaning and end, is it strange that the higher should touch the lower and that changes in this lower should result? We claim, therefore, that the existence of moral disorder consequent upon the free acts of man's will changes the presumption against miracles into a presumption in their favor, so that, in a true sense, the non-appearance of miracles would be the greatest of miracles.

Our judgment with regard to the probability of miracles will depend in great part upon the extent to which we perceive this moral disorder in the world and in our own

breasts. The degree to which we perceive this will depend in turn upon the conception we cherish with regard to God. As Mr. Mozley has intimated, there are two ruling ideas of God. The one gathers round conscience, the other round a physical center. The one looks upon God as the supreme mundane intelligence, penetrating and pervading the physical universe, and manifested in all the tides of the world's life and civilization. The other regards him as the high and holy one—the God of infinite moral purity, whose voice conscience echoes, and who is the Governor and Judge of all human souls. If we take the former view exclusively, or even predominantly, the regular order of nature's successions will seem a full and sufficient revelation of the Almighty, and then there is no place for miracles—they are an impertinence and a contradiction. But if we take the latter view, then the contrast between the spotless purity of God and the universal sin of the world will unspeakably affect us, the whole course of nature will seem out of joint, the end of the creation unattained, and all things in heaven and earth, man's nature and God's nature as well, will seem to cry out for the world's deliverance and redemption. On this view, miracles have a place and a fit place in the whole scheme of things; they are antecedently probable. And therefore the denial of miracles on the part of those who hold the former view of God ought not to perplex us or to shake our faith. They deny miracles because they have not the whole evidence before them. The moral argument in favor of miracles has no force to them because they have no eye for the facts on which it is based. But their not seeing them does not annihilate them. The moral wants of the world, once apprehended, render miracles probable as the accompaniments and attestations of a divine revelation.

Miracles are probable, but whether they have actually taken place is a question of evidence. What amount of testimony is necessary to prove a miracle? We reply: No more than is requisite to prove the occurrence of any other unusual, but confessedly possible, event. Hume, indeed,

argued that a miracle is so contradictory of all human experience that it is more reasonable to believe any amount of testimony false than to believe a miracle to be true. But the argument is fallacious. It is chargeable with a *petitio principii*. It assumes that a miracle is contrary to all human experience. But by all human experience Hume can mean only our personal experience. We have not seen a miracle. But others say that they have. To make our own experience the measure of all human experience would make the proof of any absolutely new fact impossible. Even the evidence of our own senses would be insufficient to prove a miracle, for what is contrary to our past experience would be incredible. Even if God should work a miracle, he could, on this view, never prove it. What is this general experience of mankind, that is held to render the miracle incredible? It is merely negative experience. When one man testifies that he witnessed the commission of a certain crime, shall it be sufficient in rebuttal to bring a hundred men who were not present, and who declare that they never saw any such thing? Negative testimony can never neutralize that which is positive, except upon principles which would invalidate all testimony whatsoever. And how do we know what general experience is? Why, only from testimony. Yet Hume commits the self-contradiction of seeking to overthrow our faith in human testimony by adducing to the contrary the general experience of men of which we know only through testimony. Moreover, Hume's view requires belief in a greater wonder than those which it would escape. That multitudes of intelligent and honest men should against all their interests unite in deliberate and persistent falsehood under the circumstances narrated in the New Testament record involves a change in the sequences of the mental and spiritual world far more incredible than are the miracles of Christ and his apostles.

What have we now proved, and where does the argument, thus far, leave us? In our judgment, we have proved

that granting the fact of a revelation, miracles are necessary to attest it; that there is nothing in the relation of miracles to natural law to render them impossible; that there is nothing in the relation of miracles to the laws of evidence to render them improbable. They can be subjects of testimony, like other facts. Provided the facts are certified by witnesses who in other matters are recognized as competent and credible, there is no more rational warrant for rejecting miracles than for rejecting accounts of eclipses and of darkenings of the sun.

But because miracles are possible and probable, it does not follow that we must accept as miracle all that comes to us under that name. We are simply bound to consider without prepossession each case of the apparently miraculous that presents itself, and to decide it upon its own merits. Now we do not propose to take up the New Testament miracles singly and in detail. It will be sufficient to point out the proper course to be pursued in further investigation of the subject. That course, we are persuaded, is to take first of all that great central miracle upon which Christianity rests her claims and to which the Church looks back as to the source of her life—I mean the miracle of Christ's resurrection. To that miracle we have as witnesses two of the Evangelists and the Apostle Paul, each of whom personally saw Jesus after he had risen from the dead, and these witnesses represent the faith of a great body of early believers, for whom they speak. "Like banners of a hidden army, or peaks of a distant mountain range, they represent and are sustained by compact and continuous bodies below." The accounts of these witnesses would have been contradicted if contradiction had been possible. That multitudes believed their story and against all their worldly interests became disciples of Christ is proof that they believed it to be true. The existence of the Church, the existence of Christianity itself, with its doctrines and its ordinances is inexplicable except upon the hypothesis that what these witnesses believed, *was* true. The supposition of dream or

delusion, of myth or romance, of apparition or imagination is utterly incompetent to solve the problem how keen-witted and brave-hearted and truth-loving men became converts to a faith they had bitterly opposed and went to imprisonment and martyrdom in its defense. It is irrational to suppose that this mighty fabric of Christian faith and life which has so blessed the world has its foundation either in fraud or in self-deception. But the resurrection of Jesus Christ once granted, carries with it directly or indirectly all the other miracles of the New Testament. That one miracle proves Jesus Christ to be a teacher sent from God; proves his words to be a revelation from God to men; proves his asserted oneness with God and equality with God to be a fact. The coming of such a Being into history is the most wonderful of all events. From this point of view, the miracles of his life assume a new aspect. They are fit manifestations of the incarnate Deity, fit accompaniments of the miracles of his coming and his resurrection. But more than this, the miracles of the New Testament carry with them the miracles of the Old. These are the fitting preludes and preparations for the coming of God into the world which he created,—fitting signs and prophecies to make the world ready for the great event. And so, as a matter of fact, the great epochs of miracles are coincident with the great epochs of revelation. About Moses, the giver of the law, about the prophets, as interpreters of the law, there are congeries of miracles. We find them just where we should expect them, the natural accompaniments and attestations of those new communications from God which at successive periods prepared the way for the coming of his Son. And this shows us why they have ceased. They were candles before the dawn—put out after the sun has risen. Serving to draw attention to new truth, they naturally pass away when the truth has gained currency and foothold. Clustering around the person of the Divine Redeemer and ceasing when his kingdom has been founded, they are to occur again only when he comes the second

time in the clouds of heaven to usher in the final consummation.

Thus we regard the resurrection of Christ as the central proof of Christianity. For this reason it was a main subject of apostolic preaching and a main teaching of the ordinances. It remains to-day just what it then was. We challenge the world to dispute the fact of his resurrection, and the fact being conceded, we challenge the world to show cause why it should not accept Christ and Christianity. This one fact of Christ's resurrection admitted, and the battle is substantially won. With regard to particular instances of miracle in the Old Testament or the New, there may be questions which we can not answer and difficulties which we can not solve. Christianity does not stand or fall with any single one of these, so long as the resurrection of Christ is held to be matter of history. We may not be able to mark the precise time when miracles ceased. There is reason to believe that they ceased with the first century, or at any rate with the passing away of those upon whom the apostles had laid their hands. So long as the Scripture canon was incomplete there was need of miracles. When documentary evidence was at hand, miracles were seen no longer. The fathers of the second century speak of miracles, but they confess that they are of a class widely different from the wonders wrought in the days of the apostles. And so of mediæval and modern miracles. The Scripture recognizes the existence of counterfeit miracles and denominates them "lying wonders." These counterfeit miracles in various ages argue that the belief in miracles is natural to the race and that somewhere there must exist the true. They serve to show that not all supernatural occurrences are of divine origin, and to impress upon us the necessity of careful examination before we give them credence. False miracles may commonly be distinguished from the true, by their accompaniments of immoral conduct or of doctrine contradictory to truth already revealed, as in modern spiritualism; by their internal charac-

teristics of inanity or extravagance, as in the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius, or in the miracles of the Apocryphal New Testament; in the insufficiency of the object which they are designed to further, as in the case of Apollonius of Tyana, or of the miracles said to accompany the publication of the doctrine of the immaculate conception; or, finally, in their lack of substantiating evidence, as in mediæval miracles, which are seldom if ever attested by contemporary and disinterested witnesses.

A simple comparison of other so-called miracles with those of Scripture suffices to show the vast superiority of the latter in sobriety, in benevolence, in purpose, in evidence. Mohammed disclaimed all power to work miracles, and appealed to the Koran in lieu of them, so that its paragraphs are called *aiat*, or sign. But later legends relate that Mohammed caused darkness at noon, whereupon the moon flew to him, and, after going seven times round the Kaaba, bowed to him, then entered his right sleeve, and slipping out at the left, split into two halves, which, after severally retiring to the extreme east and west, were once more united to each other. These were truly "signs from heaven," but they make no impression upon us. The fable of St. Alban, the first martyr of Britain, illustrates to us the nature of mediæval miracles. The saint walks about after his head is cut off, and, that he may not be wholly deprived of that useful portion of his body, he carries it in his hand. Mediæval miracles were part of a complicated system of deceit and evil, constructed to further the secular interests of a domineering Church. Antecedently improbable from their connection with the organization of which they are the representatives, they fail to pass either of the tests which distinguish the true miracle from the false. But in the New Testament all those tests are met. Here is purity of life in the teachers who work them, accompanied by the proclamation of doctrine not only consistent with God's past teachings, but constituting the key-stone of the arch of revelation; here are sobriety and grandeur, benevolence

and wisdom, united in every act; here are objects worthy of divine intervention—the attesting of the divine commission of his Son and the certification that what he teaches is God's authoritative word of life and salvation; here is evidence of the occurrence of these miracles from eye-witnesses of keen discernment and irreproachable integrity, who had no conceivable motive for dishonesty, and who imperiled their lives by the testimony they gave—witnesses who mutually support each other, without the possibility of collusion, and whose testimony perfectly agrees with collateral facts and circumstances, so far as these can be ascertained from the most rigorous investigations into the literature and history of their time. No other religion professes to be attested by miracles at all; no other miracles of any age present evidence of their genuineness comparable to these. Indeed, the result of extended investigation is simply this: The Christian miracles are the only series of miracles that have the slightest claim to rational credence, yet no man can rationally doubt that the Christian miracles were wrought by God.

Here we might leave our theme. We make but one closing remark,—a remark in which we have again been anticipated by Mr. Mozley. The belief in many fancied manifestations of the supernatural has vanished with the advance of civilization. Sir Matthew Hale and his belief in witches are things of the past. But the belief in the Christian miracles has not vanished; it has not decreased; it sways a larger number of minds, and minds of higher quality and culture, to-day than ever before. With civilization the belief in other wonders disappears. With civilization the belief in the Christian miracles steadily and irresistibly advances. It is an instance of survival of the fittest. It is inexplicable except by difference of kind between the faith and the superstition. And the faith whose progress is never retrograde, but whose dominion perpetually widens, unless the laws of mind and of history be changed in the interests of unbelief, must some day inevitably embrace among its adherents the total race of man.

ARTICLE VIII.

WILL THE WORLD EVER END?

BY REV. C. E. SMITH.

The Parousia of Christ: Israel P. Warren, D. D.

FOR nearly eighteen hundred years the millenarian has been permitted to appropriate a large Scripture domain, as if he had an exclusive title thereto. The discretion of charity, as well as humility in asserting precise expositions of things hard to be understood, has imposed a general silence upon those entertaining different views. Meantime he has been exercising his ingenuity in solving the problems of the future, elucidating prophecies couched in ambiguous imagery and determining that day of which no man knoweth, nor the angels, but the Father only. Again and again he has warned us that the end would occur on a certain specified date, and sought his robes in order to be suitably attired for an ascension. Or, if less confident of his ability to fix upon the exact date, he has been sure that the end of the world was so imminent as to make it the duty of God's people to be in an attitude of intensified expectation. He has been not a little tried with his brethren who have found it hard to feel regarding the second advent as good old Simeon expressed himself regarding the first; or as one of anxious heart might feel about the arrival of a railroad train, known to be due in exactly five minutes. He has mourned over the absence of that degree of power in the preaching of the Gospel which he believes would accompany a more decided recognition of the great "doctrine of a rapidly approaching millennium."

The late "prophetic conference," held in New York in the interests of these views, may be regarded as the most significant manifestation of millenarianism. So respectable

was that convention both in numbers and character, so generally were the Protestant denominations represented, and so able were the papers presented, that for the moment Adventism seemed to be taking acceptance as a doctrine of the Universal Church. Conceding, as unsympathetic cavilers declared, that imposing as was the demonstration, it failed to bring forth a single truth with which the Christian world was not already familiar; it certainly revealed the fact that "Adventist views" are by no means confined to the denomination known by that name, but have place, to a greater or lesser extent, within the bounds of every sect.

Substantially coincident with this impressive demonstration is the appearance of a work on the other side of the question, so fresh and original in its views, so powerful in its arguments, as to seem to many to mark a new epoch in the subject of eschatology. We refer to a book entitled "The Parousia of Christ," by Israel P. Warren, D. D. This work, if its exegesis can be maintained, takes the very ground from beneath the feet of the "Adventist." It maintains that the second coming of our Lord has already occurred, that he is now reigning with his saints, and that his kingdom is to go on, with continually increasing glory, forever. In short, it answers the question at the head of this paper in the negative. The world, it declares, is never to end, and the Adventist's occupation, like that of Othello, is gone.

The reader, to whom this announcement comes with the freshness of a surprise, may imagine that the book to which we refer is a new venture in the department of satire, like the "Historic Doubts concerning the Existence of Napoleon Bonaparte," written by Whately, to turn against the deists their destructive methods in dealing with the life of Christ. We assure him it is nothing of the kind. The work is the result of years of earnest and sober investigation, and embodies the conclusions of a life-time of reflection upon the subject of which it treats. It is a careful study of all the passages of the Word of God upon which

Adventism is built, and includes a wide survey of kindred literature. Its author, Dr. Warren, now editor of the *Christian Mirror*, and formerly secretary of the American Tract Society of Boston, is a gentleman high in the estimation of the denomination (Congregationalist) to which he belongs. He is not unaware that in giving his book to the world, he is making a vigorous assault upon traditional interpretations of the Scriptures, and upon long and generally cherished views. Of course, he must fare as do all discoverers until their disclosures are verified and accepted. It is said that another book has just made its appearance in England by the same or a similar title, treating upon the same subject at greater length, and with even more power, but reaching the same conclusion. Should the sober judgment of the Church accept the views of these two authors, who, unknown to each other, and divided by a great ocean, have been treading the same path of thought, prosecuting the same researches, and reaching simultaneously the same goal, it may be said that God in his providence has repeated in the domain of sacred science the remarkable coincidence which occurred in the history of mathematics when Newton and Leibnitz, by processes original to each, simultaneously arrived at the method of the differential calculus.

It is, of course, impossible within the limits of a review article to do much more than to give our readers a scanty outline of our author's work. He commences by showing that the proper meaning of the word "parousia" is not *coming*, but *presence*, a position in which he is sustained by Robinson, Stuart, Alford, and other lexicographers and commentators of authority. This distinction is of great importance to the author's purpose; is, in fact, as his title indicates, the key to the whole book. He thinks that if this meaning had always been consistently adhered to, we should never have heard of such expressions as "second advent" and "second coming." "The Church would have been taught to speak of THE PRESENCE OF THE LORD as that from which its hopes were to be realized." "There would

have been no difficulty in conceiving that that presence began to be near at the time when, in that primitive age, it was expected, and was enjoyed, in fact, before that existing generation passed away, and would continue long enough for every thing to happen under it which prophecy connects with it."

The *nature* of this presence is next considered, and found to consist in *the presence of Christ in this world in the exercise of his mediatorial offices*, which are defined to be those of King, Life-giver, and Judge. It is a *literal* presence, which need not mean a *material* and *visible* one. It is a *personal* presence. Christ being divine, and therefore omnipresent, by his *coming* can be meant only his *manifesting* himself in some one or all of his three offices. It follows from this that while there can be but *one* parousia of Christ, there may be *many* comings.

The *time* of the parousia is next considered, and the testimony, first of Christ, and then of the apostles, is brought forward to show that it must have commenced at a very early date. The Lord's own promise to come *quickly*, to come *during that generation*; Dr. Warren insists, must have been fulfilled. He will not allow that the apostles were mistaken in expecting the early advent of their Master, still less, that *Christ himself* was mistaken in expecting to come early. He will not allow that *after two thousand years* is a reasonable interpretation of such language. He treats with deserved scorn the evasions and subterfuges of commentators in their attempts to explain this language. Among these, Olshausen has avowed the opinion that our Lord *purposely* used language calculated to mislead his hearers. Every careful reader of the Scriptures has felt the difficulty which drives interpreters to such reprehensible shifts. We are free to say that Dr. Warren does much to convince his candid readers by giving them, in his idea of the presence of Christ, an escape from the unpleasant dilemma to which we have been urged by such interpretations.

Our author discusses the objections to his view, but we

lack space to detail his answers. Suffice it to say that the passage which seems most against him, Acts i, 11, and which has been generally thought to teach a *visible* and *bodily* coming of Christ is disposed of skillfully, and, as it seems to us, most fairly and effectually. We pass on to more important parts of the work.

Perhaps the most effective portion of Dr. Warren's treatise is that in which he considers what he calls the "*costume*" of the parousia. In this chapter he shows that the language in which our Lord's second coming is described is the *court language of inauguration*. He denies that it had any other than a symbolic significance. It is the same with the imagery of destruction. A great mistake is made in interpreting this imagery "after the methods of thought which prevail in our day." Passage after passage is quoted from the prophets in which their descriptions of the ruin impending over Babylon or Idumea are full of the same imagery to be found in the prophecies of the parousia. The heavens are to be rolled together as a scroll, and the earth to remove out of its place. It is shown that the apostles could use this language without a thought of its literal signification, as when Peter applied to the day of Pentecost the prophecy of Joel that the sun should be turned into darkness and the moon into blood. Dr. Warren maintains that because "the spiritual is ever greater than the material," the great events of the new dispensation might be justly set forth in such tremendous symbolism. There can be no doubt that we must hereafter make more allowance for Oriental forms of thought in our Bibles than we have hitherto done. It has universal adaptations, but it is a *Jewish* book after all.

And this fact, more carefully weighed than has been our wont, may enable us to accept the estimate which Dr. Warren puts upon the destruction of Jerusalem. He regards that event as the fulfillment of much of the language which describes the second coming of our Lord, and marking the date of the commencement of his presence. It will not be

strange if, to most Christian minds, this is to put more significance than it deserves upon the downfall of the Jewish capital. In our thought Jerusalem is but one of many famous, ancient cities, which came to a tragical end, and its overthrow is now so far in the past as to have sunk nearly into oblivion. But consider what the destruction of Jerusalem was to the *Jew*! If the fall of *pagan* cities was worthy to be described as the end of the world and the falling of the stars from heaven, how much more that of the beloved city which contained the temple and the sacrifices, and whose destruction was that of the Jewish nation, and the end of the Mosaic economy! If from that date is to be reckoned the independent existence of Christianity as a religion, set free from that chrysalis of Judaism which at first inclosed it, why may it not be regarded as practically the beginning of our Lord's parousia?

It was then, also, that, according to his previous announcement to the Jewish Sanhedrim, our Lord manifested himself in *judgment*. And here we strike one of the most remarkable features of Dr. Warren's theory, the feature for which may be anticipated the strongest opposition and the severest criticism. In his view the three functions of the present Savior,—ruling, life-giving, and judging,—though separable in thought, and for greater effect presented in the Scriptures as to occur separately, are in fact exercised immediately and simultaneously. Modern governments have disjoined the judicial from the administrative department, and lodged them in different persons; but the Oriental king was judge also, and it is this kind of sovereignty which best represents that of the Lord Jesus. Instead, therefore, of looking forward to some far-distant day, when he will raise the dead and judge the world, we are to believe that he *is* the Resurrection and the Life wherever death occurs, and that every soul is at once judged and sent to its own place. To establish these (it must be confessed very startling views) the main portion of the work before us is devoted. The author gives us a careful exegesis of all the

passages in the Bible on which the traditional views rest, and calls to his aid the revelations of science, and the speculations of metaphysicians. It is far from likely that his novel interpretations of Scripture will prove universally acceptable; but, on the other hand, it can not be doubted that he will severely shake the confidence of many millenarians and that of not a few who have rested on the more commonly accepted interpretation. For ourselves, we are free to confess that if the Scriptures could be shown to harmonize with the doctrine of an immediate resurrection, we should be glad to accept it. There are many difficulties about the old view of which this would relieve us. It disposes effectually of the notions of soul-sleep, a second probation, an inconceivable, disembodied state, and a return from heaven and hell for a formal judgment of those who were virtually if not formally judged at death. Nor do these views change any essential doctrine of the Church. Dr. Warren declares that he has not sacrificed any great truth, but only modified *the accessories* of time, order, manner, and costume. If this be true, however novel his views may seem, we can afford to examine them calmly and dispassionately. We close with a brief synopsis.

Most of the language of the Bible which is supposed to relate to the end of the world has reference, in fact, to the end of the Jewish dispensation. It was for this that the disciples inquired when they asked, "What shall be the sign of thy coming and of the end of the world?" The word for world is *αἰών*, i. e., *age*. On the other hand, no end is ever asserted or implied of the *κόσμος*, the proper term for this world as a planet, or as the abode of man. As to the remarkable passage in 2 Peter iii, 3-13, supposed to describe the final conflagration, Dr. Warren says: 1. That it should not be interpreted by the revelations of modern science. 2. That it can not mean that the earth and its skies are to be annihilated. 3. That it does not mean that the earth as an abode for man is to be destroyed. The older Scriptures teach that the world is "established forever." The imagery

of destruction is to be interpreted like that used in Isaiah and other prophets which it closely resembles. 4. That it must be understood as referring to the well-known Jewish idea of "*the aion that now is*," or, in other words, the Mosaic dispensation. This "passed away," perished "with a great noise," amid the physical phenomena described by Peter. It was for the time being "reserved unto fire." Both the "aion" that now is and the "end of this world" were to be at the parousia of Christ. They were both, in like manner, *near*, and *objects for watching and expectation*. The dissolving of the elements—*στοιχεα*—if we interpret this word by its meaning in other places, where it is translated "the weak and beggarly elements," "the rudiments of the world," the "first principles," is the superseding of the elementary *truths* of the Jewish religion, by the fuller revelations of Christianity. As to the similar passage in Rev. vi, 12-17, that the end of the world is not intended is evident from the fact that a long series of events in human history is represented as following after it.

Following these our author has some things timely and suggestive to say upon the teachings of reason and science. Through these we can not now follow him. But we remember the passage in which Professor Mitchel so finely describes that magnificent adjustment of the earth's orbit which secures its stability, apparently, for an eternal duration. He shows how the orbit of our planet passes slowly from a more to a less elliptical form, and then back again, always recovering itself when the tendency has reached a limit which is dangerous. As we consider this foundation for an everlasting empire, and recollect that of the dominion of Jesus, over a kingdom arising on the earth, it is promised that there shall be no end, it occurs to us to suggest that the Adventist should be less confident. As he bids us expect a speedy termination of the present economy, we are warranted in interposing as a question that needs to be answered first of all, Will the world ever end? Not fully persuaded by either, we find it safe to abide in the golden mean.

EDITORIAL.

MR. FROUDE AND "THE ENGLISH CHURCH."

THOSE who read Mr. Froude's history of England can not fail to observe the earnestness with which he handles ecclesiastical affairs. The great religious commotions of the times covered by his volumes, and the many political changes produced by them, would demand pre-eminence on any historic pages. Mr. Froude not only gives them the greater space and prominence, but he examines, searches for causes, traces the tendencies of things, analyzes, and reports frankly and fully. The painstaking interest he manifests in religious matters is only what we should expect in one who has done service in the Christian ministry, and is deeply concerned for the purity and usefulness of the Church. If his pages are often darkened by sad, disgusting pictures of corruption pervading all ranks of the English clergy under the Catholic *régime*; of vileness in monasteries, nunneries, and all other "religious houses," from that of a bishop to the humblest hospital,—it is because the evidence adduced drove his pen to the darker inks.

While faithful in depicting the evils of the Church in his own country, especially at the beginning of the reign of Henry VIII, he always seems to speak in the spirit of charity, and to recognize with pleasure those spiritual forces working, in many instances, within her folds as well as without, to produce the much needed reformation.

From the casting off of the papal control to the close of his history we discover only kind words and a ready recognition of the better state of things in the "Church of England," and of the good elements producing and sustaining this change. He does not conceal his knowledge of much in it that is not in accordance with Scripture teachings—that much remained of the old leaven which the best

and most spiritual in her communion have deprecated. A change in name and head, with a partial remodeling of creed and liturgy, did not, in his estimation, effect a thorough "reformation" of the Church.

Because Mr. Froude has had the courage to say this much he has been violently assailed, as was to be expected, by both English Churchmen and Catholics. The bitterest is in a fierce criticism, attacking him personally as well as his writings, by Mr. Freeman, well known as an English writer and critic. After charging him with ignorance of the times preceding the Reformation, inability to translate Latin, and unreliability in use of facts, he says:

"Mr. Froude's treatment of later times displays a characteristic which goes further to disqualify him from treating any subject of mediæval history. This is his fanatical hatred towards the English Church at all times and under all characters. Reformed or unreformed, it is all the same. Be it the Church of Dunstan, of Anselm, or of Arundel, of Parker, or of Laud, or of Tillotson, it is all the same to Mr. Froude."

To which Mr. Froude replies:

"In the very same 'confession,' as he calls it, and of which he has said so much, I explained at length that my motive for selecting as a subject the Tudor period was the injustice which I conceived to have been done by Lord Macaulay and others to the fathers of the Reformed English Church; to Cranmer especially, the chief compiler of the Liturgy, and the author of some of the most beautiful parts of it.

"The very point of the first six volumes of my history was to show what unfair treatment Cranmer, Latimer, Hooper, and their companions in suffering had met from modern writers.

"If I appeared as an apologist at all, it was as the apologist of Cranmer, whose character I conceived to require and deserve peculiarly tender consideration.

"Of the Church of England, so far as it has represented Cranmer's spirit, I have never written an unfavorable word—I have never entertained an unfavorable thought.

"I have regretted that this spirit was not more fully dominant. If it had been so, the worst misfortunes of the seventeenth century would have been avoided; and, in my own opinion (the question here is of my personal sentiments), we should at the present day have been in a happier condition than we are."

The tenor of what Mr. Froude said of the Church of England may be gathered from the twelfth and closing volume of his history. Of the condition of the Church of

England in 1584, nineteen years before Elizabeth's death, he says, pages 20-22:

"The especial nursery of dishonesty remained as before, Elizabeth's peculiar province, the Church. So long as a single turn of the wheel, a violent revolution, or the queen's death, might place a Catholic on the throne, the Established Church held a merely conditional existence. It had no root in the nation, for every earnest man who was not a Puritan was a Catholic; and its officers, for the most part, regarded their tenures an opportunity for enriching themselves, which would probably be short, and should in prudence be made use of while it remained. The worst abuses of the unreformed system were received or continued. . . . 'The bishops,' said Cecil, 'had no credit either for learning, good living, or hospitality. The bishops, who by their teaching and devotion, and relieving of the poor, ought to have won credit among the people, were generally covetous, and were rather despised than revered or beloved.'"

After citing the great scandal concerning the Archbishop of York, and the report, as recorded in Domestic Manuscripts, of the Commissioners sent down from London, and the official statement that the Bishop of Lichfield had made seventy "lewd and unlearned ministers, for money, in one day," and that the entire bench (of bishops) was "noted as avaricious," he adds:

"To the queen these performances were not of vital moment. She required qualities in her bishops which were not compatible with elevation of character. The Protestants believed in God, and in duties which no earthly authority could supersede. The Catholics believed in the Church, in the Church as superior to kings. Elizabeth preferred persons whom she could 'sound from their lowest note to the top of their highest compass,' and she accepted moral defects in consideration of spiritual complacency. Had they remained like the Scotch Tulchans they might have been borne with, but in her hatred of the Puritans she allowed them to indulge in persecution, and to mimic over again in their courts the insolent tyranny of the old prelates; they were encouraged to revive the proceedings which had formed the subject of the first grand complaint of the House of Commons, and 'by practices savoring rather of the Romish Inquisition,' by 'devices rather to seek for offenders than reform them,' they sowed the wind which was reaped afterward in the whirlwind by Charles I and Laud."

A Church with such spiritual guides could not be expected to accomplish much good. It was essentially, of the earth, earthy, and would go in the ways of the world. And as Elizabeth was head of the Church, and ever ready to control and determine its workings, we quote further from volume 12, pages 140-141, where he thus graphically

describes her indifference to the welfare of the Church, and her relations to Protestantism:

“Religion to Elizabeth was a very simple matter. She had a common sense perception of the relations between the world and its Maker. The detailed articles of creeds, sacramental mysteries, and other schemes of salvation, served to vary the vocabulary of her oaths, but were in themselves profoundly dubious to her. She despised the bigotry which insisted on precision of words, only less than the exaggerated scrupulousness which made men willing to die for an opinion. For the fools who require religious formulas, the law provided a ritual respectable by antiquity, and she cared but little for the shades which distinguished Anglicanism from Catholicism, so long as there was no Inquisition to pry into men’s consciences. The fiery indignation against falsehood, the fear of turning the service of God into a lie for personal or political convenience, she did not understand. . . . She prohibited mass in England because it would have led to disturbance. For the same reason, had she been Queen of France, she would have prohibited the Huguenots’ sermons. Circumstances, rather than preference, had placed her originally on the side of the Protestants. Her connection with them was political, and it was only when she needed their assistance that she acknowledged a community of creed. . . . With the creed as distinct from the Papal Supremacy she had no quarrel at all. Mass and breviary, accompanied by national independence, and liberty not of worship but of conscience, would have suited best with her own tastes. She had established the nearest approach to it which her position would allow, and she had no more pleasure than Philip himself in seeing the peace of Europe disturbed, that the priest at the altar might be superseded by a Calvinist in the pulpit.”

Elizabeth, as sovereign, was the head of the Church, and head in deed as well as in name. Needing all the support such an “Establishment” could possibly give her, she moulded, controlled, and used it without regard for its spirituality or honor. A “reformed” Church it was not. It was “Protestant” only in disowning the supremacy of the pope and forbidding mass.

The Church of England at the close of her reign was precisely what she wished it to be, “the nearest approach” to Catholicism “which her position would allow.” Reeking with corruptions inherited from Catholicism, the chief bishops avaricious and worldly, many others ignorant and lewd, all obsequious to the arrogant Elizabeth, the Church repelled the earnest Protestants who would have implanted the true leaven of a pure Christianity. The storm that

swept over Charles I and Laud forcibly uprooted many great evils and left the Church with a cleansed floor; but it was yet an unpurged Establishment, more political than spiritual.

Many devout souls, men of faith and wisdom, and imbued with the Holy Ghost, have prayed and wrought in its pulpits and pews for deliverance from the forms and fascinating worldiness of Romanism, but with only local and temporary success. The old leaven has ever been at work, and during the past thirty years with rapidly increasing power. Not a few of the clergy "repudiate the principles of the Reformation," and pronounce Protestantism a failure. Many formerly of its ministry or prominent among the laity have gone over to the Roman communion, while others are moving thither.

Mr. Froude warns the Church of England that the relapse indicated by this Romeward movement can only result in a repetition, in her history, of what the papal Church has experienced in Austria, Spain, France, and Italy, where "step by step it has been stripped of its wealth, of its power, and even of its control over the education of the people;" and where "culture and intelligence have ceased to interest themselves in a creed which they no longer believe," and "from which they have ceased to expect any good."

"If the clergy are permitted to carry through their Catholic 'revival,' the divorce between intelligence and Christianity will be as complete among ourselves as it is elsewhere; but we have been exempted hitherto by the efforts of those brave men whose perseverance and victory it has been my privilege in these pages to describe; and unless we are unworthy or degenerate it is not too late for us yet to save ourselves." (Vol. 12, pp. 559, 560.)

If the English Church, or the nation, is to be saved, it is evident that Mr. Froude does not hope for such salvation through the preaching he has heard the past thirty years. In an address before the University of St. Andrews, in 1869, he spoke thus of the moral defects of the preaching (in the Established Church) and the increase of dishonesty:

"We have had thirty years of unexampled clerical activity among us; churches have been doubled; theological books, magazines, reviews, news-
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papers, have been poured out by hundreds of thousands; while by the side of it there has sprung up an equally astonishing development of moral dishonesty. From the great houses in the city of London to the village grocer, the commercial life of England has been saturated with fraud. So deep has it gone that a strictly honest tradesman can hardly hold his ground against competition. You can no longer trust that any article that you buy is the thing which it pretends to be. We have false weights, false measures, cheating, and shoddy every-where. Yet the clergy have seen all this grow up in absolute indifference; and the great question which at this moment is agitating the Church of England is the color of the ecclesiastical petticoats.

"Many a hundred sermon have I heard in England—many a dissertation on the mysteries of the faith, on the divine mission of the clergy, on apostolic succession, on bishops, and justification, and the theory of good works, and verbal inspiration, and the efficacy of the sacraments; but never, during these thirty wonderful years, never one that I can recollect on common honesty, or those primitive commandments, Thou shalt not lie, and, Thou shalt not steal.

"The late Bishop Bloomfield used to tell a story of his having been once, late in life, at the University Church at Cambridge, and of having seen a verger there whom he remembered when he was himself an undergraduate. The bishop said he was glad to see him looking so well at such a great age. 'O yes, my lord,' the fellow said, 'I have much to be grateful for. I have heard every sermon which has been preached in this church for fifty years, and, thank God! I am a Christian still.'"

This may seem to be too severe, and to bear strong evidence of that "hatred" of which Mr. Freeman accused him, yet it has no little support in what has been said from time to time by both clergymen and laymen of the Church of England. What Mr. Froude says he has "disliked, and does dislike in the old times or modern, in Becket and in Laud, and in the ritualistic revival of our own time, has been the assumption of a supernatural character and a supernatural authority." He objects to their assumption that a mysterious power is transmitted by the imposition of hands by a succession of bishops, and would have them preach the Gospel and allow the Lord to exercise the power and authority.

"The shadow of the supernatural character which was left by Elizabeth in the Church of England for political purposes was the active cause of the Puritan rebellion, of the deadness which followed on the reaction from that rebellion, of the growth of modern Dissent, of the exclusion from the Establishment of so much that is most earnest and beautiful in the religious mind of this country, and of the spiritual separation between England and Scotland. From the same cause have arisen the decay of evangeli-

calism in the Church of England itself, and the growth to its present dimensions of the Oxford movement of 1833. That movement has called out energy—energy enough, I dare say, but whether energy in a right direction has yet to be seen. To me it appears that when a vessel is growing unseaworthy the right method is to probe the weak places and replace them with sound timber, and that to paint and varnish and gild will not answer.

“I regret the revival of what are called Church principles, because they are based on the assumption of what has no truth in it; and when men take up with falsehood, bad consequences are sure to follow.

“If Mr. Freeman likes to call this fanatical hatred he may choose his own expression.”

Whatever else may be alleged against Mr. Froude as a historian and critic, it must be admitted that he supports his statements concerning the Church with testimony that has not been broken. He speaks of its faults as an anxious friend naturally would. In his endeavors to save it from the great evils to which many of its leaders are hastening it, he will have the sympathy of all Christians who interpret the ecclesiastical tendencies of the present by the light of history, and long for the universal triumphs of Christianity. With all its wealth and talents, and as the Establishment of the strongest government of Europe, the Church of England can but be the object of the sincerest solicitude of all Christendom. Her present position and influence are not encouraging. Disestablished and set free, with a spiritual clergy relying on a divine call and the power of the Holy Spirit rather than the impositions of hands and the support of State, she might lead and give succor and encouragement to God's laborers in all lands.

LITERARY NOTES.

Walks to Emmaus.* *By the late REV. NEHEMIAH ADAMS, D. D. Edited by his son, REV. WILLIAM H. ADAMS. First series. January–February.*

DR. ADAMS was a close student of the Bible. He loved the great doctrines, and studied to acquaint himself with the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God contained in them. He never forsook them for lighter and more novel themes. Whatever the caption of a sermon the body was filled with the solid ore mined by studying the deep things of

* Boston: D. Lothrop & Co.

the Bible. With a mind so abundantly stored, ever fresh and original, clear and broad in his views, apt in quoting Scripture, skilled in logic and rhetoric, intensely interested in his subject, and having a ready command of language, Dr. Adams was justly esteemed by many as one of the very ablest and most entertaining preachers in the country. The volume before us contains some of his best work.

The New Testament Idea of Hell.* By S. M. MERRILL, D. D., *Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church.*

THIS is a volume of nearly three hundred pages, "written for readers of the English Scriptures," and designed to meet "the needs of ordinary inquirers, and seeking to lead them to the knowledge of the meaning and use of the original terms translated Hell in the New Testament." The established meanings of the words, Hades, Tartarus, or Gehenna, are accepted and used. The Scriptures containing them are so classified, and "the terms so applied, as to bring their specific differences into greater prominence and into right relations." This is a chief and valuable feature of the work. It is a timely contribution to plain, practical instruction on religious subjects, such as will aid the masses in forming correct views upon the subject discussed. The author adheres to Bible teachings upon future punishment which present it as a fact, and refuses to engage in speculations on questions growing out of it.

Washington Irving.† By DANIEL J. HILL, *President of Lewisburg University.*

THIS volume is the first of "a series of personal, literary, and anecdotal biographies of American authors who have attained a world-wide celebrity." The biographer "aims to present a truthful picture of each as a man," and "to make the reader feel personally acquainted with the author whose life he is reading." Anecdotes, personal experiences, the opinions of contemporaries, and extracts illustrating views and principles, are introduced and made prominent features of each sketch. This is the style of biography especially pleasing to American readers, and the one most favorable to a truthful portraiture of the man, and serves best in interpreting his writings. To be of substantial benefit to us the biography of an author must needs reveal to us the intellectual and moral aspects of his every-day life. President Hill has succeeded well in this respect. If he has erred it is in dwelling too long on minor events and matters as commonplace in lives of the great as in those of the humble. Some of the "anecdotes" and "personal experiences" could have been omitted without loss to the dead or the living, save as they serve to gratify curiosity.

The excellent criticisms in the one chapter devoted to "the man and writer" awaken regret that one so competent as President Hill should not have favored us with a far more elaborate critique upon writings so unique and inviting as Irving's.

* Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden; New York: Phillips & Hunt.

† New York: Sheldon & Co.

William Cullen Bryant.* By DAVID J. HILL, *President of Lewisburg University.*

THIS is the second in the series mentioned in our notice of the biography of Washington Irving. It is upon the same plan and equally interesting and satisfactory. The references to contemporary writers, the literature of the day, are such as will give the uninformed a comprehensive view of the more prominent products of American literature.

The Great Misnomer.† By TIBERIUS GRACCHUS JONES, D. D.

OF the many appellations employed in designating the Lord's Supper the one most commonly used is the one least befitting, and the use of which has led to many erroneous views concerning the purpose of the rite. In Scripture, "communion" expresses "joint participation," not fellowship, or an interchange of brotherly feelings. Dr. Jones shows by citing the language Christ used when instituting the Supper that it is not to be observed for the sake of making a demonstration of fraternal love, but in remembrance of 'Him. Hence, as now understood by the masses of Christians, "communion" is a great misnomer. He follows this with an interesting history of the terms used at different times and in different countries to designate this ordinance, showing why the more appropriate ones were dropped that this might supersede them.

The chapters on "the Law of the Lord's Supper" are replete with Scriptural arguments which should serve a good purpose. It is a work Baptists should give a wide circulation.

A Treatise on Infant Baptism.‡ By THOMAS H. PRITCHARD, D. D.

THE unpretentious little volume with which the author favors us is an outgrowth of a local discussion, in which he was encountered by four Pedobaptist pastors who made a learned and plausible defense of Infant Baptism. This treatise embodies the things, new and old, which the lone Baptist brought forth for the discomfiture of his opponents. His citations are numerous, and from authors of high repute and varying creeds. The admirable spirit pervading all he says, combined with respect for the opinion and feelings of his Pedobaptist brethren, will commend his utterances to all who may desire to acquaint themselves with a statement of Baptist views and arguments on this subject.

The New Choir and Congregation.¶ By GEO. F. ROOT.

THIS is a collection of hymns, tunes, anthems, chants, and responsive services for the choir and "all the people." The author recognizes the valuable services a choir can render, and proceeds upon a plan which, he believes, will "lead to union of worship and musical culture." The work is a good and timely one. The aim commends itself to those who appreciate the importance of enlisting the congregation in praising God in hymns and spiritual songs. The author is known as the composer of some

* New York : Sheldon & Co. † Nashville Tenn : Baptist Publishing House.

‡ Raleigh, N. C. : Edwards, Broughton & Co.

¶ Cincinnati : John Church & Co. Chicago : Root & Sons.

of our best music, and exercises good judgment in his selections for this work. The good reputation of Messrs. Church & Co., as publishers of choice and popular music will enlist confidence in it.

Notes on the Gospel of John.* By GEORGE W. CLARK, D. D. *Author of "A New Harmony of the Gospel," etc.*

THIS work is uniform with the author's notes on Matthew, Mark, and Luke. Like those, they are explanatory and practical, especially designed for pastors and Sunday-schools. Dr. Clark is a critical student of the Bible, always cautious, cherishing a profound reverence for the truth as God has been pleased to reveal it, and hence is conservative and safe.

Born of Water and Spirit.† By REV. SAMUEL HOUGH.

IN a series of plain, well arranged essays, the author treats of "Regeneration and the New Life." After showing that regeneration is necessary, the history of "ritual regeneration" is brought under a searching review, in which the author with a clear eye and appropriate application of Scripture teaching exposes anew the fallacies and errors of baptismal regeneration. On the other hand, he makes too much account of water both in what he calls "giving and sustaining life." We can not see the propriety of arguing that a soul is regenerated partly by water and partly by the Spirit—the Spirit representing air, or breath, and water representing the word or Gospel. Water is figuratively used in the Scriptures to denote several things; but so are bread and wine, milk and honey, lambs and lions. To follow analogies too far, or to carry a figure out to the utmost of our ingenuity, inevitably leads to darkness and trouble. Neither can we assent to the interpretation given to many passages of Scripture, which the author presses into the service of the "higher life." If we understand him, the "higher life" is the result of a second change of soul, or change in soul life. This higher life was, he holds, that for which Paul sighed when he said, "If by any means I might attain unto the resurrection from the dead." But if this higher life was above Paul's attainments in this world, shall not we, "who find our level in the seventh of Romans," be warranted in esteeming it too exalted for this life?

The Jewish-Christian Church.‡ By B. A. HINSDALE, *President of Hiram College.*

THE title, and some of the terms used in discussing what the author terms Jewish Christianity, will not be acceptable to many. In other phraseology his views would not be objectionable. The first part treats of "Jewish Culture," and the second of "The Jewish-Christian Church." It is full of good things, a gem of ecclesiastical history. It is made up of what the author informs us "was originally written as parts of a more ambitious work." Having read these few chapters one could but wish that the author's original purpose might be carried out to the fullest.

* Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. † New York: Sheldon & Co.
‡ Cincinnati: The Standard Publishing Company.

THE BAPTIST REVIEW

ARTICLE I.

GOD AND THE BIBLES.

BY PROFESSOR G. D. B. PEPPER, D. D.

THE permanent historic religions have each its sacred writings, or Bibles. Modern philological research has made these Bibles accessible and intelligible to the merely English student. Dr. Legge has translated for us "The Chinese Classics;" Wilson, Wheeler, Max Müller, and others have made us acquainted with Brahmanic literature; Martin Haug, in his recent admirable work on the Parsic religion, gives a clear insight into the Zoroastrian or Parsic Scriptures; while the Buddhist Scriptures and the Koran we have ample facilities to study. Buddhism and Mohammedanism agree in being each a modification of an ancient existing faith, effected by one man of transcendent genius. No such independence belongs to these religions and to their Bibles as belongs to the religions and religious writings of which they are in some sense the offspring. The Bibles now extant having chief claims to comparison with each other are the Christian, Brahmanic, Parsic, or Zoroastrian, and the Chinese, or Confucian. The formation of each of these began in extremely ancient times, proceeded in its own separate historic course to completion, and represents a concurrent yet independent, religious, and theological development of many centuries. A fair comparison of such and so extensive writings can not fail to be deeply interesting and instructive whatever the point or points fixed upon for special

consideration. But probably the results of such a comparison have their highest value in respect to the doctrine of God, since this is necessarily first and fundamental in every religious faith, and of deepest and ever abiding interest. Some of these results it is the aim of this article to present.

1. *In the earliest parts of all these Bibles the doctrine of Monotheism is found.* That this is true of the Christian Scriptures all are aware. Their first sentence carries the thought that God is one and one only. Until recently it has been supposed that the original teaching of the Parsic religion was a Dualism, affirming two eternal self-existent antagonistic beings, a good and a bad, Ormuzd and Ahri-man. But Haug's translation of the *Gathas*, or most ancient of all the Parsic writings, shows that in these primeval prayers the reigning thought is that of one supreme personal God, Creator and universal Sovereign. That the same conception is to be found in some of the hymns of the Rig-veda, the earliest of the Brahmanic Scriptures, is obvious to the casual reader, and is freely admitted by vedic scholars. Of these hymns more than one might in this and, indeed, in other respects take its place among the psalms contained in the Old Testament without creating a doctrinal jar. Confucianism is by many regarded, not without reason, as less a religion than a practical political philosophy. Yet there are considerations which entitle it to the place here given it as a religion, for it certainly aims and claims to meet all the demands of man's nature in so far as they can be met here, to give the supreme wisdom. And certain it is that its "classics" furnish all that Confucius and his coadjutors regarded as worthy of preservation in the literature which had been developed in the ages preceding their own. Now, even Meadows affirms* that "there is unmistakable evidence of the existence at a very early period of a national belief in a *chief*, if not an *only*, God, variously designated by the term Shang te and Teen

* "The Chinese and their Rebellion," p. 358.

Shang teen and Hwang teen, Supreme Ruler, Heaven, or Sovereign Heaven." Moffat more decidedly and with sufficient ground says:* "Among the sacred books of antiquity outside of the Bible there is no plainer recognition of the supreme authority of one personal God than in the utterances of some of the monarchs" (of China). Thus we find Monotheism in the first dawn of all these religions, or at least in the most ancient of their sacred books. We may not be able to fix with precision the date of these different documents, but they all reveal a primitive state of society, and give other evidence of an origin not later than from one to two thousand years before Christ.

2. *In the earliest Christian Scriptures the doctrine of one only personal God, Creator and Sovereign of all, is presented with a clearness, definiteness, exclusiveness, emphasis, fullness, constancy, and fruitfulness of practical application not found in the earliest writings of the other religions.* That the latter have the doctrine can be fairly made out. That they hold it with any such firmness of grasp as the former none would pretend. Side by side with the doctrine the Vedas contain a presentation midway between Monotheism and Polytheism to which Max Müller has given the name of Kathenotheism, a presentation in which the attributes of the one Absolute God are ascribed to different and apparently distinct deities. The conception of unity remained in the attributes, but the conception of unity in the Being was broken. In the Chinese King the idea of personality in the supreme power was only too feeble, even at the start, while in the Parsic faith the idea of God's sole sovereignty as Creator and Upholder of all things was not sufficiently emphasized to serve as a bar to Dualism, or even to exclude all questions as to whether Dualism were not in fact the original faith.

3. *The Christian Scriptures retain from their beginning to their close one and the same doctrine of God, which, however, is developed in ever increasing richness and fullness until it completes itself in the New Testament, while nothing like this is else-*

* "Comparative History of Religion," p. 179.

where found. In China the development was into an openly avowed Agnosticism, or Positivism. Whether there be a God, gods, angels, or spirits, Confucianism declares to be an unanswerable question. It will neither affirm nor deny. Man's wisdom is to confine his attention to the seen and temporal, and not trouble himself with the unseen and eternal. It steers clear of "other-worldness." Herbert Spencer may well enough have borrowed both his philosophy and his lofty advice to Christians upon this point from the writings of Confucius. In Brahmanism the simple faith of the original Vedas rapidly degenerated into a Pantheism, fundamentally impersonal. This has been developed with a bewildering luxuriance of form and application in utter defiance of all facts of history or truth of reason. Where a true Monotheism seems to be taught in the later writings, the one personal God is but a product of impersonal being, and in turn himself is resolved into innumerable lower gods; while all forms of personality, divine or human, are forms of illusion and evil whose highest good and hope it is to disappear at last in the universal impersonal essence. Even the reformation which bears the name of Buddhism, and holds the position of an independent religion, improved upon this doctrine of God only by treating it as practically useless, or even mischievous, and replacing it by *a blank*. That Parseism degenerated less seems due rather to an arrest of development, and almost of existence, by persecution than to any other cause. It reveals no power of a consistent maintenance and application of its original Monotheism, much less of a rich and fruitful development of it to a rounded fullness and perfection. These are facts as to those great Oriental faiths that probably no one will call in question. But will any one call in question the statement made as to the Biblical teaching concerning God? Whatever ground may exist for charging with virtual Tritheism statements of the doctrine of the Trinity as made by theologians, there is certainly no ground in the New Testament for such a charge, while it is too clear for contradiction that these latest Scriptures are

an immeasurable advance upon the Old Testament in their revelation. Few question this. Most emphasize it. Some, however, in emphasizing, pervert the fact, and make the development, not a fuller revelation of the doctrine of the Old Testament, but a correction of it. Thus the theology of the Old Testament is represented as not only in contrast with that of the New as less complete, but in conflict with it as less true. Such a view, however, is foreign to all the writers of the New Testament, and to Christ as there represented. It is false to the facts and a result of misinterpretation. The Scriptures are *Scripture*, and have a *theology*, not theologies. The God of the first verse of the Old Testament is the God of the last verse of the New Testament, and the God of every verse of both Testaments. Not only is the substance of the doctrine one throughout but also the proportion of its elements. The goodness of God—his “loving kindness and tender mercy”—is as much emphasized in the Old Testament as in the New, while the New surpasses the Old in depicting his “severity.” If one will go straight through mere outward forms of presentation to the very heart of Scripture and to that heart in true Christian honesty lay his heart, he will find no conflict between the earlier and the later writings, but instead profoundest harmony. From that eldest day to which Genesis takes us to that “last hour” when John’s pen of holy power fell from his hand we move down the ages in the presence of one and the same Being; we look into the same eyes of holy love, the same countenance of living light and infinite majesty. The Being is ever one and the same, only coming ever more fully to view till in the Word made flesh we see with us the fullness of the Godhead dwelling bodily.

4. *The Christian Scriptures give a doctrine of God adequate for a religion which truly and fully meets man’s wants while in this respect the other Bibles utterly fail.* Man has a religious nature, whose prime demand is for a proper object of intelligent worship. By virtue of this nature he differs from his dog, his horse, or his monkey. For cattle, barns; for men,

churches. In man is conscience, and in conscience moral law. This law is in conscience, not as its product, not as its attribute, not as *it*, but recognized by conscience to be law over man. This law makes itself seen and felt, not as a hollow echo of the man's own voice, but as the most real of realities and backed by a resistless force of control. It confronts you. You bid it down, but down it will not. It bids you down, and stand you can not. It haunts you. You bid it away, but it stays and stays. It bids you away, and you flee,—you flee, but escape not. In the wildest uproar it whispers,—*only* whispers,—yet its word is as though spoken in the midnight's solemn stillness with a cataract's voice. Against its word stands no other. You can not think that any other word—yours or the world's—should or can stand against its. That word has authority absolute, above every thing, co-ordinate with nothing. Man is a religious being, because by virtue of his nature he is under and in this law.

But the human nature revealed by consciousness is more inclusive than the moral nature revealed by conscience, while the man as a person is one. He is religious *by virtue* of his religious nature, but not *as* this nature. Man knows himself to be in the world and of it, his very being constituted in part of natural forces, and invested and controlled by the forces of nature about him. From the grasp of these he can not escape; that were to escape himself. Therefore, that one can not be your God who has not absolute control of nature. You can not surrender yourself wholly to one who has but partial power over you. Intelligent worship is conscious absolute surrender to a person.

Now, the Christian doctrine of God is an expansion of two statements made at the very beginning of the Bible. The first statement is that "God created the heaven and the earth;" the second, that he "created man in his own image." This makes the moral-law, whose ground is the nature of God, the exact expression of God's will of command, and all operations of all natural forces the exact

expression of God's executive will. Hence, whatever is the power of these forces over us, however we are invested or immured by them, nevertheless it is as though we were immediately imbosomed as pure spirits in the one infinite Spirit, for the beating of God's heart is in every outcome of his will. Though the touch of nature may often seem to us like an enemy's touch, her laws heartless and her deeds even hellish, Christian theology knows how to refer all to divine love, and so make all to waken an answering love, surrender, and service. Christian theology says the laws of the universe as discovered by science are but the Father's mind in expression. His mind and heart lie not far apart. The more of mind the more of heart, and the more of mind and heart disclosed, the more of adoring love evoked; since mind and heart are both the Father's. Such a doctrine, fully and consistently developed and applied as in the Christian Scriptures, is a basis for a religion that makes worship possible, and satisfies the religious nature. Nothing higher has ever been imagined or ever can be.

Nothing like this do we find elsewhere. The least taint of Dualism is fatal to worship. Pantheism in its best form makes worship an irrationality, but in its matured Brahmanic form Pantheism is at its worst. Confucianism can only hope to satisfy man's religious nature by starving it; for, like the Positivism of our own time it has positively nothing to affirm as to God save its positive ignorance. Mohammedanism in attempting to reform the Christian doctrine of God deformed it, while Buddhism had no way of improving on Brahmanism save by disregarding its theology. And if we were to pass from these theologies to those of other religions, whether extinct or extant, we should find nothing which can come into comparison with the Christian doctrine.

5. *The Christian Scriptures present their doctrine of God as the outcome of well-authenticated facts, while the other Bibles have no other basis for their theologies than religious sentiment, or philosophical speculation.* It is, indeed, not uncommon for a certain class of writers to assume that our Bible is a mass

of mingled sentiment, dogmatism, and myths. Some from whom on grounds of common honesty and intelligence we should expect better things thus speak and write. But the eminent and pre-eminent historic credibility of the Bible from its beginning to its close can never be impeached save by the groundless assumption of a theological and philosophical dogma. If one will carry to his examination of that book the foregone conclusion that supernatural facts are impossible, and hence to be denied regardless of evidence, he must deny its historical character, and whoever agrees with him on this antecedent principle will agree with him on his conclusion. But many who scruple not thus to proceed are urgent in their appeal to "theologians" to give to facts the preference above dogmas, and to make dogmas conform to facts. Let them heed their own advice, and derive their dogma as to the supernatural from well attested facts, rather than scout the facts because of their dogma. Proceeding in this spirit one will find it true that there is not in existence a collection of writings more thoroughly saturated with the sober historic spirit, more munificently endowed with convincing internal evidences of historic truth, and more perfectly supported by external evidences. Not one of the other Bibles has the remotest approximation to our own in these respects. Even for the Chinese writings no such character could be claimed for a moment.

Now, let a man attentively study the relation which, in our Bible, is held by doctrine to fact, by word to work, by dogma to event, by system to history, and he will see that this relation is not only vital, but such that one can not in reason admit the facts without also admitting the doctrine. This is conspicuously true as to the personal career of Jesus of Nazareth. The writers of the New Testament understood this, and hence gave such prominence to the events of his life in connection with his spoken words. Paul understood this and assumed that his readers did also, and hence scrupled not to say that on the fact of the resurrection of Christ depended the whole scheme of Christian doc-

trine. But if this relation is obvious in the case of Christ's history, it is scarcely less obvious every-where else, from first to last. Own the history of Israel to be history and you must own their theology to be true, for the truth of the theology and the authenticity of the history are inseparable.

This point of contrast between the Christian Scriptures and the other sacred books is one which demands close and serious attention. It is somewhat common to speak slightly, if not sneeringly, of the "historical evidences of Christianity," and to put the main, if not the exclusive, emphasis upon the self-attestation of the religion. When we try to stand upon something more ethereal than the solid earth we may find ourselves without steady footing and not quite secure of our perpendicularity. We have a right to the facts and to all the heavenly expanse that rises and stretches above them, and the best way to make good claim to that expanse, and good use of it as our own, is to keep possession of the solid earth beneath.

The points of comparison and contrast so briefly stated above will suggest other similar points, and also important lessons. It can not fail to occur to the reader that the God, who is made manifest in our Bible, is "the *Desire* of all nations," but not their Product, Invention, or Discovery.

ARTICLE II.

AN EXPOSITION OF GENESIS VI, 3.

BY REV. J. F. MORTON.

THE passage which is here discussed is translated in our English version, "My Spirit shall not always strive with man." The verb which is here rendered *strive* is $\pi\tau$, and the preposition which is translated *with* is α . The rendering of our version is obviously untenable, as the verb $\pi\tau$, if it were used with the meaning of strive, must be followed by the preposition $\alpha\gamma$. The A. V. is not a translation, but a paraphrase, which presupposes a certain interpretation, perhaps suggested by the words of the Septuagint, which may be translated, "My Spirit shall not remain in man forever."

Most of the ancient versions following the Septuagint express the signification *dwell* or *abide*. But this either presupposes a different reading, $\pi\tau$, or it is an interpretation not derived from the proper meaning of the word here written, as neither the word $\pi\tau$ nor its cognates signifies to abide. The meaning of the word $\pi\tau$ is to rule. Keil translates this verse as follows: "My Spirit shall not rule in man forever." Then, after stating the meaning of the verb, he proceeds to define $\pi\tau$ as "the divine spirit of life bestowed upon man, the principle of physical and ethical, natural and spiritual life." He then continues: "This, his Spirit, God will withdraw from man, and thereby put an end to their life and conduct." If by these words the writer means that $\pi\tau$, *my Spirit*, refers to the soul of man as proceeding directly from the divine being, he must encounter the fatal objection that $\pi\tau$ when spoken of as being a part of God is not used in this sense. When this word is used of God coming into personal relation with man, it signifies

some impartation of God or divine influence to man whereby he receives some gift or benefit in addition to that which he by nature possesses.

It seems more natural to regard this utterance, not as a threatening, but as a prediction made in view of man's condition and tendencies. Man is rapidly corrupting himself upon the earth, giving himself up to sensuality and gross wickedness. Even the best of the race is mixing with the vilest, and there is no hope of their returning to God and the ways of righteousness. God looks down upon them in this state, and declares, "*My Spirit* will not always rule in man." He will not submit to my dominion, will at length cast off all my control. This is evident from his conduct, which is each day less affected and restrained by the divine influence.

The clause next following accords with this view, and becomes more significant as explaining or giving a reason for the prophecy.

"In his wandering he is flesh," *i. e.*, because he is erring, sinful flesh, he will sink deeper and deeper into evil, and depart entirely from God. It is man, not God, who causes the separation.

Moreover, "*because he is flesh*" would not be the natural reason why God would withdraw his Spirit, but the reason why man would withdraw from him.

It should also not be overlooked that the chief design of the narrative previous to the announcement of the destruction, verses 7, *sq.*, is to describe man's character and conduct and give the causes of his condition. Verse 2 tells of the intermarriage of the best class with the worst, and we are to infer the consequences. Then follow immediately the words of our passage which give Jehovah's view of the situation and foretell the result. And it came to pass just as God had said. Men surrendered themselves to carnality and proved that they were ruled by the flesh. There was born a generation that was gross and violent and dominated by fleshly lust. These are characterized in

verse 4. In verse 5 God is again introduced as beholding the fulfillment of his own prediction, and what he then saw "grieved him at his heart," and he said, "I will destroy man." There is something both natural and dramatic in bringing forward God in these appropriate attitudes at these two points in the narrative. Keil, in explaining the clause, "for that he also is flesh," uses the following words: "Men," says God, "have proved themselves by their erring and straying to be flesh, *i. e.*, given up to the flesh, and incapable of being ruled by the Spirit of God and led back to the divine goal of their life." It seems as if the thought which found such expression would have suggested the interpretation which is here advocated.

This passage, then, may be explained in a word as follows: God's Spirit would not rule in man forever, not because God would suddenly withdraw it, but because man would resist and refuse to submit to its influence. This verse expresses a regret or lament of Jehovah over the sad state of corrupt, carnal man, and prepares the way for a further description of this condition and for the subsequent denunciations.

The last clause of the verse should be rendered: "and his days shall be a hundred and twenty years."

God saw and declared that on account of rapid degeneracy the race would only defeat the object of its earthly existence if it continued longer than this in its utterly corrupted state.

ARTICLE III.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOK OF ISAIAH.

BY REV. THOS. D. ANDERSON, JR.

STANDING at the head of the prophetical books of the canon, the prophecies bearing the name of Isaiah hold a position well merited by their intrinsic character and by the extent of their influence upon the minds of men. Writings like these, which for ages have charmed by the fascination of their style, and have afforded comfort by their encouraging thoughts, awaken curiosity with regard to their origin. But, in our endeavor to discover that origin, we are confronted with the difficulty that the authorship and date of many of the prophecies are matters of dispute. Leaving, however, the points in dispute for consideration at the proper time, we now turn our attention to facts on which all are agreed.

I. THE AUTHOR.

In the title at the head of the book we find the name of Isaiah, the son of Amoz. Whether this man wrote all the prophecies or not, it is conceded that he wrote some, and from the fact that the compilers classified all under his name, it is probable that he wrote the greater part. This Isaiah, however, was not the son of Amos the prophet, as some of the Church Fathers supposed. This mistake probably had its origin in the Greek translation, where the two names are spelled alike, though in Hebrew they differ in their first and last letters (אִישָׁא—אָמוֹס). Of his parentage we know no more than is here given. But with regard to his personal history we have more information than with regard to that of any other prophet of his day. His dress was, at

times at least,* of sackcloth, a coarse,† shaggy cloth of a dark‡ color. And that this was his *usual* dress is probable since it was the dress of other prophets, and those who in opposition to Isaiah made false claims to the prophetic office endeavored to establish their claims by the coarse, hairy cloth which they wore.

His *private life* seems to have been strongly influenced by the spirit of his prophetic work. Not only was he a prophet himself, but he had a prophetess for a wife.|| And he himself declares, "I and the children whom the Lord hath given me are for signs and for wonders in Israel, from the Lord of Hosts which dwelleth in Mount Zion."§ And it does not seem too fanciful to find in this statement an allusion to the names borne by himself and his sons. In Isaiah (the salvation of Jehovah) we find the key-note of his prophecies. Continually does the prophet break forth into a strain of exultation over the salvation Jehovah will accomplish. We listen and hear his joyous words, "The Lord will have mercy on Jacob and will yet choose Israel." And again, still more confidently, he exclaims, "Behold, God is my salvation, I will trust and not be afraid; for the Lord Jehovah is my strength and my song: he also is become my salvation." Then, rapt in vision of the future, he bursts forth yet again, "Say to them of a fearful heart, Be strong, fear not; behold your God will come with vengeance, God with a recompense; he will come and save you. And the ransomed of the Lord shall return and come to Zion with songs and everlasting joy upon their heads; they shall obtain joy and gladness, and sorrow and sighing shall flee away." As we now look at the names of his sons we discover in them also distinct reference to his prophetic mission. One is named Maher-Shalal-Hash-Baz (Hasten-booty-speed-spoil), and we find mentioned God's own reason for the giving of the name. For "saith Jehovah, before the child shall have knowledge to cry 'My Father' and 'my Mother,' the riches of Damascus and the spoil of Samaria shall be taken

* Isa. xx, 2. † Zech. xiii, 4. ‡ Isa. 1, 3. || Isa. viii, 3. § Isa. viii, 18.

away." In the name of the other son, Shear-jashub (a remnant shall return), we have the grand thought that encourages the prophet in all times of anxiety and doubt. In these two names we find the different phases of Isaiah's teaching. To all enemies of Jehovah and Jehovah's people he gives the warning Maher-Shalal-Hash-Baz—to all "who follow after righteousness and seek Jehovah" he presents the encouragement Shear-jashub. Surely we may well see how he and his children might be for signs and for wonders.

As we consider Isaiah's *public life* we find that, unlike his predecessors, his work was not restricted to preaching. He was also an author. This is discovered from references in other parts of the Bible to his biographies of Kings Uzziah and Hezekiah,* and from the evidence we have for believing that he was himself the compiler of the collection bearing his name. But his authorship was not all that distinguished him as a public man. In his relation to the state Isaiah held a pre-eminent position. We might almost call him a statesman. Dwelling at Jerusalem, the center of political life, he seems to have been at various times the privy counselor of kings—now comforting Ahaz in the time of his fear of Syria and Israel; now warning the court of Hezekiah against alliance with Egypt, and giving to the king the message he should send to the Assyrian conqueror. And it is in part owing to this superiority of position that his words have ever had a greater and more extended influence than those of the humbler prophets who performed their mission in his day. While Joel, Obadiah, and Micah are but little known and seldom read, Isaiah holds in prophetic literature the same lofty position he held in the political history of the days of Hezekiah.

II. CHRONOLOGY.

After this brief outline of Isaiah's personal history we now proceed to consider the questions, When did he live? and what were the circumstances with which he was sur-

* 2 Chron. xxvi, 22; xxxii, 32.

rounded? In the title, the truth of which we have no good grounds to dispute, we are told that this Isaiah, the son of Amoz, performed his mission in the reigns of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah. Some believe that he lived until the time of the persecution under Manasseh, and then met a martyr's death by being sawn asunder in a tree into which he had fled for refuge.* This supposition rests chiefly on a Talmudic tradition of doubtful authority which receives corroborative testimony only from the supposed reference to the event in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "They were sawn asunder."† The other arguments adduced, that he is said to have written the biography of Hezekiah,‡ and that his style is very much changed in his later writings, are also inconclusive. The reference to the biography may be to nothing more than his collection of prophecies in which he refers to the life of Hezekiah. And the difference of his style may be accounted for by reason of the nature of the subject which he treats, and from the fact that his later prophecies were probably one continuous written composition. If now we oppose to these conjectures the *argumentum a silentio*, that Isaiah did not mention Manasseh's name in the title, and that the Bible nowhere refers to him as alive during the reign of that king, we find that the theory that the prophet lived in that reign is no more than a possible conjecture.

Allowing that his public work was chiefly comprised between the last year of Uzziah and the close of the reign of Hezekiah, we may with tolerable exactness refer it to the epoch between the years 759 and 698, B. C, thus allowing a long public life of sixty-one years. But dates alone are insufficient to fix in our minds the age in which a man lived and worked. We wish also to know what nations were flourishing at the same time, and what were the striking events contemporaneous with the work of his own life. As we study the history of the time of Isaiah we find that his birth was nearly synchronous with the beginning of the

*Cf. Stanley, Jew. Ch. II, 544. † Heb. xi, 37. ‡ 2 Chron. xxxii, 32.

Olympiads and the early authentic history of Greece, and that his public work commenced a few years previous to the reputed date of the founding of Rome, while the period of his life was marked by the ascendancy of the Assyrians in the East, and of the Ethiopian Empire, at this time including Egypt, on the south-west.

Such was Isaiah's historical position with reference to the great nations of the earth. What are the events that influenced his own nation during his public life, and which enable us to understand more fully the prophecies which he wrote? *Outside* of Judah the striking events were the fall of Syria, after an existence of nearly two and a half centuries, at the capture of Damascus by Tiglath-pileser; and the removal of the ten tribes of Israel by the Assyrians under Shalmeneser. The two chief events *within* the kingdom of Judah were the invasion of the country in the reign of Ahaz by the united armies of Syria and Israel under their respective kings, Rezin and Pekah; and secondly, the invasions of the Assyrians under Sargon and Sennacherib in the reign of Hezekiah.* The first of these events gave rise to the prophecy concerning the fall of Damascus and Israel, and the future subjection to Assyria, to which country Ahaz was then looking for assistance;† while the other great event, the Assyrian invasion of the country of Judah, called forth from Isaiah the prophetic warning against an alliance with Egypt, and the prophetic exhortation to trust in God alone.‡ These references indicate only specimens of the influence exerted by historic events upon the writings of Isaiah, an influence which contributes very largely to their permanent power, for his words were intended for persons under special trials, and in the fact that they are thus based upon actual trials, lies the secret of their power to console and encourage the people of God in times of affliction and distress.

* For difference of date for invasion of Sennacherib, see Bib. Dic. s. v. Sennacherib and Hezekiah.

† Isa. vii, sq.

‡ Isa. xxx; xxxvi, sq.

III. UNITY.

Thus far we have been concerned with Isaiah, the son of Amoz. But was he the author of all the prophecies which are associated with his name? This question has been answered by many in the negative, some denying to him the authorship of various parts of the whole book, while others divide the book into two parts and deny his authorship of the latter portion. We shall consider, then, first, the general arguments advanced against the unity of the book as a whole; and, secondly, those arguments advanced by Christians as well as unbelievers against the Isaian authorship of the last twenty-seven chapters—a division which is warrantable from the fact that some of those who advance the latter arguments would by no means assert the validity of some of the former.

First. We consider the arguments of those who regard the book in its present form as a compilation of the productions of different authors, a kind of anthology of Hebrew writings. The fundamental, and almost the only ground for this view, is found in the fact that certain passages in the book contain references to events which occurred after the death of Isaiah. Therefore these passages, it is argued, could not have proceeded from his pen, for it is not given to man to know the future. Thus the whole argument rests on the assumption of the impossibility of any kind of revelation of the future; in short, on the assumption of the impossibility of prophecy itself. Much stress is now laid on differences in language and style, but it is a significant fact that the argument from diversity of style was of later origin than the argument from the historical allusions. Alexander, after referring to the historical development of the neological criticism on Isaiah, remarks: "The obvious deduction from this sketch is, that the philological objection would have slept forever, had it not become absolutely necessary to secure the rejection of a book

which, if genuine, carried on its face the clearest proofs of inspiration."*

Turning now from the negative to the positive side, we proceed to investigate the claims for belief in the integrity of the Book. The one chief argument is found in the general acknowledgment of the Book as a unit as far back as we may trace its history. The external evidence is entirely in favor of integrity. In the first place, the whole book bears the name of Isaiah as it stands in the canon, and the propriety of attributing all its contents to him is confirmed by all the evidence within our reach. The most ancient translations of which we have any knowledge—the apocryphal writings previous to the Christian era—the writings of other prophets, and the indorsement of the Book, without reference to its lack of unity, by Christ and his apostles all combine in giving evidence in favor of unity. The general harmony is unbroken until a discordant note is struck in the quiet of a German study, as a critic denies the integrity of the Book twenty-five hundred years after the times of Isaiah, and two thousand years after his authorship had been universally acknowledged. The first expression of doubt with reference to the integrity of the book of Isaiah is found in Koppe's German edition of "Lowth's Translation (1779-81)."†

With this amount of external evidence in its favor, the internal evidence must become very strong before it will be adequate to disprove the integrity of the book before us. In the light of such evidence it is not sufficient to say that there are reasons for believing that certain passages *may not* be the writings of Isaiah. Not until we can say that certain passages *can not* be his, are we authorized on the ground of evidence to assert that Isaiah was not the author of all. Such internal evidence is not found in the fact that certain

* Alex. II, Int. pp. 23, 24—Wiley and Putnam, 1847.

† We must, to be strictly true, make allowance for Aben Ezra (1093-1170), who *hinted at* another authorship of the last twenty-seven chapters. His hint, however, remained disregarded.

passages contain prophecies, for, if we discard the prophetic element in these writings, they become as inexplicable to the moral sense of mankind in general as they now are to the rationalistic prejudices of the critics of Germany. For certain it is that if some of the writings of this book are not prophetic they are falsehoods. Their direct claim is to declare the things that are to come.* But it is not our purpose at this time to go into an extended argument against those who disbelieve the possibility of a supernatural revelation of the future. To the Christian believer an argument founded simply on such disbelief has no force. Hence for him the references to events subsequent to the time of Isaiah afford no sufficient ground for denying that Isaiah was the author. Nor again is the later argument from difference of language sufficient to offset the strong external evidence. The weakness of this argument is apparent from the diversity of opinions advanced by different critics. As, says Alexander, "The continuous prophecy contained in chapters xxiv-xxvii Knobel shows to have been written in Palestine about the beginning of the Babylonish exile; Gesenius, in Babylon, towards the end of the captivity, and by the author of chapters xl-lxvi; Umbreit, at the same time, but by a different author; Gramberg, after the return from the exile; Ewald, just before the invasion of Egypt by Cambyzes; Vatke, in the period of the Maccabees; Hitzig, in Assyria, just before the fall of Nineveh; while Rosenmüller, in the last edition of his 'Scholia,' ascribes it to Isaiah himself." †

Thus neither the argument from prophecy nor that from philology is sufficient to countervail the general argument drawn from the external evidence in favor of Isaiah. And, on the other hand, in addition to this general argument, the weight of which must be allowed by all, the believer in the inspiration of the New Testament finds corroborative evidence in the particular testimony of its writers. These make citations indiscriminately from the whole book.

* Chaps. xli-xliv, *passim*.

† Alex, I, Int. pp. 28 and 64.

They quote or allude to forty-seven different chapters, and quote with mention of Isaiah's name from the first, sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twenty-ninth, fortieth, forty-second, fifty-third, sixty-first, and sixty-fifth chapters of the book as we now have it.

Secondly. We now turn to the arguments that are specially urged against the last twenty-seven chapters of the present collection.

a. These chapters contain references to events subsequent to the times of Isaiah. An argument resting simply on a denial of prophecy. This has already been considered.

b. The tenses which the writer employs in referring to certain events, as also his language, style, and historical references, indicate a *later date* than that of Isaiah; and,

c. The subjects treated, and the style of composition indicate *another author* than Isaiah.

With regard to the argument that the author wrote in the time of the captivity because he refers to the exile and the desolation of Jerusalem in the past tense, we remark, that the prophetic preterite is allowed by grammarians as legitimate, and is fully explained on the ground that a prophet might see in vision an event still future as if already past, and therefore might describe the same as if it had already taken place. If this explanation were not allowed, how should we interpret the following expressions?—"He was despised and we *esteemed* him not; the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and by his stripes we were healed. He *hath poured out* his soul unto death, *was* numbered with the transgressors and *bore* the sins of many." Is the prophet describing the sorrows of one who had already suffered death; or is he describing as it was seen in prophetic vision, the agonizing death of Him who, in the fullness of time "gave his life a ransom for many?" We certainly must allow that the prophets described as historical what was really future, or we shall be deprived of some of the richest thoughts of the Old Dispensation, thoughts,

too, which do not depend upon the play of our own imagination, but which have received the sanction of divinely inspired men. But our opponents respond—although a prophetic preterite may be legitimate, it is hardly probable that it would be sustained throughout so long a composition. To this we reply that such a use of the prophetic preterite *might* have been thus sustained, for it is quite possible, and, indeed, as our opponents themselves admit, very probable, that these chapters form one continuous written production. If this is the case, the only objection to the constant use of the prophetic preterite would lie in the impossibility of an extended vision. As there is no antecedent impossibility of such a vision, it is legitimate to suppose that Isaiah, having previously predicted the Babylonian captivity, and having especially in mind the encouragement of his people during that captivity, might give an extended account of his vision of that future to which the desolation of Jerusalem and the exile from the holy land were things of the past. Thus we may easily explain the references to the sanctuary as profaned, to Zion as a desolation, and to the holy land as waste and desolate.

The argument that Isaiah *might* have written thus prophetically is very much strengthened by both internal and external evidence. The internal evidence for a pre-Babylonian authorship is found in the language, the style, and the historical references of these chapters. As to *language*, we call attention to the purity of the Hebrew employed. After the exile, the Hebrew language declined, and became infected with Chaldaisms from the language of the Babylonian conquerors. But where are the signs of this decline and this impurity in the language of the chapters under consideration? Hirzel, an unsuspected witness, who has made the matter of Chaldaisms a study, declares that there are found *only four* real Chaldaisms in the whole of Isaiah, and that these all occur in the portions which are declared genuine.* And in this connection we may add that there are more

* These four are (vii, 14 doubtful) xxix, 1; xviii, 7; xxi, 12.

Chaldaisms in the "Song of Solomon," which Ewald and Doepke (neological critics) nevertheless trace to the time of Solomon. It is possible, as in the case of Zechariah and Malachi, that a writer of the time of the captivity might imitate the earlier phraseology. But, as Hengstenberg remarks,* "It ought to be mentioned that an artificial abstinence from the language of their times occurs only in those prophets who entirely lean upon an earlier prophetic literature, but that *purity in diction with independence*, which is manifest in the attacked portions of Isaiah is *nowhere else to be found*."

The *style* of these chapters is distinctively Jewish, and not Babylonian. Witness the difference between the imagery of Isaiah and that of Daniel. Says Professor Cowles, "The one conceives of the Church of God as a Hebrew, all true worship at the temple—all Gentiles gathering there into the one Zion of God; but the other has been schooled, not at Jerusalem, but in the court of kings and in the succession of the world empires, and you would not be reminded that he had ever been at the temple by any power it has ever had over his symbolism. Great hostile powers with him are savage wild beasts, of all which symbolism Isaiah knows nothing."†

The *historical references* contained in these chapters, to Babylon or deliverance therefrom, on which so much is based, are vague. In all references to the times of the captivity, with the exception of those to Cyrus,‡ which, however, are most probably prophetic, every thing is indistinct. There is as much reference to the times of Moses as to the times of Cyrus, and some of the references to the captivity are undoubtedly only symbolic.§ Is this the kind of language we should naturally expect from one who had lived in the times of the captivity, and had known by experience and observation the circumstances with which his people had been surrounded? Does not this absence of any dis-

* Kitto's Bib. Cyc., II, p. 421.

† Bib. Sac. Vol. XXX, pp. 531, 532. || Isa. xliv, 28; xlv, *passim*.

‡ E. g. chap. xli. Wilderness supplied with water and verdure.

tinct allusion to such times and circumstances give an indication that these writings were composed before the exile?*

Thus the argument from historical allusions favors more than it militates against an earlier date. Even the one distinct reference to Cyrus, which, for the moment, we allowed as an exception, carries evidence with itself that it is prophetic. As we study the passage in which this allusion is found we discover that the whole drift of the argument is toward an establishment of Jehovah's superiority to the gods of the Gentiles from the very fact that he can foretell what is to be. In the twenty-third verse of the forty-first chapter Jehovah offers the challenge, "Show the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods." Again, in the ninth verse of the following chapter we have a declaration by Jehovah of his ability to prophesy. And still again, in the forty-fourth chapter, he says, "I am the Lord that confirmeth the words of his servant, and performeth the counsel of his messengers, that saith to Jerusalem thou shalt be built; that saith to Cyrus, he is my shepherd and shall perform all my pleasure." Here the reference to Cyrus appears as an illustration of the power of Jehovah to declare beforehand what is to come to pass. A careful study of the whole passage relating to Cyrus will, we think, reveal the fact that the only distinct historical allusion to times later than those of Isaiah is claimed, even in the words of the passage itself, to be prophetic. The argument from historical references, then, strengthens rather than weakens the force of the internal evidence, which on the whole strongly favors the hypothesis, in itself not improbable, that Isaiah wrote these chapters. All such evidence points to

* It is worthy of remark that some commentators who deny the Isaian authorship of these latter chapters on account of references to the captivity, yet feel induced by the distinct references to the Holy Land to allow that the author may have been in Palestine. Indeed, they go so far as to consider the passage lvi, 9-lvii, 11, an incorporation of a prophecy of Isaiah's time. (*Vid. Bleek., Einleitung in das A. T.* § 199.) In this we see but a single instance of the strongly marked *tendency* of later criticism to return to a belief in the integrity of the Book.

an earlier rather than a later authorship, and thus but confirms the universal testimony of external evidence.

From the arguments for a later date than that of Isaiah we now turn to those advanced for *another author* than Isaiah. These are founded on the difference in subject and style between these chapters and those which precede.

The first argument is that Isaiah could not have written these chapters because *the subjects* are different from those of his former compositions. But what is the force of this argument? If a man has written on certain subjects in his earlier life, is it impossible for him to touch other subjects at a later period? Is it not unfair and almost absurd to say that two compositions can not have proceeded from one pen simply because the subjects are not exactly alike? As well say that Milton was not the author of "Paradise Regained" because the subject of that poem differs from that of "Paradise Lost," as well say that Raphael did not paint "The Transfiguration" because the subject is not the same as that of "The Entombment," as say that Isaiah was not the author of these chapters simply because the subjects treated differ, to some extent, from those of his earlier productions! We say, *to some extent*, for the similarity is as striking as the diversity. We believe that the thirty-fifth chapter, the chapter beginning, "The wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad for them," is the key-note of the more prolonged strain of chapters xl–lxvi. And we believe, further, that in the words, "I will stir up the Medes against them,"* and in the expressions, "Go up, O Elam—Besiege, O Media, all sighing have I made to cease,"† we find hints of the truth more expressly stated in the prophecy concerning Cyrus found among the prophet's later utterances; while we find a repetition of thoughts, and even words, that are already familiar from a study of the earlier prophecies, when the writer, almost at the very end of his composition, closes his description of the new heavens and new earth with the words: "The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, and the

* Isa. xiii, 17.

† Isa. xxi, 2.

lion shall eat straw like the bullock; they shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain, saith the Lord."* With all this similarity of thought in the two parts of the book of Isaiah, whatever diversity there may be, can be entirely accounted for by the versatility of a gifted author.

In the argument from the *language and style*, the character of neological criticism has been most clearly displayed. With microscopic glasses the critics have searched these chapters to find words that do not occur elsewhere in the writings of Isaiah, and characteristics of style that do not seem to be exactly the same as those in his earlier productions. On evidence thus discovered they found, what they consider, a very strong argument for diversity of authorship. The untrustworthiness of their evidence is indicated by the differences of opinion among themselves. As an illustration of their disagreement, we quote from Alexander.† Though the particular reference is to the earlier prophecies, the passage illustrates equally well the untrustworthiness of the neologist's decisions: "Eichhorn *rejects* the nineteenth chapter. Gesenius *calls in question* the genuineness of verses 18–20. Koppe *denies* that of verses 18–25. Hitzig regards verses 16–25 as a fabrication of a Jewish priest, while Rosenmüller, Hendewerk, Ewald, and Umbreit *vindicate the whole* as a genuine production of Isaiah." Their criterion is not found in any scientific principle, but only in the individual taste or caprice of the particular critic, a criterion, which, if used in literature generally, would work havoc with most writings that are generally believed to be, and are in fact, the work of a single author. The same experiment has been tried upon the writings of Xenophon, and the result was that forty words were found in the Anabasis which are not found elsewhere in his writings. But he who carried on the investigation remarks: "If it should be denied (on this account) that the Anabasis was written by him, it could by the same reasoning be shown that every other work was falsely attributed to him." But not only is the weakness

* Isa. lxxv, 25; cf. xi, 6–9.

† Alex. I, Int., p. 28.

of this argument shown by the diversity of opinions among the destructive critics, but also by the fact that it may be used with equal force in favor of unity. As the courtesy of scholarship restricts us to the English language we can not now enter upon an investigation of the points of similarity. We will simply state that they form a strong argument for unity, and are fully sufficient to nullify the above argument of our opponents.*

The testimony of Scripture affords sufficient ground for the belief that Isaiah *wrote* these later prophecies; while the unity of thought which, according to the admission of almost all critics, characterizes the whole composition, indicates that these prophecies form one single production. If they do, we have a sufficient explanation for the more continuous and more majestic flow of their language. But this difference of style is further accounted for by the nature of the subject considered. To quote the words of Hengstenberg:† “The commencement, ‘Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people,’ is the theme of the whole. Hence arises the gentleness and tenderness of style and the frequent repetitions. Comforting love has many words. The sublimity, abruptness, and thunders of the first part find no place here, where the object of Isaiah is, not to terrify and to shake stout-hearted sinners, but rather to bring glad tidings to the meek.”

Turning now to the external evidence, we meet the striking fact that we have no name for our author if he be not Isaiah. When we consider that he was *ex hypothesi* two hundred years nearer the time of the compiler than Isaiah, and that he seems to have been a prophet equal, if not superior, to Isaiah himself, this obscurity is still more remarkable. It can not be said that the names of the prophets of those times were not preserved, for the names of Haggai and Malachi have found an immortal place. But this author

* On this point see Delitzsch, *Int. to Later Prophecies*. Bib. Dict., App. art. on Isaiah. Leathes, O. T. Witness to Christ, Appendix.

† Kitto's Bib. Cyc. II, p. 422; cf. Keil, *Int. to O. T.* §71, 6.

who holds a position in sacred literature scarcely, if at all, inferior to the royal Psalmist himself, must be known only by the title of the "Great Unnamed." Why this silence? Why this obscurity gathering around the greatest of the prophets who predicted the future glory of the Messiah? Do we not here find a good reason for at least doubting the hypothesis of a *post-eventum* authorship? Thus external evidence gives its entire influence in favor of Isaiah. No other name presents itself, and, as we have already noticed, there was not a dissenting voice, Christian or unchristian, for two thousand years after the canon was closed.

In summing up this whole discussion concerning unity, we remark that the internal evidence is insufficient of itself to establish plurality of authorship. Neither the presence of prediction nor the use of the past tense in reference to events subsequent to the times of Isaiah, nor the alleged diversities of language and style, nor all these combined, prove conclusively that the book of Isaiah is the work of more than one person. Since this is so, and since the external evidence is *entirely* in favor of Isaiah as the only author, we must, if we are to judge *according to evidence*, decide in his favor. We leave this point, then, with the expression of our judgment that the entire collection of writings bearing the name of Isaiah was indeed the work of that inspired man.

IV. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS.

As we now consider the prophecies as a whole, what are the most striking characteristics that attract our attention? What are those traits that give to these writings their peculiar value? Their history awakens our curiosity. For, in the words of Stanley, "Of no other book of the Old Testament, except the Psalter, have the subsequent effects in the world been so marked, or the principles so fruitful of results for the future." What are the causes of these remarkable effects—these wonderful results? In answer a hint may be found in the title which has long been ascribed

to the author—the evangelical prophet. Prophet he is to the fullest extent. He both defends the law of Jehovah already promulged and also proclaims those things that are yet to come. But he is also an evangelist, not simply an *εὐαγγελιστής* in the general sense, a proclaimer of good tidings, but an evangelist like the four of the New Testament, the burden of whose tidings is salvation through a Divine Redeemer.* The writings of Isaiah, and especially his later prophecies, contain the New Dispensation in miniature. The thoughts he utters appear again as the ruling thoughts of the New Testament, only there marked by a fuller development and a greater minuteness of detail. With this idea in mind mark the thoughts of the later prophecies. At the beginning we hear† “the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord.” In the middle,‡ as the central figure of the whole, we see represented in most pathetic imagery the mediatorial sufferings and death of the servant of Jehovah, while just before the close|| we gain a glimpse of “the new heavens and new earth [that] shall remain before the Lord.” Here, as Delitzsch says,§ “The Old Testament limits are not disturbed, but within those limits evangelist, apostle, and apocalyptist are all condensed into one.”

But this Gospel of Isaiah, as Gospel we may be allowed to call it, marks an advance in *catholicity* of sentiment. It is not restricted, as former prophecies have been, to the narrow limits of his own people. As the prophet contemplates the future glories of the Gospel, all distinction of persons is lost to his view. Jew and Gentile, friend and foe, meet upon a common plane, and all receive a common blessing from their common Lord. Egypt and Assyria share together with Israel the benediction of the Lord. “Blessed be Egypt, my people, and Assyria, the work of

* “Non tam propheta dicendus est quam Evangelista: ita enim universa Christi ecclesiæque mysteria ad liquidum prosecutus est, ut non putes eum de futuris vaticinari, sed de præteritis historiam texere.” Jerome, Præf. ad.

Jes.

† Isa. xl, 3.

‡ Isa. liii.

|| Isa. lxvi, 22.

§ Del. II, Int. to later proph. p. 130.

my hand, and Israel, mine inheritance." Isaiah's vision is not confined to the restoration of Israel; this is too small a work for the servant of Jehovah. The salvation that comes to the Jews shall be proclaimed to the ends of the earth. The glory of the Lord that shall rise upon Zion shall shed its rays over the whole world: "Nations shall walk in its light, and kings in the brightness of its rising."*

But Isaiah is not only a herald of the Gospel. He is also a defender of the law. He may have "the tongue of the learned and know how to help the weary with a word." But he also pronounces the severest woes upon those who have forsaken the law and the testimony. In his earlier prophecies he closes his fearful threats with the refrain more than once repeated: "For all this his anger is not turned away, but his hand is stretched out still." And even in the midst of the comforting prophecies of his later life we find the sad and terrible statement: "There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked." Indeed, it is with words like these that the prophet closes each of the three sections of his later composition.† He opens with a comforting encouragement. He closes with a threatening curse. And it is in this very union of the law and the Gospel in Isaiah that we find the key to his writings. The people whom he addressed were influenced by two opposite tendencies; now following after false gods, again following after righteousness and seeking Jehovah. The former tendency we see manifested in the apostasy of Maacah, Athaliah, Ahaz, and Manasseh, while the latter appears in the corresponding reformation under Jehoshaphat, Joash, Hezekiah, and Josiah. There is a continual struggle for pre-eminence between the worship of idols and the worship of Jehovah. And to guide a people under such circumstances the prophet has need to pronounce woes as well as benedictions, to defend "the law and the testimony," as well as to "preach good tidings to the meek."

Turning now to the style of the prophet, we find that it

* Isa. lx, 3, Alex. Translation.

† xlviii, 22; lvii, 21; lxvi, 24.

is as varied as the thoughts he presents. He reprovcs, rebukes, exhorts, and comforts, and assumes the style best adapted to the truths he proclaims. Indeed, the peculiar characteristic of Isaiah's writings, that which establishes his superiority in this direction to all other prophets, is the comprehensiveness of his style. We perhaps can not do better here than quote the words of Ewald:* "He is not the especially lyrical prophet, or the especially oratorical or hortatory prophet, as we should describe a Joel, a Hosea, or a Micah; but just as the subject requires, he has readily at command every kind of style, and every change of delineation. His only fundamental peculiarity is the lofty, majestic calmness of his style, proceeding out of the perfect command which he feels he possesses over his subject-matter." But though, as this writer intimates, Isaiah's style was eloquent and sublime, it was, at the same time, simple, so simple as to call forth the sneer of those who were opposed to his teaching. We hear their expression of contempt when they describe his teaching as "precept upon precept, line upon line, here a little, there a little" †—a contempt which is still more apparent in the Hebrew words, "*tsavla-tsav, tsavla-tsav, kavla-kav, kavla-kav, zeir sham, zeir sham.*" Speaking of this criticism, Stanley fitly says:‡ "It is the universal complaint of the shallow, inflated rhetoricians of the professedly religious world, against original genius and apostolic simplicity, the complaint of the babblers of Ephesus against St. John, the protest of all scholastic and pedantic systems against the fullness and the breadth of a greater than John or Isaiah."

But the secret of the continued influence of Isaiah's writings is to be found, perhaps, more than anywhere else, in the fact that he is decidedly the hopeful prophet. At all times he has the word of encouragement. Is his country invaded, and the destruction of the holy city threatened? He proclaims the Word of the Lord: "I will defend this

* Propheten des Alten Bundes. I, S. 173.

† Jew. Ch., II, 497.

‡ Isa. xxviii, 13, see also verse 9, sq.

city to save it." Are his people mourning in captivity? He gives them the encouraging promise of Jehovah: "For a small moment have I forsaken thee, but with great mercies will I gather thee." And for all Christians, under all circumstances, he, like the apocalyptic seer of the New Testament, makes known the conquering power of Messiah's kingdom and the final glories of the people of God. That people may long be oppressed by the powers of this world; they may pass through long periods of darkness and gloom; but the end is not yet. These trials are but the preparation for richer blessings. That oppression will be followed by a more joyful freedom—that darkness will flee before the dawn of a more glorious day—a day when it may be said to the Church: "Violence shall no more be heard in thy land, wasting nor destruction within thy borders; but thou shalt call thy walls salvation, and thy gates praise. Thy sun shall no more go down, neither shall thy moon withdraw itself, for the Lord shall be thine everlasting light, and the days of thy mourning shall be ended."

ARTICLE IV.

THEISM GROUNDED IN MIND.

BY HON. JAMES M. HOYT, LL. D.

SUMMARY.—The existence of Mind Self-evident—Mind must Exist, before Knowledge of Matter is Possible—Mind must act Personally—Impossibility of disintegrating Mind illustrated—Sources of our Knowledge of Mind—Are Mental Revelations Trustworthy?—Is Matter Mind?—Relation of Mind to the Bodily Organs—Incongruities of the Physical Theory of Mind—Intuitions—Theism Attested by Intuition—The Causal Intuition—Personality—Concluding Summary.

THE EXISTENCE OF MIND SELF-EVIDENT.

PERSONAL consciousness reveals to every man the existence of mind. In it alone inheres the power to know; and, therefore, in the order of existence, mind must precede knowledge. What living mind is, in absolute essence, man can never certainly determine, for he can never in conscious knowledge get prior to himself. He must accept his mind as actually existing, before he can use it in the endeavor to know what constitutes its substance.

Such acceptance of mind differs radically from assumption; it is but the consciousness of thinking life; to deny which would be utter stultification.

Mind reveals itself as existing in a living unity—a conscious whole. It is impossible to disintegrate our conscious life, and thus reach elements in their fontal source which may be fancied by some to be the bases of mind. However the exigencies of one's philosophy may lead him to conjecture that there are primal elements which, when organically blended, will generate living mind, he can never verify such conjecture; for he must be himself, before he can explore himself. Each man in all possible intelligence as to either spiritual, moral, or physical truth, must begin by accepting his mind as it is self-revealed in consciousness;

he can not get back of this; but from this, his only starting-point, he may grow in knowledge.

The Author of the human mind must know what such mind is in absolute substance; but the creature can never in the exercise of its discernment precede its own constituted being; that it must always accept as it is given. By such acceptance man begs no question, makes no unauthorized assumption, but simply recognizes that which is attested to him by irreversible intuition. No possible certainty can be higher than this. Mathematical certainty is seen only in the light of intuitive consciousness. Whatever we can know, whether of axiomatic or of logically related truth, in the realm of mind or matter, we can know only through mental discernment. In the light of these realities we may see that all efforts to construct a *rationale* of the substance and structure of living mind *ab extra* must be futile. All theories as to the constituent bases of mind must in every concrete test break down utterly at the bridgeless chasm between our conscious self and our non-conscious environment. Mental life itself must ever to us be the best evidence of such life.

MIND MUST EXIST BEFORE KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER IS
POSSIBLE.

Waiving now the question, whether matter is of the substance of mind, it is clear that all knowledge of matter would be impossible without the prior existence and action of mind. To suppose the contrary would be to assume that one could live before life, or see before sight. It can in no wise alter the necessary precedence of mind before any knowledge of matter to suppose—as do some modern physicists—that mind and matter are but the differing modes of action of a common substance. Should we grant—for the argument—that mind and matter may be one in base, though utterly diverse in sphere and function, it would not alter the absolute condition that the mode of life we know to be mind must exist and act before any possible

knowledge of the contrasted reality which we know as matter. However some may vaguely conjecture that mind and matter have a common base, still, no extremist physicist can even dream it to be possible to alter the inexorable order in which only mind can know, and matter be known. However palpable or potent may be the existence and attributes of matter, all *knowledge* of such existence, by its very *certainty*, establishes *a fortiori* the precedent being and action of mind.

MIND MUST ACT PERSONALLY.

We shall have occasion, hereafter, to refer more at length to personality in its relation to theism. We wish here to show that, as our conscious life can only be personal, it is not possible for one to reach knowledge of the ultimate substance of his mental self by the study of the mental action of another, for here, as always in all intellection which can result in knowledge, realities external to one's self must be unknown until the knowledge of them is personally acquired. However ample and invaluable may be the accumulated fruits of human learning and science, they must be alien to each man until he discerns and appropriates them through his own mental action. It is true, doubtless, that every one who would grow in knowledge must add to his mental furniture, gain breadth of view, and invigorate and discipline his mind by the just study of the acquisitions of other men. Nevertheless, it is still true that the light thus attainable—however requisite to personal illumination—must enter each mind through its own action; for the consciousness of one can not be another's. Truths so simple may seem too obvious to need statement; but what is intuitive, is primal as law in thought, and when held in view will be a safeguard against error, as well as a corrective of fallacy.

The truth, then, may well be insisted on, that no man can by any possibility reach higher or more ultimate certainty as to what is of the essence of mind than that made

apparent to him through the deliverances of his consciousness. All endeavors to discover in what is without himself, the material and methods through which he became himself, must be futile. That he must have had a beginning he knows; for what is not eternal must have begun to be; and he knows that he as a conscious person is not eternal. But to reach a rationale which will be clearer to his consciousness than the fact of his conscious life, and which will reveal to him the substance and methods that have issued in the existence of his living mind, and will explain to him what his mind in its primal essence was, and how he became himself, will be impossible; for all endeavor to reach such knowledge would be simply the absurd attempt to see himself before he became himself. That the universe was instinct with living mind and illimitable realities before he lived, he can not doubt. But he can know nothing till he is, and he then can know only what as a living mind he is capable of knowing.

Let it not be said that this is circuitous reasoning. It is but insisting, as the ground of all reasoning upon the pre-existence as the primal factor in intellection of the intellect which is acting. It is but reminding the reasoner that, instead of dominating his mind, by bringing to it through his quest and science the substance and methods constituent of its life, he in fact has brought to it only what it has disclosed to him; and that constantly in every stage of his quest—in physics, no less than in metaphysics—his conscious mind has ever supplied the life and faculty by which alone he could investigate in any realm.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF DISINTEGRATING MIND ILLUSTRATED.

An analogue, illustrating the necessity of accepting the being and action of living mind, anterior to all knowledge, may be seen in the dissection of the human body. This process—in the nature of analysis—reveals to the operator the formation of a body kindred to his own; and justifies the inference through analogy that his own is of

correspondent structure. It throws light—invaluable, because otherwise unattainable—upon the complex bodily organs and their functions. But the operator, in order to this analysis, must himself remain complete in living synthesis, or the work would be impossible. Were he required in his analysis to *dissect himself*, the process would lead by each successive step ever more swiftly to darkness and death, instead of to light and knowledge. The anatomist, in his scientific quest, must accept his own conscious life. That he can neither disintegrate nor get behind. Wherever he starts in any induction from observed realities, he must himself precede his scientific progress. The light attainable through his induction is light reflected from structure analogous to his own, never identical with his own. He sees in such light in some degree how life kindred to his own was conditioned; but never for an instant does even a ray of light reveal to him the rise of that life. As to the whole realm of the genesis of discerning life, his induction is alien, as having to do with that only which followed life; the primal and regnant fact of life itself he is powerless to analyze.

If it be impossible, then, for any one by dissecting himself to reach the source of his own bodily life, far less can it be possible for him to disintegrate his mind, and reach the fountal spring of its life, and learn its elements and genesis. Whatever may be his animus in psychological inquiry and speculation, he must ever be as completely balked in all efforts to dissolve the synthesis of his living mind, that he may thus see its elements, and solve the mystery of its origin and structure, as the scientist would be who should attempt to learn anatomy by the dissection of his own body.

The only way conceivable, through which man could make any possible approach toward a knowledge of the substance of his mind, and the mode of its rise into conscious life, would be through a specific revelation from the Creator, or from some Being anterior to man, of intelligence so exalted as to be able to comprehend and reveal the

subject matter to man; but such knowledge could then be held only on trust, and would rest solely in faith, without sight. At best, it could be but imperfectly imparted to, or apprehended by man, because of the inherent poverty of language—adapted only to human experience—to reveal intelligently that which would so immeasurably transcend experience.

It is certainly impossible for man to project his conscious intelligence backward to a period prior to his life, and to personally discover thus the primal substance and method from and through which he came into being. Did we grant—for the argument—that the basis of mind may be physical; it is still certain that this can by no possibility be demonstrated by man to man; for no single man—as we have just seen—could ever get before himself to prove it; and what no one of the race could ever do, would be wholly beyond the reach of the race. Although a being of superior intelligence, living anterior to the human race, if possessed of adequate ability, might possibly have knowledge of the source, substance, and method prerequisite to the rise into being of mankind, yet, this could in no wise invest man with power, before he was himself, to discover what could constitute himself; nor with power, when he is himself, to dissolve the synthesis of his conscious life, and thus reach knowledge of its ultimate elements. Yet to be able to do just this is the ceaseless quest of the physicists, who posit all reality in matter, and attempt to show that it has power to evolve from itself living mind. Unwilling to accept mind, in its sphere, as primal and sovereign in knowledge, they strive to verify their imagined emergence of mind from matter. Assuming mind, as physical, to be but a phase of the forces which inhere in matter, they strive to reach some starting-point before and outside of mind, where they hope to discover its germs, and then become enabled to expound in scientific phrase its physiological genesis; thus constantly ignoring the inherent impossibility of the discovery of the bases of mind before the discerning

agent exists which can alone make the discovery. Insisting that psychology in its basis is purely physical, and oblivious that thus they beg the whole question, they address themselves to the stupendous endeavor to build up mind and moral consciousness from matter and its forces alone. Arrogating exclusive jurisdiction in science, they imperially abrogate the knowledge and philosophy which, on the basis of thought and spiritual consciousness, have been inwrought into human history, culture, faith, and morals; and, as so-called scientific substitutes, they offer incongruous hypotheses as to potencies, metamorphoses, and evolutions reigning within the abysmal mysteries of matter as atomic and molecular forces, which, though conceded by them to be blind and purposeless, have still, as they conjecture, infallible demiurgic power.

Such endeavors can not prove otherwise than futile; for it matters not what may be the realm in which, nor the method by which, any inquiry is prosecuted, the starting-point must be in mind. Whether the realm be material or spiritual, the method be by induction or deduction, the result be science or philosophy, the subject be physics, force, law, morals, or religion, in all alike the investigation must start from, and at every step be dominated by, living mind. Without this, knowledge, science, and philosophy would be alike impossible.

SOURCES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND.

What, then, do we know of mind? The answer is single; nothing beyond that which mind reveals through consciousness. This may seem a startling statement to those stimulated to unbounded speculation by the signal advance of modern physical science. Nevertheless, it is unalterably true that the only possible rationale of living mind is that which mind reveals. Each man, from the dawn of all science and philosophy possible to the race, has been compelled to start from the accepted fact of his conscious mind, in all efforts to enlarge his knowledge. No single

man—whatever his endowments or attainments—has ever discovered a fact, or established a principle, which was not seen to be real by his living mind. There could be no knowledge till there was mind to know it; there could be no science till there was mind to discover, classify, and demonstrate its elements; there could be no philosophy till there was mind to discern the principles of truth in their certainty, fitness, and harmony of relation. Though multitudes, exhilarated by the achievements of recent physical science, may seek, by investigations in matter, to reach the fontal substance and solve the mystery of mind, it must still be true that to learn of mind we must study mind, and that what we can know of it mind only enables us to know.

The true method, then, to learn of mind must be through investigations in its realm, and by methods normal to it. If we set out in our psychology with an animus which constrains us to postpone our recognition of mind as a supreme entity in its sphere; and to insist that its assumed emergence from matter will ere long be shown, through the interaction of substances and forces which we imagine have power to generate it, we may, possibly, through such quest, learn much of matter, but we shall certainly learn nothing of intrinsic mind. Whatever may be our animus, the truth—as before seen—will remain unalterable, that from no possible realm, and by no possible method, can we bring to mind any substance, fact, force, or law which it did not first give us the power to know. If it be thus true, that mind only can enable us to know of matter or its forces, then by pre-eminence must it be true that what we can know of mind must be revealed by mind.

ARE MENTAL REVELATIONS TRUSTWORTHY?

Is it said that the revelations of mind through consciousness may be deceptive, and are therefore not trustworthy? The objection—whatever of truth there may be in it—has equal force against every other ground of knowledge. It is

true, doubtless, that imperfection will attend every effort known to man. It is true that in the interpretations of the mind's revelations through consciousness we are not infallible, and may, therefore, err; and that error always will vitiate results.

But it is no less true that in our interpretations of the physical we are not infallible, and error there must likewise vitiate results. If, then, because error is possible, we must distrust our interpretations of the revelations of mind as to what is metaphysical, for the same reason we will be bound equally to distrust our interpretations of its revelations as to what is physical; and thus logically be shut up to *ne-science*, as to both mind and matter. Should it be claimed, however, that the hazard of error, in the interpretation of physical phenomena, is less than in the interpretation of the deliverances of consciousness as to mind, it is a sufficient answer, to recur to the fact that all our knowledge of physics, no less than of metaphysics, is derived wholly through the action of mind as the knowing agent; so that, if what mind reveals is inherently untrustworthy, both the physical and metaphysical are undermined alike; and in neither realm can our knowledge be accepted as science. A conclusion so abortive must be discarded by all wise seekers for truth. To them the path of knowledge and progress will lead to the just acceptance of the light which, in either realm, can be seen only through consciousness; and to the endeavor to remove every obstacle which excludes or distorts that light.

Because men in their interpretations of consciousness, as to mind, have not infallibly reached unity of view no more vitiates such consciousness than the imperfection of knowledge and diversity of view as to physical phenomena vitiates physical science. With all their imperfection, the best methods known to man in the realm of physics, instead of being discarded because not infallible, will be accepted and cultivated by the wise, with sedulous endeavors to render realities more clear through the patient elimination of error.

So, also, in the realm of mind, the best—indeed the only—method within the reach of man, through the mind's self-revelations, instead of being discarded, will likewise be accepted and cultivated with sedulous endeavors to eliminate prejudice, the confusion of cross-lights, the fallacies which follow inadequate discrimination, and crude generalization; so that the interpretations of consciousness in either realm may become steadily clearer, more harmonious and accordant with all related realities, because more truly normal to the mind's essential life.

IS MATTER MIND?

As living beings we have a fixed constitution; and in the light of our conscious life we discern other realities. To admit this is but the acceptance of what is seen to be real in the nature of things. Thus conditioned, conscious mind is the ground of all our growth in knowledge. To reject its supremacy in the name of science, or to decry its revelations as untrustworthy, until we can comprehend the origin of mind, and can see—stage by stage—its rise from eternal being—or as some physicists would phrase it, its emergence in eternal evolution—is simply an endeavor by the finite to be infinite; by the conditioned to be absolute. True science, and true philosophy, will ever decline such attempt. Conscious mind, then, the supreme factor in all knowledge, accepting its own being, sees matter—in the present conditions of our life—to be inseparably related to itself. Does it follow that matter is therefore the mind's self and substance? Because realities are inseparably related, must it follow that they are one? especially when the consciously seen existence of one, of necessity, precedes and dominates all knowledge of the other? To say that they are identical is but to beg the question, and assume, also, the whole burden of the proof. Demonstrably, that which sees is *per se* differentiated from that which is seen. To affirm the contrary confounds person and object. Nothing is easier than to drift here into confusion

of ideas, especially when yielding to the trend of some chosen theory.

The properties of mind are seen to be thought, intuition, reason, and will,—not to speak here of the moral nature. The properties of matter, on the other hand, are seen to be wholly diverse from those of mind. To affirm that the latter are the former; that matter and mind inherently are one; and that their diversity of properties is but diversity in the phenomena of the same substance, is,—as before seen,—a *petitio principii*. We can not deny mind; we can not deny matter. We can gain nothing for science by premature judgment. However vaunted by those dominated by a physiological animus, we can safely defer acceptance of their assumption, until it is verified. Beyond all question, the life seeing and the matter seen are here conjoined. We can not sever them. But does it follow that, because conjoined, they are identical? Does it not, rather, follow that, if conjoined, they are not one? We admit, to the full, all that can justly be claimed by any physiological psychologist as to the impossibility, under our present conditions, of the severance of mind from matter without quenching thereby the power of mind to manifest itself. But this is simply granting that by such severance, the mind is separated from the media through which, under its conditions here, it is alone able to relate itself to the external world. Back of this still lies the question, whether matter has organic inherence in the substance of mind. This question—as before seen—man can never affirmatively determine. He can never know, until he has the power to know; and this power when existing, he can never—either in himself or in another—disintegrate, or get behind, so as to discover its inherence in substances existing prior to his conscious life.

Though we have here no experience of mind severed from matter, we still can not postulate as to possibilities under other conditions, and in other horizons of life. Because we are without such experience, to affirm that,

therefore, throughout the entire sphere of intelligent being, it is impossible that conscious mind can be differently conditioned, is but presumption which is grounded in ignorance, not science. Even here, the conception of mind as essential spirit is not unthinkable. However one may strain his thought in the endeavor to conceive of matter as inherently the source of thought, it is clear that thought, as such, does not reveal such relation. Thought discerns matter as related to the thinker, but does not see it *to be* the thinker; but thought *does see* the thinker to be mind. Hence mind, while not seen intuitively to be matter, is thus seen to be mind; and is thinkable as mind, without the discernment of identity with matter. To vary the statement,—consciousness, discerning thought, attests demonstrably both thinker and thought, but does not attest in either the inherence of matter. Though mind as spirit, not blended with matter, can not certainly be realized by us in our present conditions, yet, as a conception, it is not contrary to reason. It is thinkable that, under changed conditions—the possibility of which it would be illicit for us to deny—there may be higher and less hindered conditions than ours, of the mind's intrinsic being.

We have actual experience of but five senses; will any one venture therefore to deny the possibility of yet other senses? Thought, the specific offspring of mind, can neither be heard, seen, smelt, tasted, nor touched; but who doubts its reality and sovereignty in its sphere? In each conscious mind thought, subjectively, is known to be actual, independently of the senses. Is it impossible that there can be spheres of being where mind—which here can act subjectively without dependence on the senses—may there have powers of action on, and of interaction with, other minds more direct and instant than through the media known to us? To say that it is impossible is to make ignorance the measure of possible reality; which certainly is not science. Even here, within the horizon of our experience bounded by matter, we may certainly affirm that the conception of

mind as an entity *per se*, sphered in its own substance, in which conscious volition, intuition, and reason inhere as constituting our personality, is far more thinkable than are endeavors to conceive of matter as rising *per se* from its fixed nature and conditions, to take sway as mind, and to ensphere itself with intuition, reason, will, and moral consciousness.

RELATION OF MIND TO THE BODILY ORGANS.

Mind, in our bodily life, is co-ordinated with brain, nerves, and physical organs. Whatever mind may be inherently, these are here its media of relation and expression; and, under present conditions, the co-ordination is unalterable. Sever the union, and mind, as to all manifestation through these media, disappears in this horizon; and the body—organized through the sovereignty of the life principle—is dissolved into its original elements. But does this justify even a presumption that matter is inherently mind? The two are relatively conditioned. Mind, by some mysterious *nexus*, is enthroned in the body, which is its abode, and the instrument for the expression of its activities. The hand and arm are thus servants of the mind. Amputate them, and you have a maimed body; but have you maimed the mind? You have destroyed so far its ability to control media; but can you say that even to an infinitesimal degree you have destroyed mind? Before severed, the arm and hand yielded instant obedience to the will; now, as severed, they are beyond its reach; is there, therefore, less will? So the maiming process might go on; the other arm and both legs might be cut off; but would this essentially diminish mind? You would thus destroy so far its means of action and manifestation, would impair its well-being, and disastrously hamper the will in its ability to execute its mandates through its normal servants; but there is yet no evidence that you have in any degree destroyed the integrity of mind. It is possible to continue still further the maiming process. The exterior tissues may be injured, sight and hearing destroyed,

and, through want of exercise, the vital organs may be weakened, their nervous energy impaired, and the mind be thus crippled in all the media of its action under present conditions. Physical disease might be thus induced, and the mind thus shut up to the use of deranged media of action, would be deranged in its manifestation,—for there could not be normal manifestation, through media which had become radically abnormal,—and thus the point might soon be reached where the vital relation between the thinking life and its bodily conditions is no longer possible, and death closes the scene; but have you thus annihilated mind? The mind was, but is now no longer manifested. The body was, but is now lifeless matter. The bare fact is that the mind as such can be known no longer here; and the body, as the dwelling and organ of the mind, has been dissolved. In the light of such facts, what can we certainly affirm? Can we declare with the assurance of science that the whole being which, as thus ensphered, was known to us in its life has, by the dissolution of its former relations, ceased to be? Of the body, we know certainly that we can not thus affirm; for its substance has not by even an atom passed out of being. Its substance, though in changed relations, remains. Are we warranted, then, in affirming that the more sovereign reality in the before existing co-ordination which we knew as living mind, with all its thoughtful reason, affection, and freewill, has absolutely ceased to be? It certainly has ceased to manifest itself in our horizon; and analogy would warrant the inference that it, too, has passed into changed relations yet normal to itself. But does this annihilate its being? By what warrant from science do any affirm it? The matter of the former body still is; who shall say that the mind, which dominated the former body, is not? To affirm it, is but to project ignorance, not science, into realms beyond our experience.

A simple illustration as to the relation between mind and body may aid our thought. Suppose a musician of rare genius and skill to have power to manifest his concep-

tions of harmony by the use only of a *single* violin. Upon that, in the case supposed, he can play with masterly ability, but upon no other. While that exists he has unhindered power to charm. But injure it, derange its strings, and, if used by him, its tones must be discordant and deranged; but is the source of the melody, therefore, deranged? Were you now to destroy utterly this single violin, all manifestation of the melody, in the case supposed, would of necessity cease. But would its source be destroyed? Would the originating power be annihilated because it could be no longer manifested? By no means. There has been simply the destruction of the means necessary to its manifestation; but the soul of it would be still living as ever. So the human mind, as to its power of normal life and manifestation *in a material horizon*, like the musician in the case supposed, is limited to a single body as its means of exercising and manifesting itself in its earthly conditions. Dissolve the union between the mind and this only means of its expression here, and have you destroyed the mind? Have you done more than was done, in the case supposed, by destroying the violin?

We also cite here an illustration for which we are indebted to Professor R. B. Welch, who quotes it in his "Faith and Modern Thought," page 218. "At the scientific reunion in Innspruck, M. Mayer, a prominent physicist of Germany, who has directed especial investigation to the correlation of forces, made an address. Repudiating the hypothesis that thought is only a form of chemical force, and cognition the result of free phosphorus in the brain, he declared it to 'be great error to identify molecular activity and intellectual action, which may be *parallel*, but are not *identical*. As what the telegraph says—the contents of the dispatch—could never be regarded as a function of the electro-chemical action, . . . so the brain is only the machine. It is not thought; intelligence, which is not a part of sensible things, can not be submitted to the investigations of the physicist and anatomist."

INCONGRUITIES OF THE PHYSICAL THEORY OF MIND.

Upon the theory which assumes that mind has a physical basis, and that matter, when brought into relation in a specific organism imagined to be thus effective, can generate mind, with all its faculty, will, and moral consciousness, what must mind be, if so evolved? Should we grant, for the hypothesis, that matter may have such possible power; and grant further—the inconceivable assumption—that matter uncaused, save by inherent and blind forces, will coalesce in the specific organism assumed to have power to generate mind; we ask again, upon such hypothesis, what must mind be? Look at the human body. It is physiologically certain that the life process there, in its material aspects, is an incessant commerce among ever changing atoms of matter. Waiving all question now as to the mysterious agent and method in action there, the fact is certain, that all constituent molecules are in incessant flux and efflux. To supply growth, and replace waste, the life processes of nutrition and assimilation are ever importing matter from without into internal use and structure and, after such use, discarding the molecules then functionally effete. As a river, which, ceaselessly flowing, with its stream ever changing, ever renewed at each given point, never continuing the same, is a river by virtue only of the constancy of the change in its waters, so in the human body, though you assume it—mind included—to be solely matter, it is certain that it is matter in ceaseless flow. Yet mind, with its personal identity, remains a self-evident fact. But identity in what? Not, certainly, in molecular substance, for that can at no two instants be the same. Granting, for the hypothesis, that it is possible to imagine that this flux and efflux of atoms or molecules, by some mysterious integration and disintegration can generate mind; what must the mind, thus evolved, be? Waiving the question *how*, we ask *what*, and *from what*? Upon the theory assumed, the molecules in their related impact generate that which was not in them

before, and which they do not retain when they pass out of organic relation. Certainly, the atoms thus aggregated through nutrition and assimilation were, prior to such relation, neither living faculty, reason, will, nor moral consciousness. Through their flux and efflux they successively take their place in the organism. If mindless before, and by their brief relation and impact they flash into mind, yet afterward they are mindless again. Do they thus, in a relation incessantly fleeting, *create* a new existence, a *tertium quid*, diverse utterly in sphere, properties, and functions, from themselves, which, as they pass out of relation, remains constant in being, supreme in the organism, the seat of thought, the throne of reason, and of the will, the eye of science, the glory of the world? This, passing marvel! would be creation transcending itself; *creation creating*, but no creator! Can such a theory be thought to have even the color of science? Upon any conceivable basis of induction or deduction, what could the flowing atoms in the hypothesis impart, which they never possessed? What could they lose which they never had? and what possible *entity* could thus emerge? Can conscious personal identity inhere in successive flashes, now seen, now vanishing, mere sequences of the play in action and reaction of fleeting molecules? Can the human mind, regnant in knowledge, with its sovereign moral as well as rational attributes be even dreamed to be thus but an exhalation from blank mental nonentity?

We also may urge here, that all theories as to the possible competency of matter to effect the genesis of mind through *allotropism*, or through the *correlation of forces*, can not avail, because the initial step toward even their consideration must ever be the *acceptance* of mind as *already in active being*. Until this step is taken by the theorist, it will be impossible for him even to conjecture—far less to *know*—as to any assumed or real advance in his knowledge. We readily grant that scientific discovery as to allotropism is of marvelous interest and great practical value. Matter is, in

deed, protean, in the variety of forms and attributes which a single element, by a change only in the condition or relation of its constituent atoms, will assume; as in the oft cited instance of carbon—in one form, coal; in another, the diamond. The mysteries, too, of correlation, through which one known force, under changed relations, is manifested with unvarying equivalence as another force, abundantly stimulate scientific investigation, and reward discovery, by supplying invaluable helps in the complex needs of life. Nevertheless, though the actual achievements of physical science may transcend imagination, the immutable mystery of mind must ever *precede* them. *Mind alone can see matter.* Matter—though its variety of condition, force, correlation, and properties be myriad—can never see mind; at all events, any possible conjecture to the contrary notwithstanding, it is a certainty absolute that it can not see mind, unless, *ceasing wholly to be what we know as matter*, it shall, by some inconceivable metamorphosis, *have actually become conscious mind*. The order which requires the existence of a knower, before there can be a known, is irreversible. For a theorist, then, when discerning matter through the agency solely of his pre-existent mind, to conjecture that it may be possible for the non-conscious known, to become the conscious knower, through the magic of allotropism, the correlation of forces, or in any other nameless way, is *but conjecture*; and, if such possibility be *affirmed* by him, it can be—as before seen—*but a mere petitio principii*.

Conjecture and assertion, however novel or presumptuous, are not science, and hinder, instead of aiding efforts truly scientific, to explore the mysteries of mind. The antithesis between thought and matter can neither be asserted nor guessed out of being. The recent attempt of some scientists, by the magic of a *new definition*, to *endow* matter with reason and the conscious personality of mind—though an astonishing flight of the so-called “scientific imagination”—is demonstrably not science. True science still demands the acceptance by apprehension of what is self-evident; but,

be it remembered, it does not demand the *comprehension* of that which transcends finite powers of intelligence.

Living mind, self-evidenced, should be apprehended as a reality anterior to all possible *knowledge* of matter; and the existence and sway of mind demand a recognition in science *at least equal* with that of the existence of matter. But, upon the theory of its purely physical basis, by what possibility can there be a science of mind? Such theory, in the name of science, would relegate to nihilism the ground and supreme agent in science. It would be but a travesty of science, treating of a something evolved ever from nothing; of being, which exists only as vanishing; a will-of-the-wisp glinting in gloom; a phantasm of a physicist's dream.

INTUITIONS.

Let us now recur to the truth, that what may be known of mind must be learned through mind; and that we can know of it only what it reveals as inherent in its life. As the power to know rests alone in mind, it must therefore have inalienable sovereignty in knowledge. What, then, are the mind's supreme revelations? We answer, its intuitions. These, discerned through consciousness, shine by a light inherent in mind. We can not get prior to them, for they are the primal certainties in all knowledge. A truth seen through intuition is as indisputable as is the existence of the mind discerning it; for to quench the knowledge of the certainty you must quench the mind: from its organic nature it can not act as mind, without attesting the verity seen in the intuition. If there is possible doubt, it can be only as to the genuineness of a so-called intuition. If there be error, it will arise through mistake in confounding some imperfect interpretation of consciousness with a real intuition. That can not mislead; but in its appropriate sphere it must attest universal and immutable verity. As well may it be said that light is darkness, that sight is blindness, that life is death, as to say that a truly normal intuition can be fallacious or unreal.

The quest in physical science is ever to discover and test by observation and induction what is found in the natural world to be fixed in the nature of things. So the quest in the science of mind must be ever, if realities are sought, the sincere and docile study of that which the mind reveals as inherent in its constitution, and thus inseparable from its life. The hazard of error will not lie in danger of mistake through the mind's real deliverances; but it will lie in the illicit acceptance through prejudice, inadequate attention, or a biased animus, of that as normal to mind, which, in fact, is wholly or in part abnormal. Intuitions are the supreme law in thought. Given the mind, then by power inhering in its life it reveals as real that which is seen in the intuition. Intuitions spring from the very source of thought; they are thought unchangeably formulated. In them reason takes its rise, judgment has its seat. All reason, all judgment, all certainty seen to be real in the mind's horizon, revolve around, and are held in harmonious relation by, the soul's central life, which is ever radiant with the light of its intuitions. An intuition can not be proven; for it is itself the source and law of proof. In its realm it has original and exclusive jurisdiction. You can bring to it no overmastering verity. The mind, by its intuitions, manifests through consciousness its essential organon. However it became living, from whatever source, by whatever power it was ushered into, and is sustained in being, in no wise alters the fact that in living mind an intuition is supreme in the consciousness which it illumines. The fact that illusions and error, as to mental nature and action, have been multi-form no more invalidates a truly normal intuition than the vagaries and false systems of natural science invalidate the established laws of physics. Light is none the less light because it does not dissipate all darkness; truth is none the less real because error may still be possible.

A strict analogue to an intuition is ocular sight. The mind sees an intuition as it shines in consciousness. How it sees it, why it sees it, are side inquiries which may, or

may not, be relevant; but the fact, nevertheless, is clear that it does see the inherent verity attested by the intuition. So, through the eye we see an object in clear view. We may ask how, or any other side inquiry; but nothing can annul the fact that we do see it. Thus mental and ocular sight are self-evident realities; they borrow no leave to be. In either case, though you can not tell adequately how you see, and can give no *rationale* of either, in the relation directly proximate to your conscious life, still you see, by a power inherent in mind, wholly independent of ratiocination. All side issues are powerless to reverse the fact. Who will attempt to convince a man conscious of sight that he does not see? Argument in such case would be impertinent, for what is self-evident transcends argument.

THEISM ATTESTED BY INTUITION.

Permit here a brief *résumé* of our previous discussion. We have seen that the existence of mind is self-evidenced; and that from necessity it precedes all *knowledge* of matter: also, that mind as a conscious whole, ever acting personally, can not be disintegrated; that our knowledge of mind is dependent wholly upon its living action as known in consciousness; and that these self-revelations, when truly normal to mind, constitute the ground of certainty in knowledge, and are supremely trustworthy. We saw further, that mind is self-revealed as an entity *sui generis*, diverse wholly in sphere, properties, and life, from matter, which can be known only as it is discerned through mind. Then, considering the question, whether matter can be essential mind, we referred to the relation of mind to the bodily organs; and specially instanced the incongruities which characterize all theories that assume a physical basis of mind. This brought us to the consideration of the intuitions which, expressing the mind's essential organon, give law to thought, and attest the certainties which are seen through them to be universal and immutable.

Not attempting here to consider all that is intuitive in

mind—for our limits will allow but a fragmentary treatment—we now invite attention to a few references by way, mainly, of suggestion, to those first truths which, in the light of our own self-evident being, are seen intuitively to attest, as their necessary correlate, the being of our Author.

THE CAUSAL INTUITION.

In the presence of any discerned change or event, the human mind by spontaneous action accepts instantly as a certainty absolute, the existence of an adequate cause. Is this certainty discerned by intuition? The fact that such certainty is seen instantly, and alway, is beyond denial. Whatever its seat, or source, it is an act of consciousness as inexorably present in all related mental life, as even thought is. One could as soon eliminate thought from thinking, as the discernment of causal certainty from mental action. Men have differed as to its seat, its source; have differed in their attempted definitions of it, and statements as to the mode of causal action. Our limits forbid even a glance at the vast dialectic expanse which has been opened for survey. But the fact that, in man's real living, the discernment is universal in mind of the causal relation as a certainty in the nature of things has never been questioned, however diverse the theories as to its explication. Just as sight, ocular or mental, in its relation next to consciousness, is real; just as memory in the mind's life is actual, however theory and hypothesis may abound, or conflict, in strenuous endeavor to reach a *rationale* of either, without affecting in the least degree the reality of the fact of both sight and memory; so, dissertation and disputation are alike powerless to disturb the fact of the universal discernment by mind of the causal certainty. However the exigencies of ever-shifting theories as to origins, and potencies in cosmic relations, may require with some one mode of statement as to causal action, and with others, another; yet none can gainsay the fact of its discernment by all men, in all stages of progress, and in all time. A man, whether

civilized or savage, wise or simple, learned or ignorant, who in his practical living should ignore the reality of cause, as related to consequent, in the actual events which environ him, would be held universally to be of unsound mind.

In speculation, large allowance is made for diversity of theory and assumption, as to the nature and function of cause in the abstract. One may aver its reality to be but a fixed order of sequence, and may insist that phenomena as they actually occur are alone to be regarded in science, and that all pretension toward their explication as to essential cause will be futile; another will insist that all changes and events are determined by inexorable necessity, wholly without conscious prevision or purpose; and still another will insist that our discernment of the causal relation is solely dependent on experience. Yet, nevertheless, no one of all the multiform theorists—unless utterly demented—can for an instant, in his actual living, escape allegiance to the practical supremacy of cause, as determining consequent, in all concrete reality.

We here disclaim any attempt toward an explication of the *nexus* which potentially relates cause to consequent. We have to do only with the fact of its universal discernment, a discernment so supreme in consciousness as abundantly to warrant its acceptance as an intuition. Self-evidenced, it neither requires nor admits of proof; it stands toward proof in the relation of source, not subject. Seen to be actual, it not only demands, but conquers, acceptance. While thus apprehended, the fact that it can not be *comprehended* does not warrant even the shadow of doubt as to its regnant reality. Who, of all our race, whether physicist, scientist, biologist, or idealist, has even the faintest glimpse of a *comprehension* of *life* in its *substance*? and yet who can resist its apprehension as a supreme reality?

Appealing thus to the facts of consciousness, it will be now our endeavor, though briefly, to show—however variant the theories as to its explication—that the causal intuition, in our actual living, can neither be denied nor ignored. It

can be of no avail, as affecting realities, to aver, with the positivist, that the relation between cause and consequent is that only of the order of their occurrence. He may insist that all changes transpire phenomenally, and that, causally, we have to do only with the sequence, in their appearance, which we may by observation and induction determine to be a fixed order, none insisting on such fixedness more strenuously than he. But does he thus escape causal potency? He may deny the causal as existing beyond invariability in the phenomenal order of relation. But take, for instance, any known series of sequences. None can dispute their phenomenal order; none can doubt the invariability of the recurrence of the order under correspondent conditions. Still the question remains, what must such fixed order imply? and where can its fixedness be posited? The order in such series is either fixed, or it is not. If not, there is no order; but if in the series a fixed order of sequence is demonstrably established, and seen also to be invariably recurrent under like conditions, there must be *somewhere* a *potency* which *insures* the order. But to postulate potency to insure order of sequence as existing in a phenomenal series, and then to deny that such potency is proximate to the members which must constitute the series, is but logomachy. In the very affirmation of a fixed order of succession, in a series of phenomena, the old thought of efficient cause, as between antecedent and consequent—however masked by verbal evasions—sturdily returns, will ever return; for, however carefully it may be disguised, as traversing the animus of the positivist, he assumes an impossibility, when he postulates a fixed order in a series, and then seeks to eliminate all potency to insure the order from the members. He must eliminate the *order* from the series, or admit its efficient presence in the members. If in the series, it must be in the members, for they are the series; if not in the members, it is not in the series.

Again, the averment of necessity, as determining sequence—even were the conception that of blind, mechanical,

materialistic necessity—does not annul the causal intuition, excepting only as materialism precludes all just acceptance of mind. To admit the potency of an inevitable necessity in phenomenal sequence is still, though inadequately stated, a recognition of a universally discerned invariability of relation. Thus the fact, as attested by intuition, remains in no wise annulled, though crude, indefensible, and utterly incongruous theories be urged as accounting for it. The positivist and the necessitarian with an animus, it may be, repelling Omniscient and Supreme Will as the fontal or first cause, may deny a *nexus* in changes which potentially relates antecedent to consequent, and may virtually deny, also, all moral accountability as well; but tested in actual life, their philosophy—however vaunted—is powerless to put even them out of relation to the fixed nature of things; for they, with all men, are compelled to yield practical allegiance to the causal intuition. In the presence of every change or event actual to them in real life, they never fail to accept spontaneously and instantly the certain existence of a cause at once proximate, efficient, and adequate; and also the moral responsibility of all who trespass upon their personal rights.

To put to a practical test the sovereignty of the intuition which in the presence of any actual change accepts the existence of its cause, with the moral as well as natural realities which virtually inhere in it, let us, for illustration, suppose that some positivist and necessitarian—whose theory as to materialistic necessity pressed to its logical results would abrogate all moral and personal accountability—should encounter an assassin, who, with deliberate aim, should fire a loaded pistol and lodge a ball in the theorist's leg. Can any one believe it possible, in such case, that the latter would not with the swiftness of thought, and the certainty of intuition, feel the resistless potency of both a causal and moral *nexus* between the act of the assassin and the successive consequents which linked to it the wounded leg? and that he would not instantly arrest the criminal, and

hold him responsible for the wrong? Should some other necessitarian, at this juncture, remind the theorist that, in harmony with his philosophy, he should by no means attribute responsible guilt to the assassin, who only stood in his place in the inevitable order—a mere phenomenal sequence at that moment evolved—which, think you, put thus to actual test, would prevail—the philosophy of irresponsible necessity or the causal intuition?—which, flashing instant demonstration of a direct as well as moral *nexus* between the criminal and his act, would resistlessly sweep out of consciousness every figment of a theory so utterly incongruous with the nature of things. Because in the case supposed it would be absurd even to imagine that any so-called philosopher could have failed to accept, practically, a potential relation between the criminal and his act, fixing upon him moral responsibility for the wrong, by no means makes the illustration inapposite. Such an incident—too often actual in human life—puts to a crucial test all necessitarian theories which negative moral accountability. One such fact will refute, by a *reductio ad absurdum*, all theories which, when put to an actual test, can not be accepted, even by their adherents, as ruling in human affairs. Theories which treat of history, civilization, human life, and character, by regarding all events as but inevitable sequences phenomenally evolved under the blind movement of an irresistible necessity—thus utterly subverting all moral accountability—may dreamily float in the haze of abstract speculation, but, tested by the actual discipline of events, are swept instantly out of consciousness. So sovereign, practically, in human conduct is the ineradicable intuition that relates events to causes efficient, adequate, and proximate, which instantly fasten moral accountability upon the personal actors in them, that we may fearlessly challenge all theorists to the contrary to show a single instance in which any ideal necessitarian—if sane—ever failed, in the daily conduct of his life, to hold wrong-doers, inflicting physical or moral injury upon him, to personal accountability for acts subversive of the theorist's

rights not only, but opposed also to the welfare, and, if unrestrained, to the existence even of society, as well.

Permit now a brief reference to the theory which affirms that experience is the ground of all discernment of cause. Upon this assumption it should be made clear that the consciousness of causal certainty is begotten primarily by experience, and is strengthened and augmented in a direct ratio with the growth and breadth of experience. But do facts verify this? On the contrary, does not the voice of all experience attest such consciousness as universally present and sovereign in the mind of a child, no less than in that of the most matured and practiced reasoner? Was there ever a child, of normal endowment, that with the earliest gleam of its intelligence, when noticing some new thing, did not show a clear consciousness of cause by asking how the thing came, or who made it? iterating and reiterating questions implying cause, with the perpetual inquisitiveness so characteristic of childhood?

Reason in its action begets rational experience, but can experience beget reason?

The experiential philosophy—by which John Stuart Mill labored with tireless persistence to supplant the intuitional—posits the certainty of any given axiom in the mind's phenomenal experience, instead of in the mind's inherent power to know; call this power, as you may, inherent reason, inherent ability to see self-evident truth, or, in a word, the intuitions without which it could not be conscious mind. When Mr. Mill asserts (*System of Logic*, page 152), that axioms "are experimental truths generalized from observation;" and that "the proposition, two straight lines can not inclose a space, . . . is an induction from the evidence of our senses," and is made apparent in "mental pictures" of such lines, the ability to form which is the sequel of experience; he makes experience to beget in the mind the known certainty of the axiom; in other words, experience is thus made the revealer to the mind of self-evident truth;

thus placing the cognition of an axiomatic truth in sense-perception, instead of in the determining reason, and so virtually subordinating reason to the senses which serve it. A horse can see in sense-perception two straight lines fully as well as a man can; and, for aught we know, may perhaps be able to recall in memory "mental pictures" of such lines; but what philosopher will therefore aver that a horse can know the certainty of an axiom? The cognition of a certainty as absolute is the sovereign act of the mind; the experience in which such discernment arises is but the occasion of such act. The living mind, with its ability for consciousness, its faculty, its intuitions,—in a word, the constituent substance of its *life as mind*,—must exist prior to all possible experience. Experience is the act and fact of living; but before all living there must be life. While in the discernment of the certainty of postulates the mind must act relatively to the postulates, still the *power to know* certainties must ever precede, and be discriminated from, the phenomenal occasions of the exercise of such power.

Mr. Mill's positivist animus, ever magnifying the phenomenal, inclined him to make it fontal of all reality; leading him to question the existence of any cause "which is not itself a phenomenon." (System of Logic, page 196.) But the old antithesis of being before phenomena, of life before experience, can never be eliminated from logic or philosophy. A discerned certainty implies a discerner. No objective reality can either beget or supplant the antecedent power to know the reality. No dialectics—however consummate—can avail to supply or to displace, in either science or philosophy, the sovereign precedence of the discerning mind. Its acts of intelligence arising in experience, and thus *constituting experience*, do but relate life to living. Life must give law to living; living never can be contrary to the organon of life. Thus mind must precede and dominate experience; but no possible experience can ever nullify *the organon of mind*. Hence the absolute fallacy of a

notion countenanced indirectly by Mill,* and directly recognized as not impossible, by Professor Huxley (*vide* "American Addresses," page 3), who says: "A very candid thinker may admit that a world in which two and two do not make four, and in which two straight lines do inclose a space, may exist." A dictum so astounding is the extreme outcome of the attempt by the phenomenal to dominate the intuitional. The sure preventive of such fallacy is the just recognition in all science of the existence and organon of the *knower* before the possibility of the known. Until there is a thinker thought is impossible. The phenomenal experience of the thinker may limit to him the scope and volume of the known; but never—in this world nor in any world—can phenomenal experience *falsify* a certainty which is seen to be absolute by the power to know, which must be sovereign in all science and knowledge. It must, indeed, be a singularly "candid thinker" who may think that which directly nullifies thought. Were his candor to lead such thinker to "admit" that in the same absolute instant he could *both think* and *not think*, he might justly win fame as an *agnostic*, but surely not as a scientist, unless with the "candid" science is nescience.

In the presence, then, of a discerned change or event, we have seen it to be an incontrovertible *fact* of consciousness that the recognition of a cause as of necessity prerequisite, is spontaneous, instant, and universal in mind. This causal demand, in man's actual experience, has never been, and can never be silenced in mind. The substance of mind—whatever that may be—involves the causal intuition as elemental in the very essence of reason. Fontal in mind, the causal intuition by a law of rational coherence holds all known realities in steadfast relation and order.

* "Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," Vol, I, chap. 6, *vide*. Note p 90. Mr. Mill quotes from "Essays by a Barrister," without dissent, statements to the effect that mental and optical illusions, if never corrected, would warrant a conviction that two and two may make five, and that two straight lines may inclose a space.

In the universe of mind,—like the law of gravitation in matter,—*it binds all realities to the One First Cause and Source of Eternal Order.* It is in the soul, the voice of its Author and Upholder, proclaiming ever to all intelligences their relation of subordination and dependence. All knowledge, all philosophy, all science, all wisdom, all jurisprudence, all civilization, all moral order, rest upon this irreversible principle and fact of causality, co-ordinating all realities. It is the universal recognition of the fundamental necessity of ordained relation and adjustment, as every-where and eternally prerequisite to all orderly existence. But an ordained relation implies inexorably an Ordainer. Order upheld amid incessant action and change implies an Upholder. Thus, springing from the very substance of the mind, there arises ever, as a necessary prerequisite to its own existence, the recognition of the existence of its Author. As living beings it is self-evident that our existence is not self-derived, nor self-sustained; but that in all our relations we are every instant dependent on power existing before and above ourselves. We know intuitively that we could not have come into being, and could not be sustained in being, without adequate cause; a cause of our life, a cause of our intelligence, a cause from eternity adequate to the production of all that has issued from it. The intuition which makes it self-evident that we could not have risen into being without a cause adequate to the origination of all the powers which we consciously possess demands also that such cause must be original and all-causative in the universe. Our causal intuition can never rest until it reposes in Power, Intelligence, and Will as the absolute cause. If we *are*, and are *not eternal*, and did not *create ourselves*, we see intuitively that there must have been from eternity power and attributes in our Maker adequate to our creation and upholding. We see intuitively that the same necessity which makes the existence of an adequate cause of our being a certainty demands also that such cause be ultimate. If we have power of thought, he who gave us the power must eternally have

had power of thought; for by no possibility could impotence for thought beget the power of thought, either in time or in eternity. A mere extension of duration backward—though it were eternal—could by no possibility beget even the shadow of a tendency to cause the power of thought to take rise and spring into life *from blank impotence for thought*. If we have conscious mind, He who made and upholds us in being can not be less conscious nor less knowing than we are.

These intuitive certainties can in no way be canceled did we accept as our relation to the absolute cause—instead of immediate creation—a theory of mediate and progressive evolution as the method through which we have been endowed with being. Our intuitions do not demand a limitation by us, in any wise, of the infinite, nor necessitate knowledge in us of the methods of his working. But they do not only demand, but compel, our discernment of the certainty—inwrought into the substance of reason—that a cause adequate to the origination and upholding of all that we are must inhabit eternity. But the causal intuition, while it irresistibly demands the eternal existence in the universe of an adequate source of all that is real, by no means reveals to us the whole scope of the divine being and nature. The intuition enables us to know that as we are real in the universe, God must be, and is; but it does not enable us to know all about God. Yet the fact that as finite we can not comprehend God does not in the least invalidate the certainty that we may intuitively apprehend God by a *certain*, though it be *limited*, knowledge; and, when loyal to our intuitions, we must apprehend him as the sovereign reality in the universe. Because we can not comprehend a reality attested to us by irrefutable evidence is not the shadow of a reason for denying it. We can not comprehend ourselves; but who will, therefore, deny his own existence? Let no man, then, because he can not comprehend God dream that therefore he may deny him. If we

can not comprehend ourselves, what presumptuous unreason to reject God as unknowable because we may not comprehend him.

PERSONALITY.

In intimate relation with the causal intuition, mind also reveals through consciousness our personal identity. This we know intuitively to be real. But in what does it inhere? Not, certainly, in matter, for the matter in our bodies has been shown by science to be in unceasing change. In our corporeal substance we are never for two successive moments the same. Tissue is ceaselessly removed within our bodies, and as ceaselessly reformed. Nerve cells and structure in brain and ganglia are ceaselessly changed; waste and repair run parallel with every beating heart and heaving lung and acting nerve. Conscious life, mysteriously enthroned within the fleshly environment so marvelously co-ordinated and maintained in relation with it, is busy in sight, in thought, in apprehension of truth, assenting or dissenting to asserted verities, in the very exercise of its rational intelligence; meanwhile, the body changes, but we know that our conscious self remains unchanged in the integrity of our personality. In the light of mind alone, then, we see that our personal identity must inhere in our reason, faculty, affection, and will, self-revealed, as united in our conscious life. We know that we can think, and can intuitively apprehend unchangeable truth. We know that by logical induction and deduction we can see related truths in the light of reason. We know that we can desire, can love, can choose, can will, and that within the assigned horizon of our being here we can put forth free activities; and thus consciously generic attributes cohere in our personality, of transcendent meaning. A person is a reality in eternal contrast with a thing. A person, in his living, inevitably takes on *character* and *moral responsibility*, which are utterly unthinkable, as inhering in a thing. Thus we

see self revealed in this profoundest reality of all derived existence, the eternal antithesis between man and matter. Man, placed here as lord in the cosmos—what science can measure, what philosophy can embrace or exhaust the sublime meaning of his being? Shall science ignore living mind, and make the impossible attempt to gauge man by matter? Is it science to attempt, with Tyndall, to discern in matter “the promise and potency of every form and quality of life?” Man, known never as a thing, but always as a person, is in his conscious self a power in nature, superior to material nature, in that—within his ordained horizon—he may largely control it by his will. Thus in man’s personality there is revealed to him a living symbol of the personality of his Maker; a symbol which makes the idea of God thinkable, and, so far as apprehended, intelligible. This idea of God thus arises in his consciousness as inwrought intuitively into the substance of his thinking life. His causal intuition—as we have seen—reveals the absolute necessity of an adequate cause of himself; and his conscious personality makes it eternally certain that the Infinite Author can not be less personal than the creature.

Mind only can cause mind; and to mind only can mind be revealed. He who, in his own likeness as Eternal Mind, made man a living person thereby gave power to man to know his Creator, through the exercise of the intuitions and attributes which are ineradicably grounded in mind.

We close with a summary of the intuitional verities which reveal Theism as impregnably grounded in mind.

1. The eternal prerequisite to all knowledge in any being is conscious power to know; and this, we see intuitively, can inhere alone in mind.

2. This power, as existing in ourselves, is self-evident.

3. We know that this power in us is not self-derived, nor self-supported; but is held by us in dependence, both for its origin and exercise, upon pre-existent power.

4. This pre-existent power must always have been adequate to all that has issued from, and is upheld by, it.

5. Our consciousness reveals as self-evident the living union in ourselves of reason, will, affection, conscience, with all the cognitive endowments which are blended in our personal identity; and we know intuitively that no one of these could by any possibility have issued, either in eternity or time, from a source itself incompetent to the exercise of the whole sphere of faculty which it imparted.

6. Seeing thus, as self-evident, the impossibility that our living consciousness could have been begotten by dead non-consciousness; our thoughtful reason, by non-reason and impotence for thought; our will, by blind necessity; our conscience, by nescience; our personal identity, by impersonal mental nonentity—we see intuitively, in the light which reveals our own existence, the absolute necessity for the eternal pre-existence and supremacy of God our Author.

ARTICLE V.

REASON'S SPHERE IN THINGS REVEALED.

BY REV. I. N. CARMAN.

AMONG the thoughtful this theme will keep fresh, no matter how often discussed. To young thinkers, at the point of transition from traditional to personal faith, it is weighty as a matter of life and death.

What is the mind's first duty and prerogative on receiving a communication claiming to be a revelation from God? Obviously, it must demand credentials. It must be certified that God speaks. Until that is settled it can only accept the communication as it would one from any ordinary source. It can not assume that a message is divine. That demands proof.

Reason is, at first, as the child Samuel going to Eli and saying, Here am I, for thou didst call me. Not till later may it say, Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth. The prior need is credible evidence that it is he that speaks. But who shall decide for the mind what amounts to credible evidence? Clearly, it must decide for itself. Credence comes only where evidence is weighed. That evidence may be direct or indirect. It may be scanned by the mind for itself, or by another for it, as by Eli for Samuel. It was proof to Samuel that God was calling when he found Eli sure of it. Just in this way most persons in Christian lands receive the Bible as the Word of God. In Samuel as in Eli reason was first satisfied of the fact of actual revelation. The principle in these cases is identical. Here comes in an important general qualification. The individual sense, or apprehension of truth, is required to gauge itself by common sense, or reason's aggregate apprehensions. It is my right to think for myself. But it is my duty to find,

by comparison, my relative ability to think. Whether the best thought I can use be mine or another's, it is what I want.

Within these limits reason is competent to judge of the reputed fact that God speaks. It forms an estimate from both internal and external evidence. Reason demands that the nature of a proposition shall determine the nature of its proof. A supernatural communication must be attested by supernatural evidence. So reason insists that if there be a divine revelation miracles must be its credentials. Then if a miracle be addressed to my senses, reason bids me beware of overlooking some abnormal condition of those senses, lest at that point I be deceived. If asked to accept the fact of miracle on report of witnesses, I am equally bidden by reason to weigh their evidence and take it only at its worth. Here the question grows complex. It involves both discernment and veracity. Accuracy of report as well as correctness of perception must be taken into account.

But, as miracles may be either sensible or intellectual, suppose the latter sort to be in question. Then must reason ask whether the prophetic books existed before the facts they claim to have foretold, and whether the didactic part of the Bible could have had other origin than the Author of the human conscience itself; that is to say, whether any could have made the Bible but the Maker of the heart of man. So must the mind weigh evidence for a revelation, as that evidence is fresh or remote. It must admit the lessening of the testimony of sensible miracle through lapse of time and added links in transmission, holding the chain to be no stronger than its weakest link. But it finds itself compelled to recognize, on the same principle, the cumulative quality of the evidence of intellectual miracle. The fulfillment of Scripture before the eyes and within the souls of men adds strands to the cord binding our faith to the Bible, just as fast as time adds links to the chain of reporters of sensible miracles that were given at

first. It is thus reason's sphere to discern, as has long been argued, that the evidence of intellectual miracle must strengthen by time, as surely and at least as rapidly as that of sensible miracle can weaken. As the chain grows weak the cord grows strong.

These, however, are but specimens of the earlier and simpler functions of reason as regards the bare fact of revelation. Objectors arise, declaring that they find internal evidence that the Bible is not of God, even though there seem to be miracles attesting a revelation from him. They insist that they find certain necessary affirmations of reason within their minds as to what God must be, and thence what sort of communication must come from him, if one come at all. On this ground they allege it to be more reasonable to distrust their own senses, or both the senses and veracity of professed witnesses of miracles, than to believe the Bible to be of God.

At this stage, it is in order to appeal to common sense, from the individual fragment of human thought to mind at large. It is but fair to note how concurrent history blends with the Bible's testimony that, while unaided human wisdom always knew enough about God to make man responsible to him and fitted to receive a revelation from him, yet man by his own wisdom never knew God himself. With no prior notion of the Supreme Being there would seem to be no possibility of a judgment by man as to whether an alleged communication from him were authentic or not. On the other hand, his reason tells him that if man had such prior knowledge of what God and a revelation from him must be as to qualify him for identifying, without external aid, a genuine divine communication, he could scarcely need a revelation. If, moreover, the objector gives evidence that his acquaintance with the Bible is defective he appears chargeable with taking reason out of its just sphere in the very act of making such objection. Even within its sphere he misuses it, unreasonably neglecting to rectify the variations of his mental compass by the chart of common sense.

In this connection it should be noted that no inconsiderable part of the province of reason, as to weighing credentials, is determined by the degree of clearness with which it apprehends its own limits. It must know or believe something to begin with, in order to learn at all. In other words, it must have some means of knowing truth when it finds it. Apart from some primitive notion of a Supreme Being all that could be said to it about God would be forever unintelligible. Apart from a sense of moral distinction, right and wrong would be to it meaningless expressions, world without end. Without a prior notion of time none could be gained of eternity. With none of space, omnipresence were a word of no meaning. Enough. There are elements of human consciousness fitting man for a revelation from God. And where the hypothesis of a miraculously attested communication is weighed beside some alleged datum of consciousness, it seems quite in order to be as prompt to make sure of a correct reading of consciousness and a sufficient understanding of the Bible, as to make investigation whether its miracles be genuine or spurious. "Revelation," says Locke, "where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it against the probable conjectures of reason." "But yet," he further says, "it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words in which it is delivered." The voice of reason and the Word of God agree in saying, "Take heed to thyself and to the doctrine." This virtually recognizes, also, of course, reason's right to be heard in questions of canonicity and translation.

But when the fact of revelation is ascertained, when the canon is determined, when the best MSS. are identified and their faithful translation secured, reason's function in respect of Holy Writ is not ended. The great question of interpretation remains. By what standard shall reason interpret revelation? The mind's own laws of thought and expression must furnish such standard. Else interpretation would itself require interpreting, and revelation would not reveal.

“Whoso readeth let him understand,” is philosophy as well as Scripture. Yet must we own that the treasurer of Queen Candace has abundant company in the interrogative acknowledgment, “How can I, except some man guide me?” None may understand the Scriptures without extrinsic aid, nor apart from inward enlightenment fitting the mind to receive such aid.

Granting all this, the conviction seems still unavoidable that reason's sphere in interpretation remains such that whatever kind or degree of aid be given it no one can decide an interpretation for it. We are compelled, at last, as the least we can do, to judge whether to accept a given interpretation or not. Then reason has something within itself whereby it can weigh and measure the evidence that this rather than that is the sense of a passage. This sort of necessary judgment, however, is not that of which Luther affirmed the right and duty. Duty and necessity are not in the same plane. And necessity is verily laid upon us, would we have any belief at all as to the Bible's meaning, that we choose either an interpreter or an interpretation. Protestantism arose to denounce the slavish method of exercising this power of choice. The issue, then, was private judgment as to interpretations, or “Holy Mother Church” as final interpreter stilling the voice of reason before that of authority. In later phrase, it was “reason or Rome.” And still there is no middle ground. We must think for ourselves, as far as we are able, and then manfully choose, among the results of further thinking, such conclusions as seem to us most consistent with the things already settled in our minds. To do that seems clearly within reason's just province in the matter of interpreting revelation. To shrink from such personal investigation, whether through mental laziness or moral cowardice, may be convenience, may be respectability, may be reputed orthodoxy, but one thing it is not. It is not Protestantism. Accordingly, on this question of the relative spheres of reason and authority, many a nominal Protestant sides with Rome; while

some who are outwardly Romanists, as those of the Brownson type, are essentially Protestant.

And here a caution may be needful. There is apt to be danger in reaction. Revulsion from that abuse of reason which consists in exercising it beyond its legitimate sphere, and which we name rationalism, has caused many to grow so cautious as to fear the supremacy of reason within that sphere. The conflict between reason and authority they have mistaken for a war between reason and faith. The result has been an attempt to champion the side of authority as against reason, lest they should be false to the interests of faith. But as a fact of history reason and faith have often been allies, on the one side, as against authority and superstition on the other. Indeed, reason is the true natural defender of faith, to keep her from subjugation by authority and from enslavement to superstition.

One step more. Beyond the ground that faith and reason are not foes, one of which being espoused the other would have to be fought, the position seems rightfully ours that no more are they two forces between which one's convictions must either be poised *in equilibrio* or else be kept in the pendulum's oscillation.

Call these several things settled: God has spoken; we have his words, clear as possible of corruption, omission, and interpolation; we have the results of best translation and soundest exegesis. What is left us, in reason, but to believe? What were greater unreason than disbelief? Remember, the argument is not here with the many who live on negation and thrive by denial. It is for those who admit revelation. Should any such declare that still there are things in Scripture repugnant to reason, it is proper to say that such a position, or supposition, is by hypothesis inadmissible. Difficulty there may be, not repugnancy. If Scripture, as defined, seem to contradict reason, the trouble may be that we may misapprehend Scripture. Or a deeper trouble still may be that reason itself is misapprehended. To assume all deductions of reason as being of reason's

very substance will not do. Even the less risky process of induction is often hasty, oftener narrow. There is pure reason whose voice is pure truth. But that is not the voice of finite reasoning. Nor is it the reasoning of the Infinite. He never learns, never investigates, never reasons. We have something of the divine reason or we could not learn. Our necessary primitive cognitions link us to God and make us his pupils. But we need little reminding that, infallible as those elements of knowledge are, we are very fallible. The moment we begin to use them, liability to err is ours. We step upward upon our blunders. Modesty becomes us well. So does patience with the blunders of others.

Occasion for the patience does not lag. Now comes one saying that he can not believe further than he can comprehend. He must have the areas of reason and faith exactly coincident. And the man has a mixture of truth in this. By a little help he may eliminate the confusing error.

We know that soul and body coexist. We comprehend the fact. The *how* we know not. So we have no belief, *pro* or *con*, as to that. That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost coexist, we similarly comprehend, knowing nothing, believing nothing, as to the nature or mode of that revealed coexistence. Not even in the most common things is comprehension the measure of our faith. How an atom of matter in a blade of grass changes from the dead to the living state is as much a mystery as the divine incarnation. Our simple primary cognitions on which we so trustfully rest are, to us, every one of them, incomprehensible. How much more, then, should the cognitions of our faith be so.

Let us concede yet more. In the abstract, reason can not help affirming that the essentially incomprehensible is the incredible. Whatever superstition may receive, reason asks for faith a God who comprehends himself and every mystery beside. The province of reason in relation to faith can not, then, except within certain limits, transcend simple apprehension of the credible. Yet even reason's transcendent is not necessarily reason's contradictory. All compre-

hended matters of revelation being found consistent with reason, the presumption must be that whatever Scripture propounds to faith beyond reason's comprehension is still along reason's line, as seen by the All-seeing. It therefore seems reasonable that our finite reason, going to the end of its tether in faith's company, should then trust the care of faith to the Infinite Reason.

Nor do we in this stultify reason by any attempt to justify belief in what is seen to be inconsistent with reason. Such belief were not faith but superstition. Reason and faith are wedded by Jehovah. Mental and moral confusion come from here putting asunder what God has joined. And there is a curiously successful fallacy often lurking in the plea that such or such a proposition is unreasonable. Sift the matter, and the difficulty is in the thinker, not in the subject of his thought. Inability to see consistency is mistaken for ability to see inconsistency. Now these are as wide apart as the credible and the incredible. At no point is it more needful to learn reason's sphere than at this. It is the exact question of the limit of reason's powers, a matter that every thinker finds, sooner or later, by reason's wings beating against the bars of a cage. This is the school in which we pay high tuition, for it is the school wherein we learn only by dear experience. All sound philosophy says of its pupil, at the school's threshold, in good Saxon Scripture, "Let him become a fool that he may be wise."

Two things seem clear. To reason's extent, she may walk with faith, and be faith's helper. Thenceforward faith walks on, with reason's benison, indeed, but without her supervision. Meantime, is it *crede ut intelligas*, or *intellige ut credas*? Does faith rest on knowledge, or knowledge on faith? Does the miracle prove the doctrine, or the doctrine the miracle? Space would fail for adequate discussion of these and kindred queries the theme suggests.

A hint or two, however, in closing. What is logically first is often chronologically last. The child trusts its parent before it learns from him. Back of that it trusts its senses.

It believes in its own being, practically, back of every thing else. That this last named first experienced truth is developed in thought latest of the three is but natural. Much of the contest as to the priority of faith or reason is but a war of words. Call the starting-point primary cognition, or primitive belief, as you like. The thing that is first is agreed on; the fight is scarcely worth while as to names. It is best to go with such questions to Him who gave us our reason. He gives the willing, trustful heart the chief place. "If any be willing to do his will he shall know of the doctrine." Who will be as a little child is greatest in the kingdom.

Reason's province in things natural, as well as in things revealed, is very narrow. It shall have enlargement by and by. It may be we talk too much of the present limits of reason as essential limits. At the awakening with God's likeness there shall be deliverance. We shall then know even as we are known, and no longer see as through a glass darkly.

To sum up, four principles remain:

I. All our knowledge comes through certain notions held by us without question or proof.

II. All subsequent faith should consist with these.

III. Reason sanctions faith in the uncomprehended, but not in the intrinsically incomprehensible.

IV. It is for reason to find its limits, and within these correct the reasoning of individual mind by appeal to common sense; beyond such limits to look for guidance to the Infinite Reason.

Reason's sphere in things revealed, then, appears to consist of these three parts:

1. Determination of the fact.
2. Ascertainment of the doctrine.
3. Relegation of all beyond to faith.

ARTICLE VI.

THE FOUNDATION AND THE KEYS.

EXEGESIS OF MATTHEW XVI, 18, 19.

BY REV. S. W. CULVER.

THE first essential to a right understanding of this passage is an accurate view of what is meant by the term Church, and what is meant by the kingdom of heaven. It must be obvious to every one that these terms as used in the New Testament are not synonymous. The term Church (*ἐκκλησία*) is used in the Gospels, in Acts, and, for the most part, in the Epistles, to designate a local assembly of believers, having its own distinct organization, limitations, order, and discipline. The kingdom of heaven includes the whole body of believers, without respect to external organization, considered as holding a special relation of subjection to Jesus Christ, their Lord and King. The Church is local, the kingdom is universal. The Church is visible, the kingdom is invisible. The Church, though growing out of spiritual relations and subject to spiritual conditions, has essentially an external development. The kingdom is essentially internal and spiritual ("The kingdom of God is within you").

The term Church, of course, has its generic use, and there are also a few instances in the New Testament in which it is used in an evidently tropical sense, in which the various Churches are themselves regarded as embraced in a higher and wider organic unity, commensurate with the kingdom of God itself; constituting thus a Church of the Churches—"a general assembly and Church of the first-born, whose names are written in heaven." But the primary idea of the Church is that of a local assembly, and the distinction between the Church and the kingdom is clear and

unmistakable. In the proper sense of the term, *there is no invisible Church*. In the proper sense of the term, *there is no visible kingdom*.

This distinction needs to be borne in mind in our exposition of this as well as other passages. The building which Christ tells us in verse 18 he is about to erect is the Church. The keys spoken of in verse 19 procure entrance, not to the Church, but to the kingdom of heaven. Great confusion has resulted in many instances from a failure to observe so obvious a distinction.

Another point that deserves notice is, that Christ speaks of his Church not as already existing, but as that which shall be. The tense is future: "I *will* build my Church." The implication is that up to this time there was no Church of Christ in existence. The living stones were doubtless being prepared; but the building was not erected. The inference follows with all the force of demonstration that no Church (*ἐκκλησία*) of the Old Testament can be identified with the Church of the New Testament, nor any ecclesiastical development traced from the Old to the New.

Accordingly, while the kingdom of heaven is preached from the very first, even by John the Baptist, the first mention of the Church made in the Gospels is made in the passage before us, at a time when our Savior's ministry was considerably advanced. Soon after this he proceeds to prescribe the appropriate discipline by which its affairs shall be administered. The Church is not launched forth suddenly as by a divine fiat. Like most things that show the divine workmanship, it is built up by a gradual process of development. This development begins with the baptism of John, and is rendered complete by the establishment of the memorial supper—the ever-recurring symbol of organic unity and brotherhood in Christ. But it only gets its full equipment for its mission as the grand agency for Christian edification, Christian enlightenment, and Christian evangelism, on the day of Pentecost.

The fundamental thought of verse 18 is not, then, the

same as that of verse 19, though the transition from one to the other is entirely natural and easy. In the 18th verse Christ speaks of the spiritual foundation on which he is to build his Church. In the 19th he speaks of the external means by which the kingdom of God is to be made accessible.

These are the two topics that claim our attention in this passage. Let us proceed to consider them in their order.

We inquire, then, first, what is the foundation on which Christ declares that he will build his Church? The answer to this question must be contained in the statement "upon this rock I will build my Church." What, then, does our Savior mean by this rock?

The demonstrative *this* must, according to the necessary conditions of grammatical construction, refer to something present and distinctly pointed out by appropriate gesture, or else to something distinctly pointed out in the terms of the preceding discourse. Nothing is put on record as to our Savior's look or gesture on this occasion, so that the supposition that he indicated in this manner what he meant by "this rock" is altogether gratuitous and without a shadow of support. What he meant must be indicated with sufficient clearness in the terms of the preceding discourse. To suppose that our Savior expressed himself in terms so ambiguous as to need a supplementary conjecture for their elucidation is to represent him as either resorting to purposed ambiguity, which would certainly impeach his honor, or as unable to make his meaning plain, which would as surely impeach his wisdom. If we are at liberty to supplement the record with human supposition in this case, why not in other cases? And why not *ad libitum*? And, then, what becomes of the revelation? Such a course is evidently inconsistent with a sound faith in the record itself.

These considerations compel us to dismiss at once, as unworthy of the least consideration, the conjecture that Christ by significant gesture indicated that Peter was the

rock, and also the equally groundless conjecture that he indicated by similar means that himself was the rock. What may have been his look or gesture on this occasion we have no means of knowing; and what can we reason but from what we know? For a similar reason we must reject the theory that "this rock" refers to the faith of Peter, or to the confession which he made. It is evident enough that Peter was in the exercise of faith, and it is certain that he made on this occasion a noble confession. But it must be observed that neither the faith nor the confession of this faith has any distinct mention or any certain reference made to it in the reply of Peter or our Savior's rejoinder to this reply. There is, therefore, no referring "this rock" to either of these without supplementing the record with an unwarrantable assumption.

Let us now consider the theory that represents Peter himself as "the rock." It is certainly quite pertinent to the case to ask, if our Savior meant that Peter was the rock, why did he not say 'thou art the rock on which I will build my Church?' That he said no such thing should surely be received as conclusive evidence that he meant no such thing. The original terms employed in the passage are such as to render such meaning utterly impossible. The name Peter (*Πέτρος*) is masculine, as it of course should be when employed to designate the man Peter. But *ταύτη τῇ πέτρῳ* is feminine. It is a grammatical absurdity to suppose that the latter can refer to the former. The meaning of the two expressions is not the same. "Their classical use," says Dr. Alexander, "is entirely distinct, the latter answering to *rock*, the former to *stone*—the two being scarcely ever interchanged, even by poetic license."

The *stone* is in the nature of the case comparatively small; may, therefore, by many unforeseen casualties be overturned or moved from its place, and can only attain to permanence of position as it is compacted with that which is in itself immovable. It is not at all the kind of thing that is wanted for a foundation. It is one of the very things

that needs a foundation to support it. Peter's subsequent history strikingly illustrates this view of the case.

But the term "*rock*" conveys the idea of something massive, solid, immovable, enduring, and, therefore, suitable for a sure foundation on which the stones (*πετραι*) may be built up into an appropriate superstructure. Just as little can "this rock" refer to Peter, as a representative of all the apostles. The considerations now presented would be as conclusive against this view as against the reference to Peter personally. Besides, there is no intimation that he is representing any thing beyond his own selfhood. Moreover, neither Peter nor the other apostles ever represent themselves, or are represented, as the foundation of the Church of Christ.

In Eph, ii, 20, we read of "the foundation of apostles and prophets." But this language manifestly implies a distinction between the apostles and prophets, and the foundation on which they abide. They stand on a foundation. They are not, one or all of them, the foundation itself. In the 22d Chapter of Revelations, 14th verse, we read that "the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb." Their names, it is said, are inscribed in the twelve foundations. Nothing more. It certainly is not said, or implied, that they themselves are the foundation. The implication is precisely the contrary. Our conclusion, then, is that "*this rock*" is not employed as a designation of Peter, in any sense whatever.

Does it then refer to Christ himself? It would be almost as strange a grammatical usage to refer *this* to the person speaking, without something special in the discourse to make the reference clear, as to refer it in this instance to Peter. *This* is not a qualifier of the first person. There is nothing here to make such reference clear. But again, if our Savior meant to say "I am the rock," why did he not say so in unambiguous terms? He certainly has not said so; and, therefore, we infer he did not mean so. He has in *this*

passage placed himself in an entirely different attitude toward his Church. He is the *builder*--the founder—but not the foundation. The two conceptions are entirely distinct, and must not be confounded.

The Apostle Paul, it is true, does speak of Christ as the foundation. But he speaks of him as the foundation of what he (the apostle) is building, not of what Christ himself has built. He is withal speaking here, not of the Church, but of the preaching of the Gospel. Not Paul or Apollos or Cephas, but Jesus Christ is the foundation of all Gospel teaching and preaching, and other foundation can no man lay. But in the passage before us Christ represents himself as the builder of the Church—the true temple of God—and refers not to himself, but to “*this rock*” as the foundation on which he will build it.

Does Christ, then, mean by “this rock” the saying of Peter, “Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God.” We think not; for “this” refers to the near rather than the remote in composition as in place or time. There is nothing here to indicate the remoter reference. We should, therefore, expect it to refer to the words of Christ himself, which immediately precede, rather than to those of Peter that are separated from it by a wider interval. Besides, in no other place do we find this or any similar declaration, or any one particular doctrine, however important or compressive it may be, specified as the foundation of the Church of Christ.

Doubtless a critical analysis of our Savior’s language will disclose what he refers to as “this rock.” His statement in reply to Peter must be complete in itself. We therefore seek within it for that to which he thus refers.

First of all he pronounces Peter “blessed:” “Blessed art thou Simon Barjona.” It is noticeable that the apostle is here designated by his family name,—a name importing a strictly human relation; a relation of flesh and blood. Our Savior thus brings out the marked contrast between this, the lower relation, and the higher, the spiritual relation,

associated with the name Peter. He would evidently have him remember the relation that connected him with family and race, and thence with the whole of humanity, even in this hour of transcendent blessedness. The *man* is not to be merged in the *apostle*. He is never to forget that he is Simon, son of Jonas. Indeed, our Savior does not allow him to forget it. Even after his resurrection he reminds him of it in his thrice-repeated, most incisive question. In view of this Peter can claim no *special aptitude* for a higher blessedness. What had come to him could come to others as well. He held no monopoly of it. This blessedness manifestly came to the *man*, Simon. It established in him the Petrine relation.

Having now announced the fact of Peter's blessedness, our Savior gives the reason for it; that is, he specifies that wherein the blessedness consists.

"Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona, for [or, because] flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father who is in the heavens." The negative here is important as preparing the way for the most pregnant positive which succeeds. By the compound designation "flesh and blood" (*σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα*) we understand, here as elsewhere, that which is human, and usually the human in contrast with the divine. Our Savior's words, then, imply that the fact which Peter had just announced had been received from no human source. It was something that it was out of the power of any or all human resources to bestow. It had not come to him as a lucky guess or personal discovery. He had not derived it from tradition, had not been taught it by philosophy, had not acquired it by any logical process. The negative thus has the effect to exalt and enhance the positive.

Turning now to the positive side of the statement we find it affirmed that what Peter had received had been revealed (*ἀπεκάλυψις*), simply disclosed, unveiled to his apprehension. The language implies that he had been a passive recipient, while there had come upon him the spir-

itual quickening and higher enlightenment which had been manifested in the declaration just made.

“But my Father who is in the heavens.” And this is the highest, the culminating point, the grand essential of this blessedness, that the Infinite Father was communicating with the soul of the disciple. The spiritual quickening and enlightenment had come directly from the Father in heaven. The spirit of the man had come into contact and communication with the spirit God. A higher life had been imparted to him, the true basis, the essential condition, of which was, immediate spiritual communication with the Father in heaven. The special blessing did not consist in the fact that a disclosure had been made to him, nor in the fact that had been disclosed, but *in the supreme condition* of the disclosure. He had come into higher conditions, relations, and experiences, such as had in them an essentially divine element, such as could, therefore, subsist only by the presence of the Divine Spirit in the human soul. The human, the Simonian, relation remained; but there was superadded the divine, the Petrine, condition and relation.

“And I say also unto thee that thou art Peter.” This in addition to the blessedness now pointed out, and as a necessary consequence of that. When his brother first brought Simon to the Savior, Jesus said to him, “Thou shalt be called Cephas”—*a stone*. The saying was prophetic. The time had now come, and the conditions were apparent that made it appropriate that this designation should be applied in all the fullness of its spiritual import. Therefore, says our Savior, “Thou *art* Peter.”

Simon stands forth here in all the fullness of spiritual condition, a well-defined specimen of the living stones of which Christ would build his spiritual temple. But that which has made him such, the true foundation of his exalted experience, is the blessedness now pointed out—the presence of the Divine Spirit in his own soul. This, too, is *the essential condition, the true foundation* of all genuine religious experience. The one *vital, spiritual, essential, immovable, divine*

foundation; unique and peculiar, excluding all possibility of duplicate or imitation. Therefore, continues our Savior, "On *this rock*," that is, *on that which constituted the essential blessedness of Peter*, "I will build my Church." This alone can give spiritual strength and security, and out of it spring forth all the resources of the spiritual life.

Not only Peter, but every individual member, and the whole Church collectively, stands on this rock. Others besides Peter were afterwards brought into the same condition, and enjoyed the same divine blessing. Paul, in Gal. i, 15, 16, describes his own experience in terms that show the essential features to have been the same. God had "revealed his Son in him," and, in receiving this revelation, he had not "conferred with flesh and blood." In John i, 12, 13, we find similar language applied in general to all who receive the Divine Logos, and the vital energies that come through faith in his name. They are "born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."

Expositors have missed, it seems to me, the profoundly spiritual import of our Savior's words, while interpretations have been shaped very much by the assumption that some sort of officialism must be found in the position of Peter. Hence a passage that is self-interpreting has been made to present unwarrantable difficulties. The view now presented preserves the unity of the figure employed by our Savior, and makes the teaching of the passage and its connection homogeneous. And it is certainly in harmony with, and corroborative of, the same view, that the figure of the Church as a building for the indwelling of God, growing out of the indwelling of God in the individual soul, recurs as a standard figure of inspiration, and pervades the apostolic teachings. Paul calls believers "the temple of God," "the house of God," and "God's building." Writing to the Ephesians he describes them collectively as built on the "foundation of apostles and prophets," and as "living stones builded together for a habitation of God through

the Spirit." And Peter, writing to the "strangers scattered abroad," speaks of them as "lively stones, a spiritual house," applying to them a designation of the same import with that which had first been given by the Savior to himself, and even showing their relation to the Church to have been precisely the same as his own.

We need briefly to notice the declaration of Peter which our Savior makes the occasion of his discourse: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." The Father had announced this fact over the baptism of Jesus. There had been no repetition of the announcement. The people were evidently mystified and perplexed. They knew not what to make of Jesus. The disciples hoped at least that he was the Messiah. The world was oblivious of the fact that he was the Son of God. "He was in the world and the world knew him not." The voice that had sounded out over the Jordan was now sounding in the soul of the disciple. The voice from heaven was again heard on the mount of transfiguration, and Peter recurs to it as an event of unparalleled importance.

Two things are especially to be noted: First, that the Father is the Source of the revelation, whether the revelation is addressed to the outward sense or to the inner consciousness. It was God, he tells us, who revealed "his Son" in him. We may, then, affirm in general terms, that the Father is the original source of all revelation, either in human history or human experience; and, Second, that the fact of the Divine Sonship is, in either case, the central fact of the revelation. The Fatherhood and Sonship are correlative and mutually corroborative. "No man knoweth the Son but the Father, and no man knoweth the Father but the Son and he to whom the Son will reveal him." Without the Father there is no possibility of a Divine Son. Without the Divine Son there is no possibility of a Divine Father. "Whosoever denieth the Son the same hath not the Father." The revelation of Christ is the inauguration of redemption in human history, and the revelation of Christ

in the soul is the inauguration of Christian experience. Christ is here, as every-where, manifestly the mediator through whom is brought to human consciousness the knowledge of the Divine—the true Christian Theophany—the manifestation of God in the flesh to the human spirit. Hence the miraculous birth, as well as the subsequent miracles attesting his almighty power and Godhead. Hence, too, his own assurance to his disciples that he came forth from God, and that he was still identified with the Father, at once the “Son of man” on earth, and the “Son of God” in heaven.

There is no overestimating the far-reaching importance of the declaration made by Peter. It was in view of the truth contained in it that both Peter and Paul, in their Epistles, retaining still the figure of the building, but presenting a special aspect of Christ’s relation to his Church, speak of him as the “Chief Corner-stone,” “a Chief Corner-stone in Sion,” elect, precious;—the divine foundation and the Church that is built upon it being brought into unity, coherency, and completeness in his divine person.

“And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” Literally, “the entrances to Hades,” or the invisible world; evidently an impressive representation of death itself. The reason of what is here affirmed is obvious. Flesh and blood, it is true, can not inherit the kingdom of God; but the “gift of God”—the impartation that comes of the divine contact in which the renewed soul is anchored—is “Eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.” Hence, to the living stones of which the Church is built, death is but a transition to the highest and holiest fullness of spiritual and eternal life. Death is despoiled of his prey, and the purpose of Christ is fully accomplished in each individual case. The gates of Hades do not prevail against the Church, against her individual members, or cause the slightest tremor of insecurity in the everlasting foundation.

The keys spoken of in the 19th verse represent the means of procuring entrance for the sinner—not to the

Church—but to the kingdom of heaven. The passage must be interpreted in the light of well-known Gospel facts. By what means is the kingdom of heaven made accessible? Manifestly by the preaching of the Gospel. In all Gospel preaching two great specialties of practical moment will be urged upon the sinner, with perpetual insistence; namely, “repentance towards God, and faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ.” Such preaching sets the kingdom of heaven wide open to every sinner who will enter by the way of faith and obedient submission. But by the necessary limitations which are implied, and which must also be set forth in the preaching of the Gospel, the door is effectually closed to the unbelieving and disobedient. The same Gospel is, in one case, a “savor of life unto life;” in another, of “death unto death.” And thus, not by the exercise of his individual will, but as the inevitable result of his personal agency in preaching the Gospel, one is made free by the truth as it is in Jesus with the glorious liberty of the sons of God, and another is bound with the bondage of spiritual and eternal darkness. And these spiritual results that are wrought on earth are ratified in heaven. The power here attributed to Peter is accorded to all the disciples, and therefore to the whole Church in Matt. xviii, 18.

This spiritual power in the preaching of the Gospel was committed to Peter first of all, because, with inspired intuitions that outran the slower cognitions of the other apostles, he first apprehended the great central, vitalizing truth of the Divine Sonship,—the essential Godhood of Christ—without which there would be no Gospel, and, therefore, no Gospel preaching. But every true preacher of repentance and faith, through all time, whether he be apostle, missionary, pastor, or layman, is using the same keys that Peter used, opening the same way of entrance into the kingdom of heaven that he opened, and wielding the same well-nigh Omnipotent power of binding and of loosing.

On the whole, it does not appear that Peter has any official position assigned him in the passage under consider-

ation, or that there is any thing singular in the relation which he is represented as sustaining to the Church of Christ. The Church is composed of such as share the same blessedness that he enjoyed. He is one of the living stones of which it is built. His chief precedence lies in the fact that he was made a conspicuous illustration—a sort of object lesson—by means of which Christ taught the true foundation of his Church, the renewed spiritual quality of the materials of which it is composed, and the spiritual powers and responsibilities of its members. The spiritual potencies of the kingdom of heaven are immanent in the Church; and the Church itself is the visible exponent and appropriate symbol of the kingdom of heaven.

ARTICLE VII.

THE BELIEF OF THE HEBREWS IN THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

BY M. GREGOIRE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY REV. W. H. H. MARSH.

[THIS article was prepared in defense and as confirmatory of views advanced in a paper read before the "Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-lettres," in Paris, by a Jew, M. Joseph Halévy, in which he showed, from inscriptions belonging to the seventh century B. C., that the Phoenicians believed in a future life; and hence that "the Semites of Palestine, contemporaries and neighbors of the Sidonians, must have also believed in a future state." Soon after, and on two different occasions, M. Derenberg, a member of the academy and also a Jew, denied the correctness of M. Halévy's rendering of the Zidonian inscriptions, and hence rejected the inference that the ancient Hebrews believed in the immortality of the soul; and asserted that the Old Testament knows nothing of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul; that the Jews, at a much later period, learned it by contact with other nations, and especially with the Greeks. M. Rénan participated in this controversy, defending the position of M. Derenberg, but without going quite so far. The criticisms of these two scholars elicited a reply from the learned Mgr. Frappel, Bishop of Angers, and a second paper from M. Halévy, defending his first.

There is much in the article, as prepared by the author, relating to the present phase of the discussion in France between the Rationalistic Materialists and the orthodox Jews and Roman Catholic Biblical scholars, which we omit. We also omit whatever Protestants regard as irrelevant to the argument, as references to purgatory, etc. The Scripture quotations in the original are from the Vulgate and Roman Catholic French version. We have therefore preferred to give the texts in our common English version, as we have observed no instance in which there is any essential difference in the meaning.

The author attached numerous references and foot-notes. These, except Scripture references, the translator has omitted, and inserted a few foot-notes of his own.—M.]

I. THE OPINION OF THE JEWS ON THE FUTURE LIFE, AFTER THE BABYLONISH CAPTIVITY.

THIS is not the first time they have assumed that the Hebrews were ignorant of the destiny of the soul. Voltaire, in 1776, wrote: "View it in all its phases, you Jews will not find among you (in your sacred writings) any clear no-

of hell or of the immortality of the soul." And, it being thus, Voltaire was only the echo of a class of ~~men~~ of unbelievers, or even of Christians, who were ~~the~~ detractors of the children of Jacob, when they were ~~not~~ at the same time the faithful disciples of Jesus ~~Christ~~. Especially was he influenced by William Warburton, an English bishop, renowned for his paradoxical and ~~positive~~ spirit, who, in his "Divine Legation of Moses," suggested, virtually, the ideas recently submitted by M. ~~Reverdy~~. Since Voltaire there have been others, especially the Jews, M. Salvador, and M. Cohen, who, imbued with Nationalistic prejudices, have maintained that the Jews had no conception of the continued existence of the soul. They all concede that from the time of the Babylonish captivity the complete doctrine of the faith in another life, and of remuneration after death, is clearly expressed in the ~~Hebrew~~ canonical books and in the Talmuds, but the epoch to which they assign the date of the implantation of this dogma into the Jewish theology is that which follows the first destruction of Jerusalem.

We take note of this concession. It is certain that the Jewish Talmudists admitted rewards and punishments in another life; that they believed in heaven and hell. The treatise, entitled "Sanhedrin," is, among others, very explicit on this subject. The celebrated historian Josephus †

* Bishop Warburton claims that in the Pentateuch Moses neither affirms nor denies the immortality of the soul, and he cites the narrative of the translation of Enoch as evidence that the existence of the soul was assumed. (See also Murphy on Gen. v, 24, Comp. Heb. xi, 25.) Warburton says, "As to the future existence of the soul we should distinguish between the mention of it by Moses and by the following writers. These might, and, we suppose did, conclude for its existence from the nature of the soul." "Divine Legation," Vol. V, pp. 9, 10, Ed. London, 1765. His conclusion is, that "the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is not to be found in, nor did it make a part of, the Mosaic Dispensation." In the time of Moses he says, "The real sentiments of the Jews were doubtless the same with those of the rest of mankind who thought upon the matter—that it survived the body." *Ibid.* Vol. IV, p. 375.—M.

† His words are, "The bodies of all men are indeed mortal, and created out of corruptible matter; but the soul is ever-immortal, and is a portion of

believed in the immortality of the soul, and he asserts that it was believed by the Pharisees and Essenes as well. At a more remote period we find the same doctrine clearly formulated in the Books of the Old Testament. . . . The prophet Daniel* has expressed in a few words what must have been the views of the Jews at this period. "And there shall be a time of trouble, such as never was since there was a nation even to that same time; and at that time thy people shall be delivered every one that shall be found written in the Book. And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, לְחַיִּי עוֹלָם, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness, as the stars forever and ever." It is therefore clearly established by these passages that the Jews, from the time of the Babylonish captivity, had a very explicit and very accurate knowledge of the future life. This period of sacred history being excluded from the discussion (*mise hors de cause*) as well as the Gospel period, which no one has ventured to attack on this point, we shall examine at present only the ideas of the Hebrews respecting the soul and its destiny from their origin to the epoch of their transplantation in Chaldea. It is here that the divergent views of philosophers and critics commence.

the divinity that inhabits our bodies." ("Antiquities," B. iii, Ch. viii, ¶ 5.) Of the Essenes, he says: "They teach the immortality of souls, and esteem that the rewards of righteousness are to be earnestly striven for." (*Ibid.* B. xviii, Chap. ¶ 5.) Compare a more detailed account in the "Jewish War," B. ii, Chap. viii. These references are to Whiston's "Josephus," Lippincott's Ed., Phila., 1855.—M.

* The remarks of Ewald, although he denies that the Book was written by Daniel in Babylon, but asserts it to be the work of an unknown Jew, written about the time of the invasion of Judea by Antiochus Epiphanes, B. C. 168–6, are worthy of note. He says: "At this time of utmost tension of circumstances . . . the innermost impulse of all true religion rose with growing strength. . . . The bright hopes of immortality and resurrection received a firmer and clearer development and power than they had ever done before. These hopes, as we have observed before, had long been established in Israel as one of the brightest and most enduring fruits which

The diversity of opinion on this very serious question is doubtless explained by the religious prejudice which too frequently intervenes, but it is likewise necessary to recognize another cause,—the complex character of the problem to be resolved. For, if we do not distinctly put the statement of the question, if we do not study it successively in all its phases, it is impossible to come to unity of view and to arrive at solid and exact conclusions. The discussion has not always been prosecuted with sufficient logical order and exactness, from which cause errors have accumulated upon this subject. Does some one desire to show that the Hebrews were ignorant of the immortality of the soul? He attempts to show that they had not a clear idea of the resurrection of the body or of the nature of another life. Yet these are things very distinct, however strictly and logically connected in themselves. As M. Alfred Maury has justly observed, “we must not confound the idea of the immortality of the soul with belief in the resurrection; for, as we understand, this resurrection does not necessarily suppose immortality.” Moreover, we must not confound the survival of a human being with the doctrine of ultra-terrestrial remuneration. M. Lubbock has adduced numerous facts and made deductions which establish the conclusion that “among many wild tribes possessing the notion of continued existence the idea of the resurrection of the dead is absent.” To avoid all the ambiguities and dangerous equivocations let us examine successively what conceptions the ancient Hebrews themselves had, (1) On the nature of the soul; (2) On the duration of its immortality; (3) Of Sheol, or the place of departed souls; (4) Of remuneration after death; (5) Of the resurrection of the body.

II. THE NATURE OF THE SOUL.

We find nowhere in the Bible a didactic exposition of the nature of the soul; no more do we find a formal demonstration that its thousand years' experience had brought forth upon its sacred soil.” “Hist. of Israel,” Vol. v, pp. 305, 306. Carpenter's Trans. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1874. See Lange on Daniel xii, 1—3.—M.

onstration of its existence, nor of its distinction from the body. Those philosophical processes, and that subtle analysis of which the Greeks have left us the precept and the example, are not in the Oriental genius, which expresses itself only in figures of speech, and utterly abhors abstractions. But if any one will, for himself, carefully analyze the ideas couched under these metaphors, and divesting the thought of these borrowed ornaments, in order to see the naked truth, it will be easy for whoever may wish to see distinctly to recognize the Hebrew psychology and to admire its accuracy.

Of this psychology the first page of Genesis is a *résumé*. God first formed the body, the material part of man, which he took from the dust of the earth,* **עָפָר מִן-קֶדֶשׁ אֲדָמָה**. Afterward he breathed into him the breath of life; he gave to him an immaterial spirit, **נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים**. The union of this body and of this spirit, this **עָפָר** and of this **נִשְׁמַת** formed the man, **חָיָה**, the “living soul,” which received the name Adam, or “man.” The earthly body, although fashioned by the hand of God, was therefore primarily only a stature without life, and it became man only when a new element, the **חַיִּים**, **נִשְׁמַת**,† was added to the first, and thus formed from the two elements one unique person. Could we desire a more lucid

* Gen. ii, 7. Delitzsch regards this verse as the germ of Biblical psychology. He says, “From the announcement upon the substance of man’s nature as it was created, which we read in Gen. ii, 7, . . . extends throughout Scripture a many-linked chain of assertions upon the pneumato-psychical nature and life of man. . . . And here at once is a system, to wit, a system of Biblical psychology as it lies at the foundation of the system of the facts and the revelation of salvation.” *Psychologie*, Edinburgh ed. 1867, p. 26.—M.

† The phrase **נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים**, literally “breath of lives,” says Murphy, “is peculiar to this passage. It expresses the spiritual and principal element in man, which is not formed, but breathed by the Creator into the bodily form of man. This rational part is that in which he bears the image of God, and is fitted to be his vicegerent on earth.” On Gen. *in loco*, Am. Ed., 1867. It is remarkable that the plural should be used, “lives,” not “life.” Bush says, “Some have supposed [it to intimate] that man possesses the vegetative life of plants, the sensitive life of animals, and that higher rational life which distinguishes humanity.” Notes *in loco*, Young’s Ed.,

affirmation of the existence of the soul, as well as the difference in nature existing between it and the body? Nevertheless, the Scriptures add a feature which makes these truths still more striking and palpable. Man is superior to the beasts in the structure of his body (*par son corps*)—a work of the finger of God himself; but he is especially superior to the beast, inasmuch as by his soul he is made in the “image and likeness” of God. We greatly admire, and justly, the disciple of Socrates when he denominates man a “celestial plant;” but what is the language of Plato* compared to that of Genesis, which exhibits to us, in our souls, the image of God? What a depth of meaning in this simple word. The expression of Moses has and it can have only one sense. It signifies in our unimpassioned and prosaic, though more precise, tongue that man is composed of both body and soul; his body was formed from the earth, but his soul was created directly by God, and it is by it that he resembles his Creator. His body is not the image of God, for he has his body in common with the animals; and beside, God has not a body. He is not in the image of God because he is endowed with life, for he has (natural) life in common with all other living beings; and, consequently, it is not his characteristic sign; or, speaking more philosophically, his proper differentiation; he is the image of God by his immaterial soul, intelligent and free, which is his exclusive heritage, which constitutes him King of creation, and entitles him to command all nature.

All this has been said since the time of Moses, in terms more abstract, and, if men will insist, more precise; but no one ever said it with such sublimity of style, or with more

Boston, 1870. Lange thinks it denotes “The unity of the life in all living persons, and in any living thing.” On Genesis *in loco*.—M.

* M. Gregoire simply refers to the Phædo without indicating where the thought he quotes may be found. Perhaps this passage, “The soul is in the very likeness of the divine and immortal and intelligible and uniform and indissoluble and unchangeable; and the body is in the very likeness of the human and mortal and unintelligible and multiform and dissoluble and changeable.” Jowett’s Plato, Vol. I, p. 408. Scribner’s Ed.—M.

truth. Bossuet, with the brilliancy and authority of his name and language, says that God formed the other animals in this manner. "Once more (*encore un coup*); the earth produced the plants and the animals." And thus they received their being and their life. But God, after having taken in his all-powerful hands the dust of which the human body is formed, it is not said that he *drew from it* the soul, but it is said that "he *breathed into it* the breath of life," and that in this way man became a living soul. "God," Bossuet continues, "causes each thing to be evolved from its proper elements [*principes*]. He produced from the earth the herbs and the trees, which have no other life than the terrestrial and purely animal; but the soul of man is drawn from another principle, that is, from himself. It is this that is designated as the breath of life, which God drew from his lips to vivify man. That which is made in the resemblance of God does not proceed from material things. For this image is not hidden in these inferior elements to be developed out of them as man makes a statue of marble or of wood. Man has two principles. As to the body, he is of the earth; as to the soul, he comes from God alone: and for this reason Solomon says while the body shall "return to the earth as it was, the spirit shall return unto God who gave it."

There are, therefore, to recapitulate, three successive moments in the creation of man. God first formed the material substance, "the dust," עָפָר, or the flesh, בָּשָׂר, which we call the body. He next gave to this body "the spirit," which vivifies it, נְשָׁמָה, its breath, which elsewhere the Scriptures call רוּחַ, which the Greeks name πνευμα, and the Latins *spiritus*. Then, from the union of spirit and matter, is produced the נֶפֶשׁ הַחַיָּה, the living soul—*ψυχή*—*anima*, the unique but compound being, that is, man. The "living soul" or man is not, therefore, the spirit alone, any more than it is the body alone; it is the compound (*composé*) of both, the *conjunctum*, as it is called by St. Thomas—the personality which out of two different substances makes but

one individuality. Hence, the usage in Hebrew as in Arabic of נפש for the reflexive pronoun self. The meaning of each of these several words, נפש, רוח, נפש, and of their synonyms is faithfully retained in all the books, not only of the Old but also of the New Testament in the original text, as also in the Septuagint translation and in the Latin Vulgate. The Psalmist sings, "Therefore my heart, לִב, is glad; my flesh, נַפְשִׁי, also shall rest in hope."* The Proverbs preserve the same distinction (*disent dans le même sens*), "A sound heart, לִב, is the life of the flesh," † נַפְשִׁי. Job says to his friends, God holds "in his hand the soul, נַפְשִׁי, of every living thing, and the breath, רֹחַ, of all mankind," ‡ נַפְשִׁי. Our Lord says in Matthew, "The spirit, πνευμα, indeed, is willing, but the flesh, σαρκ, is weak." || The Virgin Mary sings, "My soul, ψυχῇ, doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit, πνευμα, hath rejoiced in God." § Writing to the Thessalonians Paul says, "And I pray God your whole spirit, πνευμα, and soul, ψυχῇ, and body, σῶμα, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." ¶ And, by a remarkable coincidence, the philosopher of Stagira (Aristotle), in his treatise on the soul, uses the same language as the Bible. He also discriminates in man, the body, the spirit, and the soul, the σῶμα, the νοος, and the ψυχῇ, and he likewise regards the spirit as a distinct creation (*Il faisait aussi venir l'esprit du dehors*).

Thus the distinction between the soul and the body, and the close union of the two substances forming only one personality, are very plainly shown in the Bible. The Hebrew psychology also attributes, with remarkable definite-

* Ps. xvi, 9. † Prov. xiv, 30, (Comp. Ps. lxxxiv, 2, Heb.—M.)

‡ Job xii, 10, נֶפֶשׁ-אִדָּמָה, literally flesh of man. Comp. Num. xvi, 22. Isa. x, 18; xxxi, 3. (M. Gregoire cites Job xiv, 12, but the citation is evidently a typographical error, as it has no allusion to the point he seeks to establish. Job xxiv, 12, would be more pertinent, but is not the language he cites, which is, "le corps, נַפְשִׁי, souffre, et l'ame, נַפְשִׁי, s'afflige; i. e., the body suffers and the soul is afflicted.)—M.

| Matt. xxvi, 41.

‡ Luke i, 46, 47.

¶ 1 Thess. v, 23. (Comp. 1 Cor. xv, 45, 46, 47; Heb. iv, 12.—M.)

ness, to the נפש, the faculties which we ourselves attribute to the human personality,* as sensibility, intelligence, and will. The soul loves. It hates. It rejoices. It is grieved. The sensations of sorrow and of pleasure, of hunger and of thirst are attributed to the soul, as well as the sentiments of fear and of hope, of strength and of weakness,—the vices and the virtues,—the benedictions and the imprecations. It is this נפש that thinks and that feels, that remembers and that forgets. It is this also that wills or does not will, and that forms and executes resolutions. ארץ נפש exactly corresponds to long suffering, and קצר נפש to cowardice, רוח, designating the spirit, is naturally like נפש, the seat of the sentiments and the affections, of the will and of the understanding.

The Bible nowhere explains what the essence of the רוח is. It has been assumed that the Israelites did not conceive of the soul as a spiritual essence, because they designated it by names which all signify “breath” or “wind.” This argument, borrowed from etymology, is here valueless; for human language has had of necessity to avail itself of sensible and material figures to express metaphysical ideas, and to designate immaterial beings. This is a rule admitting of no exceptions. Now the majority of nations, perhaps, from a confused recollection of the ancient and primitive traditions respecting the origin of the soul, have regarded the breath—the wind—as the most pertinent and ex-

* “נפש occurs in the Hebrew Bible more than seven hundred times. According to all lexicographers, the several meanings of the word are (1) *breath*; (2) *life*, like the Latin *anima*, originally *breath*, secondarily *life*; (3) like the Latin *animus*, the *soul*, especially as the seat of the thoughts, emotions, and desires; (4) a living being, especially a human being. . . . The primary sense of the word is actually used in our Bible but once, Job xli, 21. . . . It is not difficult to see the connection between the several meanings of this word. Breathing is the most essential thing in the maintenance of physical life. . . . Again, the appetites, feelings, passions, and perceptions are manifestations of *living beings*. . . . It generally means either the *sensibilities*, or it means the whole *person*, inclusive of what we call soul and body.” “The Soul Here and Hereafter,” by Professor C. H. Mead, Andover, pp. 13, 15, 22.—M.

pressive image by which to represent to the imagination and to express by a single word the spirit,—that hidden and immaterial agent, which our senses are not able to apprehend, as our eyes can not see that invisible wind of which the existence manifests itself only by the effects we behold?*"Soul" and "spirit" primarily have no other sense than breath. In Latin, in Greek, and in Sanskrit, respectively, the same word designates the soul and the wind, as also in Hebrew and in Arabic. The expressions employed by the Bible, therefore, indicate rather the immaterial character of the thinking principle, inasmuch as they designate by terms the least gross and the most subtle, in some manner (*en quelque sorte*), what it was possible for them to reveal by terms identical with those used by the most spiritual philosophers—Plato, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Aquinas, and the scholastics. Nowhere is it said that the soul is only corporeal. No more, it is true, does it (the Bible) say that the soul is a pure spirit. It could not even assert it for it possessed no word to express this idea. No more does the New Testament affirm it. But all that the (Hebrew) Bible could do it has done; it has implied the spirituality of the soul. It speaks to us of the nature of the soul, in harmony with its simplicity, in the same terms in which it speaks of the nature of God. It never expressly affirms that God is a pure Spirit; no more does it affirm that God is flesh, body, or matter. Even according to the boldest anthropomorphists themselves, it avoids expressions that would make man think that God is a being similar to himself. It has thus taught the divine immateriality by means of reserve and inference so far as the imperfect and incomplete language, from a metaphysical point of view, in which the Bible was written, permits.

The same thing is true of the spirituality of the soul. The soul, or the נֶפֶשׁ, is distinct from the body. נֶפֶשׁ is applied to men and to beasts, like "Âme" in French, because it does not exclude the body, and signifies frequently the

* Ps. lxxviii, 39, and John iii, 8, for example illustrate this remark.—M.

life; but it is not spoken of God. רִיחַ, the spirit, on the contrary, is applied to him in Hebrew, as spirit is in our language to God and man, but not to beasts. There is, therefore, between God and the רִיחַ, some analogy in its nature which distinguishes the latter from material things. It is never, in fact, confounded with that composition of dust—the body—it is many times even carefully distinguished from the body.* Ecclesiastes uses the רִיחַ which ascends to God its Author, as the antithesis of the עָפָר which returns to the earth from which it had been taken.† Moses and Job alike distinguish רִיחַ from בָּשָׂר—the spirit from the body.‡ Man, when he listens to his carnal passions, descends from his high position and becomes like the beasts;|| taken on his better side, he is only a little inferior to the angels,§ he is Godlike. “Now in what specifically resides this similitude to the Infinite Being, incorporeal and eternal to the power, the intelligence, and the Divine Goodness?” asks M. Th. H. Martin, in his excellent book on the “Future Life.” “Is it not in the soul, in this ‘breath of God’—this breath of intelligence which is in us the Lamp of the Lord?” using a figure taken from the Bible, in the soul which is endowed with reason; of which, according to the Psalmist, the animals are destitute.¶

But the union existing between the body and the soul of man is not indissoluble; it is dissolved at death. The Hebrews considered death as the separation of the soul from the body. Created beings cease to live and return again to dust when God withdraws their souls,** רוּחָם. Or

* “It occurs about three hundred times, and of those about seventy times of the Divine Spirit. . . . It is never rendered by ‘life,’ and never ought to be; but it is sometimes used of the spirit in the lower sense of *animation*, or *feeling of life* (as in Judg. xv, 19, and 1 Sam. xxx, 12). . . . The predominant meaning of רִיחַ is almost precisely what is denoted by our word ‘spirit.’ It stands for the higher, divinely implanted organ of *thought and moral feeling*.” Professor C. H. Mead, “The Soul here and hereafter.” Pp. 24, 25, 26.—M.

† Eccl. xii, 7.

‡ Num. xvi, 22; Job xii, 10.

§ Ps. xlix, 13, 20.

¶ Ps. lxxviii, 6 (Comp. Heb. ii, 6, 7.—M.).

¶ Ps. xxxii, 9.

** Ps. civ, 29.

in the view of the Biblical writers, to die is to disrobe* the soul of the body, which seems to indicate that the body is to the soul as a garment of which death will disrobe it. Hence, the resurrection is caused by the return of the soul into the body. When the prophet Elijah was at Sarepta, the widow who entertained him lost her only son, and she said to Elijah, "O man of God, art thou come . . . to slay my son?" And Elijah took the child, and prayed, and said, "O Lord, my God, I pray thee let the child's soul, שְׁמָךְ, come into him again. And Jehovah heard the voice of Elijah, "and the soul, שְׁמָךְ, of the child came into him again, and he revived." † In similar terms Luke narrates the resurrection of the daughter of Jairus. ‡ At the voice of Jesus her spirit, πνευμα, came again. And in the remarkable vision of the dry bones, when Ezekiel had prophesied over them the first time, the bodies assumed their primitive form: there was nothing lacking—nerves, flesh, skin—except life—because there was no breath, רוּחַ, in them. By the command of God he prophesied a second time; then the soul came to animate these bodies, and they "lived and stood up upon their feet." || The life of man is, therefore, the result of the union of the soul and of the body, and death is the sundering of this union. The body, separated from the soul, is buried in the bosom of the earth, where it returns to dust; § but the soul separated from the body, does it die as the body? What becomes of it?

III. THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

Why should they not have had it? We can not reasonably doubt that the Chaldeans, their ancestors, had a knowledge of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. . . . One of the most significant indications of the belief of a people on the destiny of the soul after death is found in

* Isa. liii, 12 (E. V. "He hath poured out his soul unto death." M. Gregoire quotes from the Vulgate, which reads, "*Nudavit per mortem animam suam* "). More appropriate would be such passages as Job iv, 19, Ps. cxli, 8, 2 Cor. v, 1-4.—M.

† 1 Kings xvii, 18-23. ‡ viii, 55. || Ez. xxxvii, 1-10. § Gen. iii, 19

their funeral usages; for we not only venerate those who are no more, but we think, even after they have left us, that they have still some kind of existence. The Chaldeans must have had conceptions of this sort to have treated their dead as the modern excavations inform us they did. There appears to have existed among them a kind of sacred place devoted to sepulcher, and to which their piety attached religious ideas; for the human remains accumulated in lower Chaldea and especially at Warka, the ancient Erech of the times of Nimrod are incalculable. They (the excavators) were at first greatly surprised not to find Assyrian burial places in Assyria; but it has since been discovered that Chaldea was the necropolis of Assyria. The dead seem to have been transported by the Tigris and the Euphrates into the latter country as into a holy land. The sarcophagi, in which they were inclosed, are of small dimensions. They seem to have shown special solicitude to give only a small place to each of the dead, so that there might be space for a greater number of them. The most of the coffins are ornamented. They are made of unburnt clay but dried in the fire. Their shape somewhat resembles an immense slipper. On the exterior is seen a regular series of ornaments in relief, among which, and many times appearing, is a human form—the feet separated, the right hand resting on the hip, and the left hand armed with a short sword. The upper part of the coffin presents a large opening at one of its extremities. This opening is closed by a flat cover carefully cemented at the sides.

The bodies of the dead interred in Chaldea were wrapped in bands in the manner in which Lazarus, as we learn from the Gospels, was bound. The hands remained free on the breast. The head also was free. In each hand was placed a sort of mace with a circular head, which was undoubtedly a religious emblem of which the signification is to us unknown. They probably coated the body with bitumen to preserve it. Nor is the fact to be unnoticed that these sar-

cophagi frequently contained jewels and inscribed bricks, sealed, which are undoubtedly family records. Lamps, and particularly vases, found inclosed in the tomb, could have been placed there only to serve the deceased in another life. They also contain food. At Mergheir, the ancient Ur, the country of Abraham, M. Taylor discovered in each coffin two vases—in the one were still the stones of dates; in the other the bones of birds, the scales of fish, and remains of other kinds of food. M. Loftus says: "The practice of placing provisions and water near the deceased was certainly allied to the superstitions of this epoch."* It is very difficult not to discern in all the care given to the burial and in all these funeral rites so many indications of the faith of the Assyro-Babylonians in the immortality of the soul.

The little we know of the burial rites of the first Hebrew patriarchs in the land of Canaan is sufficient to teach us the importance they attached to their entombment. Abraham, desiring a family tomb, purchased one for a large sum. There he buried Sarah his wife and there he was buried himself, as also Isaac his son and Rebecca his wife. Jacob likewise there buried Leah his wife, and on his death-bed earnestly enjoined it upon his sons to bury him there, which they did. Joseph also instructed his people that when they should take possession of the Land of Promise they should carry hither his body, and his posterity interred him in the midst of those at Shechem, as we have seen; all thus leading to the conclusion that the branch of the Chaldeans migrating from the banks of the Euphrates gave to the mortal remains of their dead honors very nearly similar to those they gave them in their mother country, and attached to those ceremonies the same signification respecting the continued existence of the soul after death.

[M. Gregoire next adduces the fragment from Berosus respecting the flood and the cuneiform inscriptions translated by George Smith and by Fox Talbot. We omit this part of his argument as our limits

* Loftus' "Travels in Chaldea," pp. 204, 205; Layard's "Nineveh and Babylon," pp. 558-560.

forbid its introduction, and the author, while showing that the doctrine of immortality is strongly suggested in those inscriptions, admits that the argument they afford is inferential rather than positive.—M.]

If we pass from Chaldea, the birthplace of the Hebrews, into Egypt, where the descendants of Abraham became a people, we enter the same country, the inhabitants of which, in the opinion of the ancient Greeks, were the first who taught the immortality of the soul. We do not think that the Egyptians discovered this great doctrine, for it is not an invention of man, but a revelation from God. The testimony of Greek antiquity, however, is valuable in this, that we understand by it from whence their philosophers derived their ideas on this important subject. Some, in recent controversies, have implied that the Jews had borrowed their knowledge on this subject from the Greeks; but the Greeks assure us that they themselves had received their knowledge from the people with whom the Hebrews had been in connection from their origin. The popular beliefs among the Hellenes in another life were anterior to the appearance of their first sages, as is proven by the poems of Hesiod and Homer; but the philosophical form of these beliefs does not date earlier than Pherecydes,* of whom Cicero, in harmony with all the authors of antiquity, says, in his *Tusculan Dis-*

*Curtius says Pherecydes "found a second home in Athens," and was "a man who lived entirely in the traditions of the prehistoric ages, and whose object it was to arrange in order the mass of myths concerning the gods and heroes." *Hist. of Greece*, Vol. II, p. 548, Packard and Ward's Trans., Scribner's Am. Ed., 1874. He says nothing of his having been the teacher of Pythagoras, but of the latter he says that he, about 530 B. C., "emigrated, and transplanted to Italy the germs of a philosophy which had developed itself under the influence of an intercourse with Babylon and Egypt." *Ibid.* pp. 167, 168. Of the source whence the Greeks derived their belief in the doctrine of the immortality of the soul he says: "The deep earnestness with which the Egyptians clung to this belief was the best element in their spiritual life. . . . The Greeks . . . were too zealous searchers after truth, and their general conceptions of the nature of the soul too uncertain, for it to have been possible for them to resist the impressions of an earnest doctrine of immortality, supported by deep conviction. . . . In any case the lasting influence of the Egyptian doctrine is undeniable, and the Greeks openly confessed that in these matters they were the scholars of the Egyptians." *Ibid.*, p. 58.—M.

putations, "Pherecydes, the Syrian, first said the souls of men are eternal." Pherecydes lived in the second part of the sixth century B. C. He was, according to tradition, the master of Pythagoras. Some say he was a Syrian; others, with probability, affirming that he was originally of Syros, or Syra, one of the Cyclades; but whatever may be the fact, all agree in assigning a foreign origin to his doctrine of the soul. According to Isidore, a son of the Heresiarch, Basilides, he drew it from the "prophecy of Cham." The most trustworthy authorities testify that he borrowed his ideas from the Egyptians.

With respect to the later Greek philosophers, they themselves assign an Oriental origin to the ideas they expounded respecting the state of the soul after death. It is the record of Her, the Armenian, who relates it of Plato when, as the last groundwork of his Republic, he wished to give it the sanction of another life;* it is the testimony of the Magian Gobyrus, whom Socrates invoked when he described to Axiochus the state of the soul in the subterranean kingdom into which they descended after death. That philosopher of the Greeks who, after Pherecydes his master, contributed most to the development of psychology in the Occident, Pythagoras, according to the express testimony of Herodotus and Diodorus, of Sicily, drew all his ideas regarding the soul from Egypt. In this way the Egyptian doctrine of the future life became well known (*celebre*) among all the people of antiquity. The origin of this doctrine is lost in the night of time.† The Ebers papyrus re-

* The passage alluded to is probably, "Wherefore my council is, that we hold fast to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil." Jowett's "Plato," Vol. II. p. 452. The Republic.—M.

† "The very existence of the idea of immortality is proof of its truth. For experience shows us only death and transitoriness. Whence, then, do we get the notion of immortality with its universality and certainty? If the soul did not bear imperishable existence within it, it would not have the notion of imperishableness. . . . Consciousness of our immortality is itself a proof of its truth." Luthardt's "Saving Truths," p. 296. Translated by Sophia Taylor. Edinburgh, 1876.—M.

cently discovered, which dates from the seventeenth century before the Christian era, and which appears to be copied from a still more ancient document, is devoted to a discussion of the diseases of the soul and of the body, which shows how far psychological studies had advanced in early times in the valley of the Nile. M. E. de Rougé says: "To-day all are convinced that the Egyptians have always believed in the immortality of the soul, supplemented by the dogma of punishments and rewards." From their "Funeral Ritual," of which some copies belong to a very distant epoch, we are sustained in the conclusion that the ideas of the Egyptians on the "Future Life," are as ancient as their existence as a people. From this ritual we learn what we knew before through the writers of the ancients, that men after death were conducted by Horus before Osiris seated upon his throne. There, before the four genies of the ancients—the abode of the dead—the departed were required to justify themselves before forty-two judges on forty-two species of sins. [We omit the detailed account of the trial.]

These beliefs were not only written on the papyrus—they passed into the ethics of the nation, in which they occupied a very important place, becoming, so to speak, living and palpable. It was not possible to take a step in Egypt without the eye being arrested by scenes of judgment and of the weighing of souls which are represented on their monuments; as it was also impossible not to witness sometimes the oblations made to the deceased, and those magnificent funerals or long processions unfolding themselves (*se déroulaient*) with the greatest pomp, and in which companies of mourners gave the most expressive tokens of sorrow. Moreover, how could one have lived in Egypt without observing the care taken by the natives of their dead and in embalming the body and of their tombs, as well as the conspicuous place the preoccupation of their future destiny held in their daily thoughts, and even in their feasts and banquets, in which the memory of the dead was present. The idea of immortality has never entered so fully

into the existence of any people. All the philosophy and all the religion of the ancient Egyptians are founded upon the doctrine of the continued existence of the soul after death and the existence of a posthumous remuneration.

Now the Hebrews dwelt a long time in the midst of the Egyptians; no reasonable man, therefore, would think of denying that they may not have learned from the latter their ideas of the future life. They saw as well as we, and better than we now see them, the representations of the scenes of another life, and they beheld the funerals themselves; they heard the judgment of the soul recited many times; they even embalmed Jacob and Joseph* in the Egyptian method, and gave to Jacob† funeral obsequies similar to those with which the noble personages of the court of Pharaoh were honored. How, then, this being so, can any one pretend that the Israelites had no knowledge of the immortality of the soul? If, then, they did know it, they accepted it. Nowhere do we meet with the repudiation of any part of this belief. If they had repudiated it, we should find the trace of their denial in their sacred books. The Pentateuch reproves and formally condemns all the errors and all the reprehensible usages of the nations with which Israel had been in contact. To reject all that to him seemed censurable or dangerous (in those nations), it can not be doubted, was one of the objects which the legislator of the children of Jacob had in view. Very well. No one up to the present has been able to cite a word from Moses against the immortality of the soul. Nowhere in the law is it placed in doubt, and much less, therefore, was it denied. It is certainly evident that this great man (Moses) was profoundly convinced of the truth of a future life, because he refrained from attacking on this subject, the ideas of the oppressors of his people, when, especially as the worship of the dead was a source of danger and of seduction to his brethren, it was impossible for him to dissimulate. He ordained the offering of animals in sacrifice, which the

* Gen. 1, 26.

† Gen. 1, 1-13.

Egyptians adored as gods.* He broke and reduced to powder the golden calf, of which, after the manner of the Egyptians, they made an idol, and he caused twenty-three hundred men to perish in order to show his horror of this Egyptian idolatry.† And more, he emphatically condemned certain mourning customs in their funeral ceremonies;‡ and he proscribed as an abomination the evocation of the dead;|| but nothing, absolutely nothing, even in this last prohibition, against veneration for the dead, nor against the existence of another life. Far from it; respects (*hommages*) rendered to the dead are formally authorized in many passages of the Pentateuch.¶ We are, however, far from wishing to hold this conclusion by a negative argument, so to speak, for nothing is more easily established by positive and direct proof than the faith of the Hebrews in the immortality of the soul.

Assuredly they had the idea of immortality, since they regarded death as the punishment of original sin and be-

* Ex. viii, 26 and xxix, 1.

† Ex. xxxii, 19, 20.

‡ Deut. xiv, 1.

|| Deut. xviii, 11-14.

¶ It would be difficult to cite "many passages," as M. Gregoire asserts, from the Pentateuch. It was, however, formally enacted that, "if any man have committed a sin worthy of death, and he be to be put to death, and thou hang him on a tree; his body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou shalt in any wise bury him that day." Deut. xxi, 22, 23. Josephus says: "We bury all whom the laws condemn to die upon any account whatever. Let our enemies that fall in battle be also buried; nor let any one dead body lie above ground, or suffer a punishment beyond what justice requires." Antiquities, B. IV, ch. viii, ¶ 24. "The Jews uniformly disposed of the corpse by entombment where possible, and failing that, by interment; extending this respect even to the remains of the slain enemy and malefactor." (Comp. Deut. xxi, 23, and 1 Kings xi, 15.) Smith's "Dic. of the Bible, art. Burial," Hackett and Abbott. The Hebrews, including the patriarchs, carefully interred the body and kept the spot where the dust slept in affectionate remembrance. The reason was, their belief in a future state, and their belief, though vague, in the resurrection of the body. See art. "Burial of the Dead" in "Dict. of Christian Antiquities," ed., 1877. Cremation is allied to materialistic views of man. It appeared in the later Grecian and Roman civilization. It belongs to Hindoo Pantheism. The recent instances of cremation are outgrowths of Pantheistic philosophy. The burial of the body is demanded by our Christian faith and instincts.—M.

lieved that Adam and Eve would never have ceased to live if they had not disobeyed God. But death itself was not, in their conception, the total and complete annihilation of the man. After the fall, the posterity of Adam, condemned to bear the consequences of the transgression of their first father, live in this world as in a place of exile, as in a strange land. From Jacob and David to St. Peter and St. Paul there is only one voice thereupon from the heart of the people of God. St. Paul writes: "Here we have no continuing city, but we seek one to come."* David says: "We are strangers before Thee and sojourners, as were all our fathers."† When Pharaoh inquired of Jacob after his arrival in Egypt his age, the reply of the patriarch was, "The days of the years of my pilgrimage are an hundred and thirty years; few and evil have the days of the years of my life been, and I have not attained unto the days of the years of my fathers, in the days of their pilgrimage."‡ As Delitzsch|| has observed: "He called his life a pilgrimage on the earth because he had the presentiment of the country beyond;" and St. Paul has said: "For they that say such things declare plainly that they seek a country. And truly, if they had been mindful of that country from whence they came out they might have had opportunity to have returned. But now they desire a better country, that is, an heavenly."§

* Heb. xiii, 14. (Comp. 2 Cor. v, 6-8; Eph. ii, 19; 1 Peter ii, 11.—M.)

† 1 Chron. xxix, 15. Comp. Ps. xxxix, 13; Ps. cxix, 19, 54. (See Alexander on Ps. *in loco*.—M.)

‡ Gen. xlvii, 9: "Jacob used language which he had learned from his fathers. He speaks of *their* pilgrimage as well as his." Bush *in loco*. Jacob used the word נַגְלָה, which Gesenius defined "*journeyings, sojournings, in foreign countries.*" Says Professor T. Lewis: "No word in the Hebrew language maintains a more clear and emphatic sense. . . . The idea is ever present, that of a stranger tarrying in a strange land." Note on interview between Jacob and Pharaoh in Lange on Gen. Speaking of the patriarchs, Professor Lewis says, "Through a part of their pilgrimage the way was very dark. Not with rapture, therefore, but with calm confidence, did they go down into its unknown depths." Ibid. Surely there is no intimation in any patriarchal allusion to death, indicating that "death ends all."—M.

|| Delitzsch *in loco*.

§ Heb. xi, 14, 15.

Death, according to the ancient Hebrews, terminated the terrestrial pilgrimage. For to them, to die was "to go to their fathers," * הָכֹזָא אֶל אֲבוֹתָיו, or the deceased Hebrew "was gathered to his people," † וַיֵּאָסֶף אֶל עַמּוּן. These remarkable expressions, ‡ which we read in all parts of the Hebrew Bible, and especially in the Pentateuch, Delitzsch says, "express more than an ordinary inhumation. In the same way in which it is said the Patriarchs died full of days, they indicate by it not only their disgust with the miseries of this life, but also their aspirations for a better life, as well as that their reunion with their ancestors is not only the reunion of the body, but also the reunion of their personalities." || These expressions are, therefore, an irrefutable proof of the belief of the Hebrews in the immortality of the soul. None—as some vainly attempt to do—can legitimately assume that "to go to their people," and "to be gathered to their fathers," meant nothing more than being buried in the same tomb or in the same place; for Abraham who is "gathered to his people," is interred in Hebron, in the cave of Macpelah, while Terah, his father, died in Haran, in Syria, and his ancestors had lived and died in Chaldea; Ishmael is "gathered unto his people," although he was not buried in the tomb of his father Isaac. The death of Jacob is thus reported in the book of Genesis: "And when Jacob had made an end of commanding his sons, he gathered up his feet into the bed, and yielded up the ghost and was gathered unto his people," ¶ וַיֵּאָסֶף אֶל עַמּוּן. Joseph, his father, having been thus reunited to his people, threw himself upon his lifeless body and covered it with

* Gen. xv, 15: "To go from one place to another implies, not annihilation, but the continuance of existence." Murphy on Gen. *in loco*.—M.

† Gen. xxv, 8.

‡ They occur beside the two citations given, in Gen. xxv. 17; xxxv, 29; xlix, 29, 33; Num. xx, 24, 26; xxvii, 13; xxi, 2; Deut. xxxi, 16; xxxii, 50; Judges, ii, 10; 2 Kings, xxii, 20; Jer. viii, 2; Ez. xxxix, 5; Comp. 2 Sam. xii, 23. A careful comparison of these passages can only confirm what Murphy, as quoted above, says on Gen. xv, 15. Comp. Christ's reply to the Sadducees, Matt. xxii, 23, 33.—M.

|| On Genesis.

¶ Gen. lix, 33.

kisses and with tears. Afterward the mortal remains of the patriarch were embalmed, the Egyptians mourning for him sixty days, and it is only after the ceremonies of mourning are over that Joseph leaves for to go and inter his father in the tomb of Abraham. Jacob was, therefore, "gathered to his fathers" a long time before his remains had been gathered to those of his ancestors. Forbidden to enter into the Land of Promise, Aaron died on Mt. Horeb, and is there interred; no Israelite there sleeps with him, and, nevertheless, he "was gathered unto his people."* Moses in his turn died on Mt. Nebo, beyond Jordan, in the country of Moab.† He has, nevertheless, been "gathered unto his people." We therefore conclude, with M. Munk, "that it is evident that being 'gathered to their fathers' is a different thing from burial, and that in the time of Moses the Hebrews believed in an abode in which souls are reunited after death." This conclusion is incontestable; and the most illustrious Hebraists, whatever may have been their leaning toward rationalistic views, are careful not to leave us in any uncertainty. Gesenius‡ says "*Gathered to their fathers* means entering into the world of the departed (*de introitu in orcum*), a place in which the ancestors of the Hebrews were already themselves believed to be assembled. This 'gathering to their fathers or to their people,' is distinguished both from death, which preceded it, and from burial." ||

Thus, in the epoch of the patriarchs and of Moses, in the Pentateuch itself, we find undeniable traces of the faith of the earlier Hebrews in the immortality of the soul. We find it in the other books of the Old Testament stated with

* Num. xx, 24; Deut. xxxii, 50.

† Ibid.; and xxxiv, 16.

‡ The quotation is from the *Thesaurus Linguae Hebraeae*. Tome I, p. 131; which is no guide to verifying the passage in any edition to which we have access. The original is, "'Ingressus est ad patros suos' dicitur de introitu in orcum, ubi Hebraei majores suos jam congregatos esse credebant. Distinguitur ista 'ad patros seu ad populum congregatio' tam a morte quae eam praecedit quam a sepultura."—M.

|| [We omit a paragraph in which M. Gregoire argues that ~~הָאָדָם~~ in Gen. xxxvii, 35, does not mean the grave, but place of departed spirits.]

the same distinctness. Suffice here to cite a passage from the history of Saul, and a passage from Proverbs, either omitting or reserving for another part of this essay less important passages. [We omit the detailed recitation he gives of Saul's interview with the witch of Endor.] M. Munk very justly says: "It is evident that the author of this recital, as also those for whom he wrote, believed in the existence of the prophet beyond the tomb and in the place where the shades are reunited after death." M. de Sauley has observed in the discussions of the academy: "In fact, those who maintain that the Israelites did not believe in the reality of the existence of the dead will never be able to explain fully why Saul should have gone to seek the witch of Endor, and to entreat her to place him in communication with Samuel, long since dead." Moses had condemned necromancy as an "abomination;"* but this superstition, founded on the reality of another life, was so rooted in the people that we see Isaiah attacking it and doubtless with but little success. The prophet says: "And when they shall say unto you, Seek unto them that have familiar spirits; and unto wizards that peep and mutter; should not a people seek unto their God? for the living to the dead?"† The continuance of these superstitious consultations among the Israelites in all the epochs of their history, is an incontestable index of their faith in another life. We say with Fréret, "How is it possible those who deny the evident fact, have not seen that the practice forbidden among the Jews and common among the Canaanites, supposes that the existence of the soul separated from the body by death, was then a general and popular opinion? For it would be absurd to think that they interrogated what they did not believe to exist." Who would be so insane as to pretend that our modern spiritists do not believe in the existence of spirits?

The book of Proverbs has definitely stated (*nomme par son nom*) the immortality of the soul. Says M. Derenberg: "They point out in Proverbs the reputed allusions

* Deut. xv, 11, 12.

† Isa. viii, 19.

considered the most convincing. This book was composed in four distinct parts, of which it is difficult to define the age. They were united and completed in the time of King Hezekiah, that is, in the seventh century before our era." There is, then, one of these passages in the book of Proverbs in the section, the composition of which we must attribute to King Solomon: "In the way of righteousness is life; and in the pathway thereof is no death."* It is this word *אֶל-חַיָּת* which, in the Hebrew text, expresses the idea of immortality; and this is the word which M. Joseph Halévy thought he found in the inscriptions of Eschmounazar. But M. Derenberg, for philological reasons and from grammatical considerations, claims to demonstrate that this term could not have belonged to the Hebrew vocabulary, and that in this passage there has been an alteration of the Biblical text. We do not know what philological reasons may have influenced M. Derenberg in favor of his thesis, but it is certain that the most eminent authorities in Hebrew science are against him. M. Bertheau and M. Fürst, despite their rationalistic opinions, do not by any means believe in the alteration of the word *אֶל-חַיָּת*. They both admit as authentic the reading of the Masoretic text; and still further, they cite with it an analogous example drawn from the same portion of the book of Proverbs. Ewald does not limit himself to a single example; he enumerates many in his *Lehrbuch*. The belief of the author of Proverbs in the immortality of the soul was the result of his fixed faith in *לְאֵשׁ*, that is, the place in which souls dwell after death.

IV. SHEOL.†

Finally, we meet in nations differing from each other in origin, morals, and language, popular traditions, which, if

* Prov. xii, 28.

† [M. Gregoire enters very fully into this portion of his argument. His theory is that *לְאֵשׁ* denotes an intermediate place into which the souls of all the departed are brought. Of course he finds support for the Romish dogma of purgatory in this theory. We omit the entire argument, translating only the closing paragraph, which is pertinent to the general discussion.

we do not take into consideration the exaggeration and metaphorical description, are closely connected with the Hebrew tradition. Hesiod, in his "Theogony," describes to us all men descending into the dwelling-place of *Hades*. Homer describes to us the souls of the dead inhabiting a land of darkness—a sad abode, never illuminated by sunshine, and where the shades wander in melancholy. This common conception must have proceeded from a common source, which can be nothing less than the primitive revelation; for man himself could not know what would occur after death. Since races of diverse origin have had on this subject analogous conceptions, those conceptions could not have been the fruit of the imagination, but must be a remnant of the communications made by God to the first father of the human family. It is, in fact, important to remember always that it is only by a supernatural knowledge that we can know what is occurring in the other life, especially respecting the question of rewards and punishments which we now proceed to state.

V. THE REWARDS IN ANOTHER LIFE.*

Let us not be surprised, therefore, if Moses did not say to the Hebrews as Paul did to the first disciples of Jesus Christ, "For our conversation is in heaven;"† and again, "Seek those things which are above. . . . Set your affection on things above."‡ For the children of Jacob were not yet sufficiently emancipated from sense to receive such exalted lessons and to lift themselves to such sublime thoughts. It was necessary that so many centuries should pass before the Redeemer could find a land sufficiently prepared to receive the Divine Seed and to make it fructify. But at the epoch of his coming all was changed. He was able to establish an universal religion, which needed for itself a

* We omit here a paragraph, the object of which is to show that the doctrine of future rewards and penalties belongs especially to the New Testament, the Old Testament allusions being designed to prepare the way for the fuller revelation respecting them we have in the former.

† Phil. iii, 20.

‡ Col. iii, 1, 2.

larger basis than Judaism. It was no longer possible to establish the law upon earthly blessings, since the new dispensation was not, like the old, to comprehend one people, but all nations, and the people of God gathered together under it were all to be directed by one spiritual motive toward the one great end—the possession of heaven. [We here omit a paragraph irrelevant to the general argument.] Moses; it should be remembered, did not claim to give his people a new religion; he only sought to protect the religion of the patriarchs from impure alliance with neighboring religions, by surrounding it, so to speak, with a protecting hedge. He strongly insisted on the points threatened with alteration or corruption, as the unity of God; he did not tarry with others. He was much more of a civil legislator than a religious reformer. It is very true that in his code he did not expressly give the future life so much as the sanction of the law. As Augustine has said, “In that covenant correctly called old, since it was delivered at Mt. Sinai, is found no clearly revealed promise, except that of earthly happiness.” But what is there so surprising in that? Who is surprised because the mention of heaven and hell is not found in our civil and criminal code?

Still less did Moses compose in Occidental style a treatise on philosophy or theology. The Orientals had not, as we have, the conception of a speculative treatise, planned in harmony with a severe and orderly method, and discussing a question in all its phases, not excepting any. The methods (*procédés*) of the Aryans were entirely unknown to the children of Shem. The author of the Pentateuch has preserved the history of his people, and he attacked the reigning errors and abuses; but he found it useless to recite all that the world knew and all that the world believed. If a Greek or a Roman, if a peripatetic or a scholastic, had made the decalogue, he would most certainly have put at its head the affirmation of the existence of God. Moses, however, has nowhere affirmed the existence of God; he has always assumed it; he has never formulated it. The same thing is

true of him respecting the rewards of another life. That it was recognized by him we have no doubt, since he was learned in all the science of the Egyptians; and that the Egyptians believed in future rewards is admitted. Therefore, he believed it, since he has nowhere denied it, and has also combated and contradicted all that to him appeared false in the opinions and beliefs of the peoples among whom he had lived. He did not deem it proper to mention his faith upon this point, because to mention it appeared to him useless. The Jews have always admitted that there were many truths not cited in the law, but which had been preserved and transmitted among them from generation to generation by oral tradition; the faith in the rewards and penalties of the other life is in the number of these truths.*

Here are some of the precepts of Ecclesiastes: "In this book," says M. Breecher, "a new phenomenon presents itself; the immortality of the soul and the future judgment of God are the objects of rational demonstration, and the author presents them as conclusions drawn from the study of the moral world. In other words, Ecclesiastes seeks to establish and justify by speculation a belief already popular." How can man satisfy the deeply felt desire of establishing a lasting harmony between his faculties? How can he follow his heart and his passions, and listen at the same time to his reason and his better instincts? Alas! the solution of this difficult problem is impossible to men here below. Pleasures beget satiety, and frequently they are evil, and virtue condemns them. Virtue, in its turn, is not sheltered from suffering and misfortune. The impious seem even more happy than the righteous, whom they tread under their feet; and iniquity triumphs even before the judges. What is the possible explanation of this moral contradiction, so contrary to the goodness and the justice of God? It is this: "I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there. I said in my heart, God shall judge the

* M. Gregoire here adduces Gen. v, 24, and Gen. ix, 5. We omit it as being, in our judgment, very indirect and so inconclusive.

righteous and the wicked, for there is a time there for every purpose and for every work."* It is, therefore, "there," ~~only~~, before the tribunal of God, in the other life, where all the enigmas of the present life shall be resolved. It is from this thought the author of Ecclesiastes draws the conclusion of his book: "But know thou, that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment. Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto the God who gave it. Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man. For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be bad."† Here we have, not the full sunlight of the Gospel, but is it not already the dawn of the morning? It does not describe to us the happiness of which the elect were not yet in possession before the coming of Christ, who alone could open to us the gates of heaven and reveal to us its wonders; but it gives us a presentiment of it, and here, as every-where, the Old Testament is the preparation for the New.‡

The Hebrews carefully distinguish the soul from the body; they believed in its immortality and in the future life; they had at least glimmerings of the doctrine of rewards in another life, and they were not ignorant of the resurrection of the body. Undoubtedly we are far from overlooking the fact that the idea of the future life does not occupy in the Old Testament and in the book of Job in particular, so large a place as in the New Testament. When, in one of his most beautiful parables, our Lord treated the problem of the unequal apportionment of the good and the evil in this world, and hence the apparent injustice, he solved in two words the whole question in the clearest and most conclusive manner. Poor Lazarus,

* Eccl. iii, 16, 17.

† Ibid. xii, 13, 14.

‡ [M. Gregoire examines, lastly, "THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY." He limits himself to the book of Job. It is able, but not wholly conclusive. Want of space forbids giving the translation of even a portion of it here. He thus summarizes his entire argument.]

after having suffered here below, is carried into the bosom of Abraham; on the contrary, the wicked rich man, after having enjoyed the world, is precipitated into hell. Job, indeed, received his reward in this world. But may God protect us from despising at its source the little rivulet, which, farther on, shall become a great river, as also from denying the light of the sun because it has not yet attained the brilliancy of midday.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE PORTRAITURE OF JESUS.

BY REV. W. N. CLARKE, D. D.

Ecce Homo: A Survey of the Life and Work of Jesus Christ.*The Life of Christ.* By FREDERIC W. FARRAR, D. D.*The Life and Words of Christ.* By CUNNINGHAM GEIKIE, D. D.*Philochristus.* Memoirs of a Disciple of the Lord.

No reader of religious literature has forgotten how great an excitement was awakened by the publication of "*Ecce Homo*," in the year 1865. There were many reasons for the excitement. The book was anonymous, and the long search for the author kept curiosity on the stretch. It was also fresh and strong and full of suggestive thought, a book that claimed recognition as one of the most significant utterances of the age. It was confessedly a fragment, containing only half of what the author had to say; and of course all readers who felt the power of the fragmentary work were eager to know, and ready to guess, what the other half might be. Above all, the author had ventured upon a new method in dealing with the life of Christ, and consequently the whole question of method was opened for discussion. The literature that then sprang up was full of inquiries and suggestions as to how the life of our Lord ought to be written, or by what means the true conception of him might best be obtained and expressed.

It would be going beyond our knowledge to assert that out of this fresh study of the question of method sprang the great works of Canon Farrar and Dr. Geikie, as well as the peculiar and brilliant "*Philochristus*." The modern interest in the life of Jesus dates far back of 1865, and the impulse that produced these most recent works started, of course, in reality, from an earlier time. Yet not until "*Ecce Homo*" appeared had the subject been fairly opened

in the English language: and certain it is that the question of method reappears in these works in some of the forms which it then assumed. To one who compares them among themselves, they bring this question forward in a most interesting light.

This question of method is the first question, and the last, in writing the life of Christ. It is the fundamental, immovable, unanswerable question. Many inquiries are involved in it. How shall the true conception of the great Person be obtained? From what point of view shall the subject be approached? What materials are legitimately available for the purpose? and when this has been determined, then upon what principle shall the materials be used? Shall the life be written as the life of Julius Cæsar might be written? or is there need of a different attitude and method on the part of the biographer?—and, if so, in what respects shall the attitude and method be different? How large an element in the work shall the biographer allow his own mind to be? How much of his own shall he add in the process of using his materials? how much in the way of imagination, of judgment, and of interpretation? And, above all, whom shall he attempt to portray: the Jesus whom one might have known during the life-time of Judas Iscariot, or the Christ whom Paul preached? the neighbor of the Nazarenes, or the Only-begotten of the Father and the Savior of the world? the Jesus of the Gospels, or the Christ of Christendom? Shall he begin his study as an unprejudiced explorer, or as an adoring Christian? and shall he write the life of a man, or of a God? These questions are immensely difficult; there is no answer to them that gives satisfactory results; and yet they must be answered, or the biographer's mind must be settled respecting them, before his work can be begun.

Neander, in his life of Christ, strikes into the fundamental question at the very first sentence: "It has often been said," he remarks, "that in order to true inquiry we must take nothing for granted. Of late this statement has

been reiterated anew, and applied to the exposition of the life of Christ." This claim of freedom from presuppositions had been set forth as the first postulate of the theory that was associated with the name of Strauss—though the work that was done upon the theory was in grotesque and astonishing contrast with the postulate strictly interpreted. The question that is thus brought forward is, Shall we bring to the study of the life of Jesus some presuppositions as to what he is? And if we may bring some presuppositions, what shall they be? Or shall we come to the work without any preconceived idea of what he is, and form an idea for ourselves, *de novo*, by the critical use of the materials that are offered us? A biographer may have a right to begin as a Christian of the nineteenth century, and to bring to his work the conception of Christ that has been developed by the progress of Christian thought; or it may be his duty to begin as an investigator, uninfluenced by what may have been believed concerning Jesus, and to judge for himself. In that case, he must confine himself to the original sources of information, and sift the materials that the past has handed down; and out of the materials that he finds himself at liberty to accept he must construct an account of such a person as he finds Jesus to have been.

Some students, claiming that this was the proper course, have sought to lay preconceptions entirely aside, and to work as if the subject were fresh and unexplored. Whether or not any one ever succeeded in doing this, some, undoubtedly, have succeeded in freeing themselves in a great degree from the traditional or inherited preconceptions of Christian faith. Strauss was not writing the life of the Jesus whom the Church worships. The same is true of Rénan, whose brilliant fiction was not influenced, certainly, by any traditions of Christian theology nor sympathy. Neither of these, apparently, felt any interest in preserving to the world the ideal Christ of history. But the attempt in this direction in which we are more deeply interested was made in a different spirit. There is something especially worthy

to be studied in the endeavor of the author of "Ecce Homo" to free himself from inherited or historical prepossessions. His attempt is peculiar and interesting, because it is so positive and unqualified an attempt to be independent of the current preconceptions, and yet is not associated with any irreverent depreciation of Jesus. How directly he aims at freedom from traditional presuppositions of every kind may be seen from the oft-quoted first paragraph of his preface:

"Those who feel dissatisfied with the current conceptions of Christ, if they can not rest content without a definite opinion, may find it necessary to do what to persons not so dissatisfied it may seem audacious and perilous to do. They may be obliged to reconsider the whole subject from the beginning, and placing themselves in imagination at the time when he whom we call Christ bore no such name, but was simply, as St. Luke describes him, a young man of promise, popular with those who knew him, and appearing to enjoy the divine favor, to trace his course from point to point, and accept those conclusions about him, not which Church doctors or even apostles have sealed with their authority, but which the facts themselves, critically weighed, appear to warrant."

His appeal is boldly made from the judgment of Christendom to the facts of history; and these facts he proposes to investigate for himself, as if no one had ever done it before.

From a kindred source with "Ecce Homo" proceeds "Philochristus." The book is dedicated "to the author of 'Ecce Homo,' not more in admiration of his writings than in gratitude for the suggestive influence of a long and intimate friendship." The suggestive influence is plainly to be traced in the book, for "Philochristus" corresponds to "Ecce Homo" as a picture corresponds to a description. The author's method is virtually a statement of his theory. He writes the "Memoirs of a Disciple," and endeavors to exhibit our Lord as a contemporary and companion might

see him. He begins with nothing but the Jewish expectation of the Messiah; he portrays Jesus, the prophet of Galilee, the worker of gracious miracles, the eager servant of God's will, the person of marvelous attractiveness and power; and he ends with his "disciple" bound to Jesus by the most devoted and adoring love. At the time of writing the disciple is supposed to be in advanced age, and the name of Jesus is spreading throughout the Roman world; but the writing is intended to trace the influence of Jesus from the very beginning, and to exhibit the secret of his power as it appeared at his very side. The author has endeavored to forget all modern opinions, to divest himself of all influences that a believing Jew might not feel, and to write as if in the midst of our Lord's own age.

These two works represent, beyond any thing else in English, the theory of freedom from preconceptions. This theory exists, however, rather as a protest and an experiment than as the recognized theory. Far more numerous are the works in which this method is utterly repudiated, and the biographers claim the full right to bring in their Christian preconceptions as to the person of Christ. Liberty to use these preconceptions has been claimed in the most positive manner, not only as a Christian privilege, but as a right that is by no means inconsistent with the conditions of historical inquiry. The leading works upon the life of Christ have been written on this principle. Neander, whose life of Christ was virtually a reply to the work of Strauss, began with the most strenuous avowal of this right, and with this large, bold statement of the truth that he presupposed: "It is the belief that Jesus Christ is the Son of God in a sense which can not be predicated of any human being,—the perfect image of the personal God in the form of the humanity that was estranged from him; that in him the divine life itself in humanity appeared; that by him the idea of humanity was realized." This, Neander claims, is the only principle upon which the life of Christ can be intelligibly written; and, accordingly, the biography that he

attempts is the biography of the God-man. It was with a similar understanding of the task that Lange's life of Christ was undertaken, the first chapter being entitled, "The Incarnation of God." Canon Farrar makes no attempt to vindicate the right to make such assumptions; but on his title-page stands the motto, "*Manet immota fides*," and in his preface he says that "this life of Christ is avowedly and unconditionally the work of a believer." In Dr. Geikie's preface stands the statement, that "to the individual Christian Jesus is the Divine Savior; to believe in whom is life everlasting; to know whom is to have peace with God." Dr. Hanna's popular lectures on the life of Christ begin with the belief that "if his divinity be denied, his humanity becomes mutilated, stained, and degraded." Dr. Edmond de Pressensé sufficiently indicates his feeling toward his subject by the motto on his title-page, "*Πρὸς ταῦτα τίς ἱκανός*—Who is sufficient for these things?" Bishop Ellicott and the Rev. Samuel J. Andrews, even in their treatment of the life of Christ in its outward relations, constantly make it plain that they feel themselves to be tracing the footsteps of the Incarnate God. There is something peculiarly interesting in the position of Wieseler, whose researches in chronology they so steadily follow. In the alternative title to his "Chronological Synopsis of the Four Gospels," he calls the work "A contribution to the apologetical literature of the Gospels on the basis of freedom from preconceived notions." Yet Wieseler takes care to explain that his statement applies only to the historical understanding of the Gospels, and that he would not use such language in speaking of the Gospels as containing the "substance of faith," which is to him "the image of Christ as the one, eternal, universal Redeemer of mankind." Even in historical inquiry, he says, he will be the best interpreter, other things being equal, who has a living experience of the Christian faith; but a man can not possess such experience without acting upon a preconceived idea of Christ as the Redeemer. And so, in spite of his alternative title, Wies-

eler would freely admit that one who would portray the character of Christ must already have yielded his soul to the prepossessing influence of adoring faith?

Which theory is true? Which biographer is right?—Farrar, who begins as a believer, or the author of “*Ecce Homo*,” who begins as an inquirer?—Geikie, who approaches Jesus as the source of life to his own soul, or the author of “*Philochristus*,” who meets him as a man of Galilee, and is constrained to love him? Are we justified, or not, in approaching Jesus with the Christian preconceptions? and which method is better adapted to the purpose of obtaining a true and faithful portraiture?

The theory that was wrought out in “*Ecce Homo*” came in by way of reaction against the other. The author says that, “after reading a good many books on Christ, he felt still constrained to admit that there was no historical character whose motives, objects, and feelings remained so incomprehensible to him.” Not all these books, of course, were written upon Neander’s theory, but many of them must have been; and it is impossible not to sympathize to some extent with the complaint that such books leave the “motives, objects, and feelings” of Christ in some obscurity. The method that admits the Christian preconceptions as a part of the ground of biography is beset with difficulties that render full success impossible, and that can not be removed.

The biographer approaches his work, and if he is Neander, Lange, Geikie, or Farrar he looks upon the person whose biography is to be written as the Incarnate God. These men have trusted Jesus for their own salvation; for years they have adored him, and reflected upon the profound mystery of his unique person; they believe that he is to be their judge, and now they propose to write, in the form of biography, the record of his earthly career. But biography does not concern itself alone, or chiefly, with external events. Its purpose is to set forth, and to account for, the significance of an individual in the history of man-

kind. To this end it must present a fair exhibition of personal character, and must also preserve a true record of its growth. It must be made to appear how the man became what he was, and by what powers and purposes and efforts he achieved his place in history. There must be a fair portrayal of motives, objects, and feelings, and the correspondence of the inward life to the outward, of the character to the work, must be intelligently exhibited. These qualities properly belong to biography, and the more exalted the character the more necessary is it that the work should be successful in these respects. In the case of Jesus, especially, it is for the sake of this work that biography is attempted. Men are interested in him, if at all, as a factor in the spiritual life of mankind. Therefore, it is his inward life that they desire to contemplate; or, rather, they desire the light which a knowledge of his inward life will cast upon his deeds and words. A mere record of his movements, be it ever so vivid and impressive, can never serve as a biography, for the interest of men centers in himself, and so they insist that the work shall unfold his inward life and reveal the sources of his power. No mere sketch will answer; it is in Neander's life, ponderous as it is in movement, and heavy with thought, that the desired work of biography is undertaken. Farrar and Geikie have boldly attempted the same.

Yet every one of these biographers has felt that he had undertaken an impossible work. Indeed, according to the very terms of the supposition, biography is, in the case of Jesus, impossible, or possible, at best, only in a very limited degree. The supposition is, that he is God and man in one person. Biography includes intelligent study of the inner life. But the inner life must be human, or it is not in human power to understand it. Biography includes the tracing of act to motive, and the explaining of act by motive. But such work is possible only within the field that is familiar to man. When once the Divine Mind has become an element in the personality that is to be portrayed

biography, strictly speaking, can not be written. After Neander has announced his sublime presupposition, and Lange has written his opening chapter on "The Incarnation of God," what is written by either of them can not be more than a study. It may be a profound study, and may do much toward making Jesus better known, but it lacks what is essential to successful biography. The Person who is to be portrayed is uncomprehended and incomprehensible.

The inevitable result is to be observed in the lives of Christ that are written on this principle. They are good, and they are valuable, but they are weakest at the center. They are unsatisfactory at the very point where we especially feel the need of help.

Farrar's life of Christ can not be read without thankfulness that the author has been able to do so much towards illustrating our Lord's career on earth. But for the very reason that he has done so much the inevitable disappointment is the greater when it comes. All that surrounds the matchless life is portrayed with loving and skillful hand, but the life itself eludes the art of him who would portray it. The disappointment is greatest in the most peculiar and characteristic scenes. When the author comes, for example, to tell the story of the transfiguration, he seems to stand as an adoring spectator, his whole soul absorbed in the marvelous sight. His very style, so responsive to his inner feeling, is elevated and refined to a peculiar beauty. He sees, he adores, he describes; and we seem to be on the hill-side with the three disciples, gazing upon the Lord. But the Lord is as mysterious to us as he was to them. No glimpse of his inner life do we obtain, nor the faintest indication of what this great experience meant to him. We gaze upon a mystery. Our nearness to it is tantalizing, for it seems as if now surely we were about to see a little way at least into the glorious wonder; but the vision fades, and we are disappointed. We need not be surprised, for it was inevitable. The biographer has reached the limit of his

power. In this scene he is brought even closer than elsewhere to the superhuman element in his story, and of course it defies him, and baffles his utmost skill.

A larger illustration may be found in Farrar's vivid and heart-rending exhibition of the trial and crucifixion of our Lord. How clear to the memory is the impression that was made by the first reading of those powerful chapters. The whole scene was set before us, and the uncomplaining Victim was led, before our very eyes, through the injustice of his trial, the shame of his rejection and the agony of his death. Never was story more powerfully told. But when we paused for breath in the midst of it, we found ourselves looking about for our Lord. "Where is he? What is passing in his mind? What is all this to him?" The passions that were raging about him are described with tremendous power, and the deeds that men were doing are traced instantly to their motives; but the central figure, for the sake of whom the whole was written, moves as a mere Victim among them. He is not portrayed. The veil is not lifted from his consciousness, and we do not feel the presence of his controlling thoughts, feelings, motives. Yet the significance of the history depends upon what all this meant to him. Exactly in the point where we ardently long for help we are left to ourselves. But it would be wrong to wonder. The biographer can do little for us here. He has attempted to follow a unique and solitary Person through a solitary and unmatched experience, and it follows, of course, that his work is weakest at the center. He has attempted the impossible, and when he reaches the heart of his work there is nothing for him but to fail.

Farrar hears the voice that says to him, "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no farther," and makes but little attempt at the impossible itself. At the threshold of the impenetrable he pauses. Geikie ventures upon a little more. He labors to interpret the mind and thoughts of Christ. All his words he reproduces, in careful paraphrase, and all his works he endeavors to exhibit as appropriate expressions of

his mind and purpose. He constantly searches into that mysterious region, the mind of Christ, the place where his thoughts and motives are at work, and strives to portray the inner life of Jesus. Every thing that can illustrate his subject, nearly or remotely, he brings to his aid. He hopes, apparently, to make a clear portraiture by fullness of statement and amplitude of illustration; and so his book becomes an encyclopædia of the life of Christ. In fulfilling his purpose he gives many a good interpretation, and often helps to make our Lord's action, and our Lord himself, more comprehensible. But the task is too vast, and the work can not be carried on upon so large a scale. To suit the greatness of his purpose he brings to the work his encyclopædic stores of information, and his diligent toil in exposition and portrayal. But still the central figure is vague and indistinct. It is drawn as if with too broad a brush, and there is no clearness of outline. The secret of failure is, that he is gathering up innumerable details to illustrate what can not be illustrated by such means. It is the mind of Christ that we desire to see. He has done his utmost to show it to us, and yet has left it unrevealed; and with that still indistinct, the mass of illustrative matter can not give us a clear picture of our Lord. Many a single point is well done, but we do not carry away a distinct conception of the Person whom he is laboring to represent. Yet here again it would be wrong to wonder. The biography of the Incarnate God has been undertaken; and we must not be surprised if, at the very center of his being, that Person is still mysterious and unknown.

It is not to be wondered at that, in spite of all the biographies, the "motives, objects, and feelings" of Christ were incomprehensible to the author of "*Ecce Homo*." Begin with the Christian preconceptions, and disappointment in these respects is inevitable, because genuine biography is impossible. What then? What is the alternative? Is it the abandonment of the preconceptions? Shall we approach the study of Christ's life with no thought as to what he is,

and accept whatever we may find? This is what the author of "*Ecce Homo*" tried to do. But this method is beset with difficulties as great as those that attend the other. On this theory also we are disappointed, and, in the end, more seriously than before. Not in this way can the true portraiture of Jesus be obtained.

For, at the outset, no candid student can entirely lay aside the Christian preconceptions. We will not discuss the question of psychological possibility, or inquire whether a student can empty his mind at will, for such questions have nothing to do with our subject. The thing was never done in studying the life of Christ, and ought never to have been mentioned. Few scenes could be more grotesque than that of a German professor sitting down to write the life of Christ and supposing himself to be free from presuppositions because he was not an orthodox theologian. But apart from all this, there are definite reasons why it is impossible for a candid student to rid himself entirely of the Christian preconceptions. It has been impossible for eighteen centuries; for the existence of Christianity is a fact that of itself creates a preconception. Even the author of "*Ecce Homo*," unconsciously, perhaps, admits this preconception, in the very preface in which he proposes to be free. He has endeavored in his book, he says, "to furnish an answer to the question, What was Christ's object in founding the society which is called by his name, and how is it adapted to attain that object?" It may be well to ask what presuppositions respecting Christ are implied in this inquiry. At least these: that he had an object, reaching far beyond his own life-time; that the society which he founded was adapted to obtain that object; and that that society, after the lapse of eighteen centuries, is still called by his name. Of course, he is regarded, in all this, as the founder of Christianity—perhaps as the founder of something better than the existing Christianity, but, at any rate, as the source from which the history of Christianity has flowed. Now, when the investigator, beginning thus, approaches the New Testament

to learn what Jesus was, he is already pledged to certain conclusions. His search must reveal to him a Person who was capable of founding Christianity and giving existence to Christendom. Let him begin ever so simply with the "young man of promise, popular with those who knew him, and appearing to enjoy the divine favor;" yet that young man must turn out as no other young man of promise ever did, for the investigator already knows that he has revolutionized the history of the world. Though he may know of his antecedents nothing that the contemporaries of Jesus did not know, still he can not be upon a level with them until he knows as little as they knew of his subsequent history. The record of mankind since he was born creates a preconception that must enter into all candid study concerning him. To throw it aside is to fall into levity and historical worthlessness, as Rénan has done. He has not been deeply impressed by the testimony of Christianity to Christ, and has felt no need of maintaining his personal dignity and worth; and his work is condemned as foolish jesting by the seriousness of Christian history. This is what comes of really rejecting the preconceptions that history dictates. No candid student can approach the life of Jesus without a certain reverential prejudice, for it is matter of universal knowledge that he is, as the author of "*Ecce Homo*" calls him, "The Creator of modern theology and religion." It is exactly as if some one should endeavor, "without preconceptions," to learn from original sources what manner of genius Michael Angelo was, knowing only that he was the man who built St. Peter's.

This more recent method must be judged, however, by reference to its motive; and it must be confessed that the motive is worthy and that the work has been useful. There is a strong desire in our time to make the life and character of Jesus more real to the reader. This desire is to be accounted for by two facts. One is the increasing interest in Jesus himself, since his person has come to be regarded as the central fact in Christianity and the chief

proof of its claims. The other is the prominence that has been given of late to the personal element in history. It has come more and more to be felt that mechanical theories of history must be abandoned, and history must be treated as the record of human action. Human action being dependent on personal traits, the modern method includes a more careful study of personalities, and a more dramatic presentation of the influence of men upon events. Out of these two facts a greater interest in persons generally, in historical study, and a new and special interest in the person of Jesus,—has sprung the desire to represent the life of Jesus more distinctly, to exhibit him in his actual place among men, and to give a new freshness and sense of reality to the study of his character. With this has come an impulse toward new investigation; and it has been felt that such work should be done, as far as possible, in freedom from subjective influences and preconceived theories. The same spirit prevails now in historical studies generally; modern study aims to be free from inherited opinions; it has attempted, and, perhaps, has accomplished, the reversal of settled judgments concerning things past. Why, then, in this new study of Jesus, should not the student free himself from subjective methods? Why not ignore inherited opinions, and bring to the work only an honest purpose to study the facts, objectively, uncontrolled by personal preconceptions? Why not resolve to contribute nothing to the investigation, beyond this honest mind?

But the difficulty is, that it is impossible to prevent this method, in the present case, from becoming as truly subjective as the other. As between Farrar's "Life" and "Ecce Homo," the subjective treatment is in the latter; and the method of "Philochristus" is far more subjective than that of Geikie. This unexpected result follows from the position which the historian assumes toward his materials. No biographer of Jesus who set aside the presupposition of a divine personality has ever wrought into his work all the material that is provided in the Gospels. A process of

selection has invariably gone on, in which the biographer, guided by his theory, was the judge. Of course the process of selection is legitimate, as far as it is a critical process. Every historian has the right to act as judge upon the trustworthiness of the documents with which he has to do. But a historian has no right to begin with a theory that will forbid a part of the documents to bear their testimony. The testimony of Plato concerning the intellectual character of Socrates may be set aside by destroying the credit of the documents that bring it to us. But a biographer might begin with a theory. He might say, "Although it is generally believed that there was a strain of Platonism in the mind of Socrates, insomuch that even the 'Divine Philosophy' was indebted to his influence, still I shall assume that no wrong is done by looking upon him as the shrewd and practical philosopher whom Xenophon portrays, and as nothing more." And if a biographer began thus, he would find himself hearing and appreciating the testimony of Xenophon, but disinclined to regard what Plato said of the loftier and more subtle fancies of his master. Very similar, and equally illegitimate, is the process of selection that goes on when a biographer of Jesus begins by setting aside the presupposition of a divine personality.

Let "Ecce Homo" serve as the most convenient illustration. The author begins with Jesus as a young man of promise, concerning whom he assumes to know no more than was known to his neighbors. The theory is, then, that nothing essential to the study is omitted by beginning at this point. The author may not perceive that he is committed to a theory, but certain inevitable results of his preconception are immediately forced upon him. After adopting his purpose, his first step is to draw out a rough outline of the character of Christ. In doing this, and in the work that follows, he is limited, to a certain extent, by the position that he has taken. Beginning with Jesus as a young man, whose special qualities are yet to be ascertained, he is forced to make important omissions. If there is any thing

in the Gospels that hints at a miraculous birth, or an incarnation of God in him, it must be left out of the writer's thoughts. If this were admitted, his whole method of inquiry would be condemned as a false method; for a person of such origin could not be studied in this way. Therefore, the prologue to the first Gospel is inadmissible, for it tells the story that marks Jesus as separate from men. The prologue to the third Gospel must be still more decidedly rejected, for it tells the same story at greater length and far more impressively. The prologue to the fourth Gospel must not be glanced at for a moment, for in it the other prologues are accounted for by the declaration that in this young man the Word that in the beginning was with God, and was God, has been incarnated. The fourth Gospel as a whole, indeed, can scarcely aid in this inquiry, for the unparalleled preconception that is announced on its first page remains as the under-thought in its entire portraiture of Jesus. One who purposes to work apart from the customary theological preconceptions must be deaf to the testimony of the fourth Gospel. Now, the fourth Gospel is subject, like other documents, to historical criticism, and, if it is proved to be a forgery, its testimony must be set aside; but this method would set its testimony aside on arbitrary grounds, because of the theory which the biographer had adopted. The theory sets the biographer up as the judge of his materials; and if the biographer selects the materials in accordance with a theory of his own, the work is subjective, and the picture that results is an ideal picture, not a portrait. Evidently the evils of a subjective method are not thus to be avoided.

A more detailed and vivid illustration is to be found in "Philochristus," a work so earnest in spirit, so brilliant in conception and in execution, so suggestive and so inspiring, that one can not but regret with bitterness to find it sadly marred by this radical vice of a preconceived absence of preconceptions, whereby the author becomes the determining element in the portraiture.

The "Disciple of the Lord" who tells the story meets Jesus at the very beginning of his ministry, is immediately drawn to him, and follows him to the end. There is no question as to whence Jesus came. He is represented as a messenger of God, and as living in peculiar communion with the mind of God and the counsels of heaven. But there is no theological assumption as to his nature or person, and he is viewed entirely from the earth. The picture that is thus drawn is vivid, beautiful, and engaging. Perhaps no other attempt at biography has succeeded as well as this in actual portrayal, the making of a clear picture. A thoughtful student will be sure to learn from this portrait something valuable about the Lord. And yet the reader is constantly inquiring whether, as a whole, it is the true portrait or not; whether it is the picture that the materials, properly used, ought to give. And here the reader observes that a theory has been followed in the selection of materials. The testimony of the Gospels has been heard, but it had been manipulated before it reached these pages. This is not the Jesus of the Gospels; it is a Jesus whom the author has portrayed from certain materials that were given him in the Gospels. His guiding theory is that of "Ecce Homo;" this book, indeed, is the *alter ego* of that. Nothing is assumed as to what Jesus inherently is; and, therefore, the fourth Gospel is remanded to a secondary place. That Gospel has doubtless contributed something to the author's conception of Jesus, but as a document that bears independent testimony it is ruled out. Its dialogues and discourses are expressly omitted, and no heed is given to its testimony as to the extent and order of our Lord's ministry. This latter fact is important, because the author finds in the course and effects of the Lord's ministry one of his chief means of his ascertaining his character. Change the character of the ministry, and the representation of Jesus himself must be changed. If John's account of the early conflicts in Jerusalem be admitted, or even if then there was such an event as the raising of Lazarus, then the

author's theory of the ministry is radically incorrect, and his portraiture of the soul must be considerably modified. Moreover, although he does now and then quote detached sayings from the fourth Gospel, he quotes them as detached sayings, often expressly refusing them the connection in which they stand. Thus he takes the discourse in the supper-room away from the occasion to which the fourth Gospel assigns it, and breaks it up into fragments. A similar disregard of occasion and connection appears, though less remarkably, in his treatment of the other Gospels. The walking on the sea, though it happens to be the sole miracle that the four Evangelists record, connection and all, without divergence, he transfers to the time that follows the resurrection, placing it there because it seems to fall in with his idea of the Lord's appearances during that period. In relating those appearances, he entirely passes by the confirmations of the Lord's physical reality, and expressly denies the reality itself, making them to be mere appearances to the eye, silent and intangible. According to him, the Lord never spoke to his disciples after the resurrection, and was never touched; and it is hard to see in what the resurrection consisted, except the disappearance of his body from the tomb. And while he thus sets aside the positive testimony of all the Gospels, he admits and uses almost every one of the traditional sayings of Christ that have come down to us apart from the Scriptures.

One who reads all this will find himself asking one important question, namely, What is the material for a life of Christ? It is plain that in many respects the Gospels as they stand do not intend to tell any such story as this. In this book the testimony of the existing materials has been partly accepted, partly rejected, and partly explained away from its obvious meaning. The intention of the original witnesses has not been taken as decisive of the sense of what they said. The fact that an event or discourse is recorded in the Gospels does not entitle it to be considered in forming our conception of Christ's character. Any

intelligible principle of discrimination, however, the reader can not find. The method is subjective, and the author is the judge. And consequently the reader will be asking, if the Gospels deserve to be treated thus, do they deserve to be followed as far as this author has followed them? If the evident intention can be set aside so often, why not oftener, and always? Do any unquestionable materials for the life of Christ exist? The author of "*Philochristus*" has drawn a clear ideal picture of Jesus, but he has done it in such a way as to suggest a doubt whether a trustworthy portraiture is possible.

It may seem that our study does not tend to an encouraging result. Certainly there does appear to be a difficult dilemma for any one who would write the life of Christ. Approach the subject with the conviction that he is what the Church has believed him to be, and the work in hand is the biography of the God-man,—a work in which there is concerned at every step an element that renders genuine biography impossible. Leave that conviction out of sight, and the biographer becomes the determining element in the selection of materials, and the biography can not be trusted as a true picture. Yet a just decision between the two theories is indicated by this reflection: that with the Christian preconceptions, the difficulty is inherent in the subject; without them, the difficulty is inherent in the method. Farrar is not responsible for the fact that the divine man can not be portrayed. But the author of "*Ecce Homo*" is responsible for having adopted a theory that shuts out a part of the materials.

Out of our study may at least come some conclusions as to the qualities by which any attempt to portray our Lord in his earthly life should be judged.

1. It is plain that success is not dependent upon the biographer's clearing his mind of the ordinary theological preconceptions. The preconceptions can not now be shaken off, nor is there any need that they be shaken off. To attempt it is only to exchange a difficulty for which the

biographer is not responsible for a more serious difficulty for which he is responsible. To attempt it is also to renounce the sympathy with the highest characteristics of his subject, which is recognized in all other cases as essential to success in biography. Even though the case of Jesus be peculiar, in the tremendous assumptions which it involves, still the universal rule holds good: in order to portray him, one must have such fellowship with him as can not be reached without adoring faith. One who would write the life of Christ must be a Christian.

2. If a biographer is to begin as a believer, it follows that the success of his work must not be judged by the satisfactoriness of his portraiture. The Christ in whom a Christian believes can not be portrayed; neither, indeed, can the Jesus of the Gospels. We must freely admit that a satisfactory life of Christ can not be written. Let the best man do his best, and there will still be a sense of failure and disappointment when his book is read, for it will have the very faults that we meet in the works of Geikie and Farrar. We must not ask to be satisfied, but must accept imperfect contributions to the knowledge of Him whom we can never fully know.

3. It is right, however, to estimate such works partly by the test of clearness, and to demand that they shall make the life and character of Jesus vivid and real to the reader's mind. This, of course, is not the only test, for an untrue picture may be made distinct, and a life that he did not live may be so pictured that we shall seem to be in the midst of it. Yet a life of Jesus fails if it does not make the reader feel that he did live among men; if it does not vividly illustrate the life of his time; if it does not make his human experience a powerful means of illustrating his character.

It is in this direction that the greatest progress has been made in recent times. It is felt in our day, as it never was felt before, that our Savior lived an actual life, under conditions that can be ascertained and represented. For this progress we have great reason to be thankful. Whoever would see how great it is has only to look at the chapters

that treat of our Lord's life-time in Edward's "History of Redemption." Edwards calls that period "the most remarkable article of time that ever was or ever will be," and says that "more was done in it than had been done in the history of the world before." Yet his treatment of it is not historical, but exclusively theological. Real life he does not exhibit, except in a single passage, and then only for the sake of the theological significance of the scene. To him this is not human life; it is the fulfillment of the counsels of the Trinity, the purchasing of redemption, the completing of a transaction before the throne of God. Doubtless there may be danger now of going to the opposite extreme, and portraying the human life with its theological significance left out. But it is a blessing to the present age that it is obtaining a clearer conception of the actual reality of our Savior's life.

4. Above all, a work upon the life of Christ must be judged according to its fairness in the use of materials. Truth is the object in all such work,—the portrayal of the real Jesus. Any one who would accomplish this must be free from arbitrariness in the use of the Gospels. He must not hold any theory that will compel him to discriminate among the witnesses, and he must not himself determine what his result is to be. He must confine himself to the honest reproducing of the testimony of Christ's own time, in the light of Christian history and Christian feeling. Questions will arise, it is true, and difficult questions, as to what is arbitrary and what is fair, in the use of the Scriptural records. They can not be discussed here; but we are well convinced what will be the conclusion of the whole matter. A Christian scholar of the twentieth century, approaching his work without arbitrary limitations, will do with still greater confidence what Farrar and Geikie have done already: he will take the four Gospels as they are, in the best text that can be obtained for the material of his biography, and will reverentially endeavor to portray the Jesus who is there revealed.

LITERARY NOTES.

Studies on the Baptismal Question; with a Review of Dr. Dale's "Inquiry into the use of Baptizo."* By Rev. David B. Ford.

THIS is an able and instructive volume. It treats of the whole subject of Christian Baptism; first, of the ritual act, and, secondly, of the proper subjects of that act. But the former topic is more fully considered than the latter, so fully, indeed, that there is very little solid evidence in respect to the act of baptism, as prescribed by the Lord, which has escaped the author's notice. With his eye upon the best Pedobaptist and Baptist writers on the subject, as well as upon the words of Scripture and the testimonies, written and monumental, of the early Church, he has furnished his readers a comprehensive survey of the whole field of controversy, and has shown them the sure foundations on which they may safely rest their faith. The treatise is a scholarly production. Almost nothing has been taken by the author at second hand. And his judgment as to the meaning of Greek and Latin passages will rarely, if ever, be found incorrect. The references to Dr. Dale's elaborate volumes on Baptism are frequent, and the fallacy of that scholar's reasoning is fairly demonstrated. Indeed, some have suggested that more attention is given to the vagaries of Dr. Dale than they deserve. This may be true, if we look merely at the intrinsic merits of the argument on which his conclusions rest; but if we look at the way in which his discussions have been received by Pedobaptists, at the extraordinary commendations of his work by many writers, and at the use which has been made of his theory by some who lay claim to scholarship, there will be found reason enough for the care with which he is reviewed by Mr. Ford. If the astonishing results of Dale's "Inquiry into the Use of Baptizo" are often referred to in a tone of badinage, it may, perhaps, be said that this was unavoidable; certainly it is better than denunciation. It will be difficult for Dr. Dale to discover any intentional unfairness in the treatise before us. We, therefore, bespeak for this work the attention of all who desire to know the truth. We do not intend to say that our own opinion is the same as the author's on every passage examined by him, or that it would not be easy to discover minor imperfections in his work; but it is a work that will bear examination and prove useful, and we are happy to know that a competent critic is preparing an article upon it for this REVIEW.—A. H.

History of the Christian Church from its origin to the present time.† By W. M. BLACKBURN, D. D., *Professor of Church History, Chicago.*

A MASTER artist expresses his genius by setting forth all the chief characteristics of person or scene with the fewest possible strokes of pencil or brush. The *intensity* of expression—what signifies *strength* of character in art—will not tolerate the fussiness of extended elaboration. So is he the *best* historian

* Boston: Henry A. Young & Co. New York: Ward & Drummond.

† Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden; New York: Phillips & Hunt.

who, having obtained the correct view of the persons and events that should be embodied in the record he proposes, can sketch them, in due proportion, with the fewest lines.

The historian who would satisfy the demands of a busy public, which seldom rests long and patiently on any one person or event, when in its midst, must learn the art of intensifying. All that is essential in portraying a person who represented any feature in thought or sentiment, of his day—theologian, statesmen, or warrior—can be best told in a few of his own characteristic sayings. A few occurrences, briefly expressed, best and most accurately present to a careful reader the opinions and passions of a people.

Professor Blackburn has done this, in the main, in his Church history. It is brief, considering the vast period and immense material to be handled. But it is not a dry epitome. He presents men and events with clear, bold outlines of all essential features of form or spirit. There are defects—less said of some developments of doctrine, less of some evil tendencies affecting the spirit and work of the Church, and more of others in which his own Church (the Presbyterian) has been interested—but as a whole it is an exceptionally good work. The author has made ecclesiastical history a subject of close study for years, and his labors as a teacher in that department has led him to study the methods of expressing the results of historical investigations with brevity and accuracy. He allows persons and events to speak for themselves and the times producing them.

It will be especially acceptable to those who have not time to study more elaborate histories. Every layman should be induced to acquaint himself with the history of the Christian Church. Next to a study of the Bible we place, as to benefit to both the individual and the Church, a thorough acquaintance with Church history. Protestants have not made the use of history—so full of lessons in favor of their views—that they should. Our ministry have been negligent of a duty in not calling the attention of their flocks to vast lessons to be derived from the accurate knowledge of the Church's past trials. In so far as pastors and the mass of Christians have been repelled by the formidable size of most of the volumes of Church history, relief has been provided. Such a work as this should have a place in every Christian household. Its aim and scope are thus stated in the author's preface.

“My aim is to present, from an evangelical point of view, an outline of the great facts and doctrinal developments in the history of the Christian Church, from the time of our Lord to our own day; to set forth the epochs and their characteristics, treating each period according to a plan best adapted to it; to state causes and results; to group the facts about representative men, places, principles, doctrines, or movements, and maintain their chronological order, as nearly as possible, while preserving unity of subjects and the logic of events; to survey the facts from other base-lines than the old pagan imperialism, the papacy, or some one form of Protestantism; to exhibit the vitality, growth, declensions, revivals, and reforms of the Church; to trace the progress of civilization, tolerance, and religious liberty; and give most space to those ideas and events which enter into the Christian civilization of Western Europe and North America.”

The Great Speeches and Orations of Daniel Webster, with an Essay on Daniel Webster as a master of English style.* By EDWIN P. WHIPPLE.

The interest taken in orations usually passes away with the occasion and circumstances calling them forth. Unless the speaker can instruct upon great and abiding principles—unless he is capable of the mission of a great teacher, he is but a voice. However effective for the moment, both speaker and message soon pass from among the acting forces of society.

Webster was one of the few orators who could teach, at least in that most interesting feature—expounding. He even taught while professing only to inquire after some solid ground on which to justify proposed political or judicial action. His zeal in acting as an advocate often led him to so hold up some principle or truth as to give new views of it and of its proper observance in personal or national conduct.

Although morally defective, for years, in his own life, he saw and recognized the right so as few minds have, in its breadth of application to human action and accountability. He was a giant in emotion as well as in thought. As Mr. Whipple observes of his oratory, “the eloquence was plainly ‘in the man, in the subject, and in the occasion,’ but most emphatically was it in the man.”

Mr. Webster’s orations abide, and will be studied, as well for their style as for their solidity of thought and the interest his countrymen continue to cherish in the subjects discussed. He has made a place for himself in literature, and will be recognized and studied as an author rather than as an orator. The publishers have rendered a good service to all who wish to cultivate a clear, forcible, common-sense style, in English composition.

China and Japan.† By I. W. WILEY, D. D.

THIS is one of the many good and interesting books which, like some children of fond parents, suffer from an excess of name. In saying this, we should not be understood as imputing an overestimate of it on the part of the author,—earnest, sensible writer, and humble bishop that he is—though hopeful enough to affectionately dedicate it to his good wife. It is more probable that a desire for a brief, expressive title, desirable in several respects, has in this, as in many other instances, prompted to the exercise of a broad license accorded authors and publishers in selecting names for their books. Be this so or otherwise, China and Japan are far too much for the name of one small volume, however condensed. The sub-title: “A Record of Observations,” etc., would convey a far more accurate idea of its contents, and in that service is both the business and blessing of a name.

From 1851–54 Dr. Wiley served as a missionary physician of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Foochow. During this period he enjoyed especial facilities for studying the peculiarities of the Chinese. He also made their history, as a people, a special study. To these investigations he

* Boston: Little, Brown & Co.

† Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden. New York: Phillips & Hunt.

brought a clear eye, and special "gifts" for the analysis of what of personal and national life commands a place in history. After an absence of twenty-five years he returned under directions of his associate bishops to China, and also visited Japan, "on a tour of official visitation to the missions of his Church in both countries." This official tour furnishes the thread or plan of the book, but that which gives it special, permanent value to all classes of readers is made up of the fruits of careful study during, and immediately after, his residence in China. Many readers will recall the interesting and popular lectures on China which the author delivered in different parts of this country, upon his return from mission work at Foochow. Although "written from a missionary stand-point," but a small portion of it is occupied with the missionaries and their work. In giving a clear, intelligible report of these, the bishop goes back into the past for whatever will throw light upon the present religious and educational condition of those people. It is such a work, in research and breadth and practical bearings, as we should expect from the pen of one who is abundantly capable, and is moved to the task by an ardent desire to so learn the nature of the people and the hidden springs of motive and action as to best qualify himself "for introducing the Gospel of Christ among them." The author's object is indicated, very happily, in the closing sentence of the preface: "If the book will serve to quicken the zeal of Christians in the work of evangelizing these great empires, and will have some influence in getting the people of America to understand better both our political and religious relations towards these neighbors, whose empires are only separated from our own western borders by a steam ferry, the writer will be compensated for all his labor in giving these facts to the public."

On his way to those countries the bishop visited their Chinese mission in San Francisco, under the care of Dr. Gibson, and founded nine years previous. It had a "fine building, costing fourteen thousand dollars and on a lot costing twelve thousand dollars." "More than sixty adults had been baptized;" and "several hundred men and women had received more or less Christian education and influence." A boarding-school was maintained, in which, at that time, August, 1877, were twenty-five girls, "rescued from a life of shame." At that time the excitement there over the Chinese question was at "glowing heat." Dr. Gibson's "house had been assailed, he burned in effigy, and his life threatened." "The Chinese companies," and the American hatred of the "vile foreigners," were fierce against all who were endeavoring to evangelize the Chinese. The hostile demonstrations of American prejudice and enmity toward these weaker people were a sad sarcasm on our boastings over our liberties. But let us hope for the verification of the bishop's prediction that "such missionary work is to become an important element in the wise and just settlement of this vexed Chinese question."

As an indication of a favorable change of opinion and feeling on the part of the Chinese towards Protestant missionaries, the bishop cites the generosity of the Chinese managers of a line of neat steamers, purchased of Russell & Co., running on the Yang-tsze-kiang River, in offering one-third lower rates to missionaries than to any other class of passengers. The presi-

dent of the company, though not a Christian, had received his education in part under Dr. Brown, a missionary.

At Peking, the "great city" and "venerable capital of China," he found himself "surrounded by a goodly band of missionaries, peacefully and safely sowing the seeds of the Redeemer's kingdom," and he could but exclaim, "How great things hath God wrought in so short a time!" "Twenty-five years before my most sanguine dreams could not have reached the thought that in this brief time missionary stations would be established along the northern coast of China from the Yang-tsze to the head of the gulf of Pi-chi-li, and that the ministers of Christ would be building chapels within the 'Imperial City,' and establishing schools within the shadow of the imperial residence itself." "From this great center the 'Glad Tidings' are sounding forth through nearly all Northern China."

"The other great missionary societies of the world are well represented in Peking. The London Missionary Society, the American Board, the Presbyterian Church, the Church of England, the Protestant Episcopal Church, are here in strong force. Many of the missionaries are old, experienced men, having come from other parts of the work—some of whom, in scholarship and ability, will take rank with the ablest ministers of the world." Still "they are there only by sufferance, and probably, on a strict construction, have no real treaty-rights to be in the city."

Of the Protestant missions in other parts of China Dr. Wiley speaks with equal hopefulness,—in all of which he expresses a kindly interest,—not confining his observations to those of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He arrived at Swatow, China, during the absence of Dr. Ashmore, of our Baptist mission there, but was made acquainted with the work our missionaries are prosecuting, and says of Miss Fielde: "She has become quite famous in China for her remarkable success in women's work. She has a thoroughly organized system of training and using Bible women. She has now twenty women in constant employ, whom she sends out, two by two, into the country places and villages. She herself often accompanies them, visiting the whole work, through a territory eighty miles long and fifty broad, which is about the extent of the dialect used here."

Of Protestant missionaries and their work in Japan he says: "The missionaries are a body of scholarly and cultured gentlemen and ladies. They have accomplished a great work for Japan. They have translated portions of the Bible. They have produced a large number of religious books. They have made the standard dictionaries of the language. They have originated a Christian popular literature and hymnology. They have organized Christian Churches, introduced theological seminaries, and are the real originators of the girls' schools in Japan. In 1870 there were not ten Protestant Christians in the empire. There are now more than a score of Churches, with a membership of more than fifteen hundred."

"Gently, but surely, Christianity is leavening the nation. The only limit that I can see to the extent of most hopeful and promising missionary labor in Japan is the will and ability of the Church at home. The great, pressing immediate need is re-enforcement of all the missions. It seems to me that God is really trying the zeal and faith of American Christians by open-

ing up at their very door this beautiful Land of the Rising Sun, with its thirty-five millions of people all at once breaking away from centuries of barbarism and semi-civilization, and reaching out their hands imploringly for light and truth and knowledge and art and science."

There are most assuring evidences of a strong mental quickening in both countries. Leading men in each are aroused and awakened out of that lethargy and dull stupidity which manifested themselves chiefly in opposition to any change essential to progress. When the leading, most influential mandarin (Li Hung Cheng), of Peking, says he is "conscious of the superior power and intelligence of Christian countries, and is *anxious to know the secret* of their greatness"—and when shown the ingenuity and beauty of some foreign instruments asks: "How comes it that such inventions and discoveries are always foreign?" it is evident that his mind has been stirred, and is working in the right direction.

"The National Academy," the "imperial college for united education," now under the presidency of Dr. W. A. P. Martin, an American missionary of twenty-seven years' standing, and the famous old "observatory," all located at Peking, have honorable mention. The observatory is venerable in age, and was mentioned by Marco Polo in the thirteenth century. The astronomical records, reaching back into the far past—eclipses of the sun and moon recorded as having occurred thousands of years ago, were taken by some as evidences of great antiquity of the Chinese. But it is now shown that these could have been computed by the Chinese at comparatively recent dates, and that their delight in these calculations, when first taught by the Persians, prompted them to trace the movements of the sun and moon thousands of years past, and to embody the results in recent tables.

The author thinks that the secret to the veneration in which Confucius is held is to be found in the "perfect adaptation of the lessons he taught to the character and wants of the Chinese mind. They take no interest in abstract or metaphysical ideas, philosophical speculations; theosophy, cosmogony, the origin and destiny of man—in such they do not concern themselves. They care for nothing save as it suffices for this life; for morality only as it serves some political or utilitarian purpose. Confucius adapted his teachings—not worthy of the name of a philosophy except from the nature of the subjects treated—to these peculiarities of the Chinese mind. His genius was not subtle, but utilitarian. The very age of Confucius produced a philosopher of much more depth of thought, subtlety of genius, and comprehensiveness of system than the sage, and one, too, from whom Confucius borrowed his best ideas of immortality; and yet Taou-kiun failed to impress his character on the Chinese, and only gave them a subtle system of philosophy which has degenerated into superstition, while his more practical, but less profound, contemporary has stamped his lessons on all of Chinese life. Gratitude to a great practical man, and admiration for a great national benefactor, I believe, are the bonds which still enchain the Chinese heart to the name of Confucius. He has been a beneficent conservative power during the past centuries, but he is utterly unable to carry his people beyond the semi-civilized state in which they have been

living for twenty centuries. Something infinitely broader than Confucianism is needed to lift this great nation into the higher plane of civilization and enlightenment. That something is the divine philosophy and religion of Jesus the Christ."

We should be glad to follow the author further in his exceedingly interesting observations, did space permit. If this notice may serve to interest the public in his book and thereby assist to the realization of his desire to awaken a deeper interest in the spiritual and political welfare of the multitudes of those countries, we shall consider that we have rendered a good service.

Ruth Erskine's Crosses.* By PANSY.

THE author has found a rich mine, and not too far down in soil whose surface has been worked since the days of book making she finds the material for the best, probably the most popular, serials and books of the kind yet offered to the public. The key to the excellence and popularity of her works, so like many others which the good Christian people, as well as the saintless, would have none of, is to be found in her deep sympathy with the great lessons of the cross, which she is ever endeavoring to teach, and in clear perceptions of the struggles through which human hearts pass in surrendering to Christ's will. As said of Webster's eloquence, its power and effect is not so much in the language, so simple and clear, nor in the subject however lofty, *as in the self expressed*. Old and young alike will read, and may profit by, Ruth Erskine's sad experience and Christian triumph. The benefit religiously would have been none the less if the rewards for very impatient cross-bearing had not been meted out at the close of the ordeal.

The Service of Song for Baptist Churches.† By S. L. CALDWELL, D. D. and A. J. GORDON, D. D.

"THE Centennial edition" of the collection of hymns and tunes bearing this name, printed in large type, on tinted paper, gilt edge, and bound in dark blue leather, is as neat and convenient as eye or hand could desire. It contains about seven hundred hymns and chants, "with such changes, whether by reduction, transposition, addition, or omission of hymns, as adapt it to its purpose." It is claimed that these changes will be found to make it really a new book.

Analogies Between the Old and New Institution.‡ By JNO. F. ROWE, *Editor of the American Christian Review.*

THE "Analogies of the Old Testament as they typify the birth, life, character, and mission of Christ," are traced out with a view to proving "the unity and inspiration of the Bible." The innumerable multitude of "analogies," "types," etc., which the author discovers, seem to obscure, rather than give bold, intelligible, portraiture to the person and work of

* Boston: D. Lothrop & Co.

† New York: Sheldon & Co.

‡ Cincinnati: G. W. Rice.

Christ. It is possible, this type and analogy sketching may be overdone. A thoroughly evangelical tone pervades the work, and it may be read with profit.

The Metamorphoses of a Creed.* By FRANK WAKELEY GUNSAULUS.

THE author takes up Unitarianism and its tendencies as represented by Channing, Emerson, Frothingham, and others who have championed it, and shows its tendencies to Idealism and Pantheism. He has read much upon the subjects discussed, and brings a vast fund of quotations from various books and reviews. Part First treats of the Divinity of Jesus Christ, Part Second of the Atonement, and Part Third gives the Testimony of Poetry, etc. The scope of the work will readily be determined from this statement of its contents.

The Illustrated Annual Register of Rural Affairs for 1879.† By J. J. THOMAS, "Author of Farm Implements."

A LITTLE work full of suggestions to farmers and horticulturists. The author quotes from numerous writers of acknowledged ability and wide observation, and illustrates his advice with appropriate engravings.

Yensie Walton.‡ By MRS. S. R. GRAHAM CLARK.

A THOROUGHLY good book, with many excellent lessons in duty to God and one to another. It is written in a natural and pleasing style. It is worthy of a place in the home and Sunday-school library.

Hand-book for Nichol's Geographic Model of Palestine.] Compiled by its designer. Revised by H. S. OSBORN, LL. D.

The aim of the model is to "exhibit the features of the country directly to the senses, in their relative extent, magnitude, position, and appearance." Much study and labor have been bestowed alike upon the "model" and the "hand-book," and they are received with general favor by those most competent to pass judgment upon them. Bible students will be greatly aided by them.

Joy Bells, for the Sunday-school.§ By W. A. OGDEN.

The popularity of "Crown of Life," published three or four years ago, will greatly aid in commending this second work of Mr. Ogden to Sunday-schools. The hymns are new, Scriptural in sentiment, and "set to sparkling and easy melodies." The publisher has a clear perception of what is designed to please the musical ear, and directs his efforts accordingly.

* Chillicothe, O.: Gould & Kello.

† Albany, N. Y.: Luther Tucker & Son.

‡ Boston: D. Lothrop, & Co.

§ Cincinnati: J. C. Brooke.

§ Toledo, Ohio: W. W. Whitney.

THE BAPTIST REVIEW.

ARTICLE I.

THE TRANSCENDENT ELEMENT IN THEOLOGY.

BY REV. FRANCIS W. BAKEMAN.

THE term Theology is used in this paper in the broad sense, as including the whole range of religious science. The word "transcendent" has the significance derived from its use in the Kantian philosophy, as that which goes beyond the bounds of human knowledge; that which from the nature of things is beyond the apprehension of the intellect; in short, the unknowable.

By the Transcendent Element in Theology, then, is meant all that in relation to divine things which, from the nature and constitution of the human mind, is beyond the grasp of our mental powers.

That there is a "transcendent element" in both nature and the supernatural is a fact that can not be ignored. Wheresoever we turn in this universe, not only the unknown but the unknowable confronts us. Nature and supernatural are only logical and not real distinctions. Every-where the intellect meets two limitations: first, the relative one of ignorance, that which is as yet unknown; and, secondly, the absolute one of the unknowable. In both nature and the supernatural we know only second causes, or phenomena; but not the primal and essential. The *absolute* ground of all phenomena is unknowable.

Now the fact that we know second causes alone, and are conversant about phenomena only, gives rise to the transcendent element in both nature and the supernatural.

Every thing that is deepest and final eludes us. We call names and describe appearances; we observe methods and detect laws—and that is all. We follow nature back through many forms and processes only to reach, at last, a final and impassable barrier. Primal causes are always beyond our reach, and the deepest secrets that we learn are those of phenomena, and not of the absolute reality. All the greatest or the simplest questions are alike beyond us. We can tell what spirit really is, as easily as we can give the final secret of matter. The polyp and the man are equally beyond our comprehension.

Our powers of conception break down before the commonest truths. For example: matter is infinitely divisible, or not; who can think either? Space is limited or unlimited; but the mind can not grapple with either hypothesis. What is spirit, as a pure essence, divorced from all material relations? The unfathomable mystery of such a conception is only equaled when we ask again, What is matter in its last analysis or disconnected from mere properties, qualities, or forms?

What, for example, is a piece of wood? All the answer that you can make is to name its properties and appearances. You simply predicate certain qualities. Now burn your piece of wood, and, saving ashes and smoke, you have a different form of matter, of which you must predicate entirely different qualities and properties; and this substance in turn may be subjected to a still further process, and will yield a third product unlike the first or second.

Two gases unite with an explosion and form water. The man of science records that fact and describes the accompanying phenomena; but, in order to tell you *why* they thus unite, he must know the final secret of matter. The acid and the alkali have certain inherent and constantly opposed qualities, but we must know the ultimate elements of matter before we can determine why these phenomena.

Every-where in nature this transcendent element meets us. We know only laws and phenomena. The simplest

operations of nature are immeasurably beyond our utmost mental strain, as far as primal causes and absolute truth are concerned; and our difficulties in the spiritual realm are as much greater, as spirit is more occult and subtle than matter. There is what we may term "cause knowledge" and "effect knowledge." The last only is ours. In the growth of a tree we observe laws and processes and the proper effects in flower and fruits; but back of all this lie vital secrets and primal causes of which we know nothing. The plane of knowledge in which we move is that of effects. God alone moves in the plane of absolute causes. Our eyes behold the phenomenal; the permanent and eternal are out of sight. Nature wears a living, ever changing mask. She is indeed an Isis hid by a veil. Sometimes it seems as if the mask were all, so Protean are her shapes and forms; and we almost incline to believe with Berkeley that matter is only in appearance, and spirit the eternal and real existence. The miracles of our Lord teach us that the absolute elements of matter are infinitely deeper than the utmost reach of our faculties. That marvelous elasticity and obedience of the material world under the hand and voice of Jesus, afford us a hint of the total inadequacy of our powers and of the vast realm of secrecy which lies beyond the limits of what is knowable by us. Absolute essence is absolute mystery. The relation of spirit and matter is utterly unknown. How spirit can affect matter completely staggers us. Ineffable secrets lie behind all material and mental phenomena. The simplest things on which man's eyes have looked since man was born are still uncomprehended. Tennyson's oft-quoted lines sum up the thought on this point in a most beautiful expression of the transcendent element in nature.

"Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;—
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you *are*, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is."

Now when we come to the study of theology we find that here, too, we know only phenomena. We recognize effects and observe laws, just as in the natural world. All our theological language is metaphorical, even when we are dealing with soberest matter of fact and discussing the fundamental doctrines of grace.

The whole plan of salvation is revealed to us in terms of phenomena; and so, of course, we can only use phenomenal language about it. All our theological terminology is representative, standing for absolute realities. We speak of the atonement and sum up the elements which go to make it, and yet we are conscious that we have been giving names to events and acts which in their deepest reality completely transcend our powers of comprehension. And so it is with regeneration, our whole description of it is phenomenal and metaphoric. Our nearest approach to the absolute truth wrapped up in that word regeneration is by way of metaphor.

Such being the fact, that this transcendent element exists every-where in nature and the supernatural, and consequently in theological science, it is important

I. First to *recognize this element in the study of theology.*

The question may well be asked, "Do we make sufficient allowance in the pursuit of this deepest of all studies for the natural limitations of our mental powers?" Do we make enough of the fact that there is in this sphere a "thus far and no farther" arising from the very constitution of things? Would we be as confident and dogmatic, if we took just account of this transcendent element?

It is highly important to realize in some measure what is the limit of human capability, before attempting those largest problems with which the human mind can grapple. Before any great work is undertaken, the inquiry should be made, "Is the instrument equal to the task?" So here, at the very threshold of theological science, the question should be, "To what extent is the human mind fitted to apprehend these deepest problems?" If this question were

seriously asked and properly answered, the status of theology and its relations to all other science and systems of thought would be materially modified.

The importance of taking this transcendent element into the account is seen at once, when we consider the sources of our knowledge in theology. All science, material or spiritual, must be inductive, based upon observed facts; that is, phenomena.

The most brilliant speculation is worth nothing until substantiated by the appropriate facts. Now the major premise of all theological science must be the knowledge of God. But our knowledge of God is entirely phenomenal in the sphere of second causes. Accurate and absolute scientific knowledge as to the being and nature of God we have none. We know certain attributes and qualities which have come to us by revelation, or have been inferred from the constitution and course of nature; but that is all.

God, in his mode of being and absolute nature, is not only unknown, but unknowable in the present state of our mental powers.

Nature, and the revelation of Jesus Christ, teach much *about* God. But neither nature nor the Son reveals any thing but facts and phenomena; as to what God is essentially, both are silent. The profoundest word of the Old Testament, as to the nature of God, is given when Moses, seeking to know more of the hidden principle of Jehovah's being, asks of God, "What shall I say unto them when they shall say unto me, What is his name?" "And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM." Say, "I AM hath sent me unto you." And the deepest word of the New Testament as to God's being, given by Christ himself to the woman at the well, is this: "God is spirit." Now if the nature of God be incomprehensible, all logical deductions must be inconclusive, except those that are based on revealed facts.

All "*a priori*" reasoning is cut off, and hence theological science is not perfectible. The premise which condi-

Now when we come to theology is wanting. that here, too, we know there is first a com- effects and observe 1- not prove logically even All our theological le on this grand concept is are dealing with a speculative theology. The fundamental doct largely from a neglect of this

The whole p- here the premises are out of phenomena; a ally known, reasoning ought cer- language ab- tainly known, reasoning ought cer- resentative a very cautious pace and be extremely atonement And yet who ever sees a the- and ye- confessing his inability to go forward even in to ev- the most tangled ways?

pleth- which some theologians "explain God" it : The scientist is often wiser, it must be n- He sees this transcendent element in his pur- suit of natural science, and sometimes frankly acknowledges his inability to go farther. Even Professor Tyndall says, "Be- tween molecular mechanics and consciousness is interposed a fissure, over which the ladder of physical reasoning is incompetent to carry us." The transcendent element which stands in the way of the scientist is, that he knows nothing of matter except phenomena; that which bars the way of the theologian is, that he knows nothing of spirit except manifestations.

Both science and theology must be phenomenal until the absolute in matter and spirit is known. It is, of course, impossible to express the absolute in language. Words and symbols are but signs of the transcendent realities which lie behind them. Words are poor vehicles for the loftiest human conceptions, and constantly lose power as we ascend into the higher planes of thought. Well has the poet said:

"Thought is deeper than all speech,
Feeling deeper than all thought;
Soul to soul can never teach
What unto itself was taught."

The very limitations of human language teach us the fact and the importance of this transcendent element. Lan-

language is set to human powers, and so, of course, is utterly inadequate to express absolute truth. The atonement, *e. g.*, is doubtless only the adumbration of that eternal truth of which the historic facts are the patterns and shadows, brought down into the plane of the finite comprehension.

Since, then, our theology must be phenomenal, not absolute—a theology of facts, not of speculation—it is of the utmost importance that we begin with this understanding. If we start to sound the Atlantic it is well, to begin with, to know the length of our line.

II. In the second place let us consider the practical benefits arising from the recognition of this transcendent element.

(1.) *First a proper recognition of this element would help us to a correct notion of the possibilities in theological science and account for the limitations of human knowledge.*

Taking this element into the account, we discover at once that the field of theological research is limited by the incapacity of the human intellect. We know only phenomena, and hence the utmost possibility of our intellect does not include an exhaustive knowledge of truth. We deal only with facts, not with the deepest philosophy of those facts. He who considers, at the outset, that the possibilities of theology are limited by the inadequacy of the mental powers, will come to the study with far different spirit and expectation from those possessed by him who makes no allowance for this transcendent element.

One will remand all mysteries into the realm of the absolute, and make the most of the facts; while the other, in his endeavor for a rational solution of all problems, will beat vainly against those walls which shut out the intellect from the final and real. Whatever is too deep to be solved in terms of phenomena must be put over to the higher court to be answered in terms of the absolute. But while we know nothing exhaustively and absolutely, we can know, and do know, much of practical value. We know laws, results, and facts in the spiritual realm just as we do in the

physical. We know the fact of a harvest, although the vital processes from the blade to the full corn in the ear, may be wholly beyond us. So it is possible to know the fact of an atonement with all its saving efficacy, although it is not within the range of our intellectual possibilities to know it absolutely. We know the fact of a cross, and are conscious of its influence over us, and yet that cross is only the phenomenal sign of what is infinitely too deep for our comprehension. A knowledge of facts is one thing, a knowledge of causes, quite another.

A fact may be well known, while the philosophy of it may be profoundly a secret. It is a fact that a magnet has a strange affinity for other pieces of metal, and draws them to itself; but the *how* and *why* belong to the final secrets of matter. Jesus Christ on the cross is the means of man's redemption; but here, too, the how and why belong to the highest and final philosophy. Undoubtedly there is a harmonious and true philosophy beneath all these profoundest problems of redemption, but we have not the mental apparatus with which to apprehend it.

Taking this transcendent element into the account does by no means degrade theology into a philosophy of nescience; it simply forewarns us that our attainments must be limited, and reveals the boundary between what we may, and may not understand. We know, for example, that our Savior produced bread without those processes which we deem natural and necessary. We have no doubt of the fact, and we know that it served a purpose in his plan of salvation, and yet we are most profoundly ignorant of the real secret of that wonderful work, and ever must be until we know the last secrets of matter. Take the doctrine of the Trinity. There is, no doubt, an actual tripartite distinction in the Godhead, of which these terms "triune" and "Trinity" give a hint; but the reality which underlies these words is completely transcendent.

We know only phenomena, indeed, in spiritual things, but we have all reason to believe, that they are the true and

not misleading symbols of the real and absolute. It is thoroughly illogical to say that since we know nothing absolutely, we know nothing at all. There is just as good reason for concluding that there is a real and practical correspondence between the atonement absolutely and phenomenally considered, as that there is such a correspondence between the absolute and the phenomenal in nature.

Nature never deceives us, although her secret things are infinitely too deep for us; why should the supernatural? since in the last analysis nature and the supernatural are one. These phenomena, in both material and spiritual worlds, stand for, and represent, eternal verities.

Because we know only second causes and laws, it is simple insanity to conclude that there can be no living, personal God; the exact opposite is the more rational conclusion, since, when we go as far as laws and phenomena can lead us they still point on and up to that which is higher than they, and by which alone they exist.

“God is law! say the wise, O soul, and let us rejoice,
For if he thunder by law, the thunder is yet *his* voice.”

The one broad and universal inference from nature is that of a personal and superintending God.

But this transcendent element serves also to account for the limitations of human knowledge in divine things. It is not an arbitrary withholding, but a limitation, arising from the present state of our mental development. We learn as fast as our mental faculties will allow. We know only phenomena, simply because we have not the capacity for knowing more. It is the profound remark of a German critic, that “the apparent faults of the Old Testament are due to the imperfection of the pupil and not to the teacher.” So our imperfect knowledge of divine things is due to the fact that the human intellect is inadequate to the task of receiving them. God in the revelation of eternal truth must, of course, be limited to a certain extent by the intellectual capacity of the beings to whom these revelations are made. No profoundest mathematician can teach a four years’ old child

the calculus. God must accommodate his truth to the recipients.

The weakness and obscurity of human language alone would necessitate this. One of the deepest secrets of the incarnation is the necessity, on account of our mental limitations, of translating the higher truth into tangible and appreciable forms. Pure spiritual realities were reduced or brought down into material terms, that we might be able to comprehend them. The abundant anthropomorphism of Scripture reveals this necessity of translating the higher into lower forms.

The whole plan of salvation is an accommodation of absolute truth to the capacities of the human intellect. What we shall see in the other world will doubtless be quite unlike any thing now conceivable, and yet we shall find a practical correspondence between our earthly ideas and the heavenly realities. Our knowledge here is limited by a subjective incapacity.

(2.) *In the second place, a constant recognition of this transcendent element would tend to reconcile or, at least, to modify the doctrinal variances between evangelical sects.*

Let it once be recognized that our knowledge in theology is only phenomenal, and men would begin to think less of speculation and pay stricter attention to the fact-statements of God's Word. Instead of trying to reconcile their variant beliefs in the sphere of their actual knowledge, they would be disposed to remand all these transcendent questions into the sphere of the unknowable. Doubtless a large portion of the errors in theology has arisen from a failure to give this transcendent element a due consideration. Theologians have been too strenuous about modes and philosophic explanations, and too little anxious to make the most of Scriptural facts.

Here is half the religious world disputing with the other half about "Liberty and Necessity," or "Sovereignty and Free Will," the solution of which involves an absolute knowledge of the nature of God, and the constitution of

the human soul. Yet rival theologians have carried on the war for centuries, instead of recognizing the transcendent element and confessing that philosophic explanation was, from the nature of the case, impossible. As a matter of fact, both these doctrines are taught in God's Word, and what is an apparent inconsistency must be harmonized in the sphere of the absolute truth. There are some doctrines which are so plainly transcendent that the statement of the fact is all that can be made; any attempt at explanation only deepens the mystery. Take the Trinity or the eternal Sonship of Christ; these are doctrines where only a fact-theology is possible.

To explain them to the rational intellect we should need an absolute knowledge of both God and man. The confidence and dogmatic assurance with which the champions on either side of great doctrines will lay down what seem to them incontrovertible conclusions prove the need of recognizing this transcendent element. Each would be less positive as he took more into the account the limitations of the human intellect. Each would hold his views more tentatively; dogmatic rigor would relax, and each, as he realized more fully the inadequacy of the mental powers to sound the depths of these problems, would be driven closer to the fact-statements of God's Word. And so upon the basis of facts the doctrinal variances would be more likely to be reconciled, or at least modified, than while each is plunging deeper and deeper into speculation. And has not what is here regarded as theoretically possible been made historic and actual, indeed, to a considerable extent, within the last century?

What some have been glad to call a softening down, relaxation, or modification of evangelical doctrines, is simply a result of the growing recognition of this transcendent element, which tends, indeed, to soften the asperities of dogmatism, while it by no means indicates a change of belief or a decadence of faith.

The evangelical sects will come nearer together and into

harmony in proportion as they plant themselves upon the facts of revelation and cultivate with caution a speculative theology.

(3.) *In the third place, the transcendent element furnishes our best answer to the objections of rationalists against the plan of salvation.*

The fundamental error of the rationalist is, that he wants all theological questions to be *demonstrable* by reason. He puts human reason above revelation, and claims that the intellect is competent to make its way unaided and to discover whatever truth is needful. Having put his own reason on the throne, of course he must bow down and worship it. Reason is the supreme standard, and what does not square with that must be rejected. The rationalist will take nothing on trust. "My understanding must be the measure of my faith," is his reply to all questions which touch the supernatural and transcendent. He wants the doctrines of salvation brought into the domain of reason and demonstrated by rational tests. He rebels at the thought of any authoritative teaching which he can not fully comprehend. His chief indictment against the Bible is, that he can not understand it, that it does not square with his reason. Now what answer shall we make to him? Shall we ask him to wait until reason gets a firmer grasp on the supernatural? or until more light breaks out of the Word of God? He will reply, that he has already waited eighteen hundred years, and the original difficulties still remain. Shall we redouble our efforts to explain the colossal doctrines on which he stumbles, and to make them square with his reason? We can hardly expect to surpass the peerless intellects which have already put forth gigantic efforts and have met with but partial success.

No; let us tell the rationalist frankly and plainly this: "The Bible does not square with your reason, simply because it *can not* from the nature of the case; since it treats, and must treat, of things which, in their absolute reality, are utterly beyond your reason. All you can reasonably

demand is, that the Bible shall not do violence to your intellectual judgment and moral instincts. The office of your reason is simply to determine for yourself whether it is reasonable to suppose that the Bible is a revelation from God. After that, God speaks, and you must hear." Knowing, as we do, only phenomena or second causes, the absolute ground and essence of all things are beyond our powers of comprehension.

Faith becomes a necessity to every rational being, and is, indeed, the highest form, the bright, consummate flower of reason. The highest possible exercise of reason is to pave the way to an intelligent faith. Every-where, in small and great things, reason finds its end and goal in faith. So we say again to the rationalist, "There would be no need of faith if every thing squared with your reason as you desire. This transcendent element *necessitates* faith; and it becomes in the highest degree reasonable to assert that the Bible can square only with your faith and not with your reason. Thus the mighty stress laid on faith or belief in the Word of God is explained. Since only phenomena come within the reach of our faculties, belief is a necessity. So faith becomes the royal king-word, the greatest word of the New Testament.

The rationalist asks that the great doctrines of Scripture shall yield their final secrets to his reason. The atonement, prayer, miracles, the incarnation, he must understand them all, or he will not believe them. But we reply, These doctrines, in their final philosophy, are beyond the capacity of the very instrument which you have brought to measure them. If you want to know them fully, you must bring something better than a human intellect with which to comprehend them. You can not hope to fathom the Atlantic with a trout-line.

In asking for a rational explanation of all spiritual problems the rationalist is most unreasonable. He is asking for an ability in the plan of salvation which he does not dream of demanding in the conduct of life; for *there* all his most

important acts are based on faith. This very transcendent element, which he overlooks in the plan of salvation, he is the quickest to recognize in the plan of nature. He eats the fruits of the earth, takes medicine, sows and reaps, uses to his own practical advantage the occult forces of nature, and never thinks of demanding that every thing shall square with his reason. Indeed, he is usually the foremost of all to declare how wonderful and mysterious and past all finding out is the natural world.

He is aware, and ready to grant, that in the material universe there is a transcendent element. The final secrets of matter he can not fathom. He stands dumb before those mysterious laws which are only the modes and phenomena of still deeper realities. God's *world* of facts he takes on trust, but God's *book* of facts he rejects. If you turn to the plan of salvation the old rationalistic spirit asserts itself, and he demands here just what, in another sphere, he has acknowledged to be unknowable. He knows nothing of matter except phenomena, and yet in the spiritual realm he demands to know the absolute. In nature he realizes the impossibility of comprehending such secrets as life, growth, and reproduction of species. Why does he not recognize a like difficulty in the supernatural? How utterly impossible, for example, to comprehend the *modes* of omniscience while we know so little of spirit! How could Jesus know what was passing in the minds of those about him? From the stand-point of reason, how completely mysterious! Nothing could reveal to us the rationale of it except an exhaustive knowledge of spirit. But the rationalist watches the growth and flowering of a night-blooming cereus, and accepts the beautiful fact, while of the inner vital processes he knows no more than he does about the modes of omniscience. The deepest secret of the cereus can only be solved by an absolute knowledge of matter.

How inconceivable as to mode is a miracle; and yet the rationalist denies the possibility of one, because it transcends his reason. All dispute about a miracle ought to

be exhausted, of course, on the reasonable proof of one's having been performed. The mode must, from the nature of things, be beyond the grasp of human intellect. The rationalist must be taught to receive much, as truth, which is beyond his comprehension. In short, he must treat the plan of salvation as reasonably as he does the plan of nature.

Take the science of chemistry as an illustration of the rationalist's faith in nature, while he doubts the supernatural. From this science he derives the most valuable and trustworthy results, though he can not probe its deepest mysteries without an absolute knowledge of matter. The very terms which he uses in his chemical vocabulary he knows may be far enough from indicating the absolute reality, and yet they are not practically misleading. The facts never deceive him, though names and theories may all be wrong.

Now turn this same illustration upon the doctrine of the atonement. Here we are ready to admit, that, after we have uttered our profoundest thought, and explained our best theory, and have had our last word on this great subject, it is quite probable that we have expressed its deepest philosophy only in the most imperfect and fragmentary manner.

Nothing is easier to understand than the *fact* of an atonement; but the inner, divine secret of it the angels in heaven may yet have to learn. But it is the fact and not the philosophy which is of greatest practical importance. Its benefits are open to the weakest and mightiest of intellects alike. The fact of an atonement does not deceive us, though our theories may all be wrong. All our language about the atonement may be representative and phenomenal, but it represents what is practically the truth. Just as when we say in chemistry that each molecule of water contains two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen, or that by weight there are two parts of hydrogen to sixteen parts of oxygen, the language is phenomenal and representative, but

it stands for actual facts in nature. The plan of salvation may seem *formal* in statement, but beneath that *form* lies the eternal truth. So, when the rationalist demands that the doctrines of the Bible shall square with his reason, we answer that it is impossible, unless he can bring absolute knowledge of spirit and matter.

After all, a recognition of this transcendent element in the plan of salvation is the rational side of faith. The first thing for reason to do is to get some fair estimate of her own capabilities. The fact of the transcendent necessitates the very faith which the rationalist is so unwilling to yield. The supernatural is no more irrational than the natural, in which he trusts, for both alike offer great practical benefits where absolute knowledge is impossible.

(4.) *Again, a recognition of this transcendent element helps to harmonize the disagreements between science and religion.*

As the rationalist wants the Word of God to square with his reason, so the scientist wants all theology to square with his science. He demands that it be made scientifically demonstrable, or he will have none of it.

Now the first thing to be said is, that the recognition of this transcendent element takes the whole question of theology out of the sphere of the demonstrable, and deals with things so profound that, from the nature of the case, they are beyond demonstration. All we can say is, that the visible manifestations of the plan of salvation are the trustworthy signs of incomprehensible realities. The ultimate secrets of matter and spirit are involved in theological science. But about matter and spirit, neither the scientist nor theologian knows any thing but phenomena and second causes.

When the scientist asks the student of theology to explain scientifically the creation, the origin of life, miracles, or the philosophy of prayer, the reply must be, that such explanation is, from the nature of things and the constitution of the human mind, impossible. He comes asking for that which he has no capacity to receive, even if one were

found able to give it. He asks what the limitations of his own intellect make it impossible to bestow, and then flings at theology because it *demonstrates* nothing.

Take the doctrine of the Trinity for example. It is seen at a glance that any explanation of it which would satisfy the scientist's demands presupposes an absolute knowledge of the nature of deity. So, when we are reproached for reiterating the *fact* of the Trinity without any attempt at proof, it is legitimate to reply that nothing more *can* be said. Our inability to explain lies in the nature of things, and is not to be charged against theology.

Take the miracle again. The scientist wants us to bring it into the domain of natural law before he will believe it. But the miracles of Christ make it certain that the phenomena which we behold are far enough from exhausting the contents of nature. The laws under which we live, and which we know, must be of a lower order, and are entirely absorbed by those higher laws, of which Christ in his miracles gave us glimpses. Miracles teach us our utter inability to comprehend what is deepest in nature. Our conception of her final powers and capacities must be of the most superficial and rudimentary character. A miracle like that of changing water into wine, or multiplying the loaves and fishes, reveals to us, when we deeply contemplate it, the impassable gulf between our profoundest conceptions about the possibilities of nature and the absolute reality. Of modes and processes in either of these miracles we can not have the vaguest approach to a conception; and yet, to eyes of omniscience, the whole rationale must have been simple and clear. For these wonders, so strange to us, belonged, after all, to a world of *reality*, and must have been performed in harmony with the nature and in accord with the laws of absolute existence. Of course, no scientific demonstration is possible of things so completely out of the range of the human intellect.

The next thing to be said to the hostile scientist is, that he insists upon applying the wrong test to religious truth,

and attempts to measure it with instruments which are totally inadequate as well as inappropriate. The true tests of theological science are, of course, moral and spiritual. The man of science wants to force his own methods upon religion, and measure all things with his physical rule or weigh them in his material scales. When science attempts to apply her own peculiar tests to theological truth, she is in a sphere where her instruments are wholly worthless. As well might a mechanic bring his derrick and windlass to handle electricity, or the apothecary his scales to weigh a sunbeam, as for a scientist to expect to bring the great truths of theology to a physical test. Science can make no headway by applying to spiritual realities a set of tests which are wholly at variance with the truths to be tested. When you consider that these great spiritual truths are from their very nature utterly undemonstrable, the absurdity of applying scientific measurements to theology appears.

But the chief objection to be made against the application of scientific methods to spiritual things is this: the scientist proposes a test for theology which his own science can not endure. While he himself works only in the sphere of phenomena and second causes, he very unfairly endeavors to push the theologian back into the sphere of primal causes or the absolute truth. The scientist answers all questions put to him in terms of phenomena, but demands that the theologian shall work out all his problems in terms of absolute truth. It is needless to remark how unfair, as well as unphilosophical, is this procedure.

The most boasted victories of science are but tracing second causes a little nearer home, observing laws and naming effects, and looking a little deeper into the methods of nature. With the absolute she does not and can not deal; yet she blames theology for failing at just that point where her own powers reach their limit. The scientist puts his knowledge of *phenomena* over against the theologian's knowledge of the absolute, and expects the latter to be as con-

versant about primal causes as he himself is about secondary. He asks the student of theology to do what he has never attempted; that is, to leave phenomena, and look into the inner heart of things, and tell final secrets.

Were he required to do this in his own sphere, he would be dumb in a moment. He himself names processes, discovers methods, watches the constancy of nature until he can proclaim a law; but he never answers, why the law? After he has told us all he knows, the real mystery is as great as before. He says that the needle has a magnetic attraction to the pole; and that water changing to ice reverses an almost universal law, and expands instead of contracting. But all this reveals no secrets. It is but the bare cataloguing of facts. The great why yet remains; primal causes are hidden as deeply as ever.

Now, the theologian can do in his sphere just what the scientist does in his, and no more. And no more ought to be demanded. Concerning the origin of life, a change of heart, or the atonement, the theologian can tell the scientist facts and phenomena. The mighty question, the unknowable thing with both, is, not *what?* but *how?*

The scientist chronicles a fact, such as magnetism, with observations upon the accompanying phenomena, and thinks that he has done all that can be done. But when the theologian chronicles a spiritual fact, such as regeneration and its accompanying phenomena, the scientist is unsatisfied. We only say, "Do not ask more in the sphere of theology than it would be fair to ask in your own sphere." Do not work in the phenomenal yourself and yet push the theologian into the realm of the absolute. When the student of science so far forgets the true relations of the physical and spiritual as to join the cry of the ancient pagans, "*Show us your God,*" the solemn answer must be, "No man hath *seen* God at any time;" but we might also add, "The only begotten Son, he hath declared Him." The theologian is just as competent to explain in his field of exploration as the other in his, and neither can go beyond phenomena. The condi-

tion of a perfect science, as well as of a perfect theology, is omniscience.

When both scientist and theologian recognizes that his knowledge is relative not absolute, the way to harmony will be open.

Finally, this whole theme points with increasing emphasis *to man's need of a revelation from God.*

It is because of this transcendent element, this relativity of knowledge, that we need an authoritative guide. God *can* tell us facts, though philosophical explanation be impossible. God must deal with us in the realm of second causes. He gives us results not reasons. The Bible makes simple statement of facts in phenomenal language without any attempt at philosophizing. Take the physical facts connected with the atonement. Who can imagine what may have been their equivalent in the spiritual verities of which they were the representatives? And yet there is no attempt at explanation. Christ shed his blood to make a ground of acceptance with God for the sinner. That is the fact. Just how that death was connected with our deliverance from guilt belongs to the realm of absolute truth. The various *theories* of the atonement are but so many guesses more or less near the eternal reality. But the fact-statement, "He loved me and gave himself for me," is a better summing up of the atonement than any theological formula.

This transcendent element determines also the form and kind of revelation. The absolute verities in the plan of salvation must be translated for us into the phenomenal. If heavenly things can not be shown to the human eye, then material and earthly patterns of these things must be given. In such a case apparent imperfections will be inevitable; but, as before remarked, it will be an imperfection due to the pupil and not to the teacher.

If divine realities are to be translated for the accommodation of our limited intellectual capacity, of course such a translation must suffer, as all translations do. God was obliged to use imperfect media in his revelation, because of

the imperfect beings to whom it was made. Dr. Howe, in his endeavors to reveal to the darkened intellect of Laura Bridgman this world of consciousness and phenomena, was obliged to resort to the most imperfect, roundabout, and almost grotesque methods, and to exercise almost infinite patience, because of the imperfections of his pupil. Thus God has been obliged to deal with men; to speak to them evermore in parables, and to make these earthly patterns tell us in form and symbol that truth which is absolute and eternal.

If the story of Genesis and the prologue of John are not perfect and exhaustive, the reason may be found in the limitations of the human mind and not in the will of the revealer. The history of the creation and the unfolding of the redemptive work must, of necessity, be phenomenal.

As a corollary from this whole discussion, it follows that all true progress in theology consists in a better apprehension of the fact-statements in the divine revelation. What God's Word *says* in precept and doctrine, properly classified and rightly interpreted, is the best expression that theology can reach. Healthy progress in theological science is not in a wider scope of speculation, but in a clearer and more consistent statement of divinely revealed facts.

ARTICLE II. UNIVERSITIES.

BY PROFESSOR W. H. WHITSITT, D. D.

THE NAME.

A SHORT while since the scholars of Germany were assembled at various places on the occasion of his birthday, to pay their homage to the worth and achievements of the distinguished and lamented Berlin jurist, Von Savigny. We too may join his admirers at home in laying an humble token on his honored grave, for by his labors he has placed all the world under obligations. The points in which these obligations may be recognized are so numerous that only an accomplished lawyer would be able to state them in detail, and I will therefore content myself by referring to the single particular in which his discoveries bear upon the subject now before us. To Savigny belongs the merit of having first enlightened the ignorance of the learned world in reference to the origin and meaning of the word university. Though well known facts and usages opposed that view, it had, for several centuries prior to his time, been accepted as unquestionable that a university was a place where all the circle of sciences either was, or should be taught, and that an institution which laid claim to this designation was necessarily incomplete unless it was an *universitas literarum*. In his noble work on "Roman Law in the Middle Ages" the famous jurist pointed out that the earliest universities bore the title in question when as yet they had but a single faculty and taught but a single discipline. Paris was denominated a university when as yet it cultivated only theology, and Bologna while it cultivated only the law. To be sure, a great deal of obscurity rests upon the origin of these and other renowned seats of

learning, and there is still a keenly felt need of careful monographs which shall cast light upon a number of questions; nevertheless, this much is established, that the title university did not, at the outset, allude even remotely to the amount or nature of the studies pursued at such an institution.

In Bologna the phrase *universitas scholarium* was current; in Paris they said *universitas magistrorum*. The meaning of these phrases will be clear when the fact (first applied in this connection by Savigny) is stated, that for purposes of discipline the students were divided into four nations. At Paris the nations were the French, Normans, Picards, and English, the latter holding in that period certain possessions in the southern portion of the country. These nations composed separate corporations, with their own seal, exchequer, and courts of law. Whenever any thing happened in which they were all alike interested—if, for example, a rector was to be chosen—delegates from each of the nations met together, and the body, when thus united, was called the university. In Bologna the functions of government were reposed in the hands of the students, and on account of this democratic constitution it was known as the *universitas scholarium*. In Paris, on the contrary, where only the instructors had a voice, whether in the counsels of the different nations or in the sessions of the entire corporation, the designation *universitas magistrorum* was commonly employed. It may be remarked in passing that the democratic constitution of Bologna was not elsewhere copied, all the other universities choosing in place of it the aristocratic system which prevailed in Paris.

When the four faculties came later to be organized, each of these had likewise its four nations, and exhibited, on a reduced scale, a sort of copy of the entire body to which it was attached.

This arrangement would appear to have been a natural result of the existing state of affairs. An immense throng of persons passing under the name of students were

attracted to these centers, many of whom had no intention to apply themselves to the cares of learning, but designed rather, under cover of the extensive privileges and immunities which a generous partiality had conceded to the universities, to prosecute a career of vice and violence. As the criminal law of these institutions was unavoidably administered with a degree of laxity, there was often occasion for serious concern lest the Church should interfere and restore order by abolishing academical citizenship, and placing the graceless academical citizen under the same discipline as the rest of the population. Naturally the members of each nationality would feel a certain amount of responsibility for the orderly carriage of all their associates, and the separation of students into national bodies with courts of their own would prove, it was believed, an excellent measure of restraint. Expectation was justified by the result; a considerable improvement was observed, and the organization by nations, although subsequently modified through the organization by faculties, was for several ages in high repute. It continued in existence at the University of Leipsic until the year 1830, and still prevails at Upsala.

The discovery on the part of Savigny that the idea of an *universitas literarum* was not the current conception, when the word university first came into use, is calculated in the course of time, I believe, to produce one or two changes in the science of pedagogics which will be recognized as valuable. It is plain that the term now bears another meaning than that which originally was assigned to it, and hence we may approach with smaller prejudice the question whether the comparatively recent notion of an *universitas literarum*, of an institution where the whole circle of sciences is taught, is, on the whole, a beneficial or a hurtful notion. Much may be advanced on both sides of the question, but, after a somewhat patient review of the matter, I am inclined to favor the conclusion that it would be a gain for learning if the name university, and along with it the idea of a university of letters, should fall quite out of use.

1. In the first place it conveys a false impression. The proper design of a school of the grade which in Germany is known as a university is not primarily to promote the acquisition of stores of information, but rather to provide a place where one may acquire a scientific spirit, and cultivate the art of organizing upon new principles the learning which he already possesses or may acquire. Nobody, indeed, affirms that the process of acquisition can be separated in practice from that of scientific combination. If a mass of facts have lain for ages like the dry bones in the valley, where they have been burrowed amongst with infinite learning and stupidity by an army of pedants, and a true scholar concludes to "lay sinews upon them, and bring up flesh upon them, and cover them with skin, and put breath into them, so that they shall live," it is not questioned that he will obtain a store of new information in this process; but, after all, he may not know the facts as extensively, nor even as accurately, as one of those same pedant moles who has passed his life and worn out his strength to no purpose in burrowing among them. Now, in case the word university in its present signification is retained, men will be all the while in danger of overlooking the point that the chief end of such institutions is to lead them to a scientific use of their understanding; to teach them how to think rather than to encourage them in amassing almost worthless stores of information about what other people have thought. It is to be apprehended that they will devote their energies more to the labor of piling Pelion upon Ossa, than to the worthier task of piercing the bowels of these mountains, and laying open the mines of gold which lie hidden there. The work of learning—simple acquisition—belongs in strictness to the gymnasium or other preparatory school. There the student may properly gratify his ambition to master the entire circle of sciences, there he may cultivate his memory to any desirable pitch; but in this other place sterner business encounters him.

If, however, it should be said that the expression *university*

of letters, does not by necessity convey the erroneous notion which has here been deprecated, the reply may be proposed that, in point of fact, it often has done so, and, what is worse, has contributed thereby to the injury of learning. At any rate it is not sufficiently definite, not accurately descriptive. For my own part, I could wish to see some other name substituted in the place of the term university, and beg leave, in all modesty, to suggest that the expression High-school would do better justice to the idea.

To Fichte and Schleiermacher belongs the distinction of having first pointed out the above as the proper object of a university, and they likewise contributed more than any others towards lifting the universities of Germany to this standard, by their labors in connection with the founding and progress of the University of Berlin. And one can not forbear the tribute of his admiration and gratitude for the noble service which they thereby rendered to their fatherland and to the world. Since their day learned men have begun to be thinkers also. Almost every department of study has, by this means, been organized anew, and conclusions which, thanks to educated stupidity, were recognized for centuries as indisputable, have in a large number of cases been overset, and others often diametrically opposite have been established instead of them.

There is another matter to which I deem it necessary to allude, but inasmuch as it refers to a very vexed question in the science of pedagogics, I would beg to be understood as advancing my opinion with a due regard to the convictions of any who may cultivate the opposite way of thinking. The notions of Fichte and Schleiermacher about universities were received with distinguished favor in Germany, and naturally they were soon transplanted to our own country. Unfortunately, however, a considerable party of American educators misunderstood, and, by consequence, misapplied, what the great masters had said. These had affirmed that mere acquisition—the exercise of the memory chiefly—was the proper thing for the gymnasium, and

asserted that training in the art of thinking by original and independent investigations should be reserved for the university almost entirely. But American educators got the notion that education of all grades and in all kinds of schools should be directed mainly to the end of training the young to think. Properly speaking, however, the principle in question did not, and, may it be added, does not yet apply to the state of affairs among us, for there is no institution in our country of equal grade with a German university, and not more than eight or ten which compare favorably with a respectable German gymnasium. It is, therefore, a subject of congratulation that the fashion once so current, of insisting that even the little ones in primary schools should be taught to think, is at last passing out. Of course, such talk did not amount to any thing in the schools of inferior grade; but there is reason to apprehend that in many colleges and universities it operated injuriously, since under-graduates were sometimes assured that the chief end of their course was to learn to think, when as a matter of fact, they had got nothing to think about. It is plain that it would be decidedly a more practical exercise for them to acquire ample stores of information to be afterwards assimilated, rather than engage in the idle enterprise of striving to organize the sciences upon new principles which, in their use of them, would of necessity be *a priori* and fanciful.

2. In another and entirely practical way it is possible to conceive that the interests of learning would be advanced among us by abolishing the term university. In America we have at last arrived at a point where we can begin to make some arrangements looking towards a distinct and conscious effort to promote what Matthew Arnold calls "superior education;" but this movement, we have reason to apprehend, is checked and hindered, even in the minds of those well instructed in pedagogics, by the unsupported idea that the indispensable condition of the said "superior education" is a university of letters, and, by consequence, men

who are well able to serve the interests of learning do nothing in that way, because the erection of a university involves a larger amount of expense than they are capable of assuming. But it is evident that many of the most desirable advantages of German university training might be obtained in a much more direct way. Permit me to explain what is intended by that assertion. Let us estimate the number of institutions in this country which impart in quantity and quality a respectable "secondary" or gymnasium education at ten. Now, if a company of intelligent gentlemen, who possess an amount of money which they wish to put to the wisest use, should establish at each of these centers a single scholar of scientific spirit and extensive acquirements, whose duty it would be to give instruction to persons desiring to prosecute a post-graduate course, it is entirely likely that such a teacher would do more good work, year by year, even in case he obtained not more than two or three students, than could be done by the entire institution where he was situated. Some of the most useful schools of which there is any record were taught by a single man, as Abelard or William of Champeaux. May not the problem of superior education, which is now beginning to press itself upon the attention of the American public, be finally helped to a solution by this simple, and yet organic, method of procedure? But the great obstacle in the way of progress in this direction is the vulgar conception of a university and the unfounded prejudice that all superior education is tied and bound to institutions which have a regiment of teachers. How idle that notion is will be rendered more plain if one considers that the success of nearly every university of Germany is mainly built upon the fame of some two or three teachers, and that if these same distinguished teachers, backed by the support and countenance of the better elements of the community, were to lecture in private and independently, they would be almost as numerously attended as at present, and their work would be just as efficient.

THE FOUR FACULTIES.

I have already detained the reader's attention too long with a recital of objections to the name university. Nevertheless, I can not forbear to add a reference to the constitution by four faculties, which is introduced here simply on the ground that there may be no convenient opportunity to bring it forward elsewhere. That venerable relic of mediævalism which is based upon the mere accident that some of the earliest universities had four nations is one of the most grotesque affairs in our modern life. The Germans have yielded somewhat to the conviction that such an anomaly can not be defended by changing the title of the fourth faculty. This is now known as the philosophical faculty; and, as a sort of receptacle for all odds and ends, it often contains disciplines enough, and varied enough, to employ in itself the energies of three or four faculties. And practically there are three or four faculties in every philosophical faculty. Moreover to obtain a degree in the German philosophical faculty no student is expected to master all the subjects there discussed, but only those which lie in a particular direction, and are taught by men who have charge of that particular department.

To guard against the liability of being misunderstood permit me, on turning away from this branch of the subject, to state that I have had no thought in what I have here proposed of expressing any opposition to the practice of organizing extensive institutions of learning, and endowing them in every department with the appliances of science. When such a course appears to be feasible it should, by all means, be attempted. But in our country such a course is not yet feasible, and may not be for a long period of years; not for lack of money, indeed, but because there are not yet teachers enough for an institution of this sort. Moreover, if that obstacle were surmounted by calling promising "private-docents" and others from German universities, a still greater difficulty would be encountered in

the circumstance that they would have few or no students, and in the other circumstance (more troublesome to deal with than any of the rest) that the American public are not fully prepared either to commend or support the kind of training which would be imparted. For us, therefore, I am inclined to think it would be a wise plan to discard the unhistorical and, at the same time, misleading notion of a university of letters, and to go to work with such materials as we have at our disposal to introduce an era of superior education. If this blessing were once sufficiently extended by means of special scientific teachers established at our various schools and colleges, or by any other means, these same schools and colleges might, in numerous instances, develop into High-schools, or schools of superior learning. As matters now stand, however, the American public is in a state of paralysis, permitting itself all the while to be frightened out of any practical exertions by the idle bugbear of a university of letters. A single David with his sling and pebble might do more to slay the Goliath of ignorance than the whole army of Israel.

On the other hand, it may by some be supposed that the regular professors at our American schools are equal to the task of providing scientific instruction for post-graduates, and hence that the suggestion of appointing special teachers for superior education is untimely and unpractical. I have no question that instances can be cited of men who have risen above their surroundings, and by virtue of superior energy and enthusiasm have attained to a kind of culture which, without blushing, one may denominate scientific. But these are very extraordinary persons, and their example is quite exceptional. As a general thing the American teacher is closely hampered throughout his entire career by the drudgery of class-room drill, which, considering the materials he has to work upon, he dares not neglect; and if he teaches up to what is known in his department there will be little time left to investigate what is yet unknown, little time (and, what is worse, little incitement) for the labors of

scientific production. Therefore, I conceive that it would be more agreeable to the purpose in view to commit the interests of post-graduates into the hands of a class of men who are entirely relieved from such exacting and, sometimes, overwhelming cares.

HISTORY OF UNIVERSITIES.

For convenience of treatment, this portion of the subject may be divided into two sections, as follows:

I. Before the granting of Freedom of Instruction. From A. D. 1150–1736.

II. After the granting of Freedom of Instruction. From A. D. 1736–1879.

I. *History of Universities before the granting of Freedom of Instruction, 1150–1736.*

This period may, in its turn, be divided into two parts, as follows:

1. Until the rise of the Protestant Reformation. From A. D. 1150–1517.

2. After the rise of the Protestant Reformation. From A. D. 1517–1736.

Of course it would not be in order, in the space allotted, to attempt any thing like a detailed account, and I shall therefore take the liberty of selecting from the abundant material which the subject embraces such topics as, I hope, will be of interest and importance. But it will be necessary in the outset to explain what is intended by the expression, Freedom of Instruction. It refers chiefly to the right of the professor to conduct the teaching in his department without being subjected to distress or dictation from without, on the ground of any opinions which he may hold or inculcate. In short, he is responsible to no authority except to God and his scientific conscience for the sentiments proposed in his lectures.

I have chosen the year 1736 as the era when freedom of instruction was introduced, for the reason that at this

date the University of Göttingen was founded, professedly at least, upon this principle, and because about that time an impulse, from various sources, was imparted to the idea. It is not asserted that no instance of freedom of instruction can be cited prior to the establishment of the High-school of Göttingen, nor that nobody in Germany has been gagged and silenced since that period. But, looking at matters in the aggregate, the year 1736 may fairly be regarded as beginning a new order of things. It was then that the influence of the Church over the universities (in Germany, at least) ceased to be predominant, and the influence of the State was recognized as the controlling one. It is a misfortune, perhaps, that institutions of this nature should need to be dependent upon any power without them, but, inasmuch as that, under present conditions at least, is unavoidable, it is but a simple matter of history to point out the fact that freedom of instruction is synchronous with the change to which I have already referred. With these few words in explanation of the principle of division which has been adopted I proceed to the business in hand.

1. The history of universities from 1150 until the rise of the Protestant Reformation in 1517. I have chosen, of set purpose, to leave out of consideration the earliest universities of our Western world; namely, those of Athens and Constantinople and the law schools of Rome and Berytus, all founded during the imperial Roman age, because these, while supplying many points of contact with more recent schools, all lie beyond the flood of barbarian invasion. The scientific historian will find it an exercise of great interest, and, mayhap, of practical importance, to trace up and accurately describe these ancient schools and those of the Middle Ages, and their influence in molding the latter, both in respect to form and spirit; but here is not the place for an investigation of that sort.

As has already been intimated, authorities on the history of universities are in hopeless confusion, and there is crying need of a more patient and extensive treatment of

the subject. Inasmuch, however, as our object at this point is not primarily critical, I shall content myself, in the main, with the dates found in a circular of information of the Government Bureau of Education, that was issued in January, 1872. The catalogue there given states that the medical faculty of Salerno was founded in the year 1150. The University of Bologna, at first a law school, followed in 1158; Paris, at first a theological school, in 1213. These, as already shown, were all of them universities, although they had but a single faculty and taught but a single discipline. Oxford was founded in 1201, Cambridge in 1257, Prague in 1348, Vienna in 1365, Heidelberg in 1386, Leipzig in 1409, Rostock in 1419, Greifswalde in 1456, Basle in 1459, Tübingen in 1477, and in 1502, just prior to the Reformation, Wittenberg.

The Church had just celebrated a complete triumph, in its immortal conflict with barbarism, when this movement began, and, by reason of its noble services to mankind, its position was generally allowed to be pre-eminent. Nearly all the learning of the times was found within its precincts, and it need excite no surprise that priests were the principal, perhaps the only instructors. By this means the office of teacher came to be regarded as a clerical prerogative, and the universities as ecclesiastical institutions. Students as well as professors were, in consequence of this state of things, required to observe celibacy and to wear a priestly habit, which, at Oxford and Cambridge, has not yet been laid aside; while, for civil privileges, they enjoyed in its widest application the benefit of clergy. Indeed, so liberal were the pontiffs in this respect, that one author enumerates no fewer than one hundred and eighty-one immunities and privileges of students.

Instruction was at this time communicated by means of lectures and disputations. These latter, unfortunately, have quite gone out of fashion, unless the moot-courts of the law schools may be considered in the light of a relic of them. The students and instructors, it seems, carried the

figures and moods of logic to such fantastic extremes that a reaction set in which was almost fatal for a long time to that science itself. Recent efforts have been made, but without any corresponding success, to renew this old custom. Theremin wrote an eloquent and forcible appeal in favor of it in the year 1836; but few were inclined to adopt his suggestions, and the habit of reading lectures continues almost every-where in the ascendant. If some gifted instructor, favored by circumstances, should succeed in demonstrating that disputation or dialogue, as a means of imparting knowledge, is not necessarily a lost art, I am persuaded that he would not only earn a great reputation, but would also render a useful service to the cause of education.

THE ORIGIN OF COLLEGES.

It was not a great while after the organization of universities was effected until the need of colleges began to be felt. The causes which led to this state of things may be stated in a general way, as follows:

1. A large number of students entering the university at a very tender age—in Paris from the eighth to the fourteenth year—it was perceived that they were, in most cases, incapable of deriving any advantage from the public lectures. For these a curriculum of study was found to be indispensable, since they were not yet sufficiently ripe to guide themselves aright in this matter. They were, in a word, not capable of making any wise use of the academical freedom of learning, and required in its place a special kind of tutelage, which should be more adapted to their years.

2. Incited by the freedom of academical citizenship, many of these youths—nay, most of them—were discovered to be running into excesses, which were rapidly destroying both health and morals. To stand still and behold so many distressing sacrifices of life and happiness would have been in itself a crime.

3. Numbers of the students were exceedingly poor and

could not easily meet the expenses of lodging in private families. Hence extensive mess halls were founded, for the purpose of furnishing subsistence at the lowest rates, and there they lived in common.

Other causes may have been in operation, but these three are sufficient to explain the origin of the college system. The fashion once set, colleges were rapidly organized in almost all the universities, and by the end of the fifteenth century the bulk of students at every seat of learning, and in every faculty alike, resided in colleges, under the same roof with their instructors, and were subjected at all times, both in respect to their studies and their conduct, to the closest supervision. After the Reformation, when the professors were permitted, if they chose, to contract matrimony, they found it undesirable to reside longer in the colleges, and these were, in consequence, broken up in nearly every portion of Germany, as well as in other countries. The universities of Cambridge and Oxford, however, crystallized in this pre-reformation state of development, and these supply to the modern investigator exceedingly complete and valuable relics of that ancient period. From this showing it will be plain that colleges owed their origin chiefly to lack of ripeness in morals and in education on the part of the students, and that from this point of view, at least, a fundamental distinction between the college and the university is, that the one looks upon those who attend it as merely irresponsible boys, and the other regards them as being able to care for themselves and manage their own affairs.

As far as the interests of science are concerned, the universities of this period contented themselves with simply giving a wider circulation to the amount of learning that was already in existence. No efforts of any consequence were made in the direction of rendering it more profound or arranging it on better principles. The foremost scholars were scarcely any thing better than embodied encyclopædias, and for the most part they had no conception of any

thing higher than this. Their ideals were, indeed, very primitive and puny; but when one considers all the influences at work he will find it difficult to offer any serious blame. They were in a large measure the creatures of circumstances, and the circumstances were in the last degree unfavorable.

Moreover, the conservatism of great seats of learning is notorious. When the humanists arose with their new ideas and burning enthusiasm, they found their sturdiest opponents at the universities. These did all they could to discourage the new movement, and, for a long time, one had need to look anywhere else than to the accredited seats of learning for good scholars. Greek, in particular, was an unholy abomination, and a Greek scholar was liable to persecution almost every-where. Nevertheless, the new learning found allies in other quarters, and when its power became sufficiently robust the present era was closed and another was introduced. This second period in the history of universities prior to the granting of freedom of instruction extends

2. From the beginning of the Protestant Reformation to the founding of the University of Göttingen, A. D. 1517-1736.

Some of the leading universities established in this period were Strasburg (1538), Königsberg (1544), Jena (1548), Leyden (1575), Helmstädt (1576), Giessen (1607), Groningen (1614), Utrecht (1636), Halle (1694), Breslau (1702), Berne (1734), and Göttingen (1736). The principal changes occasioned by the Reformation are to be discovered in the faculties for theology, the others, for the most part, plodding on in the beaten track of previous centuries. Protestant theological studies, however, were essentially modified, first by means of humanism; and, secondly, by the turning away from systematical theology to give almost exclusive attention, for a season at least, to exegetical theology. As a result of the additional importance of theology, a number of universities, which had not previously had them, organ-

ized theological faculties—as, for example, Erfurt (1525, founded as a university in 1302), Rostock (1531, founded as a university in 1419), Tübingen (1535, founded as a university in 1477), Leipsic (1539, founded as a university 1409), and a number of others besides.

In theory, to be sure, but not in practice, the position of Protestant universities in Germany was at this time essentially changed. It was now the prerogative of the State and no longer of the Church to found and organize them, and the former claimed the right of appointing, sometimes also the right of nominating, professors. But notwithstanding this fact, the universities throughout our present period remained, scarcely less than in the preceding, under the domination of ecclesiastical and not of state influence. Not simply the theological, but each of the other faculties was expected to serve the interests of the Church as its first and foremost function. The motto which is still flourished by our own Harvard, “*Pro Ecclesia et Patria*,” expressed the current sentiment of these times. To the Church was unhesitatingly accorded precedence. Jurists always spoke of *corpora academica* as *corpora ecclesiastica*, and even as late as the middle of the eighteenth century the High Consistory or some other Church authority were the legally recognized visitors of universities. Even the black gown and cap were not invariably laid away until the opening of the present century. Teachers in all faculties, down to dancing and fencing masters, were qualified by taking an oath to sustain the symbols of the Lutheran or Calvinist party, as the case might be. Students, of whatever faculty, were regularly promoted to graduation in the churches; the head of the university was and still is denominated rector, as also the servant of a faculty was known as a dean.

The ancient rights accorded by the popes to academic bodies were also to a considerable extent maintained, and in Rostock, even to the present time, civil jurisdiction over the members of the university is allowed. Jurisdiction in criminal matters ceased much earlier, only a few institutions,

as Königsberg, Leipsic, Heidelberg, being able to assert it up to the close of the sixteenth century. The forms of instruction were still, as during the Middle Ages, lectures and disputations; but the latter lost favor more and more, and were at the close of this period almost fallen into disuse.

The mode of life of the students was changed by the growing unpopularity of the college system. That system was gradually dissolved, and by the middle of the eighteenth century very few traces of it remain. Persons well qualified by reason of extensive information and experience to form a judgment are divided in opinion on the question as to whether this was a beneficent change or otherwise; but in modern times, when so much attention is paid to preparatory training in the gymnasium, it seems more than likely that the university system will hold its own, supplemented as it is in very many instances by seminaries and other institutions for private instruction.

Regarding the advancement of learning by means of the universities in this period, very little that is complimentary can be said. Classical philology, in its modern sense, was not then known, and the classic languages were regarded merely in the light of humanities, a species of educated amusement which is not yet entirely obsolete. After the close of the sixteenth century Protestant theology lost its savor, and in theological faculties, as in all the rest, men were content to jog on in the beaten track.

II. We are now to treat of the *History of Universities after the Granting of Freedom of Instruction*. A. D. 1736–1879.

Göttingen is said to have been the first institution based upon this new foundation; but even there, as often elsewhere, freedom of instruction was more a matter of theory than of practice. A considerable impulse, however, was soon given to it by the “illumination,” seconded as this was by the influence and authority of Frederic the Great. Nevertheless, the “illumination period” brought with it no advantages for learning. That “sound common sense” for which

there are no mysteries and few questions of dispute is necessarily the handmaid of superficiality and ignorance, and this rule was not violated in the present instance. Matters dragged on wearily enough; learning was concealed and crushed under mountains of pedantry, until Kant set some bounds to the arrogance of rationalism in his "Critique of Pure Reason," and a better spirit began to show itself. The greatest epoch in the history of modern learning was the founding of the University of Berlin, in the year 1810. On the eve of that event the Prussian government invited the opinions of various scholars with regard to the line of policy which it would be wise to pursue, and the university system was thereby subjected to a kind of criticism which it had never before experienced. Fichte advanced the idea that universities were not designed primarily for the acquisition of vast stores of learned material, but, on the other hand, to promote the permeation of these materials by living thought, and to encourage independent activity. Production, and not reproduction, now became the watchword. Schleiermacher seconded these ideas with conspicuous ability in his tract "Concerning Universities in the German Sense of the Word" (1809), in which especially the fourth faculty was lifted up from its immemorial position of a mere preparatory school, and the preparatory work was assigned to the gymnasium. A noble minister of public instruction, William von Humboldt, wrought in the spirit of these men towards the better organization of the gymnasiums and the improvement of their course and methods of study, so that within a few years the educational system of the country was brought to a commendable state of completeness.

The remarkable effects of these new ideas and measures are familiar to all the world. Science was speedily reorganized in almost every department. Conclusions which had stood the shocks of ages, and were hallowed by venerable tradition, were every-where subjected to fresh tests, and frequently discarded as ridiculous. The guild of scholars had at last become a guild of thinkers, and huge folios, wherein were

heaped up unwieldy masses of learned rubbish, went out of fashion. The pedant yielded his scepter to the critic, the man of mere learning was supplanted by the man who combined thought with his learning. The universities which, with few exceptions, had always lagged in the rear, now caught, for once in their history, the spirit of the age, and sprung forward to the position of leadership in the world of letters.

ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

Having in this rapid sketch brought down the history of universities to our own times, you will now expect some account of the manner in which German universities are at present organized and conducted. In order to treat this part of the subject with any degree of satisfaction it will be necessary, inasmuch as the school system of Germany constitutes an organic whole, to begin at the beginning, and say something about the preliminary schools. Those of the lowest grade—the elementary schools—need not be described, however, as they are, properly speaking, only an appendage of the system, where the peasant and other poorer classes are expected, and even compelled by law, to obtain the rudiments of learning, as reading, writing, arithmetic, and a few other branches.

The preliminary training for the university is obtained in the gymnasium, a school which occupies a somewhat higher grade than the majority of our American colleges and universities. Students from no other schools can be matriculated in the High-School. In the gymnasium there are six classes—*sexta* being the lowest, *prima* the highest. The labors of the three lowest classes, *sexta*, *quinta*, and *quarta*, occupy only one year, while two years are required in each of the three highest. The entire gymnasium course is therefore nine years in length, and the student usually leaves for the university at eighteen or nineteen. The German has no large faith in difficult examinations, but a great deal of faith in patient, well-directed, long-continued teaching, and hence

two years are demanded in the higher classes, in order that the pupil may become thoroughly grounded, and may be less tempted to employ his time in cramming for examination.

These examinations have been conducted since 1834 by a government commission, organized in such a manner that its various elements shall be a check the one upon the other, and so that the examinee may be fairly treated on the one hand, and the government may not be cheated on the other. The range of the examination, and to a certain extent the subjects, which in any case shall be handled in it, are specified by the Minister of Public Instruction, inasmuch as the gymnasial authorities are required, in advance, to lay before the provincial commissioner three papers containing questions to be proposed, any one of which he may select at will. None of them are to be of such a kind as to require special preparation on the part of the student, the object being to bring out, as far as possible, what he actually has mastered, and not to incite him to any extraordinary exertions.

Not only are the examinations under the general direction of the Minister of Public Instruction, but the entire course of study likewise. There is no such thing as freedom of learning in a gymnasium, however much of this may be found in the university. The course of study for every gymnasium in the country—the particular disciplines to be pursued, the year in which each shall be taken in hand, the number of hours to be employed upon each—all such points are designated with the greatest particularity by the central authority, so that pupils of the same grade may have about the same amount of training in all portions of the country. Hence, when a professor at the university appears before his auditory, each member of which, in order to be regularly admitted, was required to bring his certificate of ripeness from the gymnasium, he knows very well just how far they have gone, and just where in the realm of culture he may lay his hand upon them. The staple arti-

cles of gymnasial training are Latin, Greek, Mathematics, and German, which occupy positions of importance in the order mentioned.

Let us then keep this point in sight throughout our discussions, namely, that, for a subject of the German Empire at least, the gymnasium is the only door for entrance to the university.

But since the year 1832 the governments of Germany have solved the question which is now so passionately discussed between the American public and American colleges, as to what dispositions shall be made in favor of that increasing class of persons who do not desire to educate themselves for scholars, but merely for positions of business, official service, or other practical duties. For these it has provided what are denominated Real Schools, with a course of instruction very similar to that which may be found in the scientific courses at Cornell University. The certificates of ripeness furnished by these institutions, however, do not entitle one to enter the university, for the mere fact that a person has chosen the Real School is taken as evidence that he is not educating himself for a scholar, but rather for a plodding, practical man of business. Some years ago, it is true, the experiment was tried, at the earnest representation of ardent but rather sentimental and impractical friends of the Real School, to obtain the concession that graduates from these might have permission to study in the chemical, agricultural, and other scientific faculties of the high-schools. This concession was allowed at Berlin certainly, and possibly at other places; but the result proved highly unsatisfactory, and I suppose by this time the whole affair has been abandoned. Prof. Hofmann, the well-known chemist of Berlin, assured me that those who came from the Real Schools were, to use his own expression, "fit for nothing," and that students who came from the gymnasia, where they had never touched chemistry, when placed in the stalls of the laboratory side by side with others who had been laboring at chemistry for two or three years in

the Real School, commonly overhauled these in six months' time, and then passed beyond them. I heard similar accounts from the agricultural faculty, and the sentiment of dissatisfaction was general.

Occupying a grade below the Real School, and cultivating many of the same branches of learning, may be found the Burgher School, whose object is sufficiently indicated by its name. Its certificates of ripeness are mainly of value to persons applying for commercial situations, as salesmen or for the humbler posts of the civil service.

The provision made in Germany for persons wishing to educate themselves for gentlemen is very meagre. The English universities furnish the best and perhaps the only places where distinguished advantages of this kind may be enjoyed. The graces of an incomparable style, joined to a sufficient amount of learning to enable one to appear respectably in the columns of the *Times* newspaper, are things not much in demand in Germany. The Teutons have little taste, and, I fancy, too much contempt for that style of excellence.

It is certainly not a mean acquisition to be able to compose, in lush and lusty English, an entertaining treatise about Homer, even if one does follow Grote with slavish subjection, and gives himself little trouble about independent study of the sources upon which that scholar bases his conclusions. But the average German *savant* can not be induced to take this reasonable view. "Phrases! phrases!!" he exclaims; "I will have none of them. Science must see every thing with her own eyes, and take nothing upon trust. What calling has a gentleman to prate about Homer?" And so he dismisses you with a too haughty disdain. But after all it does no harm that a gentleman shall be master of a faultless style; and why may not his leisure be enriched by devotion to the classics? That he should now and then fancy himself to be a scholar as well is indeed a misfortune; but he is not the only one who was ever entrapped by such a mistake. Nay, good friend, educating one's self to be a gen-

tleman is (in its own place, understand) not such a bad thing after all.

But I intended to speak, in particular, of the inner organization of a German university. These are all institutions of the state, and are under the supervision of the Minister for Public Instruction. The division into four faculties is still maintained, although, in reality, there are more, the philosophical being a sort of congeries of faculties in various branches. There are three grades of professors, of which the ordinary and the extraordinary are appointed by the government, after nomination had from their colleagues. The "Private Docent" is merely a person who has been allowed by the faculty in which he is laboring, the liberty of teaching in connection with the university, but who draws no salary from the government, and is dependent for support entirely upon the fees of his students. Professors of all these three grades may be found in each faculty, and the most active rivalry is kept up. The youthful "Private Docent" will often announce a course of lectures upon a topic which the well-established *professor ordinarius* has been treating for years, and by superior scientific methods and personal magnetism may draw away all the students of his senior. By this arrangement the powers of every worker are strained to the utmost, and where stagnation displays itself, empty forms and the empty purse of the professor will soon tell that the keen eyes of his hearers have perceived it, and have turned to look upon fresher scenes.

There are three classes of lectures, namely, public lectures, or those which one may attend without paying any fees, the government requiring, in consideration of its dotation to support his chair, that each of the ordinary and extraordinary professors shall deliver one such course every semester or term; private lectures where a fee is required by the professor, and *privatissima*, where the professor accepts only such as appear to be particularly well qualified for the instruction which he intends to impart, and instructs not by lecture, but in other ways; as for instance, reading

in the classics, asking questions, causing essays to be composed, or by any other means.

A course of three years is necessary to enable a student to apply for examination. No examinations are held in the university at the close of a session. These are only demanded at the close of one's studies when he applies for a degree. Then he is required to present certificates that he has attended lectures in certain branches of study, before an examination will be accorded, and this is the only infringement of the freedom of learning. In other respects that liberty is complete, since these studies may be pursued under any teacher whom one may select, in any order one may prefer, or in any university.

The university examination is always oral, but with it is connected a written disquisition upon any subject in the line of his studies which the examinee may choose. It is not a trying occasion, except perhaps in Austria, where the spirit of science is less active. The German professor, as before remarked, has little confidence in the virtue of examinations towards establishing or maintaining a high standard of scholarship, and hence employs them sparingly, perhaps too sparingly. Of recent years it is said that greater strictness is being observed. In general, however, the policy is faithfully to instruct the student in solid learning, to get him well-grounded in his disciplines, to encourage the scientific cultivation of them rather than to distract his mind by the bugbear of a final examination, in which the faculty of memory will do him the chiefest service. Such enormous tests of memory as are sometimes mentioned at Cambridge and Oxford are not popular, at least in Northern Germany.

But the state-examination, which is more searching, is in some sort a terror. It falls entirely outside of the sphere of the university. No one may present himself for this ordeal who has not passed his triennium, but the doctor's diploma—if he shall have troubled himself to obtain one—is of no service here. The work is performed by an examining commission appointed by the government, and lasts

three or four days. The first days are devoted to written work, and on the last day an oral examination of six or eight hours in duration is held. If this is successfully endured, the examinee is then granted the privilege of becoming a doctor, lawyer, clergyman, or farmer, as the case may be.

The discipline of universities is exercised by a university court, and is necessarily of contracted range, not extending to civil or criminal matters, but mainly to questions among students, which do not happen to be settled by themselves in the dueling-hall, and to minor peccadilloes of the beer-table and lecture-room. The highest penalty which this court may inflict is imprisonment in the university jail for a period of two weeks. It may also impose fines, and some few disabilities.

ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES.

In this necessarily imperfect outline of the subject I trust I have touched at least some of the points which engage the reader's curiosity. For the reason that I have never visited the English universities, and have little knowledge of them beyond what may be obtained from catalogues and the statements found in such books as that of Mr. Bristed, I trust I shall be pardoned for passing over them with a very brief mention. Besides, owing to the fact that they have crystallized in the form of the Pre-Reformation era, they do not properly come up for discussion at this point of time.

Perhaps the opinion which one has of them could be easiest indicated by referring to the career and achievements of one of the most distinguished recent graduates of Cambridge, namely, Lord Macaulay. What a splendid mind was that! He might have stood by Roger Bacon, or that other Bacon of Verulam, and become like him, the regenerator of the intellectual life of the English people. But posterity will only know him as a respectable statesman and orator, an agreeable diner-out, and the master of an incomparable style. Though Wolff had already lifted Greek and Latin from the

plane of mere humanities, and created the noble science of classical philology, though Boekh was laboring heroically all the while in Berlin, Macaulay never got an idea that there was any thing better to be done with his Homer than to discuss interesting verses with a lot of amateurs at a breakfast-table, or spend wasted hours in reciting half of the Iliad from memory. No profound thinking, not a word to any purpose about the Homeric question, as deaf as a dead man to every appeal of modern science, though she charmed never so wisely as in his day, and at his very side. His history, formed on the model of Thucydides, and scarcely meeting a single demand of sterner modern thought, finds no room in the library of the scholar, but only in the drawing-room of fashion. In fine, his whole life was a shipwreck of magnificent possibilities. Any of us would bless his lot to be such a wreck? Very true; but was it not a pity that Macaulay should be such a wreck? What right had he, who might have regenerated England, thus to fritter his glorious strength and opportunities away? Trinity College proved his enchanted ground, and there he fell asleep. Regrets, alas! are vain, but can one be highly blamed for wishing that this peerless genius had begun life, like Mr. Grote, as a banker's clerk, or even as a haberdasher, or any thing else, than a university man?

AMERICAN PEDAGOGICS.

This essay would not serve its purpose unless some remarks were added, even at the risk of abusing the reader's already much tried patience, with regard to the state of pedagogics in America. I am sensible of the difficulties, perhaps I should add, of the dangers, which one encounters in treating this portion of the subject. Therefore, I beg leave to remark in advance, that the reflections which I shall now propose are conceived in no spirit of impertinence, but with due modesty and, in the main, a warm respect for what our people, in the face of serious obstacles, have been able to accomplish.

In the organization of our earliest colleges English ideas

were, for the most part, controlling. At the period in question the present great advances on the Continent had not taken place, and the American public were, in consequence, well satisfied with their institutions of learning. These were, and in most instances are still, nothing but ordinary gymnasiums; there is still (since Johns Hopkins is not yet fully organized) no place in the country where a university education is given. But the colleges have done their work fairly well, and none but the ill-informed or disaffected will speak lightly of them, for unquestionably they have furnished a good gymnasial training. However, a gymnasial training which is not supplemented by that of the high-school is something unavoidably incomplete, and of late it has become increasingly difficult to convince people of its reason to exist. If high-schools were in existence where men, who have devoted four years to Latin and Greek, could enter and make immediate use of these in scientific and productive study all doubts about the value of our colleges would instantly be hushed; but, under existing circumstances, it is not so easy to close the mouths of objectors. Nevertheless, I have no question that those who bring the gymnasial training of our colleges to the great high-school of practical, outdoor life, are better prepared for its struggles than the others. Reminding them of the experience of Professor Hofmann in his chemical laboratory at Berlin, we believe that our readers will observe the same thing every day in the learned professions and in every department of life. Therefore, as one who hopes that he is inclined to weigh the various objections to colleges in a judicial spirit, I would still urge upon those who attack them to cease this course, and rather strive to promote their interests. We are almost ready for a true university, and when that time arrives, and our present colleges and so-called universities shall take their proper subordinate position in an organic system of education, even those who now oppose will be as proud of them and as thankful for them as any other persons in the community. Why should we

“despise the day of small things?” Why pluck up the plant by the roots because we can not see it grow apace? There is constant growth nevertheless.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

For example, Harvard, under the lead of its present brave and efficient president, is slowly but surely, and in a healthy organic way, laying aside the collegiate swaddling bands. The elective system, as practiced there, implies no concession to superficiality. It means simply this, that Harvard is in a state of transition, and that in a few years—perhaps we shall live to see the consummation—she will stand forward as a genuine high-school, or, if you please, university, to take her place among the worthiest learned bodies of the world. The college system is at present only enforced as far as the close of the Freshman year, and who can predict how soon even that limitation will be abolished, and only graduates of the best organized and best conducted American colleges be permitted to enjoy its privileges. As a matter of course the condition of affairs is still very primitive. Many of the elective courses are in the last degree meager, and scarcely any one of them supplies material enough to engage the labors of a student for the entire quadrennium. There is little freedom of learning too, for when the student adopts a particular elective course he has no wide choice of teachers, and no particular liberty with regard to the order in which his studies shall be pursued. But “Rome was not built in a day.” These matters will all be improved in the course of time, provided the public continues to be patient, and will allow the colleges throughout New England, upon which Harvard is founded, to impart as heretofore a good gymnasial training.

YALE COLLEGE.

I am sorry to admit that Yale, on the other hand, appears to be wasting her opportunities. It would be entirely appropriate if she, like Harvard, should study to develop

into a high-school or university; but, unfortunately for her, Dr. Porter has acquired ascendancy in her counsels, and he appears to be determined that she shall never be any thing but a college or gymnasium. Every thoughtful friend of Yale must deplore this outburst of the spirit of reaction and blind conservatism; nevertheless, even as a gymnasium the institution will have a worthy mission, and may become a valuable feeder to Harvard and other high-schools.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

It gives me pleasure to place over against the sad example of Yale the worthy record of the Johns Hopkins University. So far as I have been able to form an opinion, President Gilman is conducting its affairs in a truly enlightened spirit, except that I am not quite ready to approve the preparatory school or college that he has connected with it. The lack of students makes itself felt, to be sure, but this, in my judgment, is the wrong way to supply that lack. It would, perhaps, be a wiser course to "take the bull by the horns," and say to all the colleges in America, "You are occupying the position of gymnasiums while we are a proper high-school, and we desire your best graduates for instructions." Means, I believe, could be found of advancing this claim without giving offense, and of organizing skillful and vigorous propaganda for students at the best of our colleges, which would probably be cheaper than maintaining a preparatory school in Baltimore, and more efficient in many ways. It could be objected, indeed, that the training of students thus obtained would not be uniform; but inconveniences are unavoidable in a new country like ours. They may not be wholly avoided even under the best regulated system of education.

THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA.

The University of Virginia has taken a stand quite apart from the ideas and methods in respect to education that ordinarily prevail in this country or even in Europe, being

the only institution, of which I have any knowledge, that has formally abolished the Middle Age four-faculty enormity, and organized eight or nine faculties or schools instead. This is a brilliant contribution to the science of pedagogics, and I am the more proud of it because it has been made by my own *Alma Mater*. Of course, these faculties are as yet imperfectly organized, most of them being represented only by a single professor, and the course in all being necessarily incomplete. The influence of the old college system still may be observed in the fact that the degree of M. A. is retained, and the studies of several of the faculties are combined, in order to entitle one to receive it; but that is due to the circumstance that instruction in the separate faculties is as yet limited in extent. In the course of time, when each of the schools shall possess, respectively, a faculty of from five to twenty members, that custom will most likely be abolished, and the highest rewards of the institution will be imparted to graduates in any one school. The foundation for that species of development is already laid in the fact that such graduates do now receive a separate diploma, which is good as far as it goes, but is not regarded as the highest honor of the institution. When the proper time comes it will be easier for the University of Virginia to develop into a high-school than almost any other educational institution of the country; and may the time speedily come.

It would be a great advantage at present if this university would consent to deal more liberally by her "private docents." These now occupy a position somewhat analagous to that held by tutors at English universities. Could they be permitted to deliver lectures on the same subjects as the regular professors, and could the students who attended these graduate in a particular school on the same conditions as those who attend the lectures of the professor of that school, their activity and usefulness would be enlarged. In that case, however, provided an examination for graduation in the separate schools be retained, it would require

to be held by a state commissioner rather than by the professors.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

In America, just as in Europe, the wants of those who do not desire to become scholars, but from various circumstances are obliged to content themselves with humbler aims in life, have forced themselves into recognition. This is a healthy process of development and should excite neither surprise nor opposition. Many of the old colleges, therefore, have organized in addition to their gymnasial, also a real or scientific curriculum, precisely as in Germany we often find a real school existing immediately in connection with a gymnasium. A considerable impulse was given to this tendency a few years since by the organization of an extensive congeries of such establishments at Ithaca, New York, under the title of Cornell University. There they maintain a gymnasium with a four years' course, two or three real or scientific courses, a Burgher school course, and four or five additional courses in special studies. This is unquestionably a very noble and philanthropic enterprise; in fact, it reminds one in some things of the boasted Philanthropinum of Dessau, which Basedow founded in the heyday of the "Illumination." So many unwarranted and, to a thoughtful observer, amusing things were said at the outset by the press about this new candidate for public favor, that several of the colleges and some intelligent friends of good learning became alarmed; but, as a matter of fact, there was no ground for fear. As traffic increases there will always be a demand for a style of education which will meet the wants of the humbler laborers in the marts of trade, and it is not only a duty but a privilege to supply that demand. Hence it is plain that many faults were committed by strict college-men in denouncing this movement as a weak concession to shallow pates. That there were shallow pates among the crowds of students who pressed towards Ithaca, and among the editors and others who so unreflectingly commended its courses of instruction, is doubtless

true ; but the great majority of students and the bulk of the public were in the main correct in their estimates. They regarded these scientific courses and others simply in the light of concessions to the weakness or poverty or other unfavorable surroundings of the parties concerned, and with a proper spirit of gratitude accepted them as such. The idea that one of these incomplete courses would be as useful to the student as the gymnasial or classical course offered by Cornell and at other colleges, never once entered their mind. Speaking of them as a body, these students are sufficiently humble. They allow themselves very seldom any offensive airs, and are daily becoming more sober minded. They do not imagine that they are obtaining the best education conceivable, any more than the attendants of our commercial night-schools fancy such a thing of themselves, but like these they are obtaining the best education within their reach, and only words of commendation should be bestowed upon them for their exertions ; only words of approval and gratitude should be bestowed upon the noble men who provide them these opportunities, whether in the way of pecuniary capital or class-room instruction.

THE HUMANITIES.

As far as education for a gentleman is concerned I must believe that the Americans, taken by and large, have no considerable taste for any thing of that sort, especially since the close of the recent civil war. And this fact should constitute a warning for our educators. If these do not set themselves immediately to raise Latin and Greek from the position of mere humanities to the higher plane of classical philology, and if they fail to teach this profoundly, and in its whole encyclopædia there will soon be raised such an outcry against the study of these languages as we shall find it difficult to resist. The mere reading of them to form one's style, to elevate the taste, and, in a desultory fashion, to enlarge one's sphere of thought, is an occupation which may be very appropriate for a gentleman, but it is not se-

vere or scientific enough for the hard-headed, earnest men who are now crowding upon the stage of action. I would respectfully assure all educators in America that something more must be done for these languages than is done in our schools and colleges, or we shall speedily lose them. Especially must they be studied less as an object in themselves. I do not go to the opposite extreme of Wolff, and assert that these languages are a mere organon for the purpose of opening to our minds the treasures of antiquities which they contain and conceal, but certainly they might be made more of an organon than at present is the case; men must read more widely in them, and with the definite purpose of reconstructing for themselves in the spirit of real science the classic ages in their public, private, social, æsthetic, and intellectual life. In other words, the whole domain of philological encyclopædia should be cultivated, not merely one or two of its rubrics—as, for example, the grammar and dictionary. We must do some subsoiling else the crops will fail.

FUTURE OF AMERICAN PEDAGOGICS.

A few reflections on the probable future of pedagogics in America shall supply a conclusion to this already too extended paper. The history of education among us furnishes a reasonably accurate parallel to that described above in the history of European universities. We are still living in a period when the influence of the Church is predominant. But within comparatively recent times the State has been celebrating undoubted triumphs. Nothing is so unsafe or in general so idle as definite predictions; but it is sometimes admissible, from the existing situation, to forecast in outline, at least, a few of the leading events of the future. Modestly attempting that task, I would say that if the present rate of progress is observed we may anticipate a prosperous career for our educational system. The Department for Education at Washington promises to develop into a ministry for public instruction, whose chief shall have the direction and exclusive control of all the public schools

throughout the country. This alteration will put a stop to the inefficiency and confusion that exists in many places, and introduce a measure of uniformity. The same lines of study will every-where be pursued, the best methods of instruction will be enforced. The public schools of our cities and villages already supply signs of developing into gymnasiums, or institutions of a similar grade and importance. This will render necessary the organization of new State universities, and the enlargement of those which now exist. When that process has gone forward sufficiently, and particularly when public schools of all grades come to feel the strong hand of the central government, and are brought under the watchful eye of a minister for public instruction, there can be little doubt that improvement will be observed. Should the State schools ever rise to a point where it can be said without hesitation that they are superior to any others, we shall then perhaps begin to hear serious proposals towards requiring all who wish to enter the public service or the learned professions to present certificates showing that they have pursued the course of instruction there prescribed. Of course concessions will always have to be made to such as wish to become mere practical men of business, and perhaps also to mere "hewers of wood and drawers of water" in the learned professions. Schools will have to be organized, in fact, to meet the necessities of every class, as far as those necessities are well defined, and the demands which are founded upon them are reasonable and sensible. Primary schools, teaching only the simplest rudiments, for the laboring classes; commercial schools for the benefit of tradesmen; scientific schools for miners, engineers, and farmers; gymnasiums and high-schools for the learned classes—in a word, the interests of all should, and I have little question will, be observed. Altogether, therefore, as far as the mere increase of education goes, I am inclined to take a hopeful view of the situation. We are yet in a very primitive, imperfect state, but the foundations are already laid, and many hands are at work upon the su-

perstructure. Local jealousies and petty opposition in a thousand forms are and will be encountered ; but many difficulties have been surmounted already, and the advocates of the new era are quite in the ascendant. Indeed, ever since the Reformation the State has been steadily pressing forward and asserting control, and there is no reason to apprehend that it will at this time retrace its steps, certainly not among us in America. Doubtless we all watch its movements with intelligent interest ; and in view of the results which it has thus far achieved we shall expect almost daily other successes, until it is acknowledged to be the undisputed master of the situation. The question as to whether this is a desirable or a deplorable consummation is one with which I have at present no concern, and upon which it is not my purpose here and now to enter ; nor do I wish in any thing that has been said to be understood as assuming a position in regard to it. It has been my purpose to indulge in merely objective statements, simply to express the facts as I conceive them to exist, without either drawing or justifying or even suggesting any conclusions from them. This part of the business each one is free to arrange according to his own tastes ; but I think all will unite in the conviction that, whether for good or ill, our educational system is in the way of becoming far better organized, more extensive, and more efficient for simple educational purposes as the years go on. Even some of us may live to look upon the early giants of a race of American scholars whose fame shall fill the world and adorn the bravest annals of our history. Nevertheless, that day is not now ; and seeing that such changes do not come by accident, it behooves each one, in his own place, to help forward the cause, first, by finding out and remedying his own defects as far as may be, and by consenting to employ whatever resources are at his disposal for the benefit of others. Therefore, while observing due care to keep the nobler conditions of our future in plain view, we should not unwisely neglect the useful though humble tasks which are a part of our daily lives.

ARTICLE III.

THE RELATION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT CHURCH
TO THE PRECEDING DISPENSATIONS.

BY REV. F. L. CHAPEL.

GOD has revealed himself to men, and worked in the world, principally through three successive dispensations—the Patriarchal, the Jewish, and the Christian. They seem to have some reference severally to the three persons of the Trinity,* and to mark the morning, noon, and evening of the world's day of probation.

Of the first we have only a very brief record, in the earlier chapters of Genesis. In it God's representative was the father of the family; fit type of the fatherhood of God. During it wickedness so increased as to demand the severe judgments of the flood and the dispersion of the human family, bringing the dispensation to an end.

Of the second we have a more extended account, comprising the greater part of the Bible. In this God's representative was the priest of the nation; fit type of the sacrifice and intercession of the Son: and during it, also, in the fullness of time, the noon of the world's day, the Son actually appeared and offered himself. But during this economy, likewise, wickedness so increased as to demand the severe judgments of the destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersion of the Jewish nation, bringing the dispensation to an end.

In the third, which began in its fullness on the day of Pentecost, we are now living. It is called in the Scriptures the "latter days," or the after days, the afternoon-time of the world's probation. In it God's representative is the preacher of the Gospel; fit type of the Spirit, who speaks so generally to every heart of the things of Christ.†

In each of these dispensations we find a people of God

* John v, 17, and xiv, 16. † Acts ii, 16.

as distinguished from the world. In the first, "the sons of God;" in the second, the nation of Israel; in the third, the Church of Christ.

The office and work of these several peoples of God are twofold. First and outwardly, that of testimony to the world.* Second and inwardly, that of perfecting the body of Christ.† The first, that of testimony to the world, is, of course, the chief matter of historic observation; though the second, that of perfecting the body of Christ, may be the more important in the secret counsels of God. But the first is that with which we are the more concerned in this discussion.

These three peoples of God bear a continuous, united, and cumulative testimony to and against the world. By the mouth of these three witnesses shall every word of God be established, and the condemnation of the world be made sure.‡ And this testimony is given, not merely by word, but also by symbol; not only by abstract, spiritual teaching, but also by outward, material type. Each dispensation has its distinctive witness: the *blood* of the patriarchal sacrifice, the *water* of the Jewish purification, and the *spirit* of Christian illumination. As an apostle says, looking backward from the Christian age, "There are three that bear record on earth, the Spirit, the water, and the blood, and these three agree in one."§

With these preliminary remarks, we now inquire, What relations does the last of these three bear to the former? Wherein is the New Testament Church like, and wherein is it unlike, the economies that have preceded it?

1. And first, there is the relation of *substantial identity*. True religion is essentially the same under all dispensations. The sacrifice of Christ, as the ground of human hope, and the glorification of Christ, as the goal of Christian destiny, are set forth throughout all Scripture, and are the essential teachings through all dispensations. The language of the various

* Isa. xliii, 10; Mat. xxiv, 14. † Heb. vi, 1 and 2; Eph. iv, 11-16. ‡ 2 Cor. xiii, 1; Deut. xix, 15; Rom. iii, 19. § 1 John, v, 8.

symbols may seem slightly different, but the facts and the doctrines which underlie are ever the same. The New Testament Church has no essential doctrines different from those of the patriarchal or the Jewish. Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, the only Savior and the only Pattern. Father and Spirit bear witness to him. His dispensation is central, giving power to, and shedding light on, all before and behind.*

This essential identity may be seen, for example, in a comparison between the order of the Jewish tabernacle and that of the Christian Church. No more true and beautiful picture of Christian Church order can be found than that which is presented by a survey of the tabernacle of Israel. Transport yourself in imagination to the camp of the tribes in the wilderness, and note the order of the Tabernacle service. First, the silver trumpet calls you to the solemn convocation. This corresponds to the Spirit's voice calling the world to Christ and his Church. Obediently you respond, and enter first the outer court, where you behold principally the altar of sacrifice. This signifies Christ crucified, the first and principal theme of evangelistic preaching in the general congregation. Comprehending this, you pass on to the door of the holy place, and there you find the laver of water. This corresponds to baptism at the door of the Church. Acknowledging this, you enter the holy place, and on the one hand stands the table of shew-bread, and on the other the golden candlestick. These correspond to the ordinance of the supper and the edifying preaching of the Word within the Church. Comprehending these, you pass on to the door of the most holy place, within which is the Ark of the Covenant, and there you find the altar of incense. This signifies prayer or the holiest devotional exercises, by which we pass from the Church through the veil of the flesh to stand at length in the presence of the glorified Christ.† All is orderly, true, and appropriate. None of the innovations which men have foisted upon the Church do you find here.

* John v, 37, and xv, 26. † Acts vi, 59 and 60. Compare Luke ix, 29.

No putting of baptism before Christ crucified. No entering of the Church except by a knowledge of Christ crucified and by baptism. No partaking of the supper before entering the Church. No passing of the veil by means of the supper. In short, no confounding of Christ crucified with Christ glorified. No requisition of any ordinance in order to find a hope of salvation. But rather Christ crucified, the sinner's hope, is found outside the Church, before either of her ordinances is reached; and yet by the aid of her teaching, and within the sphere of her influence. While Christian education, and growth into the likeness of Christ glorified, and progress towards him, come within the Church, from which we pass, at length, by the service of prayerful devotion, through the veil of the flesh, into his blessed presence. Thus do Jewish and Christian order correspond.

And what little glimpses we have of the patriarchal age show the same faith and the same substantial order. Abel found Christ crucified beside his altar of sacrifice, and Enoch passed into the presence of Christ glorified through his godly walk.

The testimony and the work of each dispensation are essentially the same. The Spirit and the water and the blood all tell one story; Christ crucified, the sinner's hope; Christ glorified, the Christian's goal.

2. But the second relation we note is that of *superior organization*; or the Christian Church constituted on higher principles. As the testimony is to grow stronger and stronger, and clearer and clearer, each witnessing body is prepared on a superior law of organization.

The Church of the patriarchal age seems to have been founded merely on natural lineage, being composed of the descendants of Seth, while the world consisted of the descendants of Cain. A genealogical record of each is given, by which it appears that conformity of the Church to the world wrought the ruin of the economy. The names of the Cainites, for example, are in repeated instances adopted by the Sethites; and at last intermarriage is allowed, which

destroys the separate character of the people of God, and necessitates judgment.*

The law of the organization of the Jewish Church was superior to this, requiring submission to the sign of circumcision, and compacting the circumcised into a nation. Though natural descent was still prominent in the perpetuation of the Jewish Church, yet the principle of voluntary adherence, in submitting to circumcision and nationality, admitted so many others, that probably the majority of the Jewish nation were other than the descendants of Jacob. He brought from Padan-Aram a company of adherents so closely connected with him that he calls them "brethren."† Whole tribes, moreover, might be admitted if only they would consent to circumcision and consolidation.‡ On this principle Moses invited the Kenites to incorporate themselves with Israel, which, it seems, they ultimately did, and proved themselves no unworthy addition thereto, furnishing such men as Caleb and Othniel and Heber and Jonadab.§ The Jewish Church was thus a circumcised nation, separated from all other nations.

In addition to this, there was given to Israel the law, moral and ceremonial, which contained, in word and in symbol, the main principles of Jehovah's religion. The character of this witnessing body was thus superior to that of the first, inasmuch as it was the more carefully and voluntarily organized. But its ruin, likewise, came through conformity to the world by international alliances with uncircumcised peoples.

But the law of the organization of the Christian Church is superior to that of either of the preceding, inasmuch as membership in this body is based on personal belief, voluntary adherence, and individual confession of faith in Christ, without regard to parentage or nationality. "The priesthood being changed, there is of necessity a change of the law."||

* Gen. vi, 1-4. † Gen. xxxi, 46, 54. ‡ Gen. xxxiv, 15, 16. § Num. x, 29; Josh. xiv, 14; Judges, iii, 9; iv, 11; Jer. xxxv, 6-19. || Heb. vii, 11, 12; Mark xvi, 15, 16; Acts ii, 40, 41, 47; v, 14; x, 34, 35, 48.

The Christian Church was designed to be a witness, intelligent, interested, faithful, whom no uncertainties could confuse, no persuasions seduce, nor threats intimidate. Upon her, through the Christian centuries, the enemy has tried his power. First, by persecution, in which a great cloud of witnesses have sealed their testimony with their blood, in imitation of their great leader, "the faithful witness," who before Pontius Pilate witnessed a good confession. Next, by seductions of worldly place and preferment, which was more successful, as the existence of powerful ecclesiastical hierarchies have shown. And now, by neglect of true order, by confusions of thought, and by mutilations of symbolism, he still seeks to destroy her ability as a witness.

But amid all these powerful hostile influences the true superior law of organization has been kept by *some*, who have ever shown that the Church of Christ is founded on higher principles than those of the preceding dispensations; viz., on individual faith and intelligent profession thereof, and not on natural birth nor on national engrossment.

3. A third relation which we observe is that of *greater spirituality*. This follows from two considerations: First, that which has just been considered, the superior law of organization, which admits only believers, who have been born of the Spirit, thus making the whole body spiritual, and, in a degree, holy. So that the membership is not, as in former dispensations, a fleshly stock, but "a chosen generation:" the official power is not, as in the first dispensation, a kingly or priestly patriarch, but the whole body is "a royal priesthood:" nor is there, as in the second dispensation, a portion of the members set apart, as was the tribe of Levi, to especial sanctity, but the whole body is an "holy nation, a peculiar people."* The ministry is not an order of especial sanctity, but an office of particular work. Thus from her very constitution the greater spirituality of the Christian Church follows.

But, second, it follows also from the fact that this is the

*1 Peter ii, 9.

dispensation of the Spirit. He is more completely given since Christ's resurrection and ascension.* The Spirit is *the* witness in this dispensation, rather than the water or the blood. They still testify, it is true, but he takes the precedence of them. We must have the witness of the Spirit before we can have aught to do with the water or the blood. Moreover, the water, which symbolizes the Spirit, is used in the Christian ritual in a more complete form, as an enveloping element, indicative of the fullness of the Spirit's action; whereas, in the preceding dispensations, it was sprinkled upon the subject, indicative of the sporadic and less powerful action of the Spirit in the former dispensations. So fully is the Spirit now given, that by him we are all baptized into one body, and all live by this divine presence, drinking of it, and breathing in it.†

The Christian Church is thus theoretically a body of far greater spirituality than either the patriarchal or the Jewish. As such she should be kept. But lapsing back to former methods of organization practically destroys her spirituality, and defeats the Lord's designs concerning her.

4. But the fourth relation we note is that of *Clearer Testimony*. Not only is the New Testament Church a more competent witness, as we have seen, but she is also possessed of more facts to which she can testify. The preceding dispensations could only be prophetic and symbolic. But the death and resurrection of Christ placed the matter in the realm of fact. Christ crucified has now been *seen* as the sinner's hope; Christ glorified has now been seen as the Christian's goal. Hence the clearer testimony of the believer of the New Testament dispensation.‡ Hence, also, prophecy and symbolism greatly decline in this economy.§ They do not entirely depart, for there are many things yet to be fulfilled, and the things already fulfilled are to be commemorated. But the vast

* John vii, 39. † 1 Cor. xii, 13; Acts xvii, 28. ‡ 1 John i, 1-4.
§ Col. ii, 14-18.

appointments of shadowy symbolism are reduced to the simple ordinances of baptism and the supper, which cluster emphatically around, and distinctly show forth, the Lord's death, resurrection, and future coming. They are partly commemorative and partly prophetic, linking together the two advents, and promising the believer the benefits of both; reminding him that what has been accomplished in his Lord will be accomplished in himself likewise.* The Church of to-day thus not only prophesies of what is in store for believing humanity, but she also testifies to the pattern accomplishment in the person of Jesus Christ. Our prophecies of things to be have their earnestness in things that have been; and hence the clearer testimony of the Christian Church.

Her greater spirituality, purity, and separateness from the world are likewise designed to add a force to her testimony which could not attach to that of the preceding, grosser economies.

5. But the fifth relation we observe is that of a *Wider Commission*. The preceding economies were preparatory, and so concentrated; this is finished, and hence diffused. They were partial, and so local; this is complete, and hence universal. They were obscure, and so intelligible to few; this is clear, and hence applicable to all. They were first, and so less urgent; this is last, and hence imperative. In this, Father, Son, and Spirit together work; outward symbols and inward teaching combine to testify; accomplished events and first-fruit earnestness illustrate and enforce; and the last time has come, requiring the greatest urgency. And thus every thing conspires to justify and demand the widest proclamation of God's requirements to a world on probation. Hence the language of the great commission, "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned." And the command will be obeyed, for the Lord himself declared,

* Rom. vi, 4, 5; Mark xiv, 25; 1 Cor. xi, 26; 1 John iii, 2.

“This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world, for a witness unto all nations, and then shall the end come.”

Diffusion, therefore, instead of concentration, is the order of the latter day dispensation. If “all the world is to become guilty before God,” and if the great multitude of the saved are to be “redeemed out of every kindred and tongue and people and nation,” it is to be by a testimony delivered unto all the world. Hence the imperative duty and magnificent privilege of missions and the Christian Church—the universal commission of the last probationary dispensation.

Thus we have seen that the New Testament Church bears to the preceding dispensations the relations of substantial identity, superior organization, greater spirituality, clearer testimony, and wider commission. It is the last of three agreeing witnesses under special direction, severally, of Father, Son, and Spirit, giving a final culminating testimony to an unbelieving world; and in which also the invisible Church, or bride of Christ, shall be perfected, and the mystery of God finished.

From this brief review several practical thoughts arise.

I. Concerning the office work of the Church. So few understand it. She is not Christ. She is not an ark of safety, into which any one may, in his extremity, flee and be saved. The Church, with her ordinances, is not directly a means of salvation, but rather of testimony and Christian culture. God treats directly with men for salvation, as Christ did with the thief on the cross, without the intervention of any organization or ordinances. Christ crucified, the sinner's hope is accessible to all men, as was the altar of burnt-offering to all the camp of Israel. All talk about salvation within the pale of any Church or by means of any ordinance is in direct antagonism with the whole drift of God's Word. “Come unto *me* and be ye saved,” is the language of Scripture. The business of the Church is not to save men, but to “instruct those that oppose themselves,

if *God*, peradventure, will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth."*

But the saved will, if intelligent and obedient, unite with the Church, that they may in turn thus witness for Christ, and come also to know him more perfectly, and to be transformed into his glorified state through the resurrection.†

2) Concerning the essential nature of ordinances and Church order. They are essential to truth, not to salvation. They are concrete expressions of the truth; symbolic language, easily understood, crystallizing and inculcating principles. Any change in their form or order tells a lie, and confuses the thoughts of inquiring men. If our baptism does not symbolically preach the resurrection we are found false witnesses of God.‡ If the supper is not kept in place within the Church, we eat and drink unworthily, not discerning the Lord's body.§

3. Concerning keeping progress with God. He is the King Eternal;|| literally, the king of the ages. He is ever moving in his work, whether in nature or in grace, onward and upward by stages or ages or dispensations. The last dispensation is always higher than the one that preceded it. We must keep step with him if we are to be true witnesses for him. Pedobaptism, priesthood, sprinkling, and the like, are failures to keeping step with God; retrogradations to past economies; leading men backward into darker, instead of forward into lighter, dispensations; confusing instead of clarifying the truth of God.

4. Concerning our solemn and weighty responsibility. The preceding dispensations largely failed in their testimony. They departed from God's ordinances and conformed to the world, bringing judgment upon themselves. The same danger is before us, and in a form as much more solemn as the dispensation is superior, wider, and more critical. If we are found false witnesses for Christ the judgment will,

* 2 Tim. ii, 25. † Phil. iii. 10-21. ‡ 1 Cor. xv, 15, 16. § 1 Cor. xi, 26-29. || 1 Tim. i, 17.

indeed, begin at the house of God. Antichrist has reared high his head during the Christian centuries, and we of to-day inherit so much of what he taught when he sat in the temple of God claiming that he was God, that many know not how to separate truth from error. Thousands upon thousands who call themselves Christians are trusting in the Church and her ordinances and her priesthood for salvation. Thousand of others, who in the judgment of charity are Christians, are confusing and obliterating the truth by their inherited mutilations and transpositions of the ordinances of the Church. It is a solemn time. It is the last time. And the portentous closing words of prophecy in the second dispensation are only too true as applied to our own day. “*Even from the days of your fathers ye have gone away from mine ordinances and have not kept them.*”

ARTICLE IV.

A STUDY IN MIRACLES.

BY REV. C. B. CRANE, D. D.

IN a series of discourses, recently given in Boston by clergymen of different religious denominations, a discussion of "Miracles, or the Supernatural in the Bible," was assigned to the author of this article. The phrasing of the topic is open to criticism, as will shortly appear; and the only reason for alluding to the topic, and the discussion of it, is, that they may be to the reader an explanation of the striking resemblance of the present article to a sermon. Besides, the incidental consideration of the relations of the supernatural to the miraculous, in the present article, will be accounted for by the fact that the course of thought was largely determined by the former title, rather than by the one now adopted.

One would be justly charged with both imbecility and insincerity if he failed to apprehend and promptly to acknowledge the difficulties which encompass the doctrine of miracles. The natural attitude of the educated mind toward a miracle, when taken by itself, is that of incredulity. If one should say to me that, yesterday, in the city of Chelsea, a man was raised from the dead; or that, in the city of Cambridge, there was a shower of manna from the sky, I would at once, without listening to proffered evidence, without entering upon personal examination, utterly discredit the story.

This incredulity of mine would be shared by all; not only by the most undevout and skeptical, but also by the most devout and believing. If it should be said that this reputed miracle was wrought one hundred, or five hundred, or ten hundred years ago, it would still be discredited. But if, as having been professedly wrought a thousand years

ago, it is incredible, is it not equally incredible as having been professedly wrought eighteen hundred or thirty-three hundred years ago? In a word, is not a miracle, whenever professedly wrought, in the very nature of things, incredible?

Such being the natural attitude of the educated mind toward a miracle, taken by itself, we ought not to be surprised that many sincere and devout souls, accepting the Bible, not merely as a text-book of incomparable ethical value, but also as a supernatural revelation of religious truth, stumble at the miracles which it records, and look anxiously this way and that for some theory of interpretation which will deliver them from the necessity of believing them. Miracles, they say, are not helps, but hinderances, to faith in the Bible. They are evidences, not for, but against it. If they are to-day incredible, they are essentially incredible. Would God they were eliminated from the sacred record!

We have endeavored honestly to state the objection to miracles, as it lies fixed in the thought and feeling of many a sincere and pious soul.

Let us now endeavor to expose the fallacy in the intricate meshes of which the perplexed and unhappy objector is unconsciously entangled.

He has imagined himself to look upon a miracle as a thing by itself, an isolated and independent thing, a thing out of relations and conditions. But, in point of fact, he has been looking upon it as a thing related and conditioned. Rightly apprehending the present posture of affairs in both the secular and the religious spheres of thought and life, and profoundly impressed by the uniform operation of natural law, he has said to himself, and wisely, "The report of a miracle wrought to-day would be an incredible report." To this declaration we all agree.

He goes back in thought a thousand years, and rightly apprehending that the posture of affairs was then substantially what it is to-day, he says to himself, and wisely, "The report of a miracle wrought a thousand years ago would be an incredible report." To this declaration also we all agree.

He now goes back in thought eighteen hundred years, and forgetting to ask himself whether the posture of affairs was then substantially what it is to-day, he says to himself, though not wisely, "The report of a miracle wrought eighteen hundred years ago would be an incredible report." To this declaration we do not all agree.

For this man has fallen, unconsciously, into a grievous blunder, by reason of his lack of what we may name the *historical sense*, or the *historical imagination*. He has failed to apprehend that the posture of affairs to-day is vastly different from what it was eighteen hundred years ago; and that, because a professed miracle to-day, not fitting the present posture of affairs, would be incredible, it does not follow that a miracle professedly wrought eighteen hundred years ago would be out of joint with the posture of affairs then existing, and therefore incredible. He has committed the blunder of many an ambitious and incompetent historical novelist, whose principal character, be he Socrates or Savonarola, is a Bostonian or a Parisian of this nineteenth century, dressed in Athenian or Florentine costume, it is true, but thinking the thoughts and mingling in the society of such men as are living to-day. In a word, he has failed to apprehend and reproduce the period in which the reputed miracles were wrought. The validity of his argument requires that he demonstrate the substantial likeness between the first and the nineteenth centuries of what we style the Christian era. He has assumed the likeness, but he has not demonstrated it. If the first century was essentially and radically unlike the nineteenth, it remains to be proved that a miracle which would be incredible now would be incredible then. The miracle which would be out of joint with the posture of affairs now, might be in exact adjustment with the posture of affairs then.

It is plain, then, that our first question has to do with the nature of the period in which the reputed miracles were wrought.

There are, among others, three converging paths, along

which we may find our way back to the period which we are seeking to understand.

The *first* is the path of *professed religious truth* as formulated and believed. There are certain great doctrines of religion, upon which living Christians of all names and of all communions are agreed, such as the tri-personal unity of God, the incarnation, justification by faith, regeneration, resurrection, a final judgment of the world by the God-man. From the creeds to which men now subscribe we may trace these doctrines through theological controversies, through political and ecclesiastical revolutions, through periods of persecution, through decrees of councils, through patristic writings, back to the first century of our era, and there we seem to find their source.

The *second* path is that of a *peculiar form of religious life*. This life shows often a more than epicurean repose; yet it has not an epicurean inspiration. It shows often a more than stoical fortitude; yet it has not a stoical inspiration. Its repose is devoid of selfishness, and its fortitude is not marred by pride. It is a life which exhibits, in an amazing synthesis, the endurance of the hero and the tenderness of a woman. The product, in part, of quickened sensibilities, it is characterized by those more rugged virtues to which, according to the notions of ancient philosophy, quickened sensibilities are fatal. It is a life that is lived in God; yet there is no pantheistic unity between him who lives it, and God in whom he lives. It is a life in which, while there is a union of the human and the divine, as is set forth in the theology of India, the human and the divine personalities are maintained, as in the mythology of Greece. It is a life which has both the oriental and the occidental flavors. It is a life as unique in its composition as is the mysterious being of whom it is claimed that he is the source of it.

From the now living generation, you may trace this life, through past generations of various nations and races, through a long line of saints and martyrs, through crises

and convulsions in which it showed itself unspeakably conspicuous and glorious, back to the first century of our era; and there you seem to find its source.

The *third* path is that at every point of which you may find an organized and visible institution bearing the name of the Christian Church. In this institution you find the synthesis of the religious doctrine and the religious life which we have sketched. From the various bodies which now compose it, you may trace it, through the times of Whitefield and the Wesleys, through the times of Calvin and Knox and Fénelon and Pascal, through the times of Luther and Melancthon, through the times of Huss and Savonarola, through the times of Augustine and Cyprian, back to the first century of our era; and there you seem to find its beginning.

That century, for the reason that it was the source of Christian doctrine, of the Christian life, and of the Christian Church, constituted a period vastly unlike our own. It was a period of mighty and marvelous beginnings. It was a period the like of which the world had never seen before, and has never seen since.

The fact that in that period we find the point of convergence of the three paths which we have traced, apart from any other evidence, is ample demonstration to the thoughtful mind that the period was an extremely remarkable one. But it happens that we have in our possession copies and translations of certain contemporary documents, each of them singularly consistent with itself and with the others, and all of them, after exposure to the severest historical criticism, pronounced the product of the period in which they professedly appeared. In these documents the period which we are considering is delineated as an extremely remarkable one, a period of mighty and marvelous beginnings.

What we undertake now to say is this: A miracle which would not fit this present period, and would therefore be incredible, would fit that ancient period, and would there-

fore be credible. Apprehending that period as it was, instead of translating this period into that, we see that the miracle *fits*. It is the marvelous phenomenon of a marvelous time.

But let us take a step in advance. We are in the habit of saying that in every distinguished period we find a distinguished man, one who represents and expresses the period in which he lived. The history of the world is the sum total of the biographies of men. What Louis XIV said of himself, many a man may say of himself, and more justly: "*L'état, c'est moi—the state, it is myself.*" Henry VIII, Cromwell, William of Orange, Luther, Frederic the Great, Augustine, are men who gave to the periods in which they lived their character; or, at least, put in expression the character of their respective periods.

We have been following back to their point of convergence, in a given period, the paths of Christian doctrine, of Christian life, of the Christian Church. But those paths converge, not only in a period, but also in a person; they converge in Jesus Christ. He is the author of Christian doctrine; he is the source of Christian life; he is the founder of the Christian Church. More than this, he is the fountain of modern civilization. We are speaking unwisely. Jesus Christ is not the *author* of truth: he is *truth*. He is not the *source* of life: he is *life*. He is not the *founder* of the Church: he is the *Church*. Suffer him to speak after the manner of Louis XIV: "*La vérité, c'est moi—the truth, it is myself.*" "*La vie, c'est moi—life, it is myself.*" "*L'église, c'est moi—the Church, it is myself.*"

This mysterious and majestic person, Jesus Christ, ascribe to him whatever nature you will, certainly lived and taught and wrought in the first century of our era. The most hostile criticism has failed to thrust him out of his place in veritable history. It has equally failed to reduce him to the dimensions of a common man. The conception which men formed of him, a conception which they could not themselves have originated, is conclusive proof,

according to the most rigid philosophical induction, that he was what he is represented as being. As he appears in the literature of the world, so he also appeared in the actual history of the world. There could be no God-man in human thought if there had not been a God-man in human life. If Jesus Christ was mighty enough to be the author of truth, and the source of life, and the foundation of the Church, he was exceedingly mighty. No mere man could do what he has done; no mere man could be what he was. He was man; but he was more than man. He was not the product of nature; he came down upon it, and into it, from above. Name him, with the Athanasian, God; or name him, with the Arian, one of a nature *like* the nature of God; in either case he has come down out of the realm of the supernatural into the realm of the natural. And he has entered into the realm of the natural to reveal in it himself as supernatural, and to do in it a supernatural work. Being what he is, if he reveal himself, it must be supernaturally; if he work, it must be supernaturally. In a word, in the doing of a supernatural work, he will show himself a supernatural person.

We set this Christ before you and cry, "Behold the man!" If a miracle would fit the period in which he lived, would it not fit him who gave character to the period, and made it the fountain of the mighty and marvelous streams which are flooding the world to-day? Because a miracle does not fit you or me, does it therefore fail to fit Jesus Christ?

Recalling now the original title of this article, "Miracles, or the Supernatural in the Bible," and reading it in the light of the discussion in which we have been engaged, it may serve, in and of itself, to relieve many minds of the perplexities by which they are beset. For not a few of those who stumble at the miracles of the Bible prize the Bible chiefly because of its supernaturalism. They rejoice that in it is a revelation of truth which man could not of himself discover; that in it is a revelation of the incar-

nate God, or at least of a superhuman being, who has appeared to deliver men from the guilt and penalty and power of sin; that in it is a record of the beginning of the dispensation of the grace of God which has been for almost nineteen centuries ameliorating the condition of the human race. Though the miracles of the Bible disquiet and offend them, the supernaturalism of the Bible commands their faith and ministers to their joy.

But in the first title of this paper the miraculous is made the synonym of the supernatural; so that, if the title be defensible, in accepting the supernatural the miraculous is also accepted,—and, lo! the perplexities of the perplexed soul vanish. Meantime, we venture to affirm that the title is sufficiently defensible to legitimate the removal of the perplexities.

Still the title, though not false, may be misleading. For, while it is undoubtedly true that in the miraculous there is always the expression of the supernatural, it is equally true that the supernatural may express itself not miraculously.

The first expression of the supernatural is, in the nature of things, miraculous; the continuous expression of the supernatural will be not miraculous. For it lies in the definition of the miracle that it be exceptional and occasional, rather than normal and perpetual; a wonder, and not an event of every day.

The creation of the globe was miraculous; the continued existence of the globe, even though it imply the continued operation of creative force, is not miraculous. The creation of man and animals and plants was miraculous; their continuous development, though implying the continuance of the creative force, is not miraculous.

We may say the same thing of the Christian Church, that it was miraculous in its beginning, but that it is not miraculous in its perpetuation. If only one or two or three men had been divinely regenerated, we would rightly pronounce the events miraculous; but now that regenerative

power is in constant operation, we should not rightly pronounce regeneration miraculous.

This is our point: The institution of a supernatural dispensation must be, in the nature of things, miraculous; but the orderly development of that dispensation will not be miraculous. The miraculous always implies the supernatural; but the supernatural is not always accompanied by the miraculous. Therefore, though supernatural power is operating upon us and within us to-day, we are not to-day confronted by miracles.

It is important that our observation of the present uniform and regular operation of supernatural power should not mislead us into the notion that it began its operation in any given dispensation not miraculously. If it began at all, it must have begun miraculously.

We have known a certain meadow for twenty years, and have observed that, without any upturning of the soil, without any sowing of seed, the grass has sprung up every Spring, and has been gathered in every Summer. Yet we are assured that at some period before we knew the meadow the soil was upturned and the seed sown. The beginning of the meadow's present condition was more striking than its continuance.

As I look upon some stately house in the rocky highlands of Boston, resting like a jewel upon its emerald lawn, and surrounded by trees and shrubs and flowering plants, it is not easy for me to conceive the digging and blasting which accompanied the laying of its foundation. Where that house stands things were not always so quiet and orderly as they are to-day.

Jesus Christ, being a supernatural person, instituting a supernatural condition, working his way through the shell of things into the heart of them, can not fail to rupture that shell in many a startling explosion. This he must do, if he would reveal himself in his true character as the lord of the universe, as the king and savior of men. He must manifest his power over nature and over the human soul.

He must make it plain that nothing can stand before him, that all things must yield themselves in obedience to his will. He must open the eyes of the blind, he must calm the raging sea, he must raise the sleeping dead, he must cast out devils, he must cleanse the heart of sin. In a word, coming as the Lord of all beings and things, he must *show* himself the Lord of all beings and things. Challenging the faith of men as their Savior, he must show himself mighty to save. He must convince men that they may commit themselves to him in a perfect trust.

All supernatural dispensations have had like miraculous beginnings. What we call nature is not separate from supernature; and it began in the miracle of creation. The Mosaic dispensation began in the stupendous convulsions of Mount Sinai. The restoration of the lapsed Mosaic dispensation in the time of Elijah was effected with signs and wonders. Israel entered the promised land through the parted Jordan. Surely, the Christian dispensation, transcending all that had preceded it, and inaugurated by none other than the incarnate Son of God, will have a marvelous beginning. Its initial period will be a period of stupendous miracles. It will be conformable to, even though it vastly exceed, all the earlier analogies.

But this new dispensation will have its own system of laws; and, developing in obedience of them, it will develop not miraculously. Established with signs and wonders, it will grow without observation. Because we believe in past miracles we are not, therefore, required to believe in present miracles. The credibility of those is not inconsistent with the incredibility of these. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that, at some future time, there may be such a lapse of the present supernatural system of grace as would warrant a miraculous restoration of it; just as, in Elijah's time, there was a miraculous restoration of the lapsed Mosaic system. Of one thing we may be certain, God will never leave himself without a witness; and in some coming age he may witness for himself wonderfully. His ear is not heavy

that it can not hear, his arm is not shortened that it can not save.

We wish now to say, for the purpose of deterring the reader from placing a stumbling-block in his own path, that the miracles of our Lord were, not professedly but naturally, evidential of his person and work. He did not say to men, "In order that you may know that I am the divine teacher and Savior of the world, I now proceed to do certain wonderful works." To say this, and to do according to the saying, would remind us too painfully of the impostor and charlatan. His miracles were the *necessary accompaniments* of his work. They flashed forth from it, just as the sparks flash forth from the blacksmith's anvil or from the steel which is being polished on an emery wheel. They are the accompaniments of his work—more than this, they are a part of his work. It is a significant fact that our Lord often, if not habitually, speaks of his miracles as his *works*. They do not stand by themselves, as a separate class, having only an evidential purpose and value. They are bound up indissolubly with his words and with his acts of forgiveness and spiritual renewal. They are no more wonderful than his teaching or the spiritual resurrection of those who were dead in trespasses and sins. It was not *he* who named them signs and wonders; it was those who beheld them. And if those who beheld them had been wiser than they were, they would have marveled quite as much at his *words* as at his *works*. He revealed himself as to his supernatural character quite as much in the Sermon on the Mount as in the raising of Lazarus from the dead. Moving out upon the world in the way of self-revelation, he disclosed himself equally in what he *said* and in what he *did*.

Meantime, though it be true that his chief object was the saving of the souls of men, it is equally true that his miracles were wrought as means for the accomplishment of salvation. Whatever was requisite for the quickening of human faith, for the gaining of a firm hold upon the human heart, that he would perform, be it the miraculous feed-

ing of the multitude, or the raising of Lazarus from the dead. All the miracles which he personally wrought, equally with his own miraculous conception and resurrection, were necessary means and conditions of human salvation. They were a part of his work of salvation, rather than proofs that he was able to do his work. They were not done simply that we might believe on him; but we believe on him because he did them, and because he did them in the accomplishment of our salvation. And so he stands before us, not as one who worked wonders for the establishment of his claims, but as a wonderful Savior. His method, as the Redeemer of the world, is not that of the impostor and charlatan.

The reader would not thank us, now that our allotted space is so nearly filled, if we detained him by a discussion of the scientific possibility of a miracle in its relation to the established laws of nature. Why shall we attempt a task which has been already, again and again, successfully accomplished? If the will and intelligence of man, acting in combination as a special cause, can so manipulate charcoal and saltpetre as to produce an explosion which would astonish nature, if nature were capable of astonishment, surely the infinite will and intelligence of God, acting together as an infinite cause, can so handle natural forces and laws as to produce a result which would be to angels and men the occasion of everlasting wonder. And just as by the interposition of man the laws of nature would not be violated, so, despite the interposition of God, they would maintain their inviolability. The personality of God is the philosophical explanation of every miracle.

There are melodious voices and harmonious strains, and tremendous combinations lying hidden away as possibilities in the heart of the majestic, many-piped, many-banked organ of nature, which only the maker of the organ can bring out. There are stops which only he can manage.

There are two practical suggestions, with which we will conclude this discussion.

This is the *first* suggestion: No man can accept miracles with so intelligent and robust faith as the Christian believer, for his personal experience bears testimony on their behalf. Consciously possessed of a new and divine life, he gazes upon the cross upon which the God-man died, and upon the open sepulcher from which the God-man rose, and says to himself and to all men, "My new life presupposes those two stupendous events, and is inexplicable without them. The life which I now live would not be possible except miracles had been wrought." This man speaks wisely and well. To Christian experience miracles are supremely credible. And so we have a new illustration of the truth of our Lord's declaration, "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine." Just as the risen Christ showed himself only to his disciples, so the Christ who was approved of God by miracles and signs and wonders fully reveals himself only to those who have received from him, through faith, power to become the sons of God.

Our *second* suggestion is a caution against an unwise handling of the doctrine of miracles. One should never attempt to demonstrate, *directly* and *independently*, the genuineness of any contingent and subordinate miracle. There is in nature an established order; there is in the course of nature a striking uniformity. This fact fairly belongs to the disbeliever in the miraculous, and lends incalculable weight to his argument. Shall I now suffer him to drag me to the place where the prophet made the iron to swim, and accept his challenge to demonstrate the credibility of that particular miracle, taken by itself? Not upon a little miracle, but upon a great one—upon more than a single great one, if I can discover more than one—will I establish and defend the doctrine of miracles.

I have been exploring the eastern edge of the North American continent. I have followed down from their sources to the sea three great rivers—the Delaware, the Potomac, and the James. Their direction demonstrates that the downward slope of the watershed which they drain is

from the west to the east. Think you that I will be at the pains to follow from their sources to their mouths all the smaller streams that I find between the Delaware on the north and the James on the south? I know in advance that they belong to the system determined by the three great rivers, and that they are flowing in the same general direction with them. The great rivers explain the small streams.

Now, there are three great events known to man, which are clearly and sublimely miraculous. There is, first, the miracle of creation; second, the miracle of the Incarnation; third, the miracle of the resurrection of our Lord. Apart from the first, science can not explain the universe. Apart from the second, the Gospel story of the life of Christ is inexplicable. Apart from the third, the existence and perpetuity of the Christian Church, and the civilization of the world for eighteen centuries, are inexplicable.

These three great miracles being established and verified, every smaller miracle, if its relations with the others are manifest and natural, can well be left to take care of itself. The miraculous element in the *act* of creation may well show itself occasionally in the development of the created universe. The miracle of the Incarnation may well repeat itself in the life of the incarnate one. The miracle of the resurrection of our Lord may well reappear in the history of his Church. So do the three great miracles render credible all minor miracles that are associated with them.

This, as it seems to me, is the wisest method of handling the doctrine of miracles.

Ah, but what is the name of Him who miraculously created the universe, who was miraculously incarnated in human flesh, who miraculously rose from the dead? Listen! I will pronounce his name, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Savior of men. Who, like him, can command the faith of the world?

ARTICLE V.

HERBERT SPENCER'S PSYCHOLOGY: CONSCIOUSNESS.

BY PROF. L. E. HICKS, A. M.

HE who assumes the function of a critic must always be watchful, lest he lay himself open to the charge of misunderstanding his author, and charging him with views and doctrines which he never held. Doubly careful must be the critic of Herbert Spencer; for there is, in the first place, a many-sidedness about him, so that his statements in one volume must be balanced, limited, or corrected by those in another; in the second place, he is justly chargeable with some degree of obscurity of thought and looseness of expression; and, lastly, his system, especially his Psychology, has certain inherent qualities which make it exceedingly difficult to grasp and pointedly refute.

Mr. Spencer has, in several instances, retorted upon his critics that they did not understand him. The risk of deserving such a retort is certainly considerable; but whether that is justly a reproach to his critics or to himself, as being the author of a system so liable to be misunderstood, may well be considered. One is almost tempted to suspect that he did not mean it should be understood, so that he might always have that rod in pickle for his critics. Imagine some clever mechanical contrivance which the spectators pronounce to be a saucepan, but with an ingenious twist the inventor brings it out a book-rack, and says triumphantly, "Ah, you did n't understand it!" Is the philosophy of Herbert Spencer a huge practical joke? I say we are sometimes tempted to raise this question, though, of course, it answers itself promptly in the negative. Spencer is, no doubt, in dead earnest. He means business—means to build up a structure that will stand as one of the grand monuments of human thought. And in some sense he has been success-

ful. His work has abundant vitality, though it may be vitality of a low order. But, as in the case of animals, the lower organisms have the greatest tenacity of life, so a system of psychology which resolves consciousness into nervous shocks, and out of a succession of these evolves feeling, and out of feeling thought, memory, conscience, reason, volition—all the higher mental phenomena, thus reducing mind to a gelatinous mush of feelings and relations between feelings: such a psychology, I say, though it lacks a backbone, may be very hard to kill, just as a cold-blooded reptile has greater tenacity of life than the lordly lion. Nor do I say, or desire to have it implied, that the total destruction of his philosophy is to be desired. Whatever is good and true in it ought to live, and, moreover, it will live. Much of what he calls Estho-physiology, or the subjective phases of physical changes in the body, is not only of fascinating interest, but of solid worth. Whenever he assumes the roll of critic, his handling of contemporary and previous writers is keen and discriminating. His several demonstrations of the reality of the external world are admirable and conclusive. With these admissions (and I might enlarge them) of excellence in certain portions of his work, I proceed to the examination of his doctrine of Consciousness.

The difficulty of full and fair statement of his views meets us at the threshold. This difficulty is especially great in the case of consciousness. He seldom defines any of his terms, and has nowhere done so in the case of this fundamentally important word in psychology. We have to gather his doctrine of consciousness from scattered expressions and from the general tenor and results of his work.

In the chapter upon "The Composition of Mind," vol. 1, p. 163,* he says: "The proximate components of mind are of two broadly contrasted kinds—feelings and the relations between feelings." What does he mean by the "Rela-

* The references are to "The Principles of Psychology," by Herbert Spencer. Appletons, New York, 1873.

tions between feelings?" One may read a long way before he gets a satisfactory answer; but by putting this and that together, we find at length that the relations between feelings are what we vulgarly call *thoughts*. Mind, then, is composed of feelings and thoughts. What is the relation of consciousness to these components of mind? We get a partial answer in the definition of a feeling. "Each feeling, as we here define it, is any portion of consciousness which occupies a place sufficiently large to give it a perceivable individuality, which has its individuality marked off from adjacent portions of consciousness by qualitative contrasts; and which, when introspectively contemplated, appears to be homogeneous." (I, 164.) A feeling, then, is a portion of consciousness, or a "tract of consciousness," the latter expression being the one he most frequently employs. Thoughts, also, must be portions of consciousness, since they are the relations between feelings. But they are unlike feelings, in that they occupy no *appreciable* extent of consciousness. "A relation between feelings is, on the contrary (*i. e.* as contrasted with a feeling), characterized by occupying no appreciable part of consciousness!" (I, 164.) This implies that it does occur in consciousness, and occupies some portion of it, though it be so limited as to be inappreciable. Consciousness, then, covers the whole ground of thought and feeling; and, since these are the components of mind, consciousness must be at least as extensive as mind. It may be more extensive, but can not, according to these expressions of our author, be less extensive. We shall immediately find that he makes it *more extensive than mind*. "Thus the totality of my consciousness is divisible into a faint aggregate, which I call *my mind*; a special part of the vivid aggregate, cohering with this in various ways, which I call *my body*; and *the rest of the vivid aggregate*, which has no such coherence with the faint aggregate." (II, 472.) A mere glance at this passage confirms the statement above, that he makes consciousness more extensive than mind; though, in order to a complete understanding of it, the

meaning of "vivid aggregate" must be explained. The chapter in which it occurs is entitled, "Differentiation of Subject and Object." A tabular statement of the leading differences is given on page 463. That table, and the accompanying text, show at once that the "vivid aggregate" is the "object" or external world, and the "faint aggregate" is the mind, or *ego*; while the body holds an intermediate position between the two. Briefly expressed in ordinary terms the above passage means just this: Consciousness is divisible into mind, body, and external world. Again, he speaks of being "simply conscious of the book" (II, 437), therein plainly declaring that the sphere of consciousness includes an object belonging to the external world, outside of the mind; and if this one object, then, of course, any objects whatever, equally with the one, may be brought into consciousness. Thus the *non-ego*, as well as the *ego*, is included in consciousness, according to Herbert Spencer. His definition of these terms confirms the statement just made. "The principle of continuity, forming into a whole the faint states of consciousness, molding and modifying them by some unknown energy, is distinguished as the *ego*; while the *non-ego* is the principle of continuity, holding together the independent aggregate of vivid states." (II, 487.) This is quite explicit to the point that consciousness includes the *non-ego*, or object.

It is freely admitted that other expressions in these volumes imply a closer limitation of consciousness. For instance, "To be conscious is to think" (II, 291). This would seem to limit consciousness to thought alone, excluding not only the *non-ego*, but also feeling, one of the constituents of the *ego*. But this is an isolated expression, contradicted by the whole tenor of his writings, as well as by the explicit *dicta* of the passages above quoted. Besides, it does not necessarily mean that consciousness is limited to thought. It may mean that thought always accompanies any kind of consciousness, though it be not its sole component. It is true that this explanation spoils the argument in which

the sentence "To be conscious is to think" occurs. So we have to choose between a pointed contradiction and an argument lamed in attempting to explain away the contradiction. The truth is—and no reader of any penetration needs to peruse many chapters to be convinced of it—Herbert Spencer uses many terms very loosely; and no instance of this looseness is more striking than his treatment of this same word consciousness. For a single specimen, out of many that might be cited, take the following: "Thus the normal processes of thought inevitably originate this inexpressible but indestructible consciousness of existence beyond the limits of consciousness." If "consciousness," where it first occurs in this sentence, means *belief* or *knowledge*, there is sense in this passage—otherwise nonsense. But what shall we say of a writer who uses words so loosely that we must always be thinking, "If he means thus and thus by this word or phrase, then his teaching is so and so?" Some degree of freedom and license may be tolerated in ordinary popular style, but in the formal and extended treatment of a science so important as psychology, we have a right to expect some degree of precision, especially in the use of such fundamental terms as consciousness. At least we ought not to be obliged to interpret it with such a radical difference in two places in one short sentence, as we must do in order to save the above quotation from absurdity.

Another extremely important element of his doctrine of consciousness remains to be stated; but before proceeding to that let us briefly restate and examine the points already made. Consciousness has, according to our author, three components—mind, body, and object, or external world. Mind, or the "faint aggregate," is a portion of consciousness, and, so far as it goes, *is identical with consciousness*, differing from the totality of consciousness only in having less extent. The rest of consciousness, aside from the portion called mind, includes the body and the *non-ego*, or object. Here, as I believe, are two fundamental errors. The first

consists in *identifying mind with a portion of consciousness*, and the second in *extending consciousness beyond the sphere of mind to include external objects*. That these doctrines are held and taught by Herbert Spencer is, it seems to me, undeniable. The second has been amply established by quotations above; and the first is not only stated in one of these quotations (II, 472), but also follows, by necessary implication, from his doctrine of the composition of mind. Mind, he tells us, is composed of thoughts and feelings. Feelings are "tracts of consciousness." Thoughts also, being the relations between feelings, are portions of consciousness, though of inappreciable extent. Mind and one portion of consciousness are composed of the very same elements; therefore, they must be identical.

In any attempt to criticise these views of the nature and extent of consciousness, I realize at once the truth of a statement already made, that psychological speculation is a perilous sea. There is a chronic dispute about the nature of consciousness. Some claim that it is a special faculty, like perception, imagination, etc.; others that it is the general substance out of which the special faculties are elaborated. Spencer's doctrine is, in part, the same as that of the latter class; and, in part, it is unique and peculiar to himself. He does not believe in the existence of special faculties at all; and in that he is as near right as those who emphasize the special faculties to the extent of making them entities independent of mind. With him consciousness is the fundamental substance, and swallows up every other mental function. Out of it all mental phenomena are evolved; and it transcends all mental phenomena, extending beyond mind to include even the *non-ego*. One is scarcely able to see any use for the term mind in Spencer's system. Consciousness is every thing, mind only an obscure corner of consciousness, a "faint aggregate" of states of consciousness. It is a noteworthy fact that after the first few chapters he drops the term mind, using consciousness exclusively for the *consensus* of all mental phenomena.

Now what is the true relation of consciousness to mind? It is not the relation of identity, but of attribute, to substance. Consciousness is an attribute of mind. Mind is recognizable as mind only so far as it is conscious; that is, possesses the attribute consciousness. Consciousness is mental vitality, mental activity, mental wakefulness. It is not a special faculty, for it accompanies the action of each and all of the faculties. It is rather to be defined as *the reflexive complement of every mental action*. In an act of perception, consciousness cognizes self as the author or subject of the act of perception, and is thus the reflexive complement of that act. So with every form of mental activity. Consciousness is present in every instance, not as the substance out of which each thought or feeling is elaborated, but as an inseparable, ever present attribute of mind, the latter being the substance out of which thoughts, feelings, and volitions are elaborated.

But while consciousness is not a special faculty, and while it accompanies the action of all the faculties, it is more nearly allied to some of them than to others. Thus, for instance, it is clearly cognitive rather than emotional or sensational. Its deliverances are always cognitions, not sensations. This radical difference between consciousness and feeling will claim our attention again.

It must be confessed that if Spencer is wrong about consciousness so are many other psychologists, some of the most eminent not excepted. Sir William Hamilton (Lectures, page 187) says: "The special faculties are branches of which consciousness is the trunk." It is mind, not consciousness, in which the special faculties inhere. Hamilton's error is a natural one, because consciousness is spread over the whole area of mental activity; it is present in the action of every faculty, and hence easily mistaken for the substance of which they are composed. The true adaptation of his figure of the tree and its branches would be this: Mind is the trunk, the special faculties the branches, and consciousness is the vital sap penetrating and vivifying alike

trunk and branches. The special faculties are not separate entities, but only modes of the mind's action. They are built upon mind, and out of the substance of mind, which substance, in that modification which we call a special faculty, carries with it the attribute consciousness, just as every other part of the mind does.

Professor Porter and many other American writers have copied Hamilton's doctrine of consciousness, errors and all. There is a lamentable lack of precision among writers generally in the use of this term. Consciousness is made to mean any thing, every thing, or nothing, according to the exigencies of the moment. Such looseness usually leads simply to confusion; but when a man like Spencer starts with an error, which in Hamilton is a single flaw in an admirable system, burnishes it up, expands it, elaborates it, and bases his whole system upon it, then the fatal consequences of such lack of precision become strikingly apparent. Consciousness will inevitably continue to be used in many different senses in conversation and popular literature; but let psychologists rigidly limit it to its legitimate sphere as the reflexive complement of mental activity, and great gain to the science of mind will be the result.

Though it is true, in my opinion, that the germ of Spencer's doctrine of consciousness is found in the writings of Sir William Hamilton, yet under his manipulation that germ has evolved a product which no one would be quicker to repudiate than Hamilton. Spencer is alone among psychologists in sinking mind so utterly in consciousness that he seems to lose it altogether. His error is certainly one of the most radical and fatal of all the numerous errors in regard to consciousness. Some of its consequences will be more apparent when we come to consider his doctrine of the ultimate unit of consciousness, with which this first error is so blended that the refutation of one will also dispose of the other.

The second error consists in making consciousness include the *non-ego*, or object. No great amount of space

will be given to this point, because it is not peculiar to Herbert Spencer, but is held by many other authors. It is, in fact, a question of the proper use of words, rather than a matter of vital importance; though, of course, the misuse or loose construction of terms is very likely to lead to radical and vital errors. Spencer speaks of being conscious of objects belonging to the external world. Hamilton uses similar language. Is it admissible to say, "I am conscious of the table?" I maintain that it is not admissible. It is using consciousness in a very different sense from that indicated by the definition above; namely, that consciousness is the reflexive complement of all mental action. Almost all psychologists will readily admit that this is the usual and most important meaning of the word consciousness. The question is, whether it ought to be rigidly restricted to that meaning. Whatever may be the answer in the abstract, I maintain that in this particular instance it is not expedient to admit such a meaning as is implied in the above expression. "I perceive the table," is just as intelligible, if not more so, to the ordinary mind; and it is wholly free from the objections which lie against the former phrase. Perception is the faculty through which we obtain all knowledge of objects external to the mind. Extending consciousness over into the sphere of the *non-ego* is an unwarranted invasion of a province which belongs inalienably to sense-perception. It is essential to a true psychology to emphasize, rather than obliterate and ignore, the broad distinction between the spheres and functions of perception and consciousness. No distinction more fundamental appears in the whole range of mental science. These are the two grand sources of all our knowledge, the one looking outward, the other inward; the one bringing to the soul, in its hidden recesses, all that it can know of the universe about it; the other revealing to the mind the nature, the methods, and the limitations of its own activity.

The object of consciousness is always self, never an object external to self. But it is self in its various modifi-

cations, as perceiving, now this, now that; as reasoning, suffering, rejoicing, choosing; so that, while this object of consciousness is forever the same old self, there is no monotony about it. The soul, ever the same in substance, is protean in its forms; and it is these infinitely varied forms which are reflected by consciousness. Herein may seem to lie a partial justification of Spencer's doctrine. Let us see. When I reason, the object of my consciousness is self-in-the-act-of-reasoning. When I perceive a tree, consciousness reflects self-in-the-act-of-perceiving-a-tree. The next instant it reflects self-in-the-act-of-perceiving-a-house; and so on for all sorts of mental action. Each form yields a new object to consciousness, for it reveals self in a new phase, affected by a new object. Why not say, then, that consciousness includes the object, and admit the expression, "I am conscious of the tree?" The answer turns upon the truth of idealism or realism. If there is no actual tree, nothing but a mental modification which we are accustomed to call a tree, then by all means say, "I am conscious of the tree." But the realist, and Spencer himself is one, maintains that the tree and the mental modification caused by perceiving it, are entirely distinct entities, each real, the one an objective and the other a subjective reality. It is the latter alone which can ever be properly regarded as an object of consciousness. The mind has direct cognition of the external reality as an object of perception, and in the same concrete and undivided exercise of energy it knows itself through consciousness as thus perceiving the tree. The only consistent expression for the realist is, "I perceive the tree;" or if the word conscious is used, it should be with its proper object, thus, "I am conscious of perceiving the tree;" that is, conscious of self in the act of perceiving it.

The third point in his doctrine of consciousness is so characteristic that I shall quote *in extenso* the paragraphs relating to it, thus permitting the author to state his doctrine for himself. This was not possible in regard to the

points already established, because of the scattered and fragmentary nature of the expressions from which his views must be gathered. But his doctrine of the "ultimate unit of composition of consciousness" is distinctly enunciated in a few paragraphs of the chapter upon the "Substance of Mind." The following quotation begins at the bottom of page 148, volume I:

"Although the individual sensations and emotions, real or ideal, of which consciousness is built up, appear to be severally simple, homogeneous, unanalyzable, or of inscrutable natures, yet they are not so. There is at least one kind of feeling which, as ordinarily experienced, seems elementary—that is, demonstrably not elementary. And after resolving it into its proximate components, we can scarcely help suspecting that other apparently elementary feelings are also compound, and may have proximate components like those which we can in this one instance identify.

"Musical sound is the name we give to this seemingly simple feeling which is clearly resolvable into simpler feelings. Well known experiments prove that when equal blows or taps are made one after another, at a rate not exceeding some sixteen per second, the effect of each is perceived as a separate noise, but when the rapidity with which the blows follow one another exceeds this, the noises are no longer identified in separate states of consciousness, and there arises in place of them a continuous state of consciousness called a tone. . . . If the different sensations known as sounds are built out of a common unit, is it not to be rationally inferred that so likewise are the different sensations known as tastes, and the different sensations known as odors, and the different sensations known as colors? Nay, shall we not regard it as probable that there is a unit common to all these strongly contrasted classes of sensations? If the unlikenesses among the sensations of each class may be due to unlikenesses among the modes of aggregation of a unit of consciousness common to them all, so, too, may the much greater unlike-

nesses between the sensations of each class and those of other classes. There may be a single primordial element of consciousness, and the countless kinds of consciousness may be produced by the compounding of this element with itself and the recompounding of its compounds with one another in higher and higher degrees, so producing increased multiplicity, variety, and complexity.

“Have we any clew to this primordial element? I think we have. That simple mental impression which proves to be the unit of composition of the sensation of musical tone is allied to certain other simple mental impressions differently originated. The subjective effect produced by a crack or noise that has no appreciable duration is little else than a nervous shock. Though we distinguish such a nervous shock as belonging to what we call sounds, yet it does not differ very much from nervous shocks of other kinds. An electric discharge sent through the body causes a feeling akin to that which a sudden loud report causes. A strong, unexpected impression made through the eyes, as by a flash of lightning, similarly gives rise to a start or shock; and though the feeling so named seems, like the electric shock, to have the body at large for its seat, and may therefore be regarded as the correlative rather of the efferent than of the afferent disturbance, yet, on remembering the mental change that results from the instantaneous transit of an object across the field of vision, I think it may be perceived that the feeling accompanying the efferent disturbance is itself reduced very nearly to the same form. The state of consciousness so generated is, in fact, comparable in quality to the initial state of consciousness caused by a blow (distinguishing it from the pain or other feeling that follows the instant after); which state of consciousness, caused by a blow, may be taken as the primitive and typical form of the nervous shock. . . . It is possible, then—may we not even say probable—that something of the same order, as that which we call a nervous shock, is the ultimate unit of consciousness, and that all the unlikenesses among our feel-

ings result from unlike modes of integration of this ultimate unit."

Now, reader, if you have followed Spencer through the above quotation you know something about the "ultimate unit;" both as to what it is, and how he works it out, and what he does with it. Upon each of these points I shall offer a few comments.

First, how does he reach his doctrine of the ultimate unit of consciousness? Observe the steps: 1. A musical tone is made of many separate sounds, very brief in their duration. 2. It is "rational" to infer from this *one* instance that *all* sensations are made up of separate, very brief portions. 3. If each sensation is so constituted of its particular species of units, it is "probable" that there is some "primordial unit" common to them all, which is the aforesaid ultimate unit of consciousness.

The first step is a fact, or at least claims to be; the second a wholesale generalization from a single instance; and the third an inference, of which the best that can be said is, that it is "probable." After analyzing the slender logical basis upon which his ultimate unit rests, one can not avoid a feeling of surprise at the large place it holds in his system.

The argument is certainly not a strong one, granting that the first step is a fact. But even that minute point, upon which he balances the huge inverted pyramid of his doctrine of the ultimate unit, is not beyond question. Its apparent solidity results from a confusion of ideas in regard to sound and the physical cause of sound. The latter is, indeed, separable into minute portions called vibrations. But it by no means necessarily follows that the sensation of sound, as apprehended by the mind, is divisible into like minute portions. It may be said that there is a strong presumption that the sensation will partake of the nature of its physical cause; and since the latter is composite, the former is probably composite also. Against this presumption I might array the testimony of consciousness, and claim that as a sufficient

answer. Consciousness emphatically testifies that the mental effect of multitudinous, rapidly recurring vibrations is one smooth, entire, continuous, and undecomposable impression. But we are not entirely shut up to this testimony; other considerations may be brought to bear upon our decision of the question, and they all tend to a confirmation of the testimony of consciousness. Spencer has himself expatiated upon the fact that an impression made through the nerves lasts an appreciable time (I, 83). In the case of vision, Huxley states that each luminous impression continues about an eighth of a second. In the case of auditory impressions, each one must obviously last about as long as the interval between successive taps, which yield separate sensations, *i. e.*, one-sixteenth of a second. The limit between the rate at which the sounds are distinct and the rate at which they blend into a tone is, in fact, determined by the duration of each impression. Whenever they come so fast that the second begins before the first ends, and the third, in like manner, impinges upon the second, then we have a tone. But what is implied in this? So far as the mind is concerned, there is not a multitude of confused impressions, but a blending of them into one solid, undecomposable impression. Each vibration works its own proper and separate effect upon the auditory nerve. But that nerve, in conjunction with the great nerve centers to which it conveys the successive impressions, is an apparatus for converting these several, meaningless, unpleasant jars into music.

But, you say, though the tone seems to the perceiving mind not to be decomposable, it *must* be so in reality, since each vibration works its separate effect upon the nerves. The distinct elements are there in fact, only the mind can not perceive them.

Let us look at that matter a little more closely. Here are two straight lines. To the eye, or the microscope, they are exactly alike. But one was produced by a style which drew a continuous trace the length of the line; the other,

by a series of rotating points, each making a short trace which blended so accurately with the preceding that an even continuous trace, just like the other line, is the result. Between such lines as they actually exist there is no difference; one is just as continuous and undecomposable as the other. The different method by which they were produced does not, in the common sense view, do away with the fact that they are now equally continuous and undecomposable. Now the impression of aërial vibrations upon the mind is, as consciousness testifies, continuous. The most that can be claimed is that, like the second of these lines, it is, as regards the mode of its production, decomposable, or at least may be conceived as a composite structure, but practically it is not so. In the actual attempt to decompose the line the eye and the microscope fail; and, in like manner, consciousness is unable to resolve the mental impression into distinct elements. The nervous system may be regarded as a very perfect machine for converting successive vibrations into continuous sounds. So neatly does it work, that one smooth note is all that the mind perceives as the result of many distinct vibrations. The effects are as many as the vibrations; but they are all alike, and they overlap so as to produce a single effect. Nerve fiber is the style, and its movement is not steadily forward, but in pulsations, which, nevertheless, blend so perfectly that a straight and even line is drawn in the mind. Grant all this, and the propriety of calling these pulsations units of consciousness is still very dubious. They are at best latent elements, not of consciousness, but of the sensation of sound.

If they were really valid units of consciousness, then the science of acoustics might be constructed by a purely subjective method. Imagine the eminent physicist, Helmholtz, entering upon those investigations which have resulted in his masterly treatises upon sound. Does he summon an orchestra, wrap himself in his cloak, and sit down to listen to its music? That would have been the rational procedure if the sensation of sound is, like its physical antecedent, a

composite structure. All he need do would be to introspectively contemplate the units of his consciousness resulting from the notes of various instruments. Why should he burden himself with expensive apparatus, and weary himself with years of patient experiment and manipulation, if he could accomplish the same result so much more easily and pleasantly by the subjective method? Ah, you say, that was not his purpose; he was a physicist, not a psychologist. His aim was, not the elucidation of the mental phenomenon of sound, but its physical antecedent. Very true; that was his aim precisely; and his success in the pursuit of it was due to the fact that he kept that single purpose in view. He had the good sense to appreciate the distinction between the mental effect and its cause, and to let the former severely alone. He pursued the objective, experimental method; and the subjects of his experiments were material, sonorous bodies, not human souls. His conclusions are valid within the physical realm from which they were derived; but it is of no avail to cite them, as Spencer does, in confirmation of his psychological theories.

The result of this analysis is, that the separate effects of sonorous vibrations may be regarded as latent elements of the sensation of sound. But we are still a long way from Spencer's conclusion that they are constituent units of consciousness. For, in the first place, it is obvious, from his own statement above, that we are unconscious of them. When the successive taps exceed a certain rate, "they are no longer identified in separate states of consciousness." Now, what we are unconscious of perceiving is outside of consciousness; how can it, then, form any part of consciousness? *A fortiori*, how can it be the ultimate unit underlying the whole structure and substance of consciousness? In the second place, the sensation of sound belongs to the feelings, or sensibilities, while consciousness is cognitive in its nature. With this radical difference in view, it is a gross absurdity to call the latent elements of sound, or any other sensation, units of consciousness.

The conclusion is, that the ultimate unit is a myth. It has no logical basis which will bear examination. All its plausible ground-work of "rational" inferences vanishes into thin air the moment you take a square look at it. But even myths are instructive; and this one is sufficiently so to justify further inquiry as to its nature, and the use Spencer makes of it.

What is the nature of Spencer's ultimate unit of consciousness? Something like a nervous shock, he says; and, for a "typical form of the nervous shock," he cites the "initial state of consciousness caused by a blow (distinguishing it from the pain or other feeling that commences the instant after)." Let us dissect a nervous shock and see what it contains. Like sound, it has two aspects, an inner and an outer, or a subjective and an objective phase. Upon the objective side it consists of a wave of molecular change traversing nerve fiber; upon the subjective side it appears as a mental impression produced by that wave of molecular change. In which of these aspects is it taken by Spencer as a constituent of consciousness? This is an important consideration, and the answer is not apparent at a glance. Considering the wide sweep and fast-and-loose construction which he gives to consciousness, one would not be much surprised to find him making a mere physical phenomenon its constituent unit. The fact that a nervous shock, upon its objective side, belongs to the *non-ego*, would be nothing for him to stumble at, since he makes consciousness include the *non-ego*. Of course it would be rank materialism to make a wave of molecular change the basis of consciousness, and this, in turn, the basis of all other mental phenomena, thus reducing mind to a series of molecular changes; and this consideration at once gives us pause in attempting to fasten such a construction upon him, for he claims distinctly that he is not a materialist. I am utterly averse to calling any man by a name which he himself repudiates. But it is undeniable, that in the broad and general view, neglecting any close analysis of a nervous shock, as the average reader would naturally do, this peculiar doctrine of his does wear a sin-

ister expression, which, if not materialistic, squints in that direction. Mark how well it fits into a system which denies spiritual existence and creative power. The minor difficulties of such a system are innumerable; but it might overleap or ignore them with comparative ease were it not for two grand obstacles which bar its triumphal progress. These are, first, the gulf between matter and life; second, the gulf between sentient life and mind. The first has been bridged, *hypothetically*, in various ways, but never more neatly than by Huxley with his hypothesis, that in some former period of the earth's history, when matter was more plastic, and all the conditions more favorable than now, life was generated from matter by an electric shock. Now up comes Spencer with a capital idea in regard to the bridging of the second gulf. The electric shock generated sentient life; that life improved as time passed on, so that, from a mere speck of unorganized protoplasm, it came to be manifested in a multiplicity of animal forms with complicated nervous systems. Now, as the first gulf was bridged by an electric shock, the second shall be bridged by a nervous shock. Given matter and electricity as factors, and life is the product. Given a nervous system and a stimulus from without to produce a nervous shock, and mind is the product. No need of creative power, and no evidence of spiritual existence in the whole process. Spencer's ultimate unit fits into materialism as neatly as if it was made to fit there. He claims to be enlisted upon the side of a spiritual interpretation of the universe; but, if that is so, then he is certainly trading with the enemy, and furnishing them some of their best artillery and ammunition. His ultimate unit is contraband of war, and ought to be seized and confiscated.

Such must be our conclusion when we view the matter broadly; and when we view it closely, taking note of the two aspects of a nervous shock, that conclusion still needs little modification. For if we regard a nervous shock as molecular, the doctrine is gross materialism; but if we regard it as a mental impression, the doctrine is still material-

istic, as we shall immediately see. The latter is only a little less gross, and by so much the more dangerous, form of materialism. The one is a broad guffaw of contempt, the other a covert, refined sneer at spiritualism.

Let us grant that Spencer means the resulting mental impression whenever he speaks of a nervous shock as the ultimate unit of consciousness. The anti-spiritual outcome of the doctrine, even in that form, is not far to seek. Remember that in his system consciousness is built up out of these ultimate units, feeling is built up out of consciousness, and all else in mind is built up out of feelings. All depends upon the nervous shock. Pull out that from the foundation and the whole structure of mind falls to ruin. Where does the immaterial principle, the immortal soul, belong in such a scheme?

You may say that a mental impression implies the existence of mind to receive that impression. Very true; and it may furthermore be true that the awakening of mind to consciousness is dependent upon a nervous shock. At any rate, some stimulus from without, through the nerves, does always, as a matter of fact, precede the initial self-knowledge of the soul. But this is so far from justifying Spencer's doctrine, that it serves rather to show its utter absurdity. Mind is there before any mental impression, yet out of mental impressions, as units, mind is constituted. The climax of absurdity is reached in such a proposition. To escape it, and still save the doctrine, we must say that mind was not there first, but was *generated* by the nervous shock; and thus land ourselves once more upon the low grounds of materialism.

That this is a fair statement of the outcome of this doctrine will readily appear when we inquire what use its author proposes to make of it. He proposes to generate mind out of nervous shocks. That may be criticised as too summary a statement, but that is the only valid criticism upon it. Its essential truth is manifest when we draw out the summary statement into its details. That might be done in the

author's own language ; but it would be necessary to quote his whole chapter upon the "Composition of Mind." To that I refer any reader who doubts the accuracy of my analysis of it. He there explains at length how each successive nervous shock blends with the faint forms of preceding shocks, so as to generate a continuous feeling ; which feeling is, at the same time, a "tract of consciousness." Thus we have feelings and consciousness simultaneously generated by the same process and from the same units. Mind is then generated from feelings in precisely the same manner that feelings are generated from nervous shocks. Each feeling blends and is assimilated with the faint forms of previous feelings of the same kind.

"Mind is constituted only when each sensation is assimilated to the faint forms of antecedent like sensations. . . . Observe, further, that while each special sensation is raised into a proximate constituent of simple thought only by being fused with like predecessors, it becomes a proximate constituent of compound thought by simultaneously entering into relations of unlikeness with other sensations which limit it in space or time. . . . That the same law of composition continues without definite limit through tracts of higher consciousness, formed of clusters of clusters of feelings held together by relations of an extremely involved kind, scarcely needs adding." (Vol. I, pp. 185, 186.)

Here we have mind constituted of sensations, simple thought constituted by fusing like sensations, compound thought constituted by fusing unlike sensations, and the same law extended "without definite limit" over the higher mental phenomena. The detailed statement confirms the truth of the summary statement. Nervous shocks simultaneously generate feelings and consciousness, and feelings generate mind.

Another example of careless use of terms here emerges to view. A true classification makes mind include feelings as well as intellect, and that is Spencer's own view in gen-

eral. But when he speaks of sensations blending to produce mind, it is implied that they are something distinct from mind. Oxygen and hydrogen unite to produce water, a thing distinct from either of them. In like manner, if mind is the product of blending sensations it must be different from them. If the physical analogy be objected to, I answer that such analogies are Spencer's especial delight. He distinctly appeals to them in many instances for confirmation of his psychological theories. If they turn against him he is not the one to object to them as illegitimate in psychology. His loose and inconsistent employment of the term mind appears plainly enough, however, without any reference to physical analogies.

The salient features of his doctrine of consciousness have been indicated. Think a moment what they imply. Here is man, a sentient, thinking creature, in a universe filled with objects of sense, including other beings like himself, all in beautiful order and harmony. Through the gates of the senses, by the agency of light, sound, or bodily contact, troops of sensations enter the soul. The environment plays upon the organism, sets up waves of molecular change in the nerves, which are translated into melodious pulses of thought and feeling. Sweet, bright, glad influences emanating from the Cosmos, come trooping in with joyous notes, and the man rejoices. But the music changes; it falls into minor cadences, and the man weeps. Again, the Cosmos sings him a song of heavenly melody, and peaceful, holy thoughts fill his breast. Once more the music changes; a discordant clangor shakes the nerves, and is translated into a murderous thought. Love and hatred, joy and sorrow, ennobling philosophy and mawkish sentiment, pure affection and beastly lust—all alike generated by different kinds and combinations of nervous shocks. Man a mere toy in the hands of the mighty forces of the universe—a sort of music-box, with sometimes an angel and sometimes a devil fingering the keys!

Of course, Spencer is a fatalist. His doctrine of con-

sciousness leaves no standing ground for the freedom of the will.

With a brief summary of conclusions I shall bring this article to a close.

Herbert Spencer's psychology is vitiated by three important errors in respect to consciousness.

First, he makes mind identical with a portion of consciousness, whereas consciousness is, in fact, an attribute of mind.

Second, he makes consciousness include the *non-ego*, which is inconsistent with realism.

Third, he resolves all mental phenomena, including consciousness, into nervous shocks as ultimate units. This doctrine is false, because these shocks are not apprehended in consciousness, and are moreover sensational, while consciousness is cognitive in its nature; and it is inconsistent with belief in spiritual existence and the immortality of the soul.

ARTICLE VI.

THE TEMPTATION OF JESUS.

BY REV. A. J. ROWLAND.

THE public life of our Savior began with his baptism. That unique personality which for thirty years had been developing at Nazareth reached the fullness of its growth and burst into perfect flower when our Lord rose from the waters of the Jordan. God, the Father, gave attestation of this fact by sending forth a dove to rest upon his head, and by emphatically declaring, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." Immediately upon his baptism Christ must have reached the full consciousness of his mission, must have thoroughly realized that upon him, as the divinely appointed Messiah, rested the redemption of a fallen world.

Had the story of Christ's life been invented by man there would, doubtless, have been no chasm between this final and complete budding of the Messianic consciousness and the Savior's public teaching and work. To our human sense of the fitness of things, it would seem that, in coming up out of the baptismal waters, the divinely attested Messiah should at once have caused his glory to blaze forth, that men might be convinced of his Messiahship. Indeed, we can not doubt that Jesus himself must have had with the full perception of his mission a burning desire to begin his work among men. The profound and pressing necessities of the suffering and perishing race with which he had to do must have wrought with intense power upon his sympathies, and called upon him most loudly and urgently to make himself known.

The divine method in Christ's life was, however, one of concealments. The glory of his birth was followed by

the obscurity of an unknown childhood. The brief display of his supernatural wisdom, which was given at the temple, when, at the age of twelve, he surprised and confounded the wisest men of his nation, was succeeded by a long and unbroken silence of nearly a score of years. In like manner, the glorious scene of his baptism was the precursor of the mysterious and lonely trial of the wilderness. It was a life of profoundest humiliation Christ came to live among men. To do his work of atonement he must be constantly shrinking from view. From the very beginning he must walk in the shadow of that awful cross upon which he is finally to writhe in agony and death.

Accordingly, we are not surprised to be told that, immediately upon the manifestation of his Messiahship and the full ripening of his own consciousness of the same, Jesus was led by the Spirit into the wilderness. This retirement, as the Scriptures are careful to say, was no accidental or unnecessary experience. On the contrary, it was part of a divinely ordained plan; the impelling power was the Spirit of God. Mark tells us* that Jesus was driven by the Spirit, as though a sort of divine force were needed to draw our Lord temporarily from the great work to which he felt himself commissioned, and the urgency of which pressed his heart.

Nor was this withdrawal or propulsion of Jesus into the wilderness merely for purposes of retirement. A period of retirement would, indeed, seem most appropriate. It were well for our Lord to spend some time alone with that God whose son he felt himself to be, that in direct and unhindered communion with him he might calm the enthusiasm of his spirit, more definitely shape the plan of his life, and secure at the Father's hands the stores of strength he might need for the exigencies of coming months. Man's truest strength is born of solitude. We do not reach our full stature in the market-place. Moments of great excitement need to be followed by periods of quiet and calm, when the

* *Vide* Mark i, 12, "*ἐκβάλλει*;" *cf.* John ii, 15.

soul can gather and marshal the forces which excitement has aroused. Moses, to be a leader of Israel, must spend forty years in the desert. Elijah, to be prepared for hand to hand contests for the truth, must sit in lonely discouragement under the juniper tree, and, in some wild cleft of the mountain, hear the still small voice of God. Luther, to be fitted for the large work laid upon him, must retire awhile to the secluded fortress of the Wartburg. The forty days spent in the wilderness seem, therefore, divinely natural. As the ideal man, it was eminently fitting for Jesus, after the excitements of his baptism, and before the inauguration of his public work, to exile himself from men, and to give himself in the solitudes of nature to meditation and to God.

But it was not merely for retirement that Jesus was led or driven into the wilderness. He was there to meet and be tempted by the devil. Against the devil his whole life work was to be wrought. It was necessary, therefore, at the very outset, that he should grapple with the arch adversary. The first Adam had been overcome of the devil. The second Adam must, therefore, challenge him to single combat at the very threshold of his redemption and vicarious career. It was inevitable that the struggle should come at once, and come under such circumstances as would give the devil every possible opportunity and advantage to present his most forceful enticements and try his utmost skill.

This contest with Satan was necessary, also, to fit Jesus himself for his work. He was to come near the heart of humanity, to place himself alongside of men in their deepest and sorest needs, and assure them of victory. Manifestly he could have had no adequate sympathy with tempted and suffering souls unless he had himself undergone the hard struggle with the prince of evil. As the author of the "Ecce Deus" says: "A man who had not been tempted would have been of no use to men. He would have been a stranger to their mental history, only able to talk of, but never to, their spirit; all his words, however refined and lustrous, would never have penetrated into the deep moods

of human nature. The weary, aching heart can not feed on metaphors or the cunning sleights of rhetoric."* It was divinely ordered, therefore, that Christ's contest with the devil should come at the very threshold of his public life. The victory he then gained fitted him from the start to be what the prophets had announced he would be—the bearer of men's burdens, the sharer of their deepest life, and the conqueror of their worst foe. The temptation was the natural and necessary preface to the official work of Christ for the race, a preface without which there could have been no real Christ and no real atoning work for humanity.

The place where the temptation occurred can never be definitely known. It seems most probable that a range of rugged hills, south of Jericho and west of the Jordan, one of which to this day bears the name Quarantaià in commemoration of the forty days of trial, which tradition affirms to have been endured upon its rocky summit, was the spot. There, we are told, Jesus was with the wild beasts, and during the entire forty days remained fasting. This fast was not, necessarily, a total abstinence from food. Luke does, indeed, say that he ate nothing, but this may be one of those orientalisms which are not to be taken as absolutely literal. It is not impossible, however, that our Lord may have lived even through forty days without food. In times of intense mental excitement the ordinary laws of the body are held in abeyance. Persons have been known to live without the least physical nutriment for an almost incredible time; and if we take into account the high state of feeling to which Christ was subjected in the wilderness, the Scripture statement need give us no trouble. In like manner, it is not necessary to assume that any miraculous power was needed to protect Jesus against the wild beasts. We may believe that these instinctively recognized the purity and power of our and their Lord and shrank from doing him harm.

Here, then, in the wilderness, among the wild beasts,

*"Ecce Deus," pp. 61, 62.

fasting and lonely, Jesus grappled with the arch enemy of souls. Why the time of the temptation rounded itself up in just forty days is a question of little practical importance. There may be some mystic meaning in the correspondence of this period with the forty years spent by the children of Israel in the wilderness, the forty days of Moses upon Sinai, the forty days' exile of Elijah, and the forty days of our Lord's Epiphanies, but the evidential value of this would seem to be but slight.

We can not doubt, however, that forty literal days and nights were spent by our Lord in the desert. During the entire time he was tempted of the devil. The needed temptations at the close were the final trials of a series of trials—the last and most powerful charges of a determined, though half-despairing foe. Mark and Luke tell us explicitly that this was the case.* Their statement greatly intensifies the horrors of the struggle. That portion which is revealed to us was awful in its fierce persistence; how much more awful must the entire series of trials have been, from the day when Jesus entered the desert until the moment when the devil spread his wings in despairing flight, and angels came to minister to their fainting king!

That the temptation itself was a real experience seems beyond question. It is impossible for us to conceive of our Lord giving his disciples, in the form of a matter-of-fact history, what to him was only a subjective reverie—a mere fancy sketch of contest between evil and good. If we accept the Gospel records as genuine, we can not doubt that Jesus did go into an actual earthly wilderness, and did there, in his own person, meet and overcome a real devil.

Nor was the temptation simply a reality. It was an objective reality, implying the presence and felt power of Satanic suggestions coming from without. This was not a conflict which originated and was confined within the Savior's own mind and heart. Such explanation is at variance with the form of the Scripture story, and also does violence to

* Mark i, 13 ; Luke iv, 2.

the sinlessness of our Lord. "According to this," says Ullmann, "wicked, seducing thoughts rise up from the soul of Jesus himself, which presupposes that there dwelt in that soul unclean and unholy imaginations. This we can not admit."* Lange puts the matter in a still stronger light: "Christ could not, in an idle manner, brood over the possibilities of sin, or imagine them in darkness, by spreading out the allurements of the false ideal of the world before his own spirit. On this suggestion, one part of his consciousness would have been the tempter and the other the conqueror. Such a self-tempting of the consciousness can hardly be imagined without involving sin."†

The temptation of our Lord was, therefore, an objective one. The suggestions to evil were made, as the Scriptures assert, by a personal devil—a being acting entirely outside of the soul of Christ, and who sought in every possible way to secure his defeat. To argue the question of the existence and personality of the prince of evil is foreign to the purpose of this paper. It must be sufficient now to say, that no other theory so well accounts for the presence and power of evil in human life and society. It is impossible for us to think of an impalpable principle or influence operating with so much persistence and potency through all lands and hearts and centuries, unless, behind this, there are living personalities to give it force, at the head of whom, it is fair to presume, there is one who is prominent in hate and skill. We can not doubt, therefore, that the devil with whom our Lord entered into personal conflict in the wilderness was none other than that arch spirit who, ages ago, "through transgression fell," and has ever since been doing his fiendish work in human hearts.

But admitting that the temptation was an objective one, and that the tempter was the chief of the forces of evil, the further question arises, "How did he appear to our Lord?" Various replies have been made to this question. Milton, in the "Paradise Regained," supposes the devil

* "Sinlessness of Jesus," pp. 311. † "Life of Christ," vol. II, pp. 55.

to have assumed a human form in which to deceive the Savior.*

Lange, in the most elaborate manner, endeavors to show that Satan embodied himself, and employed in the temptation the delegation from the Sanhedrim which had gone to John the Baptist to question him as to his Messiahship, and returning towards Jerusalem found Jesus in the desert.† Others have imagined that Satan assumed the form of an angel of light; and thus, in the most insidious way, sought to ingratiate himself into the confidence of our Lord. Still others have thought that, scorning all disguises, Satan appeared to Jesus in his own proper person, and endeavored, by sheer force of native power, to bend him to his will.

But all such suppositions are entirely unnecessary. We need not hold that there was any visible appearance whatever. Satan could have communicated his suggestions to Jesus as he does to all others without personal manifestation. That he did so, seems, in fact, necessary, if we are to get the comfort we should from that declaration of the Scripture which assures us that Christ was tempted in all points like as are we. Indeed, the whole story of the temptation must be interpreted as the record, not of visible and corporeal facts alone, but of facts which are largely spiritual—facts which, while profoundly real and objective, fall, in part, outside of the realm of the ordinary sense life. It is evident that the account of the experience upon the high mountain can not be taken as absolutely literal. We may also believe there was no actual transference of the body of Christ to the pinnacle of the temple. The whole conflict, while real and personal, was profoundly spiritual. Satan presented to Christ, in such manner as if they were standing together upon an exceeding high mountain, the kingdoms of this world and their glory. In imagination—an imagination so preternaturally excited, that the suggestion of the adversary became as real as it could have been had it been translated into

* *Vide* "Par. Reg." "But now an aged man, etc." I. 315. † "Life of Christ," vol. II, pp. 58 et seq.

physical facts,—our Lord stood upon the “Stoa Basilike” of that glorious edifice which adorned the holy hill of Zion, and looked into the dizzy depths beneath.

A great modern preacher, speaking of the prophet mind, says, “The prophet mind, in its highest moods, hung in a trance between the real physical life and the equally real spiritual state. Not ideas, but pictures were before it. The relations of time and space seemed to disappear. The prophet, though stationary, seemed to himself to be ubiquitous. He was borne to distant nations, made the circuit of kingdoms, held high conference with monarchs, saw the events of empires disclosed as in a glass. His own body often became unconscious. He lost ordinary sight of the physical world. He saw visions of the spirit-land. Angels conversed with him. The throne of God blazed full upon his dazzled eyes.”*

Such we conceive to have been the state of Christ’s mind in the wilderness. “Like the prophets of earlier days, Jesus fasted long, and shutting out external scenes, except such as belonged to the most solitary phases of nature, he rose at length to the vision state.” The Gospel record is a record of facts, because, in the very best sense of the word, the experience was composed of facts. These were, however, spiritual as well as material. Christ was carried away to a high mountain, not in the body, but in the spirit. In spirit he stood upon the pinnacle of the temple. Thus, and thus only, is the great temptation of the wilderness part and parcel of the general estate of temptation to which humanity has fallen heir, and Christ become the real captain of the struggling hosts of all time.

One other question now confronts us—the most important and difficult, doubtless, of all the questions which group themselves about this most august event. How, it is asked, could Jesus be tempted at all? Temptation seems to imply the presence of some germs of evil inclination in the heart to which appeal can be made. From a perfectly sinless

* Beecher’s “Life of Christ,” vol. I, pp. 121.

nature, it is claimed, every evil suggestion must fall off as the rain-drops roll from the polished rock. Either, therefore, the temptation of Jesus could not have been a real temptation, such as men feel whose hearts are full of slumbering propensities to evil; or, if real, casts doubt upon that purity which is absolutely essential to his atoning work, and which he himself claimed to have been without the slightest blemish or taint.

Now, with regard to this matter, it would be sufficient to say that a full and satisfactory explanation of the possibility of our Lord's being tempted is not at all necessary to a rational and implicit acceptance of the fact. We know that our Lord was sinless, not only from his claims, but from his entire life and the testimony of both friends and foes. We know that he was tempted, not only because the Scriptures so assures us, but because his profound sympathy with tempted souls and his power over the Satanic world, give us unequivocal demonstration that he knew the full meaning both of struggle with and victory over the prince of evil. We may, therefore, lay these two facts side by side, and charge any apparent lack of harmony between them, not to them, or the book which reveals them, but to our own ignorance. Christ was tempted, and Christ was sinless. We may gratefully and confidently accept both these truths, and leave their full explanation and adjustment to that clearer day when we shall no longer look through a glass darkly, but know as we are known.

It deserves to be said, moreover, that to those who have thought most deeply upon this subject the difficulty seems by no means insuperable. Ullmann, who has studied and written of the inner life of our Lord more clearly and profoundly, perhaps, than any other man, says in his "Sinlessness of Jesus," "The presentation of evil, through the understanding and imagination, only implies sin when the thought or image rises from within ourselves. And, in case the thought or image is suggested from without, we are chargeable with sin only if we dwell thereon with approval;

for then our moral judgment begins to be darkened, and an inclination towards evil to be felt."* With Christ, however, the temptation did come from without, and was not dwelt upon with the slightest approval. While really tempted, then, he was yet without sin. As to the reality of the temptation, Canon Farrar does not hesitate to say, "Christ was liable to temptation all the sorer, because it came like agony to a nature infinitely strong, yet infinitely pure. In proportion, as any one has striven to be all his life like his great exemplar, in that same proportion will he realize the intensity of the struggle, the anguish of the antipathy, which pervade a noble nature when it has been dragged into even apparent proximity to the possibilities of evil. It must be a weak or perverted intellect which imagines that man becomes acquainted with temptation only as he is defiled with it, or that is unable to discriminate between the severity of a powerful temptation and the stain of a guilty thought."†

It should also be taken into consideration that the same difficulty which men urge against the reality of the temptation of the second Adam applies with equal force to the temptation of the first Adam. Coming as they did, directly from the hands of an all holy Creator, our first parents must have been perfectly free from all inclination or propensities to sin. That, however, temptation was to them real and possible, we know, not merely from the Scripture record of the fall, but also and especially from the sad history of the sin-cursed race of which they are the head. Even to a sinless being, therefore, temptation must be a power and yielding a possibility. For aught we know, exposure to the contingency of falling may be a necessary element of finiteness, and struggle against this contingency a necessary experience for every human and angelic spirit. While Christ was sinless he met the great adversary as a man. There is not the slightest indication in the Scripture

* "Sinlessness of Jesus," pp. 161, 162. † "Life of Christ," vol. I, pp. 124-126.

narrative of the interposition of the divine nature. As the second Adam, therefore, temptation was just as real, and falling just as possible for him as for the first Adam. Nay, since he received his human nature, centuries after evil entered the world, his susceptibilities may have been infinitely increased, and resistance and victory maintained and secured at the expense of a suffering of which we can have only the faintest idea.

The question of the possibility of our Lord's enduring a real temptation, and of preserving through this his perfect sinlessness, need not, therefore, give us trouble. We may be sure, on the one side, that we have one "who can be touched with the feeling of our infirmities," and give us a real sympathy and victory in our struggles, because he was tempted in all points like ourselves; and, on the other side, that we have also one who is "holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners," and who on this account is able, through the perfect sacrifice he offered, to save to the uttermost all who come to God by him.

We come now to the discussion of the temptation itself in the threefold form in which we find it in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. I shall follow the order in Matthew rather than that in Luke, not because I believe there is anything essential in the order itself, but because Matthew seems best to culminate the attacks of the great adversary, putting that last which must appear to most minds to have had the greatest power over our Lord's heart or will.

The forty days are now concluded. These forty days, as has already been said, were all days of trial. They may have been, as one has suggested, "the private struggles and personal probation of our Lord; and it is probable that the experiences with which they were filled were either incommunicable or not for human ears." These forty days have, however, passed, and have left Jesus weak with fasting, hungry in body for food, and hungry too, perhaps, in spirit to begin his work.

Two conditions made him peculiarly susceptible to the

attacks of the adversary—solitude and physical prostration. For, if solitude has its advantages, it has also its dangers. Solitude throws men upon their own unaided virtue, and compels them to endure struggle without support. The lonely situation in which our Lord was placed was precisely the one in which the devil, in all ages, has won his greatest triumphs. And then, added to solitude, was physical prostration. Perhaps at no time is temptation more to be dreaded than when it comes to men isolated from their fellow-men, and with their physical force at its lowest ebb.

Amid all the dangers arising from hunger and loneliness does Jesus, then, stand to meet the final assaults of the prince of evil. Out of the kingdom of darkness sweeps over this unaided and exhausted man the mighty force of Satanic temptation. Upon him, when least prepared and weakest in power of resistance, the arch enemy of souls, with power strengthened and cunning sharpened by centuries of experience, leaps to do his deadly work. Did we not know the issue beforehand we might well tremble for the result.

The first temptation, as is natural, was founded on the Savior's hunger. "If thou be the Son of God," says the tempter, "command that these stones be made loaves of bread." The suggestion couched in these words looks towards mistrust of God. There are in this temptation two elements, an appeal to the bodily appetites and an attempt to induce Christ to change or lower the plan of his Messianic work. Christ was hungry. The lower nature was clamoring with a loud voice for satisfaction. Attend to this, urges Satan. The wants of the body are as real as those of the soul. If you are the Son of God you ought not to be hungry. Come down, then, from your high plane of celestial food and trust in God, and command for your own comfort and relief that these stones be made loaves of bread.

In this aspect of the case the temptation was real and strong. Every-where men are yielding to precisely similar temptation, forgetting God and their souls in the satisfac-

tion of their lower natures. Every-where, especially in poverty and hunger, do men feel that they have a right to bread and are entitled to use, in order to procure this, whatever power or force they may happen to possess or are able to seize. Alas, how many have yielded to the clamor of the senses. How few have been content to dwell in loneliness and hunger, that they might find companionship and nutriment in God.

The main force of this temptation lies, however, in its other phase. There is here a suggestion to lower the whole scope of the Messianic work. You profess, says the tempter, to be the Son of God; you claim to have come to transform the world; your experience of want and hunger here in the desert has shown you the real needs of men. If, then, you are going to help men, help them where they require help most. Begin your transformation of the world by turning stones to bread. Bid poverty disappear; let hunger be unknown; fill all the lands with plenty; be the Messiah of comfort and wealth. Unless you do so help men you are not the Son of God.

In other words, the demand of Satan was the demand which all ages have made of Christianity, the demand which in our age a materialistic science is every-where so loudly bawling. Let Christianity prove itself divine says, this modern Diabolus, by its power and willingness, to improve the material conditions of men. Let it occupy itself in giving bread to the poor, in abolishing tenement houses, in refining the home, in seeking to wrap the race in an atmosphere of commercial and political prosperity and good cheer. Only as it does this, and quits bidding men look away to a far off God and heaven, will we accept it as divine.

And this suggestion of the adversary must have fallen with great force upon our Lord's mind. He had come to help men. Why not begin by relieving his own and their physical necessities? All his life long he had been surrounded with poverty and suffering. Why not exercise his power as the Messiah to abolish these from the face of

the earth? But if he had yielded it is evident the whole scope of his mission must have been changed. The soul he came to relieve of its weight of sin would have remained in bondage and ruin. Grand as the civilizing work would have been, those larger and broader realms in human life, the mind and the spirit, would have been untouched. So Jesus does not hesitate. "It is written," he said to the tempter, "man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God." Bread is good, but obedience to God is better. My work lies in other fields than the provision of material food. As Son of God I have come not alone to relieve the physical needs of men, but pre-eminently to save their souls. What men themselves require is not so much material prosperity as a higher spiritual life—such a life as they can secure only by taking into their hearts the words of God. This higher bread I have come to give. Upon this will I myself feed, and go on with my ordained work, trusting in God.

Foiled in the first temptation, Satan rapidly proceeds to the second. Since he can not induce Christ to yield to under-trust in God, he passes to precisely the opposite pole, and seeks to tempt him to over-trust or presumption. Taking our Lord to a pinnacle of the temple directly in the midst of the expectant Jewish people among whom he is to preach and toil, Satan says, "If thou be the Son of God cast thyself down; for it is written, he shall give his angels charge concerning thee; and in their hands they shall bear thee up, lest at any time thou dash thy foot against a stone." This was as much as to say, "If you are the Messiah give proof of this to the people. Leap among them from God's own dwelling-place. That God, in whom you appear so implicitly to trust, will assuredly protect and sanction you in giving the world you have come to redeem such proof of your divine commission. Perform some such miracle as this; make such display of your power, and you must not only be approved of God but be surrounded, from the very start, with a great host of believing souls."

Surely this must have been a severe temptation to our Lord. He had come to win men to himself. How easy to secure their confidence by appealing to their love of the marvelous. Were he to leap from the pinnacle of the temple how many would throng about and welcome him, and what a mighty host he would gather at once to his side to unite with him in the subjugation and salvation of the race. Certainly, as Son of God, he might venture to presume thus far upon the Heavenly Father. If the end ever can justify the means here was the occasion. Alas, how many thousands, under similar circumstances, have listened to the voice of the tempter and, presuming upon divine favor or mercy, have stepped outside the will and ways of God.

But Christ knew that his life was to be one of humiliation. He knew that God's way of redeeming men was the hard way of isolation and self-denial, and that in this he had come to walk. He will not, therefore, presume upon God, or attempt to change the divine plan. Had he done so, of course, the whole scheme of salvation must have failed. The Messiah, whom the marvel-expecting Jews would have received from the pinnacle of the temple, could not have been the Messiah of Gethsemane and Calvary, and the devil's reign over the race must have remained unbroken. So our Lord calmly replies to this temptation, "It is also written, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." I will not presume to take any other way than God's way, neither will I venture to try his forbearance. To save men by poverty and humiliation and the cross is my appointed mission, and to this will I cling.

And now comes the third temptation, the climax and culmination of the forty days' trial of our Lord. Caught up in the spirit, and placed upon the summit of an exceeding high mountain, the devil shows him all the kingdoms of this world and their glory, and disdaining all disguises, says, "All these will I give thee if thou wilt fall down and worship me."

Whether Satan had any rights in this fair world which he could thus have transferred to Christ is questionable; but surely the vision thus given our Lord must have been one of intensest power. Jesus was a man like other men; with susceptibilities as strong and desires as great. We may believe, therefore, that on the lower side of his nature this offer of universal sovereignty was most keenly felt. Certain it is that much smaller offers have usually been found sufficient to overcome the virtue of men. "There are some that will say," observes good old Bishop Andrews, "that we are never tempted with kingdoms. It may well be, for it needs not be, when less will serve. Satan need never carry us as high as the mount. Let him but carry us to the leads and gutters of our own houses; nay, let us but stand in our windows or our doors, if he will give us as much as we can there see, he will tempt us thoroughly; we will accept it, and thank him too. A matter of half a crown or ten groats or a pair of shoes or some such trifle will bring us on our knees to the devil." But if this be so among men why may not the Son of man; pure and heavenly though he was, have felt an awful unrest of spirit when the shining and mighty kingdoms of the whole world were laid at his feet?

But there was also, in this temptation, a still stronger appeal to Christ's higher nature. Below him, as he stands upon the mountain-top, lies the earth he came to redeem. Countless multitudes of human souls are running to and fro, gathered here in majestic cities, and scattered yonder over plain and sea. How Christ must have felt these myriads calling him to come to their relief. How his heart must have been stirred with profoundest and all-consuming desire to change the false glory of the kingdoms of earth to the real glory of the kingdom of Heaven. "All the motives of compassion, love, and holy zeal must have impelled him to hasten to leave no means untried, but at any cost to make himself, forthwith, master of the world."

The offer of Satan must, therefore, have carried with it

great enticing power to the Savior's mind. By recognizing Satan's presence, bowing to his requirements, and employing his methods, he may much more quickly conquer and rescue men. In all ages men have felt the power of this seducing suggestion, and have been tempted to do evil that good might come. Some of the best of men have thought it right and expedient to attempt to forward the kingdom of truth by the sword and inquisition, or the use of means which seemed adapted to secure the favor of an ungodly world. It is this conscious or unconscious bowing of the knee to Satan which has led to the union of Church and State, the employment of the civil power in spiritual concerns, and the adaptation of innumerable short cuts towards religious prosperity. Christ's own people have too often been found willing to nod to the devil, and accept the favors he has had to bestow.

But Jesus knew that to yield to Satan's solicitations would be to bow the knee to unrighteousness. Had Satan been able to fulfill his promise, Christ must have bartered away his heavenly kingdom for a dominion which would have been only earthly and perishing. This would have implied everlasting ruin for the race, and an utter defeat of the true Messianic plan. Accordingly, Christ at once rejects the Satanic suggestion. He will not at all recognize evil, or do evil that good may come. The appeal to ambition, or the use of Satanic means, like the appeal to mistrust and presumption, utterly failed to find the least lodgment in his heart. His wrath flowed out against the tempter. Since the devil had declared himself, he spoke to him sternly and directly. "Get thee behind me, Satan, for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve."

"He said, and stood.

But Satan, smitten by amazement, fell;
And to his crew that sat consulting brought
Joyless triumphals of his hoped success—
Ruin and desperation and dismay."*

* "Par. Reg." Book IV, 482, et seq.

Such was the threefold temptation of Jesus. These were, however, not the only nor the last struggles with the great adversary through which he had to pass. When they were ended, Luke tells us, Satan departed from him for a season.*

This evidently implies that he did not entirely give up the contest. All along the Savior's career, we may believe, he was watching his chances and plying his solicitations. There is not a chord in the whole gamut of temptation the siren music of which Christ was not compelled to hear. At the very last, when the cross reared itself directly before him, and the anguish of atoning suffering deepened towards death, the arch-enemy came once more upon him with all his powers. The few hours our Lord spent in the garden the evening before the crucifixion were filled with the concentrations of hellish fury. Not until the cry, "It is finished," rang from the Savior's dying lips, not until the spear of the Roman soldier was thrust into his pulseless side did the enemy of God and souls leave him to rest and peace. In the entire life, however, Christ was more than conqueror. The work he came to do was carried to its perfect end—the kingdom of evil was broken—a new race center was established, and our Lord became, to all who put their trust in him, the author of our eternal salvation.

The practical lessons growing out of this discussion are very numerous. It does not fall within the present purpose, however, to dwell upon these at length. We may merely designate a few of the most prominent.

1. The fact that Jesus, the representative and ideal man, was tempted, shows that temptation is a common and perhaps necessary human experience.

2. The threefold temptation of our Lord gives us the sphere of ordinary Satanic enticement, and discloses to us the method and aim of Satanic approach.

3. The successful endurance and resistance of temptation, on the part of Jesus, without the interposition of his divine nature, and, purely as a man, secures for us a sym-

* Luke iv, 13.

pathy which is all the heart can ask, and an assurance of complete final victory both for the individual and the world.

4. The methods employed by our Lord in his temptation are the best that can be used in resisting the prince of evils. With the spirit Jesus manifested in our hearts, and the Word of God in our hands, we may defy the adversary.

5. The conquest of Satan in the wilderness is a prophecy of his final overthrow. His kingdom is now broken, and in God's good time will utterly disappear.

ARTICLE VII.

A REVIEW OF FORD'S BAPTISMAL STUDIES.*

BY REV. J. COLVER WIGHTMAN.

THE Bible is the nominal text-book of Christendom. To it all denominations of Christians appeal for a vindication of their creeds and practices. Among them all it is acknowledged to be an authority. By some, its jurisdiction in morals and religion is claimed to be universal, supreme, infallible, and final. On the baptismal question the testimony of Scripture, like the oath for confirmation, must be to the disputants "an end of all strife."

At this time the Bible is under the quizzing-glasses of a generation curious to know what it teaches, if not devout enough to do what it requires. The translation of the Scriptures is undergoing revision. This movement is the crest-wave of the religious thought of our age. Its profound agitation has brought baptism into the foreground of renewed discussion; for it is universally agreed that baptism is taught in the New Testament. The just translation of the terms by which it is described depends upon the nature of the rite which is to be administered. Hence arises a renewal of the war of conflicting opinions. We hear the din of battle in newspapers, pamphlets, periodicals, and in books. At the present time there is unusual activity along the denominational skirmish lines, in the field works, and in the fortresses of the combatants. Professor Conant's "Baptizein" jarred the whole Pedobaptist world. There would have been neither Dale, nor Hutchins, nor Heaton, nor Jewett, nor Stearns, if there had not been first Thomas J. Conant. The revision movement has a quaking tremu-

*Studies on the Baptismal Question. By David B. Ford, Hanover, Massachusetts. H. A. Young & Co., 13 Bromfield Street, Boston; Ward & Drummond, 116 Nassau Street, New York.

lousness which is destined to shake down every baseless fabrication in religion, that those things which can not be shaken may abide.

On the baptismal question much has already been said and written, but the case is still on the docket. James W. Dale, D. D., a Presbyterian clergyman of Pennsylvania, the present prominent advocate for sprinkling, has recently brought before the court of an indulgent public four "ponderous volumes" of argumentation. His books, in the aggregate contain over eighteen hundred octavo pages. It is the bulkiest work on this phase of the controversy which has made its appearance in the present generation, and seems to be a kind of saurian monster of a former period, such as the geologists tell of, which we dare to look upon only because we know that dead creatures will not bite.

To the above voluminous disquisition "Studies on the Baptismal Question," by Rev. David B. Ford, of Massachusetts, is an indirect reply. Mr. Ford's volume opens with a few thrusts at the Dalistic theory of baptism, and subsequently by occasional encounter exposes its chief fallacies; but it manifestly did not enter into the author's plan to follow Dr. Dale through all the extraordinary evolutions of his hermeneutical strategy. The chapter-headings of Mr. Ford's volume show at a glance that it is not primarily a review of another work, but is an independent treatise, whose aim is to vanquish all opponents by establishing positive truth. It is an instructive compend on the subject of baptism. Two leading topics are compassed by the discussion: first, What is the proper rite of Christian baptism; second, Who are the fit subjects? The strategic points which the writer assumes are those which Baptists have held ever since the days of the apostles. Hence the views presented are not so novel and various as those presented by the recent advocates of pedobaptism, and the book can not boast of a certain unenviable originality which characterizes the author of "Classic, Judaic, Johannic, Christic, and Patristic Baptism." The argument of the writer does not take

the shape of an advocate's plea, so much as it does that of a scholar's investigation. As a production abreast of current literature, it abounds in brief citations and references to contemporaneous authors. More than five hundred names of persons and works are cited in the volume. The most of these are exact; the page, full name of the author, and chapter or paragraph of the work referred to are incorporated into the text, so that they can be readily re-examined. The insertion of figures after the names in the index to denote the pages where they occur in the volume, as the *Congregationalist*, of Boston, suggested, would have been an improvement which some readers and reviewers would appreciate. The work contains thirty-two chapters. The style is pure and perspicuous. In regard to its literary characteristics we quote a few sentences from several Pedobaptist journals.

The *Congregationalist*, of Boston, in the issue of August 13th, says:

"One characteristic of the discussion is its freshness in the matter of literature, the periodical press, weekly and quarterly being referred to often, showing that its author is familiar with the latest phases of the unending debate, and that he has not failed to examine what writers in general have had to say in regard to it."

The *Southwestern Presbyterian* of August 7th, says:

"This is a handsome octavo of four hundred and sixteen pages. A portion of it appeared in the columns of the *Watchman*, where the pleasing style of the author secured for it many readers."

The *Methodist* of New York, July 26th, says:

"The author has preserved in the book the popular style adapted to the wants of most laymen."

The *Pittsburg Christian Advocate* praises its candor and catholicity:

"We commend this work as able, frank, and as pervaded by the spirit of fairness."

The *Christian World*, of Ohio, an organ of the Dutch Reformed Church, expresses its high appreciation as follows:

"It is, doubtless, the ablest, as well as the most thorough, book on the Baptist side."

The notices which it has received from the English press are no less commendatory.

OUTLINE OF ITS ARGUMENT.

The first five chapters of the "Studies" are devoted to a statement and differentiation of the author's position. But this is not done in a dry and abstract way, but is horizoned with the lights and shadows of a deep perspective, in which are outlined the most prominent irregularities of modern thought on the subject—its jutting prejudices and winding vagaries, its proud assumptions and cloudy perturbations, its sunny peaks and misty dales. The definition of Dr. Dale is accepted as substantially correct and claimed to be essentially Baptistic. That there may be no mistake the definition is given in the very words of the Pedobaptist champion, and with his characteristic reiteration in various forms. Thus, near the end of his fourth volume, page five hundred and fifty-seven, he says: "An object *wholly within water*, without limitation of mode in effecting such condition or of time in abiding in such condition, has been insisted upon throughout this inquiry as a physical baptism." (Quoted in "Studies on Baptism," page seven.) Again he says, "This word (*βαπτίζω*) primarily makes demand for the intusposition of its object within a fluid element by any competent act, moving indifferently the object or the element, without limitation of time as to continuance in such intusposition." (Quoted in "Studies on Baptism," page seven.) "Its import is vitally dependent upon and governed by the idea of intusposition within a closely investing element." (Quoted, "Studies on Baptism," page eight.) "The demand of *baptizo* is for intusposition." (Page eight.)

The first discrimination in definition which Mr. Ford makes is to show that baptism is not a purifying. This is manifest from the regimen of the word which describes it, and from the fact that, "in accordance with classical usage, one can baptize a thing in a permeable solid as well as in

a liquid, or can baptize in filth and pollution as well as in pure water."

The Dalistic theory insists that "Immersion in water deprives of life any human being." It becomes necessary, therefore, to show that baptism, though an entire immersion of the body in water, "kills nobody." Accordingly, examples of persons who underwent physical immersion, and yet were not thereby drowned, are cited from Greek writers. "Aristobulus, Herod's brother-in-law, had to undergo repeated baptisms, performed on him as if in sport by the king's hired assassins, before he was finally suffocated." Hippocrates says of a patient, "She breathed as persons breathe after having been immersed." Naaman, the Syrian, "went down and dipped himself seven times in the Jordan, according to the saying of the man of God," yet he was not thereby drowned. The effect, on the other hand, was most salutary. Numerous other instances are cited from Prof. Conant's *Baptiscin*, a well-filled magazine of examples.

"Studies on Baptism" insists that baptism is "more than a wetting." A partial wetting "will answer neither for the literal nor figurative classical baptisms." An entire submersion, or "a complete covering in water, is demanded by the language in which baptism is described by the Christian fathers." Augustine says, "We immersed three times your heads in the sacred font." Chrysostom says, "We sank our heads down in the water as in a kind of tomb." Basil says, "The bodies of those who are baptized are, in a manner, buried in the water." Gregory, of Nyssa, says, "We hide ourselves in it (water) as the Savior hid himself in the earth." Cyril, of Jerusalem, says "that he who sinks down in the water, and is baptized, is surrounded on all sides by the waters."

Numerous examples are cited from classical authors, in which a distinction is drawn between wetting and baptism. Strabo tells of marsh-lakes, whose waters are so buoyant that "those who can not swim are not *immersed* (baptized),

floating like pieces of wood." Pindar speaks of a "cork above the fisher's net" as "not immersed (unbaptized)."

As representative of lexical authority Liddell and Scott is cited. The only primary definition of *baptizo* given in their sixth edition is "to *dip in*, or *under water*," from which all the figurative or secondary uses of the word are derived.

The testimony of Prof. Charles Anthon is also given. "The primary meaning of the word (baptizo) is to dip or immerse; and its secondary meanings, *if it ever had any*, all refer in some way or other to the same leading idea. Sprinkling, etc., are entirely out of the question." Instances of metaphorical use are—immersed or baptized in cares, evils, worldly affairs, troubles, taxes, poverty, affliction, grief, anger, opiate draught, insensibility, sleep, wickedness, wantonness, pollution, fornication, sins, and pleasure, which all are manifestly grounded in the idea of immersion.

In reference to Judaic baptisms, according to Meyer, the baptisms of cups, pots, and brazen vessels, "are to be understood of ablution by *immersion*." If this seems incredible to any one, let him note that in the last edition of Tischendorf's New Testament, and other critical authorities cited by Mr. Ford, the word for *couches* is omitted, as lacking requisite support from manuscripts. Philo and Josephus are the chief Greeco-Jewish writers outside of the New Testament. The former uses *baptizo* but twice, both tropically, of gluttony and of drunkenness. The latter uses it fifteen times; tropically of drunkenness, of a whelming to destruction some four times; and literally of a suicidal sword-plunging, of dipping hyssop once, of bodily immersion four times; and about one-half of the whole in language borrowed from shipwreck. Only one of them has ever been taken by any one to signify a purifying. That opinion was grounded on a blunder of translation, as is satisfactorily shown in Mr. Ford's chapter devoted to the examination of this passage.

The objection which is urged against immersion, in behalf of Judith's modesty, is shown to be inconclusive. The

demand for a generous supply of water looks towards immersion. The special order of the Assyrian general-in-chief to the guards, "not to hinder her," and the final outcome of the story prove that, whether inside or outside the camp, she was mistress of the situation, and therefore needed "not to expose herself to the gaze of the soldiers, even if they were there, and it were light enough for them to see."

The assumptions of affusionists and sprinklers, that *baptizo* means "to make drunk," "to purify," "to drown," or "any application of water" you please, except immerse, are simply ridiculous. There is a method of argumentation so far-fetched and puerile that it seems to burlesque the view which it professes to advocate. Dr. Dale's work is shown to abound in arguments of this kind. This feature of his work may be seen in the "Studies," as in a mirror. Apt quotations sometimes set him in a comic attitude in the presence of the reader. He is allowed to speak for himself several times in the chapter on "Intoxicating Baptism." Some of his extraordinary statements are left without comment to their own natural reaction upon the elasticity of ordinary common sense. It ought, therefore, to be regretted by Baptists that Dr. Dale did not adapt his work to a wider circulation by making it less costly and cumbersome.

Several chapters in the "Studies," etc., are devoted to the examination of the use of the prepositions in the descriptions of baptism which the New Testament contains. There is nothing more admirable than the scholarly equanimity of the author in dealing with the unscholarly twaddle of the Dalistic school of interpreters in their treatment of Greek prepositions.

The following chapter-headings in the "Studies" suggest of themselves the trend of the author's argument: the "Baptism of the three thousand at Pentecost," the "Baptism of the Eunuch," and "Baptismal burial."

The old objections against immersion, based on assumptions of lack of water, want of time and poverty of wardrobe are answered. History repeats itself. "Other three

thousands since the Apostles' time have been immersed in one day." At the fountain in the north of England, called the "Ladies' Well," "Paulinus, the bishop, baptized three thousand Northumbrians. Easter, DCXXII."

In A. D. 496 Remigius, bishop of Rheims, baptized Clovis and "more than three thousand of his army." On Easter night, April 16, A. D. 400, at Constantinople, in Chrysostom's Church, amid peculiar hostile disturbances, there were thrice immersed, with all the manifold attendant ceremonies which characterized the ritualistic tastes of that period, about three thousand persons.

Three chapters are devoted to the examination of the arguments in favor of infant and household baptism. The concessions of the most scholarly men in all denominations of Christians, that babe baptism can claim no express precept or example from the Scriptures, are abundant.

"All traces of child-baptism which one will find in the New Testament must first be put into it." (Schleiermacher's *Christian Faith*, vol. ii, p. 283.)

"We have not, in fact, a single sure proof-text for the baptism of children in the apostolic age." (Olshausen on Acts xvi, 15.)

"Whether infants were baptized in the apostolic age . . . is a controverted question, on which the New Testament writings furnish no direct information. The mention of the baptism of households is not entirely conclusive, since we are not certain that infant children were contained in them." *The Beginnings of Christianity*, p. 565, by George P. Fisher, D. D., Prof. of Ecclesiastical History, Yale College.)

The inferential proofs on which this pious superstition rests are inadequate and flimsy. The oft-cited text, "Suffer the little children to come unto me" (Matt. xix, 13), affords no warrant for babe-baptism, because Jesus himself never baptized any one (John iv, 2); and because, if the disciples had ever been taught to baptize children, they would not have rebuked those who brought them for that purpose.

Peter's utterance on the day of Pentecost, viz., "The promise is to you and to your children" (Acts ii, 39), though often urged in support of babe-baptism, is really subversive of the possibility of such an institution; because there is only one way of salvation. If parents are saved through

penitence and faith, the same way, and no other, is open to their "children, and to all that are afar off," *i. e.*, the whole Gentile world.

A false inference, in favor of pedobaptism, is sometimes drawn from the language of Paul in 1 Cor. vii, 14. It really proves directly the reverse, as Meyer shows in his commentary. Infant baptism at that time did not exist in the Church, "because the holiness of the children of Christians would then have had *another* ground."

No Scriptural authority for infant-baptism is to be derived from the covenants which God made with Abraham, because it is impossible to say on which one of the *three* Abrahamic covenants it rests; because neither of them pledges the spiritual salvation of those to whom it was given; because circumcision was a fleshly ordinance, which denoted neither piety nor morality in its recipients; and because even the seed of believers must become actually partakers of the faith of Abraham through spiritual birth before they can be called the sons of Abraham, and thus entitled to the seal of the Christian covenant. The tendency of the practice of babe-baptism is mischievous. It encourages false security in impenitent men, and thereby jeopardizes the eternal salvation of vast multitudes; in proportion as it prevails, it "annihilates the only baptism appointed by Christ's commission," and theoretically subverts the central doctrine of the Gospel—justification through personal faith in Christ, and in no other way. The "hesitating, mincing, half-hearted declarations" with which it is enforced in some Protestant ecclesiastical standards of confession and the ambiguous ways with which it is treated in others are indicative of shallow convictions on the part of those who profess to believe that the Lord "alloweth this charitable work." It is subversive of personal liberty, in so far as any regard is cherished for it, in that it prevents those who were subjected in infancy to this ceremony, from "*being baptized upon a deliberate profession of their faith.*"

The chapter on "Baptismal Monuments of the Early

Church" is a noble sheaf from a rich field. The "vast baptisteries" which have been discovered in various parts of Europe are witnesses whose testimony can not be impeached. Their size and capacity is conclusive evidence of the purpose for which they were constructed and used. The baptistery of Constantine, near the church of St. John Lateran, at Rome, measures about twenty-five feet in longest diameter, and though it had a false wooden floor in the bottom, "its depth was something over three feet." The large octangular basin in the baptistery at Verona is twenty-eight feet in circumference and four and a half feet deep. The font of Novara "is eight feet wide with a depth of four feet."

The picture-baptisms of the early Churches are arguments which address the eye. The oldest of these are in the catacombs of Rome, four in number. The one in the cemetery of St. Pontianus is carefully described. The water-pool or basin is cut out of solid tufa and fed by a living spring. At present about two feet of the original length is covered by a stone platform discovered by Mr. Robert G. Hatfield. When built the font was six feet and a half in length, three and a third feet wide, and four feet deep. As a cut of this ancient baptistery forms the charming frontispiece to the book, we insert a description of it in the author's own words:

"Rising out of this pool, painted on the back wall, is a gemmed and floriated cross bearing on its arms two blazing lights above; while from the same arms are suspended the Greek letters Alpha and Omega, indicative of the eternal being of Christ. This jeweled, fruit bearing, blazing cross is evidently symbolical of the glory of Christ's redemption. Above the cross is the pictured baptism of Jesus. He is represented as standing in the river, entirely nude, and up to his waist in water. John stands as he is usually represented, on the river bank, nearly nude, with his right hand resting on the Savior's head. 'I was particular,' says Mr. Hatfield, 'to observe especially the position of the hand of John, which, it has been said, held something from which water was poured on the head of Christ. The hand, with the palm downwards, rests upon the head of the Savior, and of it only the thumb and forefinger are seen; the thumb in contact with the forehead extends to a point just over the nose, while the forefinger reaches to a point above the right eye. There is no cup to be seen.' On

the opposite bank is an angel holding, perhaps, the Savior's robe and a tablet, inscribed with Hebrew letters, which are supposed by some to designate God the Father. . . . It was a frequent saying among the patrists, 'Go to the Jordan and you will see the Trinity.' And so, here the Holy Spirit is represented as a dove alighting on the head of the Redeemer. A nimbus or circle of glory surrounds the heads of these three personages. On the shore below is a hart 'panting after the water brooks.'"

Descriptions are also given of the pictured baptism of a youth in the cemetery of St. Pretextatus, and of a fresco baptism in the cemetery of St. Lucina, and another in the cemetery of St. Callistus:

"We venture to say that, in all the baptismal pictures of ancient Christianity there is not one single instance of mere hand pouring." "Not until the twelfth or thirteenth century do we find evidence of supplementing a partial immersion by affusion in order to avoid all perils of the young infant's life."

We have not space to outline the thought in the closing chapters of this book. The chapter on "Infant Baptism in the Early Church" is careful, critical, and rich in pertinent citations. The one on "Baptismal Regeneration" we consider, on the whole, the least satisfactory of all in the book, and this not because we differ from the author in his main conclusion, but because we dissent from him in the interpretation of the phrase "born of water," which gives shape to his argument.

In conclusion, we wish to express the opinion that the author of "Studies on Baptism" has taken very few positions from which he will be forced to retire, and has said very little which either he or his friends will ever wish to have been unsaid. The book which he has written is one which well bears re-reading and improves upon acquaintance. That it should completely cover the whole field of a many-sided controversy, in which the resolute combatants whom he assails retire from their old works, take new positions and form strange alliances with former foes, is too much to demand.

As a volume, "Studies on the Baptismal Question" is all that its title implies and more. It merits the compliment which it received from Rev. Barnas Sears, D. D., pub-

lished in the *Watchman*, of Boston, September 11th, in which that illustrious scholar calls it "a thesaurus—a work of immense labor, of extensive research, and of sound learning."

The volume is to be commended for its candor, accuracy, and comprehensiveness. Its scope is broader than that of Dr. Dale's work; for that author's elaborate disquisition, of over eighteen hundred pages, is confined mainly to a single topic—the baptismal rite, or the meaning of a single Greek word! Mr. Ford's book treats both of the rite of baptism, and of the candidates to whom it may fitly be administered. The arguments which are presented are substantial, resting firmly on linguistic, literary, Biblical, and monumental evidences.

The Appendix is a valuable addition, or more fitly, a becoming complement to the volume. It is well filled with archæological gems whose worth and beauty will be appreciated by all scholarly readers.

As a review of Dr. Dale's "Inquiry into the Usage of *Baptizo*," this single volume is not, and could not reasonably be expected to be exhaustive. Had the author seen fit to extend his "Studies" so as to embrace Dr. Dale's peregrinations into Quakerism, the last retreat of the Dalistic theory would have been demolished. In manifold details he quietly refutes his antagonist at all the points where the paths of their discourse chance to intersect each other; but he does not undermine that side of the Dalistic theory which stands on Quaker ground. The underlying assumption of Dr. Dale's argument is that the baptism which the New Testament enjoins is not physical baptism. Hence his distinction between "a baptism primary" and "a baptism secondary," and his elaborate attempt to establish his theory of "controlling influence." At the close of his last volume, Dr. Dale having laboriously spelled out his theory, at last audibly pronounces what we understand to be the Quaker view of baptism. He defines the baptism which the Scriptures enjoin to be just what we understand by regeneration or being born again. His words are, "The baptism

of inspiration is a thoroughly changed, spiritual condition of the soul, effected by the power of the Holy Ghost, through the cleansing blood of the Lord Jesus Christ, and so making it meet for reconciliation, subjection, and assimilation to the one fully revealed, living, and true God—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.” To the Quakerism of this Presbyterian divine our author’s reply is very brief, thus—“He has labored through some eighteen hundred octavo pages to show the world that *the only way to get rid of baptism as immersion is to abolish the baptismal rite altogether.*”

The statement that baptism is “a thoroughly changed spiritual condition of the soul” rests on the assumption that the baptism which the New Testament enjoins is not physical, but spiritual. On the contrary, the whole truth may be expressed in the following categorical proposition. *The only baptism which the New Testament enjoins and makes obligatory on men is physical baptism.* This proposition does not affirm that there are no other duties enjoined in the New Testament which properly precede or follow baptism, but that baptism itself is a physical act, and not a spiritual operation; though voluntary, like other bodily acts, it is a physical rite, and does not radically change “the spiritual condition of the soul.”

In confirmation of this proposition, note the nature of several of the baptisms described in the New Testament. Mark says, in his Gospel, that “Jesus came from Nazareth of Galilee, and *was baptized* into (εἰς) the Jordan by John.” (Mark i, 9.) Was the spiritual condition of Jesus thoroughly changed by John? Did He who was holy from his birth, who knew no sin, in whom dwelt all the fullness of the godhead bodily, derive any spiritual profit from the baptism which he received? Here was a baptism, but certainly no “thoroughly changed spiritual condition of the soul.” In this representative case surely the baptism was simply physical.

Luke tells us that Simon the sorcerer was baptized (Acts viii, 13). But he as distinctly informs us that his spiritual

condition was not thereby changed, for "his heart was not right in the sight of God," but he was "in the gall of bitterness, and in the bond of iniquity." His baptism was administered under apostolic sanction, and therefore was not faultily administered. Simon was as veritably baptized as was the apostle Paul. In this case, also, we see the difference between spiritual regeneration and physical baptism.

Men are commanded to preach the Gospel, and to baptize those who believe it; but never are they commanded to change the hearts of men, or to baptize them in the Holy Spirit. It is the prerogative of God only to work "a thoroughly changed, spiritual condition of the soul." John did just what Christ's ministers may do, viz, "baptize in water;" but it is only the Mighty One who can baptize in the Holy Spirit. Hence the baptism which men are commanded to administer is not spiritual, but physical.

The distinction implied in the language of the New Testament between spiritual acts and baptism shows that baptism is not spiritual, but physical. "Repent, and be baptized, every one of you." (Acts ii, 38.) "He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved." (Mark xvi, 16.) "Then they who received his Word were baptized." (Acts ii, 41.) The expressions, "repent," "believe," etc., denote spiritual acts. They imply the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and consequently of every grace which is essential to the regenerate state, because salvation is promised to all who thus repent and believe the Gospel. Baptism, therefore, is not an essential part of regeneration. If baptism is not an essential part of regeneration, then it is no part, because regeneration is complete without it. Hence, baptism is not spiritual, but physical. If baptism were a thoroughly changed spiritual condition of the soul, what would be the sphere of repentance and faith?

That Paul accounted baptism subordinate to the preaching of the Gospel proves that he did not understand it to be "a thoroughly changed condition of the soul." He thanked God that he baptized none of the Corinthians but

Crispus and Gaius, and the household of Stephanus. This avowal is consistent with the idea that baptism is a bodily rite, but not with the novel claim that it radically affects the soul. From the above considerations it seems clear that the baptism enjoined in the New Testament is a physical rite, and nothing else.

Let us now examine more particularly Dr. Dale's definition of a physical baptism. It has already been quoted; but, in order to have it directly under the eye, we cite it again. "An object wholly within water, without limitation of mode in effecting such condition, or of time in abiding in such condition, has been insisted upon throughout this inquiry as a physical baptism."

We would not call attention to the grammatical incongruity between the subject and predicate of this proposition if it did not seem to shelter the logical fallacy which perambulates Dr. Dale's argument through four wearisome volumes. Besides this grammatical infelicity of statement, there is also obscurity arising from redundant limitation. Concealed within the folds of his restrictive qualifications probably lurks the ambiguity by which the venerable divine inadvertently imposed on himself as well as on his readers. Surely, is it not reasonable to expect to find in a work of that magnitude, written for the single purpose to tell what baptism is, one clear definition of it in intelligible English? If our dear mother tongue is inadequate to express in word or phrase what baptism is, it is something for scholars to appreciate to be told what it is in that nameless dialect to which "intusposition" belongs!

According to the definition just cited, what is it which has been "insisted upon as a physical baptism?" Is it the grammatical subject of the main proposition, namely, "an object?" It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of an object as a baptism. Perhaps the limitation by which the subject is qualified is to be more prominent in the mind than the subject itself. But it is incomprehensible to me how "an object *wholly within water*," can be "insisted

on as a physical baptism." The argument of the author leads one to query, whether he did not take in succession, and with varying emphasis, the thought in each of the several clauses of this definition, as his real definition of a physical baptism. When he emphasized the clause, without limitation of time in abiding in such condition," he reached the startling conclusion that drowning is inevitable. When he laid the chief emphasis on the clause "without limitation of mode in effecting such condition," the rite to be performed is indifferent or indeterminate. When the emphasis is on the clause "wholly within water," baptism is "intusposition." These hypotheses would account for the curious circumgyrations of the author's argumentation.

Perhaps the more obvious meaning of the definition is this: the putting of an object *wholly within water* is physical baptism. The other definitions which were quoted above in this article, harmonize with this interpretation. If this be the meaning, the phrases "without limitation of mode or of time," etc., do not add any essential modification to the proposition. For the sake of simplicity, then, we will consider it in its naked form. To bring it directly upon the subject which is under discussion, we may insert the words *human body* instead of the words "an object." This will not alter the logical sense of the proposition; for it can not be denied that the human body is a legitimate object to be baptized, if it is not thereby drowned. The proposition may be expressed thus: Physical baptism is the putting of the human body wholly within water. It has already been shown above that the only baptism which the New Testament enjoins upon men is physical baptism; therefore, the only baptism which the New Testament enjoins upon men is the putting of the human body wholly within water.

If we have correctly interpreted Dr. Dale's definition of physical baptism, the conclusion is inevitable; without the discomfort of a long argument, we are landed at once in the safe harbor of sound Baptist doctrine, that the only baptism which the New Testament requires is immersion.

LITERARY NOTES.

A Compendious and Complete Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament; with an English-Hebrew Index.* By BENJAMIN DAVIES, Ph. D., LL. D. *Carefully Revised, with a Concise Statement of the Principles of Hebrew Grammar, by* EDWARD C. MITCHELL, D. D. 8vo. Pp. 752.

In its mechanical make-up this is our ideal of a lexicon. Its size is convenient and the binding tasty. It remains open at any page without any of those appliances often so necessary in using books, but always troublesome and vexatious. The paper is excellent in quality, and the typography very clear and attractive. The Hebrew words are in large and bold type, and readily catch the eye. Its use will be attended with the least possible inconvenience and waste of time.

Dr. Davies's lexicon is based on the works of Gesenius and Fürst, but its definitions have been rewritten and condensed. It is not, however, a mere abridgment of their lexicons, for it is characterized by independent thought, original investigation, and careful treatment. The author has arranged "the irregular and harder forms of words" in their alphabetical order, under their respective roots. This is certainly an advantage over the usual plan—that of placing them by themselves at the end. Certain letters, notably **ג**, **נ**, **ו**, have been very fully treated, "to indicate and illustrate their affinities and interchanges, and also their formative uses, or their effect in word-building." Some improvements have been attempted "in the handling of roots and derivatives, and especially of those that seem to have more than three radical letters."

The latest results of comparative philology have been utilized to show "the relations and analogies between words in different forms and of various dialects and languages."

The present edition has been thoroughly revised and carefully collated with the standard authorities by Dr. Mitchell, "the result of which has been," as he says, "the correction of several hundred errors and the addition of nearly a hundred new words or forms." He claims also that it "will be found to contain over a thousand more Hebrew words or forms than appear in Tregelles's or Robinson's Gesenius, besides incorporating into the body of the work all the grammatical forms contained in Robinson's Analytical Appendix."

The English-Hebrew Index will be useful to those who wish to practice Hebrew composition.

The grammatical notes by Dr. Mitchell have been used by him for fifteen years in giving elementary instruction in Hebrew. They will be helpful in aiding beginners to take the first steps in learning the language.

In its present form, so convenient and attractive, so complete and accurate, this Hebrew Lexicon is decidedly the most serviceable one now accessible to American students.

* Andover, Mass.: Warren F. Draper.

A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures. By JOHN PETER LANGE, D. D. *Numbers*, by Dr. LANGE. *Translated by* Rev. S. F. LOWRIE, D. D., and Rev. A. GOSMAN, D. D. *Deuteronomy*, by Rev. F. W. J. SCHROEDER. *Translated by* Rev. A. GOSMAN, D. D.* Price, \$5.00.

The introductory matter of this volume is especially valuable. The date and authorship of Numbers and Deuteronomy are very fully and thoroughly and satisfactorily discussed. The present Mosaic controversy receives special attention. The objections against the generally received view are taken up *seriatim* and well answered. Dr. Gosman has added an appendix of thirty closely printed pages, in which he treats the subject with fullness and vigor. He discusses the present "state of the question, with some preliminary points upon which the parties at issue are agreed, the special objections urged against the Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy, the difficulties involved in the critical or evolutionary theory, and the positive proof of its Mosaic origin." He deals fairly with his opponents, carefully examines their reasoning, and reveals their weaknesses. His argument is very conclusive in favor, not only of the Mosaic origin of Deuteronomy, but also of the Pentateuch.

The introduction to Numbers is divided into seven sections, thus: The position and characteristic mark of Numbers; its origin and composition; its antiquity; the title of the book; division of the book; the army of God; difficulties presented in Numbers—(a) the difference between the two musters, (b) the proportion of the first-born to the number of males in the tribes, (c) the reduction of the number 603,550 in Ex. xxxviii, 26, to the same in Num. i, (d) the possibility of supporting life in the wilderness of Sinai, (e) the journey of the Israelites from Sinai to the Steppes of Moab, (f) the unity of the book of Numbers. Practical questions of great importance are carefully and, in the main, judiciously considered. Under the first head it is well said: "The fundamental thought of the book of Numbers is the march of the typical army of God at the sound of the silver trumpets, the signals for waging the wars of Jehovah until the firm founding of God's state, and the celebration of the festivals of victory and blessing of Jehovah in the land of promise."

The introduction to Deuteronomy is divided into nine sections, as follows: Its description according to its position and titles; the book viewed according to its own declarations; the most important hypotheses of the criticisms as to Deuteronomy, with reference to the entire Pentateuch; the anti-Mosaic argument and its refutation; the assumed origin of Deuteronomy considered in its literary and moral aspects; the Mosaic features and origin of Deuteronomy shown from its peculiar style and method; the manifold importance of Deuteronomy; its divisions and survey of its contents; and the theological and homiletical literature upon the book.

Deuteronomy is called the epilogue, as Genesis is the prologue, of the Pentateuch, and makes intelligible "the all-embracing goal or completion of the law" which has been previously announced. This commentary will be warmly welcomed by students of the Bible.

* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

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